





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MEMOIRS OF
FRANCESCO CRISPI






Photo: Giacomo Brogi. Firenze.

FRANCESCO CRISPI

1027.23.101

THE MEMOIRS
OF
FRANCESCO CRISPI

Translated by
MARY PRICHARD-AGNETTI
from the Documents
Collected and Edited by
THOMAS PALAMENGHI-CRISPI

VOLUME II
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

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CONTENTS

FOREIGN POLITICS, MEMOIRS, AND DOCUMENTS

CHAPTER I

A SECRET MISSION

	PAGE
A great Italy—The new kingdom—The foreign policy of the Right—Andrássy and Bismarck in 1873 are unsuccessful in concluding an <i>entente intime</i> with the ministers of the Right—Irridentists and the Italo-Austrian relations—The Turco-Russian war—French republican institutions in danger—Necessity for Italy to cast off inertia—The mission entrusted to Crispi by Victor Emmanuel and Minister Depretis at the end of August 1877—Crispi's memoirs and his correspondence with Victor Emmanuel and Depretis; conferences with Decazes, Gambetta, Thiers, Bismarck, Derby, Gladstone, Andrássy, and others—Crispi opens negotiations with Prince Bismarck for an Italo-German alliance, . . .	1

CHAPTER II

ITALY'S FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1878 TO THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

Count Corti refuses the proposal for a secret understanding with England on the eve of the Berlin Congress—How France obtained <i>carte blanche</i> for Tunis—The policy of isolation—Irridentist movement makes Austria threaten to cross frontier—Benedetto Cairoli's partiality to France does not prevent occupation of Tunis—Documentary history of England's abstention from interference—At that time Italy might have occupied Tripoli—Disappointed in France, she turns to Germany—Forerunners of the Triple Alliance—Count Maffei—The treaty of May 20, 1882, . . .	92
---	----

CHAPTER III

THE EGYPTIAN QUESTION IN 1882

Italy refuses to intervene in Egypt when invited by England to do so—Crispi's journey to Berlin and London—Interviews with Count Hatzfeldt and Lord Granville—Nine letters from Crispi on the advisability of Italy's acceptance of the English proposal,	PAGE 125
---	-------------

CHAPTER IV

FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND TRIPLE
ALLIANCE TREATY

The original error: the Emperor of Austria fails to come to Rome—Consequently the King and Queen of Italy cannot go to Berlin—A conference between Prince Bismarck and the Duke of Genoa: likelihood of war coming from France and Russia—Prince Frederick William at Rome—The Italian Cabinet dissatisfied with the allies—General Robilant, Minister of Foreign Affairs—A further opinion of Prince Bismarck's on the situation in 1885—Negotiations for renewing the Triple Alliance—The arguments by means of which Prince Bismarck induced England to stipulate an agreement with Italy concerning the Mediterranean—The new treaty of February 20, 1887,	156
--	-----

CHAPTER V

CRISPI AND THE BULGARIAN QUESTION

The ministerial crisis of February 1887—Crispi's attitude; his talks with the King; his appointment as Minister of the Interior—The Bulgarian Question and the conduct of the Italian government before and after Crispi's assumption of control of our foreign policy as regards affairs in the East—Correspondence and documents—Italy proposes and prevails upon the Powers to accept the non-intervention policy in Bulgaria—The Triple Alliance for Eastern Affairs,	165
---	-----

CHAPTER VI

THE FIRST JOURNEY TO FRIEDRICHSRUH

	PAGE
Crispi and France—Crispi's opinion of the Empire and of the Republic—The Paris Exposition of 1889, and monarchical Europe—Crispi's first journey to Friedrichsrub to see Prince Bismarck ; their conversation—The Turin speech,	193

CHAPTER VII

THE RUPTURE OF COMMERCIAL RELATIONS
WITH FRANCE

Negotiations for the renewal of the Franco-Italian treaty of commerce—Boselli's semi-official mission to Paris ; his letters to Crispi—Political and economic reasons which led to the tariff war—From Crispi's diary for October and December 1887 ; international questions—A conversation between the Czar and Prince Bismarck—False documents—The consular incident at Florence,	241
--	-----

CHAPTER VIII

FROM CRISPI'S DIARY : DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE
FROM JANUARY UNTIL THE END OF JUNE 1888

Germany and Russia in a conversation with Prince Bismarck—The publication of the Austro-German treaty of 1879—Italy and Russia in a conversation between Crispi and the Ambassador Uxkull—Flourens wishes to avoid the Franco-Russian alliance—Information concerning the internal situation in France—Military preparations in France—The Crown-Prince of Germany in Liguria—Death of William I.—The Italian and Austrian fleets at Barcelona—Cordial relations existing between Crispi and Bismarck—A sharp verbal encounter between Bismarck and Ambassador Herbette—Death of Frederick III.—King Humbert expresses his desire to go to Berlin,	277
--	-----

CHAPTER IX

ANOTHER FRANCO-ITALIAN INCIDENT

The question with France concerning taxation in Massowah ; three diplomatic Notes by Crispi on Italy's rights and

the annoyance caused by France—The Powers decide in favour of Italy—From Crispi's diary; Spain and the Vatican—King Louis of Portugal alarmed concerning our sovereign's excursion into Romagna—Crispi pays Prince Bismarck a second visit—The Austrian Grand Chancellor meets Crispi at Eger,	307
--	-----

CHAPTER X

A THIRD INCIDENT WITH FRANCE

A spurious letter from Félix Pyat—William II. in Rome—Conferences between Crispi and Count Herbert Bismarck—Documentary account of the incident concerning Italian schools at Tunis—From Crispi's Diary—The situation in France at the close of the year 1888,	339
--	-----

CHAPTER XI

1889

The Balkan Federation and Crispi's initiative—The Paris Exposition is inaugurated—The danger of war with France: Cardinal Hohenlohe's mission to Leo XIII.: Cucchi's mission to Prince Bismarck—Italians in Paris—Abolition of differential duties and the hostility of France—Spuller's opinion of the French press,	379
---	-----

CHAPTER XII

1890—TUNIS AND TRIPOLI

Prince Bismarck's dismissal; the Imperial rescripts concerning the protection of the working classes; Emperor William's explanations; Crispi and Bismarck—The proposed annexation of Tunis by France; Crispi's opposition; the support of the great Powers; the Crispi-Salisbury correspondence—Tripoli for Tunis—The fortifications at Biserta—In anticipation of Italian occupation of Tripoli,	427
INDEX,	477

FOREIGN POLITICS, MEMOIRS AND DOCUMENTS

CHAPTER I

A SECRET MISSION

A great Italy—The new kingdom—The foreign policy of the Right—Andrássy and Bismarck in 1873 are unsuccessful in concluding an *entente intime* with the ministers of the Right—Irredentists and the Italo-Austrian relations—The Turco-Russian war—French republican institutions in danger—Necessity for Italy to cast off inertia—The mission entrusted to Crispi by Victor Emmanuel and Minister Depretis at the end of August 1877—Crispi's memoirs and his correspondence with Victor Emmanuel and Depretis; conferences with Decazes, Gambetta, Thiers, Bismarck, Derby, Gladstone, Andrássy, and others—Crispi opens negotiations with Prince Bismarck for an Italo-German alliance.

THE vision of a great Italy enabled the mighty Italians to whom the world owes modern Italy to endure not only exile and imprisonment, but every form of persecution that despotic government could contrive. In Mazzini's mind the idea of greatness was correlative with that of unity, while in federation he saw but 'perpetual weakness.' The glories which our divided peoples had achieved were looked upon as pledges for greater glories to follow when these divided peoples should be united in one state. For thirty years Mazzini himself preached that we had a 'mission of universal civilisation' to carry out, a mission upon which we had entered by the force of our arms in the days of Rome's greatness, which the example set by free communes had continued to preach in mediæval times, and which our learning and our arts had carried far afield at the time of the Renaissance.

The new kingdom did not at once attain to the fulness of its independence, and the policy that brought the French

forces on to the plains of Lombardy in 1859 continued to hold Italy in subjection to Napoleon III. for many years to come. Francesco Crispi, who, with Mazzini, had championed the principle that union should be achieved without the help of the foreigner and by our own unaided efforts, fought against French interference in our affairs from the moment of convoking the first Italian Parliament. He was one of the most fervid adversaries of the 'September Convention' (1864); he opposed the permanent quartering of French troops on Roman territory; and in 1870 he was the leading spirit of the Left party, which finally forced the more than reluctant Right party to assert the national right to occupy Rome.

From the moment of the proclamation of the Republic in France, until the Italian Left rose to power (March 18, 1876), our foreign policy, deprived of the guidance which it had heretofore found at Paris, amounted to nothing at all. The army was disorganised, the navy had been destroyed after Lissa, and those in authority had justified their inaction by alleging our weakness and the necessity of carrying out the programme for internal reorganisation. Even the visits which King Victor Emmanuel II. had been prevailed upon to pay to the courts of Vienna and Berlin in September 1873 had rendered Italy's international position more rather than less difficult, for while emphasising our desire henceforth to lean more in the direction of the Central Powers, they made it clear to France that the days of the Franco-Italian alliance were over. The Hon. Minghetti and the Hon. Visconti-Venosta, who accompanied the King on the journey, were assured both by the Austro-Hungarian chancellor, Count Andrassy, and by the German chancellor, Prince Bismarck, that they felt '*très vivement le désir d'une entente intime.*' With a view to ingratiating himself with the Italian ministers, Andrassy declared explicitly and frankly that he would lend no sort of support to the Pope's querimonious demands, which at that time were still being hopefully and vigorously pressed, and that he would abstain from all co-operation with France in affairs relating to the Papacy. He went so far as to give a proof of his amicable intentions by informing the ministers that he had already refused to grant a certain locality for which the Vatican had applied, and where it was proposed to

hold the next Conclave, and said he was fully determined to persevere in his refusal. Nor did Bismarck show himself more favourably disposed towards the Pope, to whom, on the third of that very month of September, he had persuaded the Emperor to send a refusal to grant certain modifications concerning ecclesiastical legislation which the Vatican had solicited. But while he fully realised that, in dealing with the Pontiff, Italy was bound to exercise a certain amount of consideration, he demanded that with France she should refrain from a concessionary policy, which would only encourage increased demands from that country. He ended by declaring that Germany would never permit an attack upon Italy.

The two ministers, who appear to have left Rome with the intention of proposing a dual alliance with Germany, abstained from making any proposal whatsoever, and returned to Italy, flattering themselves that, without assuming any obligations, they might now rely upon Germany and Austria, and at the same time preserve the good will of France. But this proved a fleeting dream.

Very soon the movement among the Irredentists furnished Austria with a pretext for alarm. At first the government was not suspected of encouraging the hopes of the 'party of delirium,' that aimed at territorial expansion at Austria's expense; and Count Andr  ssy, through his ambassador at Rome, Count Wimpffen, proposed that the two countries should co-operate in combating the danger which threatened to disturb their friendly relations—co-operation on Italy's part being expected to manifest itself mainly in helping Austria to discover 'the promoters and agents of the annexationist propaganda.'

The relations between Italy and Austria improved somewhat during the opening months of the year 1875. The Emperor Francis Joseph came to Venice to return the visit the King of Italy had paid him in Vienna, and received a warm welcome. In February 1876, however, the activity of the Irredentist party began to increase; preparations for sending Italian volunteers into Dalmatia were set afoot; the Austrian government adopted energetic measures, and many Italians were arrested at Ragusa and Trieste. In June the festivities at Milan and Legnano in commemoration of the

hundredth anniversary of the League of the Lombard Communes, and the revival of the circumstances connected with it, in which the greater part of the Italian press freely indulged, gave rise to much ill-feeling in Austria.

Upon the outbreak of the Turco-Servian war, with fighting in Montenegro and Albania, Austria began to suspect the sincerity of our policy. Servia solicited Italy's mediation, but the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet would not hear of this. There were meetings in Milan, in Rome, and in other cities protesting against the Austrian policy. Austria allowed her embassy at Rome to remain unoccupied, and the entire press of the Empire, led by the official journals themselves, attacked Italy with extreme violence, accusing the government of collusion with the Irredentists. Our ambassador, Count di Robilant, suddenly found himself most uncomfortably situated in Vienna, and applied for a long leave of absence.

It was only natural that Austria should be greatly incensed against Italy. Doubting the policy of this country as she did, she was not free to face Russia, who was preparing for war with Turkey, and she found herself entirely at the mercy of Germany.

In January 1877 a new ambassador to the Quirinal was appointed in the person of Baron Haymerle; but ill-feeling did not abate. Italy's offer of a conference for the adjustment of the Eastern question was declined by Andrassy, who found a new source of vexation in the suspicion, suggested to him, it is said, by a foreign government, of secret negotiations between Ignatieff and Robilant for a Russo-Italian *entente*. In May news came that Austria was arming on our frontiers, and a plenipotentiary extraordinary, who was followed almost immediately by 2000 Austrian pilgrims, came to Rome to do homage to the Pope. In July our diplomatic intervention on behalf of Montenegro met with a rebuff at Vienna, where it was supposed to be but a preliminary to military intervention in Albania. In August serious complications arose. The chief clerk of the Italian consulate at Vienna, and the military attaché at our embassy there, were both accused of espionage, and the attacks of the press became so violent that the military attaché was forced to leave Vienna.

Meanwhile the war between Russia and Turkey had broken

out, and was being waged with varying fortune. On April 27 the Russian minister, Nelidoff, left Constantinople with all the members of the embassy, and on the morrow the Russian army crossed the Turkish frontier. On April 28 the Roumanian Chamber sanctioned a convention with Russia permitting the passage of Russian troops through the territory of the principality, and on May 10 Prince Charles himself took command of the army; while in Turkey the 'Holy War' was proclaimed on May 20, and Roumania declared her own independence and war against the Turks simultaneously. On June 22 the Russians crossed the Danube; on July 5 their vanguard occupied Tirnovo; on July 19 they were defeated at Plevna, and on the thirtieth at Kassanyk. Then the fortunes of war appeared to change. On August 24 the Prince of Roumania assumed command of both the Russian and Roumanian armies assailing Plevna, and on the twenty-eighth Suleyman Pasha was defeated at Schipka.

Grave events were also taking place in France, concerning which the whole of Europe was in a state of apprehension. On the fourth of May of that same year (1877) the French Chamber had brought in a resolution urging the government to make use of the means at its disposal to suppress the clerical movement, and Jules Simon, President of the Cabinet, had accepted it. Hereupon Marshal MacMahon, President of the Republic, despatched a letter to Jules Simon on May 16, challenging him to justify the passive attitude he had maintained towards the Chamber, and upbraiding him for having been unable to exert sufficient influence to ensure the triumph of his own principles. The Simon Ministry resigned, and on the day following the reactionary De Broglie-Fortou Ministry was formed, in which, thanks to pressure brought to bear by MacMahon, the Duc de Decazes was retained as Minister of Foreign Affairs. During its debate of the seventeenth the Chamber, in accordance with a proposition of Léon Gambetta's, resolved that 'they could place no confidence in any cabinet save in one that was free to act and determined to govern according to republican principles, which alone can ensure order at home and peace abroad.'

On the eighteenth the President of the Republic sent a message to the Chamber, in which he announced the prorogation

of the parliamentary session, and explained the causes of this ministerial crisis.

Hereupon the party of the Left in the Senate published a manifesto declaring that the crisis had been provoked without cause, while the deputies of the extreme Left in the Chamber published a second manifesto that pronounced the act of May 16, and those acts that followed, to be both illegal and unconstitutional.

On May 23 Minister de Broglie despatched a circular to all the procurators-general stimulating them to greater vigilance and energy in the strict enforcement of obedience to the laws that protect morals, religion, and property against the attacks of the press, and especially against the diffusion of false reports disturbing to public opinion. On June 2 the President of the Municipal Council of Paris was arrested in consequence of seditious language he had used against the President of the Republic in a speech delivered at St. Denis. That same day the Minister of the Interior, Fortou, issued a circular ordering all persons publishing newspapers or circulating libellous literature to be strictly watched. On June 8 the President of the Municipal Council was sentenced to fifteen months' imprisonment and a fine of 2000 francs. On June 17 the Duc de Broglie read a message from the President of the Republic to the Senate, inviting that body to consent to the dissolution of the Chamber, in conformity with Article v. of the statute regulating public offices. The dissolution of the Chamber was decreed on June 22. Meanwhile, on the nineteenth, the Chamber had expressed by vote its distrust of the ministry, and on the twenty-first had refused to sanction the Revenue Bill, granting supplemental credit to the War Department alone. On the twenty-fourth the Left both in the Chamber and in the Senate declared that the country was in honour bound to re-elect those deputies who had expressed their distrust of the ministry by vote. The Chamber was finally dissolved on the twenty-fifth, and on September 22 the electoral colleges were convoked for October 14.

Italy could not, might not, remain inactive during these momentous times through which Europe was passing. The possibility of the triumph of the clerical party in France had to be provided for, as this event would have constituted

a serious and immediate danger for us. Austria's attitude in all dealings with Italy had become so hostile and so menacing that corrective measures were necessary, and finally, in consequence of the Turco-Russian war, changes in the Balkan peninsula were in view which Italy could not disregard.

Francesco Crispi, fully alive to all these contingencies, and convinced that, the Left party having now come into power, our foreign policy should assume a new direction, an attitude at once of prudence and daring, more in keeping with our country's importance among European nations, and with our legitimate interests, succeeded in obtaining the appointment to carry out the mission of which he himself has left us an account in the following pages:—

ROME, 25 August, 1877.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,—As long ago as the year 1861 *Commendatore* Mancini proposed to His Excellency Baron Ricasoli, who was then President of the Council of Ministers, to open negotiations with the different European governments for the purpose of stipulating an international code which should regulate the juridical position of citizens of the respective countries and their civil rights, in respect to the laws obtaining in the several states. Owing to the conditions that prevailed at that time nothing came of that proposal. Nevertheless, the Italian government, alive to the interests of progress and civilisation, did not hesitate to endorse, under Article III. of the civil code of 1865, the principle that foreigners must be admitted to the enjoyment of those civil rights which our own citizens possess.

In order, however, that this principle may produce useful and far-reaching results it should be endorsed by the legislatures of the other states as well, and its observance must be ensured by international agreements.

His Majesty's government has sought in every

way to bring about such agreements. In the year 1867 *Commendatore* Mancini, on visiting Paris, Brussels and Berlin, undertook to ascertain the views of those governments upon this important question.

The advances made by this distinguished jurist were favourably received, but circumstances intervened which prevented the achievement of any practical results.

As Your Excellency is about to visit the above-named capitals I should be grateful if, in the course of the conversations you will hold with those of influence and competence with whom you are sure to come in contact, you would seek to ascertain whether their governments are disposed to resume negotiations. Your Excellency, who had so large a share in the compiling of those statutes which regulate civil conditions in Italy, is better able than any one else to point out the advantages of our proposal.

I thank Your Excellency in anticipation of your efforts, and I take this opportunity once more to assure you of my most sincere esteem.

MELEGARI.

To His Excellency

Signor Commendatore Crispi,

President of the Chamber of Deputies.

TURIN, 26 August.

At eleven A.M. I visit the King.

TURIN, 27 August.

At ten A.M. I again visit the King.

TURIN, 27 August, 1877.

MY DEAR DEPRETIS,—As I have already telegraphed you, I am leaving to-night at 6.30. I shall

meet Bargoni¹ at the station and he will give me your letter.

His Majesty sent for me and I was with him a long time. He was in his usual good spirits, although Correnti, who saw him this morning at 8, had found him somewhat ruffled. He has no hope of any settlement forthcoming from the war in the East, and he also is of opinion that it is too late and that there is no room for us. Nevertheless he urged me to do my best to obtain an advantageous footing. His tone changed when we discussed that other matter which is the real object of my journey. The King feels the need of crowning his life-work with a victory which shall give our army the power and prestige it now lacks in the eyes of the world. He speaks as a soldier, and I fully understand him. Poor Bixio, who died so sad a death, having been denied the joy of fighting a last battle for the glory of our country, had the same aspiration.

Unfortunately, moreover, the King is right. If the leaders had not failed us in 1866 and we had conquered in Venetia and on the Adriatic, the Austrians would not dare to write and speak of us as they do, the Italian army would be a power in Europe, which to-day it is not, and Italy's voice would command greater respect than it does in the different Cabinets.

Let us, if possible, make good this deficiency, and justify our pretensions to cleverness as diplomatists by striving to place our country in a position to prove to those whose regard for her at present is but slight, that she really counts for something on this old continent.

As soon as I have any news, I will write from

¹ Magistrate of Turin.

Paris. If I can help you with the matters you have in hand, let me know.—Yours devotedly,

F. CRISPI.

I start for Paris at 8.50 P.M., after receiving from Bargoni the following letter from Depretis.

‘ROME, 27 August, 1877.

‘Presidency of the
‘Council of Ministers.

‘YOUR EXCELLENCY,—I have informed His Majesty that you have consented to undertake the mission with which the Ministry has entrusted you, that of resuming negotiations with the governments of the principal powers for the purpose of obtaining recognition, by their respective legislatures, of those liberal principles which are endorsed in the Italian civil code. It is our August Sovereign’s wish that, availing yourself of the opportunity your journey affords, Your Excellency should also undertake a special and confidential mission to the government of His Majesty the Emperor of Germany.

‘A short time ago the German government consulted the Italian government concerning the possibility of a closer union between the two states, and the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs did not hesitate to express his willingness to enter into an alliance for mutual defence. His Majesty, whose views on this subject entirely coincide with my own, now feels the necessity of rendering the friendly relations between Germany and Italy more intimate, and desires Your Excellency to lay before His Highness Prince Bismarck all the advantages that would accrue from a complete and clear understanding by means of a treaty of alliance which shall represent the interests of both countries and provide for all

contingencies. Italian interests would be threatened not only by the supremacy of the Ultramontane party, but also by the territorial expansion of Austria, should she annex certain Turkish provinces, which annexation might possibly be a consequence of the war in the East. It is greatly to be desired that the two countries should come to an understanding on this point.

‘Your Excellency is intimately acquainted with the principles by which the Italian policy, both foreign and domestic, is regulated, and it is therefore unnecessary to repeat them here. The interests of Italy and Germany do not clash, and both nations should be strong in their determination to defend the monuments they have raised to national union and to political and civil liberty. Italy’s chief object is the defence, against any attack, of the inestimable treasure we have acquired, and of the principles upon which our very existence rests.

‘Your Excellency must seek an opportunity of privately confiding to Prince Bismarck His Majesty’s wishes and those of this government, assuring him at the same time of our gratitude for the regard he so constantly manifests for Italy.

‘I beg Your Excellency to accept the assurance of my high esteem, and to believe me, your most obliged and devoted

A. DEPRETIS,

‘President of the Council of Ministers.

‘To His Excellency

‘Signor Commendatore F. Crispi,

‘President of the Chamber of Deputies, Turin.’

Crispi to Depretis.

PARIS, 2 September, 1877.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,—Yesterday the Minister of

Foreign Affairs granted me an audience. The lateness of the hour prevented me from at once communicating to Your Excellency the result of our long conference, during which we discussed various matters of interest to both countries.

The Duc de Decazes began by thanking me for the attitude we maintained on the occasion of the question asked in the Chamber by the Deputy Savini. I replied that both the Chamber and the government had but fulfilled their duty in not permitting French internal politics to be discussed and criticised in the Italian Chamber, and I expressed my opinion that at Versailles they would have done the same for us.

His Excellency then referred to the necessity for a perfect understanding between the two nations, speaking at some length on this subject and taking great pains to demonstrate to me that France cannot possibly entertain for us sentiments other than of a most friendly nature. 'Beyond the Alps,' His Excellency said, 'there is a nation to whom France is bound by ties of an economic, as well as of a moral and political nature, and it would be a crime indeed to disturb the harmony in which these two peoples should live.' He dwelt, however, upon the existence amongst us of a group he terms the 'Prussian Party,' alluding to it as if it might one day prove a source of dissension, but he spoke guardedly and in a manner implying that he did not wish his views to leave an unpleasant impression in my mind.

I hastened to assure him that in our country we are all true Italians; that one and all, irrespective of party and with the single exception of the Clericals, have no other interest at heart than the

good of the nation, and that it would be a mistake to presume that we could or would regulate our government in accordance with the admonitions or influence of any foreign power. As regards France, everything inclines us to feel and exhibit sincere friendship for her—the traditions of our civilisation, our education and culture, our laws and commercial interests, all form strong ties between us, and we shall certainly never be guilty of any action calculated to sever this natural bond.

His Excellency then went on to inform me that he found it difficult to understand why we still continued in arms, and especially why a recent decree had provided for the fortifying of Rome. He once more assured me of the eminently peaceful intentions entertained by his Ministry, and declared that not one of the parties who stand any chance of attaining to power in France would commit the folly of waging war upon Italy. ‘The days are gone by,’ he added, ‘when it was our habit to force our views upon other people by strength of arms. Our very misfortunes have taught us that there are other ways of bringing the world to respect our opinions.’

I now felt called upon to explain the conduct of our government by assuring His Excellency that what is being done in Italy is nothing unusual. Italy must have peace because she must carry out her administrative and financial reforms, and develop and consolidate her political institutions. As to the army, we are simply transforming and completing its equipment, and it will be many years before this work is finished. With regard to the fortifications of Rome, I told him that they are not an isolated instance, but form part of a complete scheme for the

territorial defence of our country. I reminded him that as soon as the Kingdom was constituted a commission had been appointed, under the presidency of His Royal Highness the Prince of Carignano, to work out a system of fortifications adapted to the altered conditions of the peninsula. I stated that the work of this commission was now finished, that Parliament had some years since granted the necessary funds, but that up to the present nothing had been done, and that, as a matter of fact, those fortresses were still intact which had been erected by the deposed princes with intentions and for purposes in direct contradiction to the present order of things. I then explained how the fortifying of Rome forms part of this general scheme for national defence, and I concluded by assuring His Excellency that France has no reason to be alarmed, as these works can in no wise be regarded as a proof of hostility towards herself. His Excellency appeared satisfied with my explanations, and seeing him so well disposed, I seized this favourable opportunity of introducing another question, that of applying the dispositions set forth under Article III. in our Civil Code to our subjects residing on the territory of the Republic.

I explained the purpose and origin of this article, referred to the negotiations that had once before been undertaken to obtain the acceptance of these principles in France, by means of an international convention, and I concluded by alluding to the enactments of the Supreme Courts, which, by virtue of the law of retorsion, are beginning to apply Article XIV. of the 'Code Napoléon' to French subjects in Italy. I did not fail to point out that the conclusion of a treaty endorsing this reform

would produce a favourable impression in our country at the present moment.

His Excellency followed me with approval and declared himself ready to conclude a treaty. He promised to call for and examine the reports of the previous negotiations in order that, on a future occasion, he might be able to bring a clearer understanding to bear upon the matter, and thus facilitate a satisfactory conclusion. The Minister himself feels that Article III. of our Civil Code should be recognised in France for the benefit of Italians, and he promised me that he would do his best to get the demand accepted.

His Excellency's tone clearly implied his desire to give fresh proof that France is and will remain our friend, and, with this end in view, he referred to the alacrity with which his government had consented to the conclusion of the treaty of commerce. He assured me that we should have another meeting.

I was more than satisfied with the Duc de Decazes' bearing and with the tenor of his conversation. Were I to doubt the sincerity of his utterances I should indeed have to think him an accomplished hypocrite. He had nothing but praise for our government and spoke of our King with fervent admiration. He declared we had given proof of great political wisdom, and that our attitude towards the Vatican had been correct in every respect. On this subject I feel bound to acquaint Your Excellency with an opinion he expressed, of which the importance will not escape you. The Duc de Decazes declared himself convinced that, on the death of the Pope, the Conclave will perform its office in the Vatican in the full en-

joyment of perfect freedom of action, and this conviction he said he had expressed to his colleagues as well. He added that since his return from Rome, Cardinal Guibert is also of the same opinion.

I will now bring my long letter to a close by declaring myself Your Excellency's most devoted and affectionate friend,

F. CRISPI.

PARIS, 5 September, 1877.

MY DEAR DEPRETIS,—On the second of this month I sent you an official letter, of which the enclosed is the continuation and conclusion. I have written it in such a way that, when you have copied it, you may, if you choose, consign it to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Let us now set aside official restraint, and speak as old friends and patriots.

I have seen the leading statesmen of this country, among others Gambetta,¹ spending some time with him and dining with him on the third of this month. I have therefore been able to form an accurate conception of French conditions, and to judge, as far as is possible, whither they are leading.

¹ The following letter from Gambetta to Crispi shows how cordial were the relations that prevailed between the two statesmen after this meeting :—

PARIS, ce 21 octobre, 1877.

MON CHER PRÉSIDENT,—Je profite du voyage de mon ami Armand Ruiz à Rome pour vous envoyer l'expression des sentiments d'affectueuse solidarité que m'a laissé votre charmante liaison.

Je tiens à vous redire que je serai toujours fort aise de rester en communication avec vous, et vous rendre ici les services que je sais que vous n'hésiteriez pas à me rendre à Rome. Vous pouvez croire qu'on est heureux dans la vie publique de rencontrer des hommes d'un caractère aussi ouvert, aussi ferme que le vôtre. Donc vous pouvez user de mon ami Ruiz et avoir en lui la confiance la plus entière.

C'est à ce titre de confidant que je l'introduis auprès de vous.

Croyez à mon amicale sympathie.

LÉON GAMBETTA.

France is at present passing through a terrible crisis and it is difficult to foresee what its end will be. The present government represents a very small minority, but it is controlled by a Bonapartist committee which is both daring and unscrupulous, and of which a handful of individuals, themselves daring and unscrupulous, are the moving spirits.

The republicans protest that they are sure of a victory at the next general elections, and two days since some conservatives expressed the same belief to me, frankly declaring that '*nous sommes battus.*' I doubt whether these convictions will continue to prevail after the death of M. Thiers, which happened the day before yesterday, or, at least, whether the victory will be as complete as was expected before this most unfortunate loss. But supposing that the government be defeated, what will happen when the Chambers assemble?

In the course of our conversation on August 3, M. Thiers told me that when parliament met the Ministers and the President of the Republic would resign, and that the two Chambers, assembling as a national congress, would then appoint a new president. Gambetta had previously told me the same thing.

Will this come about, now that Thiers is no more, Thiers who was the candidate in whom the conservatives who have accepted the Republic had full confidence? The republicans say it will, and judging from the tone of the press, I am inclined to conclude that, despite the serious loss the country has sustained, all will proceed regularly and in accordance with the wishes of that party.

I hope so indeed, but my faith is greatly shaken.

And should the Ministers and the President resign—what then?

The republicans declare they would make it impossible to pass the budgets.

And should the government resort to a *coup-d'état*? Thiers had no fear of this, both because the army would refuse to participate and because MacMahon is neither clever enough nor possessed of the personal attributes necessary to accomplish such an act. Gambetta added that, should there be a *coup-d'état*, the army would split, and civil war might result.

Be this as it may, let us consider future events, whatever their nature may be, in their bearing upon Italy.

Republicans and reactionists alike declare that they wish to remain on friendly terms with Italy, and that they will make no attack upon her. I believe the republicans, but I doubt the reactionists.

I doubt them because the committee that rules at the *Élysée* is composed of clericals, and the *Figaro* is its organ, the journal that has so frequently insulted both our country and our Sovereign. . . .

I do not think they would go the length of immediately declaring war against us, for the political parties one and all entertain a most wholesome fear of Prince Bismarck, who, they believe, would stand by us. But they would certainly be on the lookout for an opportunity, and would make the slightest pretext an excuse for quarrelling with us.

I have been able to ascertain beyond doubt that throughout this country all classes are firmly persuaded that Italy desires war with France. I have sought to dispel this conviction wherever I have encountered it, but the reflection is forced upon me that those who first inculcated this belief did so for

the purpose of providing justification in the minds of the people for the war which would ensue should they one day see fit to attack us. Of one thing there can be no doubt: the French are continuing to arm and all the private manufactories are busy preparing arms of every description for the War Department. It therefore behoves us to look well to our own interests, and to hold ourselves in readiness to meet any emergency.

Let me hear from you in London through the Embassy, if it is only to tell me that my letters have reached you.—Yours heartily, F. CRISPI.

PARIS, 5 September, 1877.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,—Before leaving Paris I feel in duty bound to give you an account of my further dealings with this government.

The Duc de Decazes returned my visit on the day following our conference. I was out, and we did not meet again. On that day, August 31, I had gone to St. Germain-en-Laye to see M. Thiers, the news of whose death, which occurred the day before yesterday, has certainly already reached Your Excellency by telegraph.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, being obliged to leave Paris, sent one of his subordinates to Signor Ressiman, first secretary of the Italian Embassy, in fulfilment of his promise to me concerning the negotiations I had desired to resume for the purpose of obtaining recognition of Article III. of our Civil Code. Ressiman and the above-named subordinate met on September 2, and discussed the question.

His Excellency sent me word that on examining my request, he had found that the application of Article III. of our Civil Code to Italians residing in

France would necessitate a reform in the legislation of this country, which reform could be brought about only by an act of Parliament. For the present, he says, it is impossible for him to undertake to deal with the matter. Later on it might be taken up again, but to obtain this, it would be expedient for Italy to open negotiations through official channels.

The Duc de Decazes is not a hypocrite, but he is certainly weak. It appears he has consulted M. de Broglie, the Minister of Justice, who, at the present moment, has matters of far greater importance than the Civil Code to consider.

I take this opportunity of once more declaring myself to be, etc.,
F. CRISPI.

7 September.—Luncheon at Émile de Girardin's house, rue La Pérouse 27, Champs-Élysées. A visit to the Chambers at Versailles. The Questor Baze.

8 September.—Thiers' funeral.

9 September.—At Garnier-Pagès' house. Henri Martin.

PARIS, 9 *September.*

DEAR DEPRETIS,—Yesterday I received your telegram which, translated, reads as follows:—

‘What you have done has my full approval, and I believe it will be well for you to go directly to Berlin without visiting England.’

On Tuesday at 3 P.M., I shall start for Berlin, where I expect to arrive the next day at 7.45 P.M. Should it prove expedient I will go to Brussels and London on my return: I shall arrange my movements as may seem best.

I should have left sooner had I not been some-

what indisposed. For the past week I have been so unwell as to be obliged to consult a doctor. To-day I am better, and I trust I shall be able to make the journey in comfort.

Yesterday passed quietly here. It was feared that Thiers' funeral might be used as a pretext for some disorder. But the calmness of the people was really admirable. There were a few shouts of *Vive la République! Honneur à Thiers!* and *Vive Gambetta!* but that was all, and the programme was carried out in perfect order.

If the Parisian will but forget to rush off to the barricades, and learn to regulate his conduct in obedience to the laws, the cause of liberty will triumph in France, and become a guarantee of peace for the rest of Europe.

All the foreign representatives were present at the obsequies, and your friend himself also, at the special invitation of the Thiers family.

If you wish to write to me address your letter to the Italian Embassy at Berlin.

My respectful homage to your wife and believe me, yours affectionately,

F. CRISPI.

9 September. — Lunch with E. de Girardin. Gambetta came.

PARIS, 11 September 1877.

To His Majesty the King of Italy.

SIRE,—Before leaving Paris I feel it my duty to render an account to Your Majesty of the first part of my journey, or at least, to acquaint you with the impressions I have received.

I arrived in this city on August 28, at 6 P.M., and I am leaving to-morrow. I have seen Minister Decazes and the leading men in the political arena

of France, both among the partisans of the dynasty and the republicans.

All are unanimous in freely recognising Your Majesty's loyalty and discretion, as well as the generosity and prudence of our people. All feel that the Italians are endowed with great good sense in political matters and are fortunate in possessing a Sovereign who has so thoroughly grasped their natural tendencies and who, amidst many difficulties, has so skilfully steered the ship of state to a safe port. But in the background of this pleasing picture there is a dark spot which should be pointed out to our attention.

The French mistrust us, and, at the same time, suspect us of mistrusting them.

They all mistrust us, and more than one believes that Italy intends to wage war on France. Minister Decazes himself, although he did not openly express this opinion, exhibited, nevertheless, a lively interest in our arming and in the Roman fortifications, and appeared to regard these fortifications as being intended to serve some anti-French purpose.

In conversing with the Minister and with others who mentioned the matter to me, I declared that Italy must have peace, and that the reorganising of our army and the strengthening of our fortifications does not signify belligerent intentions on our part, but simply the determination to provide the proper means of defence for our territory. 'The King of Italy,' I frequently repeated, 'is faithful to our treaties and international obligations, and has never failed and never will fail in the performance of his duty; but, strong in the consciousness of his rights, he demands only that they be respected.'

The French suspect us of mistrusting them, and

in order to dispel the doubts they believe we entertain, they strive in every way to manifest their friendship for us. The Duc de Decazes was very explicit on this point, repeatedly assuring me that not one of the political parties for whom there is any prospect of public supremacy would commit the folly of going to war with Italy. 'Of course,' he added, 'there are the extreme parties who might be ready to risk war, but they have no prospect of rising to power, and moreover, even should they do so, the country would not support them.'

It is unnecessary for me to explain to Your Majesty to which parties His Excellency was alluding. I myself share the Minister's opinion that, at the present moment, France would refuse them her support. But the history of this country teaches us that the unexpected is a monster to be feared, and as we can never be sure here what the morrow will bring forth, prudence admonishes us to look well to our own interests.

France is passing through a crisis whose solution is still enveloped in uncertainty. The republicans and the government party declare themselves sure of their positions, and both groups are making the most of the means at their disposal to obtain the victory.

I will not enlarge upon the hypothesis of the eventual success of the government party. Its consequences may be easily foreseen: MacMahon would continue in office until 1880, that is to say he would complete the term of seven years, with the intention of demanding the revision of the constitution in favour of monarchism, during the last year of his presidency. I will now examine the consequences of a republican victory.

Should the republicans conquer, what would be the attitude of the authors of the episode of May 16? Would they resort to a *coup-d'état*? And should they attempt this and be successful, who would benefit by it?

The Cabinet is composed of Orleanists and Bonapartists, and, though they may unite to overthrow republicanism, each party will undoubtedly labour for the triumph of its favourite dynasty.

If we accept the republican, the Bonapartist party is the one that possesses the greatest vitality in this country, and it is also the most daring group. But this does not count for much, and as one or other must of necessity succumb should the *coup-d'état* really take place, the cleverer of the two parties will find a means of ridding itself of its rival.

Whichever party conquers, and let us admit for the sake of argument that it is able to enter upon the office of governing immediately and without encountering opposition, will owe its victory to the army and the clergy. The army and the clergy, being the two forces of which the victor has made use, will certainly advance claims that may not be overlooked.

We all know what the clergy will demand—a return to the past, and the very first condition of this return is the restoration of the temporal power to the Pope. The army, on the other hand, will wish to re-establish the prestige it forfeited during the late war with Germany by some great victory.

It is obvious that the field best adapted to this reactionary enterprise is our own Italy, where France believes that easy triumphs await her.

These conjectures of mine would, however, vanish,

could France but cast aside her evil habits, usher in a *régime* of true liberty and once for all renounce the jugglery of revolutions and *coups-d'état*, whence nothing stable, nothing lasting can ever spring, for violence, being incompatible with the spirit of our age, can never lead to good government.

But it behoves us to be on our guard, and to adopt all such measures as would be necessary should either of the hypotheses I have contemplated become an actuality. Alas for Italy, should a change of government in France find her unprepared to defend her throne and her national independence!

I will not conceal from Your Majesty that the republicans declare a *coup-d'état* to be out of the question. They are of the opinion that MacMahon would lack both the genius and the other moral attributes necessary for the consummation of an act of such daring, and that the army would not support him so far. Such were also the views of M. Thiers, whom I saw on August 31, three days before his death, and who spoke of Your Majesty in terms of the deepest devotion.

I have now discharged my duty by reporting in full. During the nine-and-twenty years of Your Majesty's reign your intelligence and courage have enabled you to overcome greater difficulties than those I have pointed out, and also to avoid far greater dangers than now threaten. Your judgment and experience, aided by the counsels of those who are responsible for the welfare of the Crown, will suggest the proper measures to be adopted in prevision of these events.

Permit me, Sire, to close my address by declaring myself to be, with profound devotion and respectful

affection, Your Majesty's most humble and grateful
servant,

F. CRISPI.

14 September.—I arrive at Berlin at 7 A.M.

At half-past twelve I call upon Baron Holstein of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and then upon Count von Bülow, Secretary of State.

Count de Launay, the Italian Ambassador, comes to see me at 3.30. We visit the Reichstag. I write to President von Bennigsen.¹

15 September.—Rudolf von Bennigsen telegraphs from Hanover: 'I will come to Berlin to-night to have the honour and pleasure of seeing you.'

De Launay and I go to see Leonhardt, Minister of Justice for the Kingdom of Prussia, who sends us, for information, to Friberg, President of the German Commission of Justice. I discuss with him the question of the adoption by Germany, of Article III. of the Italian Civil Code. He would gladly accept it, but Bismarck alone can overcome the difficulties attending its adoption.

I start at 8 P.M. from the Anhalt Station for Munich.

17 September.—I reached Wildbad at 6 P.M., and announced my arrival to Prince Bismarck by sending him my card and, immediately afterwards, a note that ran as follows:—

'HOTEL STRAUBINGEN, 6.40 P.M.

'YOUR HIGHNESS,—Fearing that you may not yet have received my card, I am writing to beg you to be so kind as to fix an hour at which I may have the honour of calling upon you.'

¹ Baron Rudolf von Bennigsen, leader of the national-liberal party, had visited Rome in May 1877, and received a most cordial welcome from the President of the Chamber, as well as from many Italian deputies.

Prince Bismarck sent his secretary at once, to express his regret that his ill-health made it impossible for him to call upon me in person, and to say that he would receive me immediately.

The Chancellor occupies an unpretentious house belonging to the Straubingen, on the right bank of the river. I was conducted upstairs to the first floor. The Prince was in his study, which opens upon the landing at the head of the stairs. The room contained a few chairs, a table and a fine porcelain stove. A magnificent dog was stretched on the floor near his master's chair. A small, white-handled pistol lay upon the table.

When the door was thrown open the Prince rose and came towards me with hand outstretched.

'I am very happy to have this opportunity of making Your Highness' acquaintance,' I said.

'We have long known each other,' Bismarck answered.

'That is true, but to-day I have the pleasure of seeing Your Highness for the first time, and of taking your hand in mine. Being in Germany, I could not leave without bringing you my Sovereign's greetings, and I am grateful to have been allowed to come here to see you.'

'What news do you bring from Italy? Have you been in France? What are they doing in Paris?' the Prince asked.

'There has been some anxiety in Rome,' I replied, 'concerning the probability of war, should the reactionist party conquer at the next general political elections in France. Moreover, we are not sure of Austria, whose conduct towards our government is anything but friendly.'

'Baron von Keudell informed us that it was your

wish to strengthen the bonds of friendship between our countries, and I am therefore come, at my King's command, to discuss several matters with you.

‘The first concerns Germany and Italy alone, but all the others are of international interest.

‘I will begin with the question which interests you and ourselves only.

‘I am unaware whether it will be necessary to readjust the treaty of commerce which was signed in 1865, but I am convinced that the opening of the Gothard Tunnel will greatly increase traffic between our countries, and it will therefore be well to make such provisions as shall remove all obstacles to trade between our peoples, and also facilitate the transaction of private business. With this end in view my government hopes that Your Highness will agree to a treaty by virtue of which Germans in Italy and Italians in Germany shall be placed upon a perfectly equal footing with the subjects of those countries, as far as civil rights are concerned.

‘Now let us pass to matters of still greater importance, and which a few words will suffice to explain.

‘I am charged to ask whether you would be disposed to sign a treaty of eventual alliance with us, in case we should be forced into war with France or Austria.

‘Besides this, my Sovereign desires to come to an understanding with the Emperor as regards the solution of the Eastern Question.’

The Chancellor replied as follows:—

‘I heartily welcome the proposal for a treaty which shall place Italians in Germany and Germans in Italy on the same footing with the subjects of

those countries, and by virtue of which all shall enjoy perfect equality in the exercise of civil rights. I cannot, however, establish this without first consulting my colleagues. A treaty of this sort would suit me because it would be a public manifestation of our cordial relations with Italy.

‘Let us now examine the other questions.

‘You are already aware of our intentions, which are, that, should Italy be attacked by France, Germany would give proof of her solidarity by joining with you against the common enemy. We shall be able to arrange for a treaty to this effect. It is to be hoped, however, that war may not become necessary, and that we may be able to preserve peace. Only by keeping peace can the republic continue to exist in France, and should she adopt another policy than that of peace she would be risking destruction. I hold that only a return to monarchy would make war possible.

‘In France all dynasties are of necessity clerical, and because her clergy are restless and powerful and her kings must be warriors in order to sway the masses, the natural consequence is that they are forced to attack their neighbours. Such conditions have long prevailed, and you will find an example of them as far back as the reign of Louis XIV.

‘As regards Austria, the conditions are totally different. I shrink from even assuming that she might one day be hostile to us, and I frankly admit that I must refuse to consider such a possibility.

‘To-morrow I am to meet Andrassy, and I wish to be able to give him my word that I am bound by no obligations to others and that I will remain his friend.

‘The Turco-Russian war has developed along lines which no one had foreseen. Nevertheless, Austria has not found it necessary to cross the frontier. I trust she may not be compelled to do so, and that the struggle may not extend beyond the present combatants, and may remain localised.

‘We desire that Austria and Russia should be on friendly terms, and we are doing our best to keep them so.

‘The different plans for the solution of the Eastern Problem we may, however, freely discuss, and we may also establish a certain criterion which shall regulate the line of conduct to be pursued. It must be admitted that, up to the present, the Russian army has not been fortunate and it is as yet impossible to foresee how the war will end.

‘The Czar has still many difficulties to overcome. Should the army return defeated, the Czar might experience much trouble at home.

‘However, that is a matter which concerns Russia only, and I am willing to confess to you that, as Germany has no personal interest in this Eastern Question, we shall accept any solution which does not threaten the peace of Europe.’

‘I cannot but admire your frankness,’ I replied, ‘and I assure you that in your place I should speak precisely as you do.

‘We therefore agree that a convention shall be established between us for the purpose of ensuring to Germans in Italy and to Italians in Germany the enjoyment of the same civil rights that the subjects of these countries possess. Article III. of the Italian Civil Code may serve as a basis for this convention, as it already contemplates the extension of such benefits to foreigners.

‘ We are also agreed as regards France.

‘ I must now beg you to allow me to put a few questions.

‘ Are you sure that Austria will always remain your friend? For the present she needs you, as she must make good the losses she suffered in 1866, and you alone can ensure her that peace without which the readjustment of her finances and the reformation of her army would be impossible. But Austria will not forget the past, nor can she look with favour upon the new German Emperor.

‘ You say that Germany has no personal interest in the Eastern Question. Let us assume that this is so. I cannot, however, refrain from reminding you that, for the greater part, the Danube is a German river—it flows past Ratisbon, and German trade goes down it to the Black Sea.

‘ We Italians cannot, must not remain indifferent to the Eastern Question, as you may. Vague rumours have reached us which lead us to believe that we shall suffer through it. If the great Powers will agree to abstain from conquest in the Balkan Provinces and consent that all territory taken from the Turks shall remain the property of the local population, we shall have nothing to complain of. But it is reported that Russia, in order to secure the friendship of Austria, has offered her Bosnia and Herzegovina. Now Italy can never allow Austria to occupy that territory.

‘ As you are well aware, in 1866 the Kingdom of Italy found her boundaries in the direction of the Eastern Alps practically non-existent. Should Austria’s position on the Adriatic be strengthened by the annexation of fresh provinces our country would find herself clasped as in a vice, and would

become the victim of easy invasion whenever this appeared desirable to the neighbouring Empire.

‘You should help us to avoid this danger. We are loyal to our treaties, and we ask nothing of any one. Try to persuade Count Andrassy to-morrow, to forgo all conquest of Turkish territory.’

‘Austria is pursuing a wise policy,’ the Chancellor replied, ‘and I believe she will persevere in it. There could be but one cause for a breach in the friendship that unites Austria and Germany, and that would be a disagreement between the two governments concerning the Polish policy.’

‘There are practically two nations in Poland—the aristocracy and the peasants (*la noblesse et le paysan*)—two nations in whom temperament, views and habits all differ widely. The one is restless and factious, the other quiet, industrious and sober. Austria favours the aristocracy.

‘If a Polish rebellion should break out and Austria should lend it her support, we should be obliged to assert ourselves. We cannot permit the reconstruction of a Catholic kingdom so near at hand. It would be a northern France. We have one France to look to already, and a second would become the natural ally of the first, and we should find ourselves entrapped between two enemies.

‘The resurrection of Poland would injure us in other ways as well. It could not come about without the loss of a part of our territory. We cannot possibly relinquish either Posen or Danzig, because the German Empire would remain exposed on the Russian frontier, and we should lose an outlet on the Baltic.

‘Austria knows it is now too late to turn back and she is also aware that we are loyal friends to

her. She is pursuing a judicious course and one it would be against her own interests to alter. Should she change, and undertake to champion Catholicism we should change also, and an alliance with Italy would be the consequence. For the time being, however, there is no reason to suppose that this will come to pass.

‘We must avoid a manifestation of distrust, which might serve Austria as a pretext for altering her policy. There will be time enough for all necessary measures of precaution.

‘The Danube is no concern of ours. The river is navigable only from Belgrade onwards, and at Ratisbon there are only a few rafts (*quelques radeaux*).

‘At the Paris Congress in 1856, Austria, in her own interest, deliberately ignored the German Confederation in the Danube Commission, and, as a matter of fact, there was no reason why she should not. Austria herself trades by way of Trieste and Hamburg.

‘German interests have nothing to do with Bosnia nor indeed with the Eastern Question in general. We should be deeply grieved if this question led to dissension between Italy and Austria, for it would be a struggle between two Powers who are our friends and whom we desire to see at peace.

‘At all events, if Austria takes Bosnia, Italy can take Albania, or some other Turkish province on the Adriatic.

‘I believe that the relations between your government and that of Vienna will become more friendly and, in course of time, even cordial. But be this as it may, should you engage in a contest with Austria, no matter how deeply I might regret the circum-

stance, we should not allow it to induce us to go to war.'

At this point the door opened and Count Herbert von Bismarck came in with a handful of telegrams. These he handed to his father, who read them and gave the necessary directions for answering them. When the Chancellor had finished, Count Herbert withdrew.

Presently Princess Bismarck came in with a glass of lemonade for her husband.

As I rose the Chancellor said simply, by way of presentation :

'My wife.'

I paid my respects to the Princess, and when Bismarck had finished his lemonade, she left us. When we were alone again I replied to the Chancellor's last observations.

'I understand your attitude towards the Court of Vienna and I respect it. But allow me to point out that German unity is not yet complete. Between the years 1866 and 1870 you certainly worked miracles, but many German peoples still dwell beyond the Empire's boundaries, and certainly, sooner or later, these will be gathered in.

'You yourself are partial to Austrian territory. You come hither every year, and Gastein, which with the Alps, marks the natural boundary of Germany, has a special significance for me ; it may even, in a way, amount to a prophecy. . . .'

'No, no ! You are mistaken. I used to come here long before 1866. Besides, mark well what I am going to tell you,' the Chancellor protested.

'We have a vast empire to govern, an empire counting forty million inhabitants and with an extensive frontier. We are fully occupied as it is,

and we would not risk losing what we have for the sake of fresh conquest. The work we have undertaken requires all our skill and all our time.

‘There are many difficulties to be overcome. The King, at his age, must be shielded from shock. He has done great things for Germany, and must now be allowed to rest.

‘Within our boundaries we have several Catholic Princes, a French Catholic Queen, and a clergy so restless that special laws are necessary to keep them in check. It is to our interest that peace be maintained, and should an Austrian Catholic province be offered us, we should refuse to accept it.

‘We have been accused of wishing to acquire Holland and Denmark.

‘What should we do with these countries? We have a sufficiently large number of non-German subjects to make us shrink from adding to them. We are on friendly terms with Holland, and our relations with Denmark are satisfactory. As long as I remain in office, I shall be with Italy, but although I am your friend, I will not break with Austria.

‘In 1860 I was at St. Petersburg, but my heart was with you. I followed your successes with delight, for they represented the triumph of my own convictions.

‘Nevertheless, I must repeat that we wish you to be friends with Austria. In solving the Eastern Question you may be able to come to some understanding, by means of which Italy would take some Turkish province on the Adriatic, as a compensation, should Austria annex Bosnia.’

‘A Turkish province on the Adriatic would not

satisfy us,' I replied. 'We should not know what to do with it.

'We have no frontiers on the East. Austria is this side of the Alps, and can invade our kingdom whenever she sees fit to do so. We ask nothing of others, and we are loyal to our treaties, but we must feel safe at home. Pray mention this to Count Andrassy.'

'No,' said the Chancellor. 'I have no wish to touch upon the question of Bosnia and much less of your eastern boundaries. Let us drop the matter for the present. I cannot introduce topics that are sure to irritate Count Andrassy, for my great desire is to keep on friendly terms with him.'

'Very well then. You must do as you please,' I said. 'But now kindly explain one or two points to me.

'You desire peace, and hope that it may endure. We have discussed the hypothesis of a victory of the reactionist party in France, and of a possible return to monarchy. We are agreed that it will be well to be prepared for such an event.

'Let us now examine another hypothesis. Should the republicans conquer at the general elections in France, could you not find a means of establishing an understanding with them ?

'I am not putting this question at random. When I was in Paris I saw the Deputy Gambetta, who is a power in his own country. We had a long discussion concerning the political position of France and the necessity for peace in Europe if the Republic is to take firm root. I did not seek to hide from him that I was coming to see you, and he expressed his desire for an understanding with your government, and he requested me to broach the subject to you.

‘I fully understand that an alliance between France and Germany is not yet possible, because public sentiment in France is still too bitter after the defeat she has suffered. But there is one point on which you might agree, and on which Italy would be with you—that is disarmament.’

‘An alliance with republican France,’ the Prince replied, ‘would be of no use to us.’¹ The two countries could not possibly disarm. This question was gone into with Emperor Napoleon before 1870, and, after long discussion, it was proved beyond doubt that the principle of disarmament can never succeed in practice. There are no words in the dictionary that accurately define the limits of disarmament and armament. Military institutions differ in every state, and even when you have succeeded in placing the armies on a peaceful footing, you will not be able to affirm that the conditions of offence and defence are equal with all the nations which have participated in disarmament. Let us leave this question to the Society of the Friends of Peace.’

‘Then we must confine ourselves to a treaty of alliance in case we should be attacked by France,’ I said.

‘I will take the Emperor’s orders with a view to opening official negotiations for an alliance,’ the Chancellor replied.

It being already late, and as all the subjects I had wished to introduce had been discussed, I rose to go.

‘Are you staying on at Gastein?’ the Prince inquired.

‘No, Your Highness. It would be unwise for

¹ Prince Hohenlohe’s *Memoirs*, ii. 407: ‘*Septembre, 1877. Gastein.*—Quant à la France il (Bismarck) compte l’écarter de toutes les combinaisons de grande politique et veut éviter tout rapprochement.’

me to remain in these parts. I did not give my name at the Hotel d'Europe at Salzburg, nor have I done so here at the Hotel Straubingen.'

'Then it is *au revoir*.'

'It is *au revoir*,' I replied.

18 *September*.—I left Wildbad at 9.45 A.M., in a light carriage that conveyed me to Lend in three hours. The railway that passes through Lend comes from the Tyrol and runs into Germany. We started at 2 P.M., reaching Salzburg at 5, and Munich at midnight.

Munich, 19 *September*.—The King of Italy has an envoy extraordinary, and a minister plenipotentiary, here in Munich. I really cannot understand why we should maintain diplomatic representatives in Bavaria. After the constitution of the great empire the German princelings ceased to have a voice in the chapter of European politics. Treaties are made in Berlin, and the Great Chancellor thinks and acts in the interest of all the German peoples and states.

Count Rati-Opizzoni holds the legation here, and his office is a sinecure in the truest sense of the word. He has, as yet, no official residence, but lives at an hotel, where I saw him. His favourite Italian newspaper is the *Unità Cattolica*!

From Munich I telegraphed the result of my conference with Prince Bismarck, to the King and the President of the Council. I wrote as follows to His Majesty, with whom I had arranged to use the French cipher.

'I have seen Bismarck. He accepts treaty of alliance, defensive and offensive should France attack. He will take His Majesty the Emperor's

orders with regard to official action in the matter. I am returning to Berlin always at Your Majesty's service.'

My despatch to Depretis read:—

'Had an interview with Prince Bismarck at Gastein which lasted two hours. He accepts eventual alliance in case France should attack. Accepts Article III. Civil Code, as a political demonstration. Refuses eventual treaty against Austria. Eastern Question does not interest Germany. Will take Emperor's orders with a view to opening official negotiations. Write to me at Berlin.'

Berlin, 20 *September*.—I reach Berlin at 7.45. I find a letter awaiting me from Dr. Giovanni Valeri, professor of the Italian language and literature to the Crown Princess Victoria, consort to Prince Frederick William, heir to the German throne. Valeri, who called at the hotel during my absence, now writes to say he has an important communication to make, and asks for an appointment. He gives his address: Deutsches Haus, Potsdam. I telegraph him that I will see him at any hour to-day which may suit him.

Towards eleven o'clock the Hon. Ludwig Loewe and the Hon. Friedrich Dernburg, both deputies to the *Reichstag*, call upon me in the name of their colleagues and of the members of the *Landtag*, to inform me of their desire to give a parliamentary banquet in my honour. I accept, leaving them to fix the date.

Loewe is a 'progressionist,' while Dernburg belongs to the national-liberal party.

Count de Launay calls upon me and brings me two telegrams from the King. I inform our ambassador that Prince Bismarck welcomes the proposal for a

treaty which shall place Italian subjects in Germany on an equal footing with the Germans in the exercise of all civil rights.

One of the King's telegrams, dated Sept. 17, is an answer to my letter of the eleventh from Paris; the other, dated Sept. 20, is an acknowledgment of my despatch from Munich. The first runs:—

‘Thank you for your letter which greatly pleased me because I see that your views and mine are in agreement. I note however that you do not mention the ministerial aspirations. Be so kind as to telegraph to me whether I ought to write to Prince Bismarck or whether you can arrange matters without my doing so. I wish you success in everything and have entire confidence in your experience and skill. Kind regards.

‘VICTOR EMMANUEL.’

The second telegram contains the words:—

‘Thank you. Try to get some positive document for the treaty.

‘VICTOR EMMANUEL.’

Depretis was in no hurry to answer my despatch from Munich, and I was obliged to telegraph once more. He replied at last, on the evening of the twentieth: ‘Received your despatch yesterday.’

I write him a letter containing an account of my interview with Prince Bismarck.

‘BERLIN, 20 *Sept.* 1877.

‘DEAR DEPRETIS,—Yesterday I sent you the following despatch in cipher, from Munich: “Had an interview with Prince Bismarck at Gastein

which lasted two hours. He accepts eventual alliance in case France should attack. Accepts Article III. Civil Code, as a political demonstration. Refuses eventual treaty against Austria. Eastern Question does not interest Germany. Will take Emperor's orders with a view to opening official negotiations. Write to me at Berlin."

'To His Majesty, whom I had promised to keep informed on the same subject, I despatched a second telegram, also in cipher: "I have seen Bismarck. He accepts treaty of alliance, defensive and offensive should France attack. He will take His Majesty the Emperor's orders with regard to official action in this matter. I am returning to Berlin always at Your Majesty's service."

'I warn you that I have not mentioned our negotiations for an alliance to de Launay and have discussed only the question of Article III. of the Civil Code with him.

'Here you have an account of what has taken place.

'I reached this city on the fourteenth, at 7 A.M. At noon I called upon Baron Holstein to whom I expressed my desire to see Prince Bismarck. He offered several objections, some as to the form the visit would take, others concerning its purpose.

'The Prince is at Gastein. A visit paid him there, in so small a place, would immediately impress every one, and the European press would be sure to make the most of it. It would be better to see him here in the great city, where much might be accomplished while the public remained in ignorance. He added that the Chancellor would be glad to see me, and was already aware of my proposed visit to Germany.

‘Such were the objections as regards form.

‘As for the other difficulties, Holstein was of opinion that it would be necessary to apply to Baron von Bülow in order to obtain an audience with the Prince. The strictest discipline prevails at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and no one dares do anything that has not been sanctioned by the hierarchy.

“Moreover,” he concluded, “von Bülow enjoys the Prince’s full confidence—at the present moment, indeed, during the Great Chancellor’s absence, he is practically Minister of Foreign Affairs.”

‘I was conducted to see Baron von Bülow, who is evidently about sixty years of age; he is most affable in manner, and received me as if I had been an old friend.

‘He was aware that I was coming to Berlin, having been informed of this fact by Count de Launay.

‘After some conversation, during which we dwelt especially upon the subject of the political interests of both Germany and Italy, and after having agreed that, as the two nations have the same principles to maintain and the same enemy to combat, they should certainly fraternise and be united, Baron von Bülow promised to write to the Prince and inform him of my desire to see him.

‘On the 15th, von Bülow and Holstein came to the hotel to call upon me, but I was out. Holstein then sent me a note to say he had some news for me.

‘I went to see him at once and was informed that the Prince had consented to receive me and was expecting me at Gastein. Without loss of time I set out that night at eight o’clock, and

seventeen hours later found myself in Munich, whence I proceeded to Salzburg, and spent the night there.

‘On the 17th, at 9.45 A.M., I set out for Lend, where I arrived at two in the afternoon. I hired a carriage which conveyed me to Gastein in six hours.

‘Beyond Lend we wound up the side of the mountain whence the river *Ache* rushes downwards. The road is a difficult one, and the horses had to labour hard. We passed through a narrow gorge called the *Klamm Pass* that is gloomy and cold, and presently emerged into the crooked Gastein valley, which is several miles long. The top of the *Klamm Pass* and the hills that surround the valley were covered with snow, and unfortunately, I had omitted to bring heavy wraps to keep out the cold.

‘On reaching Gastein, which is at the head of the valley, directly beneath the Reichenberg peak, I was tired enough, and longed to rest. However, I sent my card, and presently despatched a note to Prince Bismarck, who immediately sent his secretary to express his regret that, owing to his ill-health, he was unable to come himself, and to say that he would receive me at once.

‘I went to him, and we were together from half-past seven until ten o’clock. We talked of everything that is of interest in European politics at the present moment, and my telegrams have given you a synopsis of our conclusions on points of especial interest to us.

‘I shall send you a full account of our conference, but I wish to let you know without delay that, although it is quite possible that no written treaty

of alliance exists between the three Emperors concerning the Eastern Question, they have, nevertheless, established the conditions which, under given circumstances, shall regulate the solution of that question. If Russia pushes forward, Austria will occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in the event of a partition of Turkish territory, she will annex those provinces. When I pointed out that Italy could not remain indifferent to Austria's territorial expansion beyond the Adriatic, Bismarck replied :

“*Then take Albania.*”

‘And when I declared that we would never think of such an annexation and that it would be well for him to use his influence to procure compensation to us in the form of a readjustment of our boundaries towards the Alps, he remarked that such a subject must not be alluded to at Vienna ; that Germany, the friend of both powers, could only desire and seek to promote peace between Austria and Italy, and that, under existing circumstances and until Austria should alter her present policy, silence must be maintained in order not to arouse suspicion.

‘Now I am of opinion that, in consideration of the Russian reverses, and in prevision of the resumption of hostilities in the Spring, it would be expedient for us to speak openly and frankly both at Vienna and in London, and to free our minds once and for all. We should, meanwhile, be arming as rapidly as possible in order to show that we also can produce arguments that will cause our wishes to be respected.

‘My little excursion to Gastein remained a secret. Neither at Salzburg nor at Gastein did I give my name at the hotels.

‘De Launay was aware of my visit to Bismarck,

but in obedience to your instructions I concealed its true purpose from him.

‘And here, with my most cordial greetings to you, I will stop for to-day.’

A 8 P.M. Dr. Valeri called to tell me that the Crown Princess wished to see me. I answered that I fully appreciated the honour the Princess was graciously conferring upon me, and that I would leave it to Her Imperial Highness to appoint a time when I might wait upon her.

Valeri assured me that the Princess is infatuated with Italy, and that she follows our progress with the greatest interest. Her Imperial Highness had heard with much pleasure that the President of the Italian Chamber was in Berlin, and would greatly appreciate a visit from him in Potsdam.

I begged the kind messenger to express my gratitude to the Princess, and to assure her that I should be delighted to have an opportunity of personally offering her my homage and devotion.

Berlin, 21 *September*.—The telegram received yesterday from Depretis being unsatisfactory, I replied as follows:—

‘Your laconic telegram received. His Majesty the King was more considerate. I warn you that de Launay is unaware of negotiations concerning treaty of alliance against France.’

Herr von Holstein writes to me:—

‘BERLIN, 21 *Sept.* 1877.

‘M. LE PRÉSIDENT,—Fully realising to what extent any attempt on my part to find you at home would be a pure formality I venture in advance to notify my coming, not out of consideration for myself but because I have a communication to

banquet which the members of the *Reichstag* and the *Landtag* in Berlin have been permitted to offer you as a mark of their respect for you and for your great and beautiful country.

‘As you have been so kind as to leave us to decide the day we have chosen Sunday next, when we shall have the pleasure of fetching you at a quarter to five o’clock.

‘I am proud to be permitted to express to you in my colleagues’ names and in my own name the great pleasure that your presence here in January gives us. I find in it the happiest augury of the future relations between our two countries, already so closely united.

‘I have the honour to be, M. le Président, your most obedient servant,

‘F. DERNBURG,

‘*Membre du Reichstag et chef rédacteur*
‘*de la Nationalzeitung.*’

I reply as follows :—

‘KAISERHOF, 21 Sept.

‘DEAR SIR AND COLLEAGUE,—In thanking you and your colleagues of the *Reichstag* and *Landtag* for the honour you are paying me, I accept your invitation, and I shall await you at the hotel on Sunday the 23rd inst. at the time you mention.

‘I am, Sir, your obedient servant.’

I write to Depretis : ‘A note from the Master of Ceremonies announcing that the Princess desired my presence at dinner on Sunday evening, September 23, was received by Count de Launay, who immediately came to inform me of the invitation.

‘The coincidence of the two invitations on the same date places me in an awkward position as I

must find a means of freeing myself from one or other of them. His Majesty's ambassador has, however, undertaken to solve the problem.'

Late in the evening I received the following despatch from Depretis: 'If my despatch was even more brief than usual this was due to the fact that I have been ill, and confined to my bed for the past week. It was more prudent to be brief, as I had not thoroughly examined your report; you must, nevertheless, understand that I give you all the credit for the successful result of the interview you describe. But unfortunately an important point, the most urgent question of all indeed, is left unsettled. If you can obtain nothing further, try at least, to leave some loophole open which will enable us to resume negotiations and press the matter.¹ It seems to me that we cannot be expected to remain indifferent to a solution of the Eastern Question that will result in the territorial expansion of Austria.'

I hastened to telegraph him as follows:—

'Very sorry to hear of your illness. Austria's possible territorial expansion was fully discussed, and question can be brought up again.² Matter must, however, be dealt with at Vienna and in London.'

22 *September*.—A satisfactory arrangement was made, by means of which I was enabled to attend both the dinner at Potsdam and the parliamentary banquet, and this, thanks to the courtesy of H.I.H. Princess Victoria, who allowed the national assembly

¹ As I had already written to Depretis, the question here alluded to had been fully discussed. See my letter of September 20.

² In that same letter of September 20 I mentioned my objections to the proposed territorial expansion of Austria, and I reported Prince Bismarck's answers.

to take precedence. Count de Launay wrote to me on the subject :—

‘All has been satisfactorily arranged. An answer to my despatch to the Master of Ceremonies has reached me, saying that the invitation to Potsdam is postponed until Monday.’

Herr Friedrich Goldberg, correspondent for several German and foreign papers, having requested me to grant him an interview, I had appointed a time on Friday. He was punctual to the minute, and his first question was whether I was satisfied with the results of my visit to Berlin. I replied that I had come to the German capital without any official mission, and that I had derived much satisfaction from my visit, as personal observation had convinced me of the warm regard of the German people for Italy.

Herr Goldberg praised the Italian policy. He observed that the conditions at present prevailing in Europe rendered the maintenance of peace extremely difficult, and that a war might entail disastrous consequences for Germany as well as for all the other powers, especially as the treaties between them were still ill-defined and uncertain.

He asked for my views on the subject of the war between Russia and Turkey.

‘It is an act of overbearance,’ I replied, ‘on which Europe looks unmoved. This would not have happened had the old alliance been maintained.’

‘You are right,’ he assented. ‘But the German Empire cannot act otherwise. Germany has no interests at stake in the East, and should she take sides with Turkey a general conflagration would result, for France would make this a pretext for rushing to the Rhine and avenging the defeat in-

flicted upon her in 1870. I assure you, however, that the Germans have no liking for Russia, and that our people rejoiced in the defeats she suffered on the Danube.'

'I cannot understand this attitude,' I remarked. 'In 1870 Russia's strict neutrality helped you to conquer. Had she intervened, even diplomatically—and indeed poor Thiers did all he could to persuade her to act—the German army would never have reached Paris. You should therefore be grateful to Russia.'

'Unfortunately that is so,' Herr Goldberg replied, 'but you must not forget to distinguish between the Germans and the Imperial Court—the people are opposed to Russia, while the Court is entirely friendly to her. The Russian frontiers are closed tight against our commerce and our subjects. You have no idea how much trouble the Russian police and customs-officers give the Germans, and how difficult it is to travel in Russia. Complaints are being sent in every day, and as the people are always influenced by what most directly affects their interests, so their dislike increases with each new injury to which they are subjected.'

'All this may be as you say,' I replied, 'but Germany is bound to Russia by many ties, and the two countries should seek to come to an understanding, and work together.'

'Prussia has as great an interest as Russia in keeping possession of the provinces that were acquired towards the close of the XVIII. century, at the time of the partition of Poland. With this end in view the policy of the Court of Berlin and that of the Court of St. Petersburg should be identical.'

‘No, you are mistaken,’ my visitor answered. ‘That is entirely a matter of domestic administration, and Germany can dispense with foreign aid in ensuring her possessions in those provinces whose population is not purely German. In West Prussia and in the duchy of Posen, the true Poles are all in the rural districts, and are docile and obedient. The aristocracy has no real influence in those regions.

‘The cities are almost entirely germanised; half the population in Posen is German, and although the Poles predominate in Danzig, they are not to be feared on that account (*ils ne sont pas à craindre pour cela*). The city has to thank its commerce for its flourishing condition, and the people would gain nothing by breaking away from Germany.

‘Moreover, Danzig is strongly garrisoned, is a fortified post of the first order, and would be most difficult to overpower. Remember with what difficulty the city was brought to capitulate in 1813.’

‘I do not doubt Germany’s ability to maintain her authority in West Prussia under ordinary circumstances,’ I said, ‘but I question whether she would be able to do so should a revolution break out.

‘Remember the Polish uprising in 1863. You cannot have forgotten that at that time Prussia and Russia felt the necessity of a treaty¹ and of co-operation in suppressing the disturbance. Insurrections are contagious, especially when inspired by the principle of nationality.’

‘But Germany did not exist in 1863,’ Herr Goldberg objected.

‘That is true, but you must furthermore re-

¹ Treaty of February 8, 1863.

member that the population of the provinces that are of Polish origin is Catholic, and that Catholics can give great trouble. Now of all Catholics, the clergy and the people of Posen are the most active and daring.'

'That is quite another matter,' he assured me. 'The Catholic party is strong all over Germany—it has money, a press of its own, and is powerfully organised. It is, nevertheless, in the minority throughout the Empire. It may provoke annoyance, but it will never be feared. It is simply a party like all the others, like them obliged to respect the laws, and it can, therefore, be easily kept in check.'

'Allow me to point out,' I observed, 'that the question assumes a different form in the Polish provinces.'

'The inhabitants of the German provinces are Germans, and cannot desire the downfall of the Empire. The Polish Catholics have nothing in common with Germany; their country is elsewhere, and a religious contest would furnish the means of vindicating their nationality.'

'I agree with you that the problem is a difficult one to solve,' my visitor replied. 'But Prince Bismarck has repeatedly given proof that he knows his business well. He would find a means of quelling a Polish rebellion, should they seek to disturb the nation's peace. In the month of November, 1870, the clergy of Posen, led by the archbishop himself, set a movement afoot for preserving the temporal power to the Papacy. The attempt was frustrated by the Prince's iron will. It spread indeed, but never assumed a political form. Then came the May Laws, passed by the unanimous vote

of all the national parties and amidst the applause of the entire nation. And believe me, further laws of a like nature would speedily be enacted, should they become necessary. The Prince had every reason to wish to maintain the friendship already existing between Germany and Italy, and the Catholics were forced to yield and obey.'

'As an Italian,' I said, 'I must be grateful to the German government for its attitude towards the interests of my country. But your arguments have failed to shake my conviction that, in dealing with the Polish question, Russia and Prussia should work together.'

Hereupon I rose, and my visitor took his leave.

I see von Holstein, and beg him to let me know if and when I shall be able to see Prince Bismarck.

September 23.—I receive the following letter from von Holstein :—

'M. LE PRÉSIDENT,—The Prince goes away to-morrow afternoon, Monday, earlier than he at first anticipated. However he hopes to see you again. Would you be so kind as to come and see me a little before one o'clock? At one o'clock the Prince hopes to be disengaged.

'I have the honour to be, M. le Président, your most obedient servant,

HOLSTEIN.

'Sunday.'

At noon I went to see von Holstein at the Chancery Department. He informed me that the Prince was very busy, and had been unable to receive several foreign ministers. He added that I would be received on the following afternoon at one o'clock.

Herr von Holstein stated that Bismarck had commissioned Dr. Leonhardt, Minister of State, to examine the project for establishing equality between Italians and Germans, in the exercise of their civil rights in Germany. He advised me to see Leonhardt and confer with him on this subject.

We spoke of the banquet, and of the dinner I was to attend at Potsdam. The Prince, he said, was gratified by these manifestations.

At half-past two Count de Launay accompanied me to the Ministry of Justice to see Dr. Leonhardt. He is a man of some sixty years of age, with an open countenance and a cordial manner. We came to the point at once, and I began by observing that the time was now come when, outside the sphere of politics, all inequality in the treatment of the subjects of different states should cease. Within the sphere of private relations a universal agreement should guarantee the same rights in every country to all men, without distinction of nationality. I dwelt upon the fact that, through her new Code, Italy had set the example for the other nations to follow, by admitting foreigners to the free exercise of all civil rights. It was to be regretted, I observed, that no government had as yet followed our example. I pointed out the necessity for a treaty between Germany and Italy in order that all incongruities in the legislative dispositions of the two countries may be removed.

Leonhardt declared his readiness to support the project, and promised to do his best to comply with our wishes.

23 September.—At 4.30 the Hon. Loewe and the Hon. Dernburg come to the Kaiserhof, and together

we proceed to the Restaurant d'Europe (Poppenberg), on *Unter den Linden*.

I found Count de Launay there, who had arrived before me, some members of the *Reichstag* and of the two Chambers of the *Landtag*, delegates to the Federal Council, ministerial directors, under-secretaries of state, the Mayor of Berlin, artists, scientists and journalists. All the political parties were represented, more members of the National party than of any other being present, while the Progressionists had rallied almost to a man, and Herr Grävenitz represented the Right.

President von Bennigsen immediately performed the ceremony of introduction and soon afterwards we sat down to dinner. I was placed on the left of the President of the Prussian Chamber and Count de Launay on his right.

When the moment for proposing the toasts arrived, Herr von Bennigsen rose and gave us the healths of the Emperor William and of Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy.

The guests all rose and the two sovereigns were enthusiastically acclaimed.

After a short interval Bennigsen proposed the health of the President of the Italian Chamber. He spoke in French, and most of the speeches that followed were also delivered in that language.

The speaker first reminded us of the intellectual and scientific relations that have long existed between Germany and Italy. He then dwelt upon the artistic and natural beauties of the peninsula, which since time immemorial have not only attracted the Germans, but exercised a great moral influence over them.

He touched lightly upon the contests that raged

in mediæval times, and hastened to add that an era of peace had followed these wars of conquest, during which the ties of affection between the two nations had been strengthened by those of common interest.

‘Germany,’ he said, ‘feels true and loyal friendship for Italy. The two nations have the same aspirations, the same purpose—namely the preservation of national union and the maintenance of a liberal and parliamentary constitution. They must unite in defending these possessions, and their union will render them prosperous at home and so strong that they will be respected abroad. To-day, as in the future, Italy and Germany are bound to act in union.’

‘There are probably but few among those here present who have not visited Italy, whereas it is rare that an Italian comes amongst us, prepared to face the rigours of our climate, which are perhaps unduly feared, and this is another reason why the visit of our present guest gives us especial pleasure.’

‘In Signor Crispi we are honouring one of the bravest men his country boasts, a man animated by the most ardent patriotism, a man eminent for his statesmanship and for his knowledge of everything best calculated to benefit his country.’

‘I therefore beg you to join with me in acclaiming the union of the two nations, the glory and greatness of Italy, and the President of the Italian Chamber, one of his country’s noblest sons!’¹

All the guests rose and responded to the toast. It was now my duty to speak, and I began by expressing my regret that I was unable to address

¹ For reasons which will be easily understood I have taken this synopsis of Bismarck’s address from the *National Zeitung*.

my friends in their own language. I thanked the assembly in the name of Italy, and declared that beyond the Alps there dwell a people whose sentiments towards the Germans are fraternal. At the very moment when Germany and Italy came into being, both became conscious that their interests were identical. I touched upon the conditions prevailing in the two countries from the middle ages down to 1815. The ancient Empire had possessed no true greatness—it had been reactionary and despotic. The Congress of 1815 had treated Italy and Germany alike in denying them all political existence on this old Continent of ours. Happily for us, and thanks also to two dynasties who understood the spirit of the people and the tendencies of their own subjects, the national movement that began in 1848 has led us, albeit through innumerable trials and sacrifices, to the formation of two nations which, vitalised by the liberty they enjoy at home, constitute a guarantee for the peace of Europe.

The new German Empire has nothing in common with the Empire of the past, and the flag has been lowered that once waved over Ratisbon. The banner of to-day is the symbol of liberty and of union, and Italy is glad to place her trust therein. I brought my address to a close by proposing a toast to the Emperor, the representative of German unity, and to everlasting friendship between our two countries.

Further addresses were delivered by Schulze-Delitzsch, the Italian Ambassador, and the Mayor of Berlin, Duncker, who, after reminding us that Italy was the country whence civilisation had spread to other lands, proposed a toast to Rome, which was enthusiastically drunk.

24 *September*.—At one o'clock a visit to Prince Bismarck. Taking Baron von Holstein's advice I went up to the Grand Chancellor's apartment. As soon as I appeared in the doorway, the Prince rose and we shook hands cordially.

'I did not wish to leave Berlin without seeing you again,' I said.

'And I came to Berlin on purpose to give you the answer I promised you,' was his reply. 'We are quite ready to sign a treaty establishing reciprocity between the two countries. Kindly forward the official documents and we will see that everything is arranged.'

'But this is not all I want, nor all that my Sovereign demands,' I protested. 'What have you to tell me concerning the project for an alliance between the Kingdom of Italy and the German Empire, in case either or both should be attacked by France?'

'I have not seen the King yet,' Bismarck replied, 'nor is this a subject about which I can communicate with him in writing. I must speak to him personally and receive his verbal orders.'

'But who is more powerful than Bismarck in all Germany?' I urged. 'If you yourself are decided, if you believe that what I propose is for the good of both countries, there is no reason why the King should not approve.'

'I am not ready to open negotiations,' Bismarck assured me. 'Send for your credentials, and we will arrange the terms of a possible treaty.'

'On what basis shall these terms rest? By what principles shall they be controlled? What shall our attitude be towards Austria?' I asked.

'I have already told you I am ready to treat

with you against France, but not against Austria. Our relations towards the two countries are not the same. At the present moment France is in a state of unrest. No one can foresee who will triumph in the contest between MacMahon and Parliament. The President General has seriously compromised his position by his electoral proclamation, and for all we know a monarchical Chamber may be the result of the next general elections. A king could maintain his position only by means of the army, and the army would demand to be allowed to retaliate. . . . I may add that he would also look to the clergy for support, and the clergy would demand that the temporal power be restored to the Pope.

‘Now from Austria we have none of these dangers to fear, and it is to our advantage to keep on friendly terms with her. But I go further. I refuse even to presume that she might one day become our enemy. At any rate, it will be soon enough to form an alliance against her when she changes her policy, which I do not believe she will do.’

‘Well, then we must confine ourselves to France,’ I replied. ‘But upon what basis is our treaty to rest?’

‘The alliance must be both offensive and defensive,’ Bismarck declared. ‘Not because I wish for war, which indeed I shall do all in my power to avoid, but as a natural consequence of prevailing conditions. ‘Suppose, for example, that the French assemble 200,000 men at Lyons. Their intention would be obvious. Are we to wait for them to attack us?’

‘Very well,’ I replied, ‘I will report your views

to the King, and he will despatch the official deeds for the stipulation of both treaties.'

'The papers concerning reciprocity in the exercise of civil rights in both countries may be sent to de Launay, but I should prefer to stipulate the treaty of alliance with you.'

'Thank you. I will discuss the matter with His Majesty, and get his orders,' I replied.

'I saw Andrassy yesterday,' Bismarck resumed, 'and mentioned to him that you had been to see me, and that the Italian government wishes to remain on friendly terms with Austria. He was gratified, and begged me to present his compliments to you.'

'In the course of conversation I informed him that Italy does not wish Austria to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina.'

'Russian affairs are in an unsatisfactory condition, and the campaign is closed for this year. Austria has not the slightest intention of making any move.'

'I think you would do well to see Andrassy. You would find him your friend.'

'I must beg Your Highness to allow me to refer to a subject which is of vital interest to Italy,' I said. 'Pius ix. is well advanced in years, and will, in all probability, soon depart this life. We shall then have a conclave for the nomination of his successor. It is true that your Protestant government has not the same reasons for anxiety concerning the election of the future Roman Pontiff, as have the Catholic governments. Nevertheless the Empire counts many Catholic subjects and a Catholic clergy, and consequently cannot remain indifferent to what takes place in the Vatican.'

'I care little,' Bismarck said, 'who Pius' suc-

cessor may be. A liberal pope might be still less desirable than a reactionist. The evil lies in the institution itself; and the man, no matter who he may be and what may be his views and inclinations, can have but little or no power to influence the actions of the Holy See. It is the *Curia* that dominates in the Vatican.'

'That is, unfortunately, correct,' I admitted. 'You have certainly discovered the truth of what you say in the course of your struggle with the Catholic clergy, which began in 1870. We Italians are grateful to you for resisting!'

'But I cannot be equally grateful to the Italian government,' Bismarck observed.

'You have packed the Pope away in cotton-wool, and no one can touch him.¹ As long ago as 1875 we pointed out to the Italian government the menaces to the other Powers which the law of guarantee to the Holy See contains. The question, however, was allowed to drop.'

'As you are probably aware, I was opposed to that law when it was under discussion in Parliament,' I said.

After some further conversation of no particular importance we parted with expressions of mutual esteem, and in the hope of meeting again in the near future.

25 September.—Dinner at de Launay's.—Before that, a visit to the Town-Hall.

BERLIN, 25 September, 1877.

To His Majesty the King of Italy.

SIRE!—In order to complete my telegram of the

¹ The expression the Prince made use of was: 'Vous l'avez emboîté dans le coton, et personne peut l'atteindre.'

tenth of this month and the one despatched this very day, I feel it incumbent upon me to render an account of the manner in which I have acquitted myself of the mission to Prince Bismarck, with which Your Majesty and the President of the Council of Ministers have entrusted me.

The objects of this mission, which formed the subjects of our discussions at Gastein on the 17th, and at Berlin on the 24th, were as follows:—

An eventual alliance with Germany in case of war with France or Austria.

An understanding concerning the solution of the various questions which may arise in consequence of the Russo-Turkish war in the East.

The establishment of equality between Germans and Italians in the exercise of civil rights in both countries.

The Prince remained obdurate in refusing an alliance against Austria. On the other hand, he was very willing to consent to one against France, although he expressed the hope that this last-named Power would know how to keep quiet and refrain from disturbing the peace of Europe.

I naturally assured him that we also cherished the same hope. But I pointed out to him—and the Prince was quite of my opinion—that in case the reactionist party should triumph at the next political elections, and the Republic fall, the government that should take its place would be obliged to resort to war in order to avenge the defeats of 1870 and establish its authority throughout the country.

As regards Austria's attitude towards ourselves, the Prince assured me that he deeply deplored it, and expressed a desire that a cordial understand-

ing might be established between the two governments.

I hereupon reminded him that, although Austria needs peace in order to recuperate after the war of 1866, she cannot possibly forget the injury she has suffered and that, sooner or later, she will feel the necessity of seeking to regain the position she once occupied. His Highness replied that he was determined to believe that would never happen. There could be but one cause for a breach between the two nations, namely, should Austria, by her attitude, encourage a rebellion in Poland. 'Austria,' said the Prince, 'favours the ambitions of the Polish aristocracy. Nevertheless,' he added, 'things have not as yet reached the danger point. Leave me my faith in the government. Should the day dawn on which my presumptions are proved to be mistaken, there will still be time for us to unite and form an alliance.'

My conviction is that the Prince wishes to hold fast to Austria, and I believe I am justified in concluding from his remarks that he intends to maintain a perfect understanding with the Cabinet of Vienna, and that he wishes us to follow the same policy. The remote hypothesis of a rupture between the two empires did not appear to cause His Highness the slightest uneasiness. As to Italy, he frankly declared that although he might deplore a rupture between Austria and that country, he would not allow it to induce him to go to war.

With regard to the Eastern Question the Prince declared that Germany, having no interests at stake, would accept any solution that did not disturb the peace of Europe.

I hastened to point out that it cannot be said of Italy that she has no interests at stake, and I

alluded to the rumours concerning territorial changes, and to Russia's proposal, by means of which she hopes to ingratiate herself with Austria, that Austria take Bosnia and Herzegovina. I reminded him of the condition in which we found ourselves after the peace of 1866, and explained that any addition to the territory of the neighbouring empire would constitute a menace to us. 'Our Eastern frontiers,' I said, 'are extremely exposed, and should Austria's position on the Adriatic be strengthened, we should be held as in a vice, and our safety would be threatened.'

'You should help us at this crisis,' I added. 'We are loyal to our treaties, and we ask nothing of any one. To-morrow you should seek to prevail upon Count Andrassy to relinquish all intention of annexing any part of the Ottoman territory.'

The Prince replied that he did not wish to mention these matters to Andrassy, as the Austrian Chancellor might find them obnoxious topics. He is of opinion, however, that an understanding might be arrived at, and he proposes that, should Austria take Bosnia and Herzegovina, Italy should annex Albania or some other Turkish province on the Adriatic.

In the course of yesterday's conversation the several topics we had discussed at Gastein were once more touched upon, and as I was about to leave, the Prince informed me that he had mentioned our objections to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, to the Chancellor. 'Go to Vienna,' he concluded. 'I am sure you will be able to come to an agreement with Andrassy.'

A journey to Vienna is, indeed, necessary in order to learn Andrassy's intentions in regard to the

Eastern Question, and to ascertain whether there is any possibility of an agreement with Austria. I will go there after I have been to London, whither I am going to-morrow, as my telegram has already informed Your Majesty.

As regards the establishing of equality in the exercise of civil rights between Germans and Italians in the two countries, the Prince had no objections to offer, and willingly accepted our proposals. He mentioned a treaty which exists between Germany and Switzerland—concerning the citizens of Neuchâtel, I believe—and expressed a desire that it might be adopted as a model in stipulating the treaty between the German Empire and the Kingdom of Italy.

The Chancellor promised me that he would obtain the Emperor's orders concerning an eventual alliance against France. He is anxious that the treaty concerning the civil rights should be concluded without delay, and therefore hopes Your Majesty will empower Count de Launay to execute it.

Other less important matters were discussed in the course of both interviews, but I refrain from further particulars, that my letter may not become unduly long. I will explain minutely on my return to Italy, when I hope Your Majesty will deign to grant me an audience.

I am ever at Your Majesty's service, and I grasp this opportunity of once more professing my devotion and my respectful affection, etc., etc. . . .

26 September.—Farewell visit to the Secretary of State, Friedberg and to Minister von Bülow.

27 September.—Before leaving Berlin I despatch the following telegram :—

'To His Majesty the Emperor William.

'BADEN-BADEN.

'Being about to say farewell to Germany I wish to express my deep regret that I have been unable to do homage to Your Majesty in person, and I feel it my duty to thank Your Majesty most warmly and as the supreme head of this great nation, for the proofs of friendship for Italy which the noble German people have given. FRANCESCO CRISPI.'

28 *September*.—I am at Cannon Street Station at 4 A.M.

Presentation at the Athenæum Club.—I send my card to the Speaker, the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief-Justice, Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Derby.

ROME, 26 *September* 1877.

DEAR CRISPI,— . . . Your journey will have one important result: diplomacy has begun to recognise us, to do us justice, to treat with us openly. For a long time we were simply conspirators for the unity of our country; we have been respected as deputies of liberal tendencies, and now we shall be appreciated as statesmen. On your return we will plan together how best to ensure the result of your mission and render it fruitful.

Here are several items of news which you should know, as they may influence you in fixing the date of your return to Rome.

First, as regards home affairs:

Zanardelli tendered his resignation because I had telegraphed him that the delay in the stipulation of the conventions was a calamity. I replied in a conciliatory tone and succeeded in getting him to consent to carry on the negotiations. I still hope,

therefore, to be able to bring that matter to a close without a ministerial crisis.

I do not hope for much from Mancini, for I fear he will never be completely restored to health. This is going to be a source of most serious annoyance to us.

But another misfortune threatens :

Cialdini has recently been in Rome and has declared his disapproval of Mezzacapo, of all these retirements in the army, and of Nicotera with his seventy *Commendatori*. He talked of resigning, not immediately indeed, but before long. Cialdini's resignation would greatly injure us, and I therefore believe it would be well for you to see him, if you are passing through Paris on your way back to Italy, and seek to persuade him not to deprive us of his support. He told me he had had a talk with you, and that you had assured him the Chamber would agree to an increase in the forces. I am not sure the project would have passed without encountering opposition and I will not pretend that some of the provisions made by Mezzacapo were not mistaken, but what is now certain is that something must be done, and that General Cialdini's resignation must be avoided at all costs. You are aware that the Party entirely approved of Mezzacapo's provisions, and that an act of hostility against him would injure both the Party and the Ministry, and might possibly open a breach through which our political adversaries would rush in.

As regards foreign affairs it will be as well for you to know that de Launay has written to Melegari about your visit to [Bismarck],¹ calling attention especially to what [Bismarck] said to [Andrássy].

¹ The words enclosed in [] are in cipher in the original.

Now those expressions contain a programme for us which we must make every effort to carry out. Unfortunately we are ignorant of [Andrássy's] answer, and we may be sure our demands will encounter lively opposition at [Vienna]. It will take much skill, much firmness on our part, and a touch of luck as well, if we are to succeed.

The arguments you used with [Bismarck] on this subject you must, with some reservations, repeat to [Derby]. We have many interests in common with [England] and no interests that clash with hers. We are extremely anxious to maintain relations of the most cordial description with her. This, moreover, it is to our interest to do, because, should we become involved in war, [England's] friendship would ensure the safety of our [fortified ports], that is to say, of our great cities.

In course of conversation with [English] leaders you may touch upon a very delicate subject which must be introduced only in case a propitious occasion presents, and even then only with the greatest precaution.

A part of the English press has been judging us in an unfriendly manner of late. Rumours of an alliance between Italy and Austria have been circulated, whereas, as you are well aware, such an alliance has never existed even as a possibility. Recently also, the Foreign Office published a manifesto concerning the passports with which English subjects are invited to provide themselves before setting out to travel in Italy. This announcement conveys an undeserved affront to Italy and the Italian government, who have always welcomed and will ever continue to welcome British subjects with the greatest cordiality. And are we not the adver-

saries of the Papacy, that most ancient of England's enemies?—Now, many Italians are convinced that one person alone is responsible for this ill-feeling. We are not in favour with the present Ambassador to Rome, who is on terms of intimacy with our political opponents.

I rely implicitly upon your discretion in dealing with this matter, and I advise you to give our Ambassador an inkling of these conditions.

I shall be greatly obliged if you will telegraph to me from London telling me what views are held there as to the result of the elections that will soon take place in France. These prognostications will also serve me in handling the finances.

Kindly keep me posted as to your movements, and let me know on what date you hope to be back in Rome. The financial situation being satisfactory, I trust the parliamentary situation may prove so also. But this is only a part of the problem we have to solve, and much study, much energy and no little labour will be necessary before the rule of the liberal party is firmly established.—Believe me always, your affectionate

A. DEPRETIS.

PS.—I shall feel easier if you will kindly acknowledge receipt of this letter by telegraph.

(Telegram.)

LONDON, 1 October.

Letter received. Will telegraph date of return when I have seen Derby.

CRISPI.

LONDON, 3 October 1877.

DEAR DEPRETIS,—I received your letter. . . .

I will see Cialdini on my way through Paris, and should I hasten my return, I will endeavour to see him in Italy.

It is true that he and I had a discussion concerning the army and the country's defences. He did not appear satisfied with Mezzacapo's provisions, but when we got down to facts he was obliged to admit that many of those who have been retired are indeed past good service, and that those who have been placed *à disposition* or overlooked, can, on occasion, be immediately and honourably reinstated. As a matter of fact the Ministry of War exhibited but slight respect for the veterans of the revolution, whereas those who were our enemies up to 1860 were treated with great consideration. What do you think of Pianell's being placed in command of Verona, at the very gates of Italy, and but a short distance from the Tyrol? And remember that this is a fortress that should have been destroyed, which the Austrians covet, which they would seize the first opportunity to recapture, and whose strength they would probably use against us. In Germany I was informed it had not been destroyed out of consideration for Pianell.

Be this as it may, these are matters we shall deal with presently.

Cialdini must be convinced of this, and I will do my best to prevent his taking a step which would reflect upon us.

I could not hide my visits to Bismarck from de Launay. As I telegraphed you, I kept from him only the knowledge of the negotiations for an alliance against France. He, for his part, always brought all telegrams and letters for me to read before despatching them. I cannot doubt that you have read them all.

It is absolutely necessary that I should visit Vienna and see Andrassy. The military party there

is determined to occupy Bosnia at the earliest opportunity. The German government offers no opposition, but it has refrained from declaring that it intends to allow this occupation. According to what Menabrea tells me, England had no objection to the annexation in the beginning, but when she understood that we could not tolerate it unless we were granted territorial compensation at the foot of the Alps, the government admitted that we were in the right.

The circumstances being such, a frank and resolute declaration that should assure Austria of our consent and support under certain clearly specified conditions, should profit us, and could certainly not injure our position.

I feel myself capable of making such a declaration, and with your consent, will turn my face towards Vienna. Should you not approve, however, I will return to Italy at once. I shall expect to learn your decision by telegraph as soon as you receive this letter.

Disraeli is ill. Derby is in Liverpool, and I am awaiting a line from him telling me where we are to meet. I will call his attention to the points I have already mentioned to you, and I have little doubt of obtaining a favourable answer. I shall find no difficulty in speaking of these matters, now that I know he is well disposed.

It is true that the English press has been unfriendly to us, and in part you yourselves are responsible for this because you have neglected it and allowed the conservatives to get hold of it. In this country the papers are a power and must be reckoned with. For example, here is an incident which happens to concern myself. Yesterday the

Times published a despatch from its Roman correspondent stating that my speeches in Berlin and my telegram to Emperor William have produced an unfavourable impression in the official and diplomatic circles of Berlin. This is simply the echo of certain passages in the *Opinione* of the 29th, which your organs left unrefuted.

My speeches in Berlin were eminently constitutional and in every way correct. In the highest political spheres they were greeted with applause, and many leaders personally expressed their approval to me.

I consulted both Minister von Bülow and Baron von Holstein before despatching my telegram to the Emperor, and not only did they sanction its form but were gratified that I should have given the Emperor credit for the demonstrations on the part of the representatives of the German people in my honour, and in honour of Italy.

Remember that during my visit even court etiquette was disregarded. As soon as the Crown Princess heard of my arrival in Berlin she sent a private messenger to inform me of her wish to see me. And as both the Emperor and the Crown Prince were absent at the manœuvres, the Princess herself gave a dinner in my honour at the palace in Potsdam. Personally I set but slight store by all this, but I cannot but be deeply gratified for my country and my party.

I will make your declaration at the Foreign Office and seek to interest Menabrea in the matter, that he may also help in cancelling the unpleasant impression this affair of the passports has produced. I will not neglect to touch on this subject when I see Lord Derby.

I will send you the information you desire con-

cerning the French elections, and you shall be informed of my further plans as soon as your answer to this letter reaches me by telegraph.

I am delighted to hear the financial outlook is satisfactory. With our finances in good order we shall be able to do great things. Leave the rest to me, and rest assured everything will proceed in a satisfactory manner at the Chamber.

And now allow me to press your hand, and believe me to be yours affectionately, F. CRISPI.

4 October.—A visit to Woolwich.

I telegraph to Depretis: 'Derby coming up from the country to-morrow on purpose to see me. Shall see Gladstone on Saturday. Shall leave for the Continent on Sunday. In the city it is generally believed republican party will win at the elections in France. At French embassy they do not deny this possibility, but it is believed MacMahon will gain votes, and govern with the left-centre.'

5 October.—An interview with Lord Derby at one o'clock. My trip to Germany.—Conventions for reciprocity of civil rights.—Mutually cordial sentiments.—France and Germany: 'Their mistrust of each other. Asks me what Bismarck's views are. I tell him that Bismarck will not go to war unless forced to do so.—France: Her allies.—The territorial *status quo*. Changes in the East: Appeal to the Powers for justice. Derby: 'Take Albania.' Our position as regards Austria, the Power on our borders.

I telegraph to the King: 'I have been with Minister for Foreign Affairs. He sees the justness of our objections to Austria's occupation of a Turkish Province and will remember in event of its happening. He raised no objection when I told

him that in such a case we should have the right to claim compensation in the Alps.'

I telegraph to Depretis :

'Have seen Derby. Am satisfied with interview. Consents to treaty concerning Article III. Civil Code, and will remember our objections to eventual territorial expansion of Austria on Adriatic.'

6 *October*.—At 8 o'clock I start for Chester. Leave Chester at 9.45, and reach Hawarden Castle at 10.30. Those who are unfamiliar with Great Britain must be amazed at sight of these rural regions so thickly populated and everywhere under cultivation.

Hawarden Castle is situated in Flint County in Wales, and very near the English frontier, to which country it was annexed in the reign of Henry III.

Gladstone's place occupies the very site of the castle of Edward I. The castle stands upon high ground and commands a fine view of the surrounding plains. The English flag floats above it as a sign that Gladstone is there.

The house he occupies is but a short distance from the park. It is Gothic in style and was built sixty years ago. On entering one is struck by the great number of books which are everywhere.

Mr. Gladstone received me like an old friend. He expressed his pleasure at having me with him, and I told him how delighted I was to press the hand of so faithful a friend to Italy. I was then presented to Mrs. Gladstone, an amiable and cultured lady who, on learning that business would oblige me to return to London at once, was kind enough to express regret that I could not remain longer. Both Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone had wished me to stay a couple of days with them. Mr. Glad-

stone, who was the first to learn that I could spare but one day, exclaimed: 'But I see you have your box with you!' as much as to say: 'You surely have not come for a few hours only!'

We immediately entered upon a discussion of the topics of the day, and especially of the Eastern Question and its consequences.

Mr. Gladstone is of opinion that the Russians will conquer in the end. He thinks it possible there may be a Winter campaign, but does not believe the Turks will come through it victorious.

'The same thing will happen to them as befell the Southerners in America,' he said. 'Up to the present they have been able to hold out, and have even been victorious on one or two occasions, because they are better armed than the Russians, but superiority of numbers will triumph in the end, for the resources of an empire counting 80 millions of subjects are overpowering when set against those of an empire counting but six-and-twenty millions. It is unfortunate that the Eastern Question could not have been settled otherwise than by force of arms, but there was no alternative. For Russia to-day, it is a question of life or death.'

I called Mr. Gladstone's attention to the ill-feeling, I might almost say the spitefulness, displayed by the English press against Italy.

'It is difficult to discover the reason for this,' he said, 'because there is really no reason. One may seek an explanation for it in the *russophobia* which has attacked us, and which has reached the point of absurdity. Italy being on friendly terms with Germany, who is on friendly terms with Russia, it is generally assumed that you share this friendship. This, however, is not the sentiment of the people,

but only of the upper classes. Now, in this country, the upper classes come last and the people first. Happily the Italian Question is settled for all time, but should it be raised again, you would find this country enthusiastic in your defence.'

'I am gratified by what you tell me, and I shall not forget it. We are on friendly terms with Germany because our interests are identical and because her enemies are ours, but this does not mean that we must share her political relations and her friendships. We are on friendly terms with your country for reasons that are almost identical.'

We then proceeded to discuss the Papacy, the Eastern Question, the situation of Austria and that of France.

'Italy's condition is now such as to make her a desirable ally for you instead of Austria and France, to whom you cannot have resource,' I said.

'You are right,' Gladstone admitted, 'but, believe me, you have the good will of the English people, and you must not attribute undue importance to a newspaper article which is simply the outcome of *russophobia*, and does not express the feelings of the nation.'

Mrs. Gladstone joins us.—We go to visit the castle.—Lunch.—A walk in the park.—The parish.

Lord Derby is weak, but unprejudiced against foreigners, and liberal-minded on the whole.

The appointment of parish priests.—The Papacy.—The future Pope and the candidates.—Cardinal Simeoni.—Cardinal Antonelli.—His daughters.—The trial.

The castle of Hawarden was besieged and destroyed by the Parliamentarians in the time of Charles I.

The parish of Hawarden counts 6000 inhabitants—church dates from XVI. century—was destroyed by fire some years ago, and only the walls remained standing.

Dinner.—I take my departure.

7 October.—I receive the following telegram from the King: ‘Thank you for your despatch. I hope that ministerial expectations may be realised. Please let me know when you are returning.

‘VICTOR EMMANUEL.’

I reply as follows: ‘I am returning the 22 or 24 inst. I am leaving for Vienna, where I await Your Majesty’s orders.’

8 October.—I leave London at 8.30 P.M.

9 October.—Arrive in Paris at 6.30 A.M.—I see Gambetta.

11 October.—Leave Paris at 9.20 A.M.

12 October.—Reach Vienna at 9.30 P.M.

13 October.—Our Ambassador, General Robilant, writes, placing himself at my service. At 12.30 I go to see him.—He gives me valuable information.—I telegraph to Depretis: ‘Have received your letter. Andrassy is in the country. Will be in Buda-Pesth on the twentieth. Situation here complicated. Will write to-morrow morning. Contradict report that I was present at Gambetta’s electoral address.’

14 October.—I receive the following telegram from Depretis: ‘Am awaiting your letters. Meanwhile must inform you that de Launay has written advising utmost circumspection in dealing with Vienna. If you have an opportunity of speaking with Andrassy keep to generalities, expressing our friendly feeling, but maintaining the strictest reserve as regards any differences which might arise between the two countries. We hope to be able to come

to an agreement concerning the Eastern Question. Therefore come to Rome as soon as possible. The conditions are becoming serious and your presence is absolutely necessary.'

I call upon Minister Glaser.—Article III. of the Civil Code.—Formalities.—Old questions brought up again.—Agreement for an international convention.

I call upon Monsieur Orczy.—Article III.—Treaty of Commerce.

I visit Schönbrunn.

DEAR CRISPI,—I am writing to you from Stradella, where I have been able to stop for a few hours. I have had not a moment's leisure during the last three days. After the inauguration of the new Venetian railways I went to Brescia, or rather to a country place near Brescia to see Zanardelli. I had a long talk with him, and he showed himself strongly opposed to the assumption of the public services by government. He seems disposed to support me. I did not conceal from him my determination not to present myself before the Chamber until the terms of the conventions are stipulated. Zanardelli, who is now perfectly well again, will come to Rome presently, and then the matter will be definitely concluded, as I am in a position to bring the negotiations to a close at any moment. But your presence in Rome is necessary, for should any misunderstanding arise between Zanardelli and myself the position would become most serious.

And now as to the main purpose of this letter of which I gave you a hint in my telegram from Padua. It is certainly unnecessary for me to beg you not to mention, at [Vienna], your [interviews]

with [Bismarck], and to maintain the strictest [reserve]. The [Catholic party] is very numerous and powerful in that city, and will not fail to watch your every movement and seize upon your every [utterance] for the purpose of publishing it. Our [adversaries'] press is ever ready to spread the most insidious [insinuations], and would be glad of [fresh pretexts].

As regards your [interview] with [Andrássy], besides Article III., you will certainly touch upon the [treaty of commerce] and the possible [extension] of [Austrian] territory by means of the [annexation] of [Bosnia].

As to the [treaty of commerce], it will suffice to express our [desire] to resume and [conclude negotiations], and should it be impossible to stipulate the terms of a [permanent treaty], we must try, at least, to come to an understanding in the form of a *modus vivendi* or of a [temporary treaty] by way of experiment. The basis for the permanent [treaty] we have pointed out to [Haymerle] in a memorandum which has been consigned to him, and in which we furthermore informed him that weighty reasons of a financial nature would make it impossible for us to accept certain stipulations made in the course of previous [negotiations]—the abolition of the duty on [grain] coming into Italy, for example. But try to convince [Andrássy] of our sincere wish for an agreement on the [points] that are of importance to the [Austrian government].

You must also do your best to explain our [government's position] as regards the question of the 9145 (?).

[Italy] stands in need of [peace] and desires to maintain [friendly] relations with her neighbours.

We are in full [sympathy] with [Andrássy], with his [ministry] and with the liberal [party] that supports him, and we are disposed to do everything in our power to remain on a [friendly footing] with him. But tell him also that we shall not be [able] to [control] public [opinion in Italy] in the event of [Austrian expansion] without [compensation] to Italy. This is perfectly true. What would take place in [Italy] it is difficult to foresee, but it is evident that the present [ministry] could not remain in office.

You must, my dear Crispi, be most [cautious] in your utterances, both out of consideration for [Robilant], who is extremely [susceptible], and in order not to provide the [Catholic and military parties] with a pretext for rousing [apprehensions] which it is most important to avoid. Let your words [express] your honest [personal opinion], and take your cue from what [Andrássy] may say to you.

Here, my dear Crispi, you have a synopsis of my views which I felt it incumbent upon me to expose to you, and which you may perhaps consider superfluous. Have patience with me however, for I am fully alive to the serious nature of prevailing conditions, and determined to neglect nothing that can benefit our country.—Believe me always, yours affectionately,

DEPRETIS.

STRADELLA, 10 October, 1877.

VIENNA, 15 October, 1877.

DEAR DEPRETIS,—As I telegraphed you on the evening of the 13th, the conditions here are complicated. The press, politicians, ministry and court—all are antagonistic to us. I cannot tell you who

has stirred up all this ill-feeling, I can but certify to the fact, which is of the greatest importance.

Robilant, who described the state of affairs to me, told me that the Austrians hold us responsible for all their misfortunes. We have aroused the spirit of nationalism here, and are keeping it alive by our pretensions to Illyria and the Trent district. Had it not been for us, the war of 1866 would never have taken place, in consequence of which Austria was excluded from the German confederacy. We may even prove the cause, and bring about the dissolution of the empire if we persist in our demands for the possession of the territory which Austria holds beyond the Alps.

I need not point out the injustice of these accusations, but no judgment can be sound which is influenced by conflicting interests.

The conditions being such, my first duty was to pacify, if possible, the general indignation, and reinstate Italy in the esteem of the Austrian liberals.

The editors of several newspapers have called upon me, among others the proprietors of the *Neue Freie Presse*, and of the *Tageblatt*, which journals have the widest circulation of all, both here and in foreign countries. I made a point of inquiring of each one of these gentlemen why, for the last two years, they had shown themselves so hostile to our ministry. The editor of the *Presse* declared it was because Melegari's policy in regard to the Eastern Question is not straightforward, and said it would even appear from his attitude that we favoured Russia. Nevertheless, although they protested their friendship for Italy and their desire to maintain peaceful and friendly relations with us, the fact was

apparent that they one and all mistrust us. As regards the Eastern Question, I pointed out that we had observed and are still observing the strictest neutrality; that we do not favour either of the belligerents, but only regret that the condition of the people it was intended to redeem is worse than before. As to Austria, I added that we are her friends, and wish to co-operate with her in promoting the common interests of both countries. I enlarged somewhat upon this point, upholding the principle that the Empire must be preserved and consolidated, constituting, as it does in our eyes, a bulwark of civilisation in the East.

The proprietor of the *Neue Freie Presse* assured me that we shall soon become friends again. I did not make much out of the proprietor of the *Tageblatt*, for he came armed with a copy of his paper containing an article about me, which was flattering if not always historically accurate.

When your telegram reached me last night, I had already been to see the Minister of Justice and Baron Orczy, who is Count Andrassy's right hand and his representative at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreseeing what your wishes would be, I had assumed an attitude towards these statesmen which entirely coincided with your wishes. Robilant, who was present at my interview with Monsieur Orczy, could not refrain from expressing his approval of my conduct.

Count Andrassy is visiting his Hungarian estates. Some say he postponed his departure for twenty-four hours in anticipation of my arrival, but others there are who declare he hurried away for the purpose of avoiding me. Count Robilant is of opinion that neither statement is correct.

Count Andrassy will be at Buda-Pesth after the 17th, and as I am going there, I shall probably have an opportunity of meeting him. As I have already published my intention of visiting Buda-Pesth, and communicated with friends there who had urged me to come, I cannot well alter my plans without arousing suspicion and furnishing a pretext for malicious conjecturings. But I assure you I shall be most circumspect in my bearing, and that our political position will not be compromised.

I am returning to Italy immediately after my visit to Buda-Pesth.

This is all for to-day, so I press your hand.—
Yours affectionately, F. CRISPI.

15 *October*.—Visit from Minister Glaser. Another lengthy discussion concerning the convention for equality of civil rights in the two states—execution of judgments, confiscations and like provisions.—Limitations.—Judgments rendered without discussion.

I send my card to the President of the Chamber.

16 *October*.—The President of the Chamber calls upon me.—Our conversation turns on parliamentary procedure.

At noon I go to the House of Parliament. The Vice-President Vidulich, an Istrian, conducts me. The President arrives.

I visit the prisons, the Court of Assizes and the Tribunal.

At 4.30 I call upon the Minister of Commerce.

17 *October*.—Vice-President Vidulich calls upon me.—The communes in Austria.—Electoral system.—The Communal Council.—The Communal Deputation and the elective *Podestà*. Three classes of

voters, according to census. In communes that have their own statute the *podestà*, or mayor, is proposed by the council and approved by the Emperor. The provincial diets.—Legislative authorities for local administration—districts subject to their authority.

18 *October*.—I leave Vienna at 8.30 A.M. Reach Buda-Pesth at 5.30 P.M.

19 *October*.—I visit the two Hungarian Chambers and the Museum.

20 *October*.—At 4.30 P.M. I call upon the President of the Hungarian Council, Monsieur Tisza.

‘Your Excellency has made a long journey. Are you going to visit the Orient also?’ he inquired.

‘No, there is no reason why I should do so,’ I replied. ‘Vienna and Buda-Pesth are the last stages of my journey. I had arranged this before setting out.’ First subject of discussion—International Convention for ensuring civil rights to Austro-Hungarians in Italy and to Italians in Austria-Hungary. Tisza does not refuse outright, but does not stop to examine any of the questions appertaining to the matter. Second subject—Treaty of Commerce. If the present treaty is to be prorogued, special clauses respecting Hungarian wines will be proposed. When I pointed out that, should the question be brought up for discussion before the House, prorogation might not result, Tisza declared his determination to cut the discussion as short as possible. Third subject—Agreement between the two countries. Answer: ‘Not all of your fellow-countrymen are of your way of thinking.’ I observe that the country is represented by its Parliament and by its Government. The parliament is the lawful representative of public

opinion. Sobriety of the constitutional *régime*. All questions are handled openly in Italy—military matters and international problems alike. We may be attacked, but we shall never attack.—The three Emperors.—Eastern Question.—In 1854 Piedmont shed much blood and was lavish with money.

‘It was not a bad policy,’ he declared.

‘Recognising this, you must understand that we shall not depart from it. At any rate, Austria’s policy was different,’ I replied.

Declarations of good will towards Italy. I take my leave at a quarter to five.

Tisza looks like a parson. His face wears an expression of impassibility, and huge spectacles hide his eyes. He does not argue, but lays down the law. It is clearly apparent that his knowledge of civil law is but slight. He desires an international, European alliance. A fine thing, were it possible, but used here only to prevent any conclusion being reached.

At five o’clock I receive a call from the Minister of Justice and his Under-Secretary of State. The Minister said to me: ‘We did not wish you to leave Buda-Pesth without a good impression of us.’

Dinner party at the house of President Ghyczy. There were present: Deputies representing the different parties, several ex-ministers, Szlávý (Jórséf) formerly prime minister—Gorosc, formerly minister of commerce, now president of the Club of the Left—Simonyi, formerly minister of commerce—Szapáry, formerly minister of the interior—Bittò (István), formerly prime minister—Eber, deputy—Wahermann Mór, deputy—Csernátory, deputy and editor of the *Ellenor*—Falk, deputy and editor of

the *Pester Lloyd*—Zsedénzi, president of the finance commission—Pulszky, director of the museum—Kállay Beni, deputy of the extreme right—Hélfy Ignáez, deputy of the extreme left, etc., etc.

I telegraph to the King: ‘I expect to be in Turin on the 24th. I beg Your Majesty to telegraph me where and when I may see you. At Your Majesty’s service, etc. . . .’

I call upon Andrassy at 12.30. The question of civil rights.—Treaty of Commerce.

‘Your trip to Gastein did not alarm me,’ the Premier said, ‘and I let the press have its say.’

‘You had no reason to be alarmed,’ I replied, ‘for Prince Bismarck himself informed you of it, and told you what my views were. I said nothing that you could possibly object to.’

He went on to speak of his policy towards Italy.—Ultramontanism—antiquated views—are not to Austria-Hungary’s interest. Had he been an Italian he would have done the same. Present necessity for remaining friends and refraining from disturbing relations by demands it is practically impossible to comply with. He does not credit newspaper reports, but believes in our good faith. He adds: ‘The principle of nationalism is not everywhere applicable, nor may nationality be established according to language. Politics are not subject to the rules of grammar. Nationality is composed of various elements—first and foremost of which is topography, and next come the economic conditions upon which the existence of the population depends. Take Trieste, could we be persuaded to give it to you, and you would not remain there four-and-twenty hours. You would be cursed! I have a memorandum on this subject, in which I have dealt

with these principles, and which I should have liked to show you, had I it by me.

‘Let us speak frankly: do you wish for other territory? Then say so. That is a policy I understand! It is a question now. . . .’

‘I agree with the principle you maintain,’ I assured him. ‘Language alone cannot decide nationality, and should we adopt language as a gauge, we should only win the enmity of many states, and be quickly forced into war. Now our policy is one of peace. We wish to stand well with our neighbours, to establish agreements that shall further the interests of all concerned, and we will respect our treaties. We shall not attack, but should we be attacked we shall defend ourselves. We became revolutionists in order to create Italy, but we are conservatives in maintaining her. You alone are capable of understanding us, for you also were once a revolutionist.’

‘I was hanged in effigy!’ was his reply.¹

‘Then you are aware that when the liberty and independence of a country have been acquired at cost of great sacrifice, those who made that sacrifice will never endanger the welfare of that country by embarking upon foolhardy adventures. Fiume!—A ridiculous imputation! Ports are the necessary outlet for commerce, and those who possess them must also hold the territory whence the produce is derived. What use have we for Fiume?’

‘The Parliament and the Government represent public opinion. Have you any reason to complain of their attitude? The two states must remain friends and their governments must agree.’

¹ Count J. Andrassy took part in the Hungarian revolution of 1848-9, he being a Hungarian. He was sentenced to death by an Austrian court-martial, and was hanged in effigy on September 22, 1851.

‘That is the policy I faithfully followed during the six years I was minister, and which I have continued to follow since I became Chancellor five years since,’ Andrassy said. ‘I ignore newspapers and parliaments alike, and I defy unpopularity, for I know what is best for the Empire. A hostile policy towards Italy is contrary to the interests of Austria-Hungary.—As long as I remain in office I shall not alter my policy.’

‘In conclusion,’ I said, ‘let us decide to stipulate a treaty of commerce and regulate civil relations.’

‘Not so fast!’ Andrassy admonished. ‘Politics have little to do with commercial relations.’

We go into the question.—The example of Germany.

‘I am also of this opinion,’ I replied, ‘but let us examine the consequences. I do not say the treaty of commerce should be entered into blindly. My idea is that we should open negotiations in order to reach a conclusion. The suspension of the treaty might give rise to false impressions.’

‘There I agree with you,’ the Premier said.

‘How about an understanding on the Eastern Question? . . .’

The Turco-Russian war; what its end will be. A question of nationality involved here also; how best to settle it. Autonomy for the Bulgarians—to what extent?—to the Balkans. And the others? All this if Russia conquers. But if Turkey should conquer? We must wait for the close of the war.

‘It is precisely at that moment that we should be prepared to co-operate.’

Money and lives lavished.—A question that breaks out periodically—the necessity for settling it once and

for all.—Impossible to foresee how this is to be done, and whether it will be best to establish the territorial *status quo*.

‘Even on this point nothing can be finally settled,’ Andrassy said. ‘We must wait until such a time as the Powers shall meet in Congress.’

‘That is well, but would you be willing to give a tract of territory to Russia?’

‘Certainly not. But, for the rest, we must await a more favourable opportunity for rearranging things.’

‘Very well,’ I replied. ‘This is another point on which we wish to suit our action to yours.’

Am at Elfy at 3.30 P.M.

I receive the following telegram in answer to mine of this morning: ‘I beg that you will come and stay at my palace in Turin. On Wednesday I will let you know at what time I shall have the pleasure of seeing you.—Kindest regards,

‘VICTOR EMMANUEL.’

23 October.—In Turin.—A conference with the King.

NAPLES, 30 Oct. 1877.

DEAR DEPRETIS,—I hope we may not have war, but as we cannot check the course of European events, and as it is of paramount importance that Europe should esteem us sufficiently powerful to make our strength felt should complications result from the war in the East, it is incumbent upon us to hold ourselves in readiness to join in the campaign if necessary. On this point, my friend, I cannot find words strong enough to impress upon you that, at no matter what cost, Italy must complete her arma-

ment. In foreign lands we are looked upon as a prudent and law-abiding people, but there are many who consider us weak.

Andrássy did not say as much to me, but Robilant told me that in course of conversation, the Austro-Hungarian Chancellor had implied to him that the Empire was ready to settle all territorial questions by force of arms.

It is therefore necessary for the welfare of our country that we place ourselves in a position in which we shall be able to declare our readiness to take up arms, should our adversaries push us to this point.

In this way only shall we be able to avoid war.

My regret is doubly profound when I reflect that, as far back as 1870, the Ministry of the Right turned a deaf ear to my petition to arm the nation in anticipation of mighty events.

But to-day we ourselves are in office, and should misfortune befall us our adversaries would hasten to proclaim that we had not done our duty. Let us, therefore, set to work zealously, doing all that is necessary.

I beg you to telegraph me, and I assure you that I shall always be with you in everything that is for the good of our country.

I sincerely hope you and Zanardelli may be reconciled at last.

The railways present another all-important problem which must be solved, one way or the other, without delay.

In anticipation of war we must have the great lines uniting the different parts of Italy reorganised. Zanardelli is a true patriot, and must understand how heavy is the responsibility that rests upon him.

This branch of the public service must be reconstructed before the month of December is out. We must not allow the railways of Upper Italy to remain any longer at the mercy of the *Südbahn*. Although the director is a person to be trusted, he must nevertheless obey the orders of a company that is not friendly to us. To my way of thinking this is not only a financial question, but an eminently political one as well.

If you will but play upon this chord in conferring with the Minister of Public Works, I am sure you will succeed with him.—Yours affectionately,

F. CRISPI.

CHAPTER II

ITALY'S FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1878 TO THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

Count Corti refuses the proposal for a secret understanding with England on the eve of the Berlin Congress—How France obtained *carte blanche* for Tunis—The policy of isolation—Irridentist movement makes Austria threaten to cross frontier—Benedetto Cairoli's partiality to France does not prevent occupation of Tunis—Documentary history of England's abstention from interference—At that time Italy might have occupied Tripoli—Disappointed in France, she turns to Germany—Forerunners of the Triple Alliance—Count Maffei—The treaty of May 20, 1882.

CRISPI's journey, which was welcomed with enthusiastic fervour in Germany, aroused suspicion in the French government and press, who had unpleasant visions of a German-Italian alliance. The *Figaro* published an article entitled *M. Crispi à Berlin*, in which the extraordinary reception the Italian statesman had received, and the more striking passages in President von Bunnigsen's speech at the parliamentary banquet of September 23, were dwelt upon at length. Among others, the following passage was especially pointed out: '... the two peoples—Germans and Italians—have a common enemy to combat.' In Italy also the conservative press sought to minimise the value of the demonstrations of which Crispi had been made the object by declaring that, although he was indeed President of the Chamber of Deputies (so the *Gazzetta d'Italia* wrote), he represented that body only, that is to say, a very small minority. 'The Chamber is elected by 300,000 voters, and Italy has 27 million inhabitants!' And the *Opinione*, the most influential journal of the conservative party, went so far (October 3) as to censure the government for maintaining friendly relations with the Berlin Cabinet 'at the expense of our

dignity'! This judgment aroused the wrath of that excellent ambassador, de Launay, who wrote to Crispi: 'This is indeed too much! The reproach falls, in part, upon the representative of this policy in Germany. . . . I have written to Melegari to confute this accusation in the strongest possible terms.'

As a matter of fact, during that excursion across Europe, Crispi had spoken wisely on behalf of Italy's rights, had re-kindled friendly sentiments, and laid the foundations for a policy which, had it been carefully and loyally adhered to, would have spared our country the injury and insult which she suffered later on at the hands of all. Crispi found that the ancient Austrian Empire was still alive and stern, and he saw that the day for an honest and lasting alliance between the two countries was still far distant. But it was the very moment for an alliance with Germany—public opinion was favourable, and Prince Bismarck had not, as yet, contracted other obligations. It was his wish, indeed, to co-operate with Austria; but at that time he entertained no thought of an alliance with her, nor did he do so until after the Berlin Congress, when it became necessary to reply to panslavistic threats, and even then he did not succeed in bringing about an alliance until 1879, having experienced the greatest difficulty in persuading the Emperor William. Without counting all the moral, political, and economic advantages that would have accrued to us, the Italo-German alliance would have guaranteed our position at the Berlin Congress. It would probably have failed to prevent the Austro-German alliance; but Austria, not Italy, would then have been the last to enter the German league, and we should have been spared the mortification we suffered in 1882, when we were forced to pass through Vienna in order to reach Berlin. Moreover, France would not have obtained *carte blanche* to occupy Tunis in 1878, and would not have dared to inflict that humiliation upon us, by taking advantage of the 'right of the stronger.'

The King and his Prime Minister decided to give Italy's policy a new tendency, and on December 29, 1877, Crispi entered the Depretis Ministry as Minister of the Interior. But unfortunately, a few days later, Victor Emmanuel fell ill, and died on the ninth of February. The obsequies of the first King of Italy, the first acts of Humbert, and the death of

Pius IX., followed by the Conclave that appointed Leo XIII., absorbed all the attention of the ministry; and when the time came to turn his mind once more to the arrangements made with Prince Bismarck at Gastein, Crispi fell from office, the victim of a shameful conspiracy, skilfully set afoot, in the name of morality, by men destitute of moral principles both in their political and private careers, but who found ready support among those dabblers in politics who are ever eager for scandal and upheaval. As the accusations hurled against him were of a delicate and domestic nature, Crispi would defend himself only before the magistrate, and was freely acquitted of all suspicion of illegal conduct. But, to his intense grief, he was obliged to relinquish his ambition to render those services to his country which he was sure of being able to accomplish.

As long as he lived he never ceased to sorrow over the irremediable evil which his enemies had inflicted more upon Italy than upon himself. From a diary of his of the year 1896 we take an account of a conversation he had on October 26 with Domenico Farini, President of the Senate.

Crispi to Farini.

As you are well aware, in 1878 the convocation of a congress to be held at Berlin was decided upon, and Italy must send a representative. Then, as now, I was being mishandled by my adversaries. However, personal attacks could not make me forget the interests of my country. I saw Bertani, and in speaking to him of my visits to the various European States, and of our position towards foreign countries, I begged him to see Cairoli and advise him to read my letters and telegrams, and then confer with me. In treating international questions there are some things that may not be put on paper, and I could therefore add much to the written reports. Would you believe it? *Cairoli refused either to read my reports or to confer with me!* Bertani left him in anger, and at Berlin, instead

of combating the proposed Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, they favoured it.

The declarations made by Crispi, in the name of Italy, to Lord Derby in the course of their conversation on December 5 were seeds sown in fertile soil. Never suspecting that Italy, as regards her foreign policy, was as changeable as a child at its play, towards the first of March 1878 Lord Derby proposed an exchange of views on the common interests of Italy and England in the Mediterranean. Depretis accepted the offer so eagerly that General Menabrea, our ambassador at London, telegraphed him on March 9 as follows :—

In obedience to the orders contained in your telegram of yesterday I have begun to confer with Derby on the state of affairs in Egypt, Tripoli and Tunis. He says it is plain that Italy and England have common interests in the Mediterranean, and that for this reason he desires an exchange of views, reserving the right to take the matter up again later on.

On March 13 Menabrea telegraphed again.

. . . Derby has answered that he desires to come to an understanding with Italy on the questions regarding the Mediterranean, and that he has commissioned Paget [English Ambassador at Rome] to approach Your Excellency on this subject.

On March 16 General Menabrea was still more emphatic.

Lord Derby appears to count upon Italy's co-operation in protecting common interests in the Mediterranean and Black Sea. He told me he had charged Sir A. Paget to approach Your Excellency on this subject, as Your Excellency yourself suggested in your telegram of the 8th of this month.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had remained silent since the eighth. Depretis had resigned on the ninth; the ministerial crisis was brought to a close on the twenty-fourth by

the nomination of Benedetto Cairoli to the office of President of the Council. At last Rome replied. Count Corti, who had assumed the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs on the twenty-sixth, did not hesitate, two days later, to repulse the hand England had extended to us, and that by means of the following incredible letter, in which it is not made clear why he limited the offer of co-operation, which had embraced the Mediterranean as well, to the Black Sea and the Straits.

ROME, 26 March, 1878.

To His Excellency the Ambassador.

The English Ambassador has this day waited upon me, and, in obedience to the orders of his government, communicated to me what Your Excellency has already announced.

In anticipation of the changes which the present war may bring in the equilibrium of the Powers that have hitherto maintained order at the points of communication between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, Her Majesty's government considers that the governments who have the most extensive interests at stake in those waters should unite in considering how best to protect their commercial interests in the Black Sea and the Straits, and should, in consequence, look upon any act calculated to violate those interests as a question of general import : furthermore, that, in consideration of these conditions, they should, from time to time and in as far as this is practicable, proceed to establish understandings concerning the measures that may appear necessary for the protection of these interests.

I replied to Sir Augustus Paget that His Majesty's government attaches the greatest importance to remaining on terms of the most perfect cordiality and intimacy with the English Government ; that, without doubt, England and Italy have many common interests of a commercial nature at stake

as regards the *régime* at the Straits and in the Black Sea ; that we shall ever be glad to receive any communications and warnings which Her Majesty's government may see fit to forward to us on the subject ; but that the Italian government does not deem it expedient to assume responsibilities in this regard, which might lead to active measures.

By means of this despatch I have the honour to present an account of the English Ambassador's communication and of my reply, which information is intended for Your Excellency's personal enlightenment.—Receive, etc., etc. . . . L. CORTI.

Confronted with the instability of Italian politics, Lord Derby—who had probably counted upon Italy for the success of his diplomatic plan, which certainly contained, as he had promised Crispi it should, a guarantee of Italian interests in regard to the much talked-of Austrian annexation—could have had but a poor opinion of the ‘descendants of Machiavelli,’ and he hastened to exert his zeal in the interests of Austria. In fact, at the session of June 28, 1878, of the Congress which had assembled in Berlin on the thirteenth of that month, it was Lord Salisbury, one of the English plenipotentiaries, who, ‘having duly considered the gravity of the conditions prevalent in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and recognising Turkey's inability to deal with them,’ proposed that ‘these two provinces be subjected to military occupation by Austria, and be administered by her.’

And Prince Bismarck, who had doubtless waited in vain for a renewal of the offers made at Gastein and in Berlin by Crispi in the name of his sovereign, did not hesitate to second the Marquis of Salisbury's proposal, in the name of Germany.

Italy was entirely ignored, and Count Corti, who represented her at the Congress, was not even wise enough to hold his peace. He asked the Austrian representative, who was Andrassy himself, if he ‘was prepared to furnish further explanations on the subject of the proposed arrangement with regard to its bearing on the interests of Europe in general’! Andrassy did not reply to this futile question, but

simply observed that he was convinced 'the view the Austro-Hungarian government had taken of the interests of Europe in general would prove as satisfactory to the Italian Cabinet as it had to all the others.'

Not even France denied her adhesion, and that country's leading diplomatist, M. Waddington, expressed the opinion that 'the arrangement proposed by the English Cabinet was the only one that would ensure peace to the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that the Austro-Hungarian intervention must be looked upon as a police measure, adopted by Europe.'

Nor could this adhesion be withheld. As England received the island of Crete (by means of a convention with Turkey concluded on June 4, before the opening of the Congress), so Germany sought to benefit herself by protecting the interests of Russia, and thus purchasing her gratitude; and as Austro-Hungary received Bosnia and Herzegovina, so France, by means of arrangements made behind the scenes, obtained permission to occupy Tunis whenever she should see fit to do so.

The granting of this permission—which explains the ambiguous attitude of the English Cabinet in the Tunisian question when Italy remonstrated—was for years alternately affirmed and denied. But there can no longer be any doubt concerning it.

'Gambetta,' so General Cialdini wrote on June 26, 1880, 'reminded us how, immediately after the Berlin Congress, France was advised by Prince Bismarck, and urged and encouraged by Lord Beaconsfield, to take Tunis, while neither Germany nor England had given a thought to Italy's desires or to what was due her.'

Waddington himself openly boasts of this concession, as of one of the greatest achievements of his career. This is clearly revealed in the following letter from the Ambassador Tornielli to Crispi:—

LONDON, 9 January, 1894.

. . . During the electoral campaign, which has resulted so unfortunately for M. Waddington, that gentleman, in setting forth the efforts he has made on behalf of France in the course of his diplomatic

career, mentioned in a letter to the newspapers, among other claims to merit, that he had, by means of a secret understanding with England, obtained *carte blanche* for France at Tunis, on the occasion of the Berlin Congress, thus enabling France to establish her protectorate there later on, without provoking a European incident.

While Lord Salisbury was in office, I was repeatedly obliged, in obedience to the precise instructions of His Majesty's government, to put up with his evasive answers to our communications which sought to induce the London Cabinet to share our interest in the Biserta Question, and I was careful to report at the time, that it was my opinion this English minister, who had represented his country at the Berlin Congress, was bound, in the matter, by obligations then personally contracted with M. Waddington. What at first was but a suspicion aroused by Lord Salisbury's strange attitude, became almost a certainty during a conversation I had with Lord Rosebery in July 1893, when he incidentally informed me that the occupation of Tunis by France had been arranged between that country and the other Powers at the time of the Berlin Congress.

M. Waddington's recent letter to his constituents removes all doubt. The former French Ambassador to London is not a man to trifle with words whose meaning and importance are perfectly clear to him. I have not seen the French text of his article, but I have before me the English version published by the *Times*: 'Finally by a secret stipulation with England, I obtained *carte blanche* for France in Tunis, which later on permitted us to establish there our protectorate without the occurrence of any

European incident.' If M. Waddington says that a secret stipulation took place with England, that means that there exists a written agreement, and his last words would imply that other Powers were cognisant of this, and offered no objections. This interpretation would coincide with what Lord Rosebery incidentally told me.

It is worthy of note that the Italian representatives at Berlin had a vague suspicion that agreements between the others concerning Tunis had been stipulated, or were in the course of stipulation. In fact, on July 18, 1878, five days after the signing of the treaty, Ambassador de Launay telegraphed to Rome as follows:—

It would be wise to keep our eyes open in Paris as regards certain possible agreements concerning Tunis.

This warning, transmitted to our ambassador at Paris, irritated General Cialdini, who replied on the eighteenth.

In reply to your telegram of the day before yesterday concerning the Tunisian question, I am to-day forwarding to Your Excellency a fresh report of the most reassuring nature. Kindly inform His Excellency the Ambassador of His Majesty at Berlin that it would be wise to keep a vigilant eye upon Prince Bismarck as regards certain possible agreements concerning Holland.

General Cialdini's sarcasm was out of place, for the combination concerning Tunis was an accomplished fact; but it was not at Paris that we should have kept watch, as de Launay recommended—we should have had our eyes open at Berlin.

Count de Launay, who, though he may not have been a genius was, nevertheless, a zealous diplomatist, sought to solve the mystery. But the information he obtained from his colleagues only rendered it more impenetrable.

The English ambassador, Lord Odo Russell, told him that

France's views concerning the possession of Tunis, or at least of establishing a protectorate there, had notably developed, and that we must not allow future events to take us by surprise. M. Radowitz expressed the opinion that certain 'insinuations' had been made to M. Waddington, who had 'declined any discussion, even of an academic nature.' And so, being unable to form a judgment derived from a knowledge of facts, he argued that, in her own interest, England must prefer to see Italy rather than France strengthen her position in the Mediterranean, and that, naturally, Germany would rather see Tunis in the hands of Italy than in those of France. Therefore there was nothing to fear. 'It is evident,' he concluded, 'that we could not allow the country, which is now a Regency, to become a French province, to be used, in case of necessity, as a basis for military operations, either for the purpose of organising insurrections in our own territory, or of paralysing our movements in the Mediterranean, should we become involved in war. France presses us too closely already with Savoy, Nice, the Upper Dauphiné, Corsica, etc., for us to consent to allow her to acquire other strategic points which may be a menace to us.'

The policy formed by the Hon. Benedetto Cairoli, who was President of the Council almost without interruption from 1871 to 1881, kept Italy in a state of isolation. Cairoli's sympathies were with France; but while he failed to induce the government of that country to treat Italy's interests with just consideration, he kept in touch with many of the leading members of the republican party who were not in office, with whom he went the length of concluding secret understandings, and whom he held in high esteem because, having no official responsibility, they were lavish in their expressions of friendship. As regards Austria, coming as he did of a Lombard family of lofty patriotism, he was unable, on assuming the ministerial office, to rid himself of the memories of the past struggle, and to consider the duties of his position with the cool and objective equanimity of the statesman. There is no evidence to prove that he lent active support to 'Irredentism' while in office, but many who publicly declared themselves his friends were militant Irredentists, and his conduct, on the whole, pointed to tolerance of the anti-Austrian

agitations, which, moreover, neither the constitutional party nor his own press showed any zeal in combating.

These agitations, indeed, were most injurious to Italy; nor could they be taken seriously, for the Irredentists themselves neither believed they could wrench the Italian provinces from Austria by force of arms, nor imagined they could redeem them by means of a great clamour. These demonstrations were furthermore injurious, because they popularised the idea in Austria that the struggle against the Irredentist movement was identical with the defence of those principles upon which the stability of the Empire rests, and consequently enhanced the difficulties of a consensual readjustment of frontiers in the future, a readjustment which every Italian patriot must desire.

Crispi was ever of opinion that it was of the most vital importance that Italy should obtain her natural boundaries, but he felt that it was for diplomacy to settle the question, and that the Irredentists would succeed only in making such a settlement impossible.

It was repeatedly declared at Vienna and Berlin that the Irredentist agitation in Italy, like certain panslavistic manifestations in Russia, was but a stratagem for which the French party of action was responsible, and of which the Austrian and German police pretended to have discovered the threads, especially in our masonic lodges, its purpose being to estrange Italy from Austria and Germany, and excite a republican movement with an Irredentist tendency in this country, which should paralyse Austria and render an alliance with her useless to Germany. By a strange and unfortunate coincidence this pretended propaganda on the part of the French party of action in Italy was denounced precisely at a time when the policy of the Foreign Office was such as to imply that Austria was there looked upon as the natural enemy not only of Italy, but of all the kindred peoples of the Danube and the Balkan States as well. The Viennese Cabinet naturally grew suspicious, and its diffidence caused the Home Office many anxious days. In September 1878 Colonel Haymerle, who had at one time been military attaché when his brother was Austrian ambassador to the Quirinal, published an article entitled *Italicæ res*, in which he set forth the arguments according to

which, from an Austrian point of view, the Irredentist theory was founded upon error, and must of necessity encounter unrelenting opposition on the part of Austria. This publication aroused endless contention. Soon afterwards, at the beginning of the year 1880, Austria was greatly exasperated by the fact that, at the obsequies of General Avezzana, President of the *Irredenta*, two ministers and a secretary-general had acted as pall-bearers in the company of Signor Matteo Imbriani, a fanatical Irredentist. Not satisfied with Cairoli's explanations, the Austrian government assumed a threatening attitude. On March 31 the commandant of the III. Army Corps at Verona informed the minister that troops were being massed on the frontier under Archduke Albert. There were divisions at Bezzeca, at Pieve di Ledro, and at Riva, while the Archduke himself was at Arco with his staff. On April 10 the ambassador at Vienna, Count Robilant, announced that the advance of troops in Tyrol must be considered as a menace.

Incidents that were continually occurring maintained the tension throughout the year 1880, and even longer. On April 14 the Deputy Cavallotti was expelled from Trieste; in June Austria disapproved of the conversion of the property of the *College de Propaganda Fide*, declaring it to be an international institution; in August she opposed the bestowal of Italian orders upon citizens of the Tyrol and of Trieste; in October she protested against the decision of the committee for the National Exhibition, to be held in Milan in 1881, to admit exhibits from the Imperial provinces speaking the Italian language. Many other incidents followed, which it is unnecessary to enumerate; nor did their sequence cease until Cairoli had relinquished the direction of government and of our foreign policy, that is to say, until the end of May 1881.

Cairoli fell from office in consequence of the protectorate which France assumed over Tunis. His incompetence, which might have led us into war with Austria, led us instead to a moral and political disaster upon the very field he had especially favoured.

It was indeed a clever move which pushed France to employ her activity in Tunis. Prince Bismarck successfully turned

the stream of French ambitions from Europe; and although that nation had at first looked upon the offer as a snare, and deemed it a sin to devote their energy and thoughts to any undertaking that was not the redemption of Alsace and Lorraine, they gradually awoke to a sense of satisfaction at finding in Africa not only financial but moral compensation for the defeat they had suffered. And who can say that some may not have thought of the new strength which France might one day draw from Africa and fling upon the balance in which the destinies of Europe are weighed? In a report dated July 18, 1878, the Ambassador Cialdini expressed himself as follows:—

‘It will be well to remember that the republican party has adopted as a dogma, for the time being at least, the principle that France must attempt no conquest or annexation, until the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine have been redeemed, and restored to the Republic.’

If France had but avoided offending Italian susceptibilities and interests, Tunis would still be open to the free activity of the two nations. But France, above all else, was anxious to maintain the foundations upon which her international existence rested, and from which her strength was derived. What could Italy expect—Italy, isolated and defenceless? That France, anxious to dominate, and seeing a way open before her that was free from all material obstacles, should pause out of consideration for what was due to a youthful state, which had sprung up out of season, and that threatened to become her rival? No one whose conception of international politics was not absolutely childish could expect this of her. It was the duty of the Italian government, who had witnessed the birth of the danger and, thanks to the minute information supplied by General Cialdini, could follow the evolution of French opinion concerning the utility of the undertaking, to forestall it, to ensure the *status quo* in the Mediterranean by means of those alliances to which it turned too late.

Between 1878 and 1881 Cairoli was kept carefully informed of the intentions of the French Cabinet in regard to Tunis.

During a first period France formally recognised Italy's right to demand that she be not confined within the limits of her own waters, and on August 19, 1879, Cialdini reported

the following declaration, which M. Waddington, Minister of Foreign Affairs, had made.

That the question of Tunis had never been raised, and that not even as a casual topic of conversation had it been discussed in the Council of Ministers. He added that, should the necessity or the expediency arise of adopting precautionary measures for the protection of French interests in the basin of the Mediterranean—in consequence of the position in which the Berlin Congress had placed the Mediterranean Powers, and especially of the Anglo-Turkish treaty—France would take no steps, absolutely none, without having first established a full understanding with Italy. He furthermore declared it to be his opinion that what was gained in surface extent was often lost in depth and strength; that Algeria was a drag, a mill-stone, a source of weakness to France; personally, therefore, he was opposed to the annexation of Tunis.

‘Nevertheless,’ he concluded, ‘the counsel of others may prevail, but I give you my word of honour that as long as I am a member of the French government nothing of the sort will be attempted; no occupation either of Tunis or any other place will take place without your co-operation, without a previous recognition of Italy’s right to occupy another point of relative and justly proportioned importance.’

Late yesterday afternoon M. Gambetta called upon me, as I wished to confer with him again on this subject. He was cordial, even expansive, in the renewal of the assurance he had given me some time since, that the French government in power at the present moment and the republican party which supports it, had never thought of occupying Tunis

—an undertaking that does not coincide with their views. And should the day ever dawn on which they might contemplate such a step, they would, first of all, come to an understanding with Italy, as it would not be to the interest of France to make implacable enemies of us. He begged me to inform His Majesty's government that, in his opinion, one of the most important results of the Berlin Congress has been to show us the necessity for ever closer union, especially as regards the Eastern Questions and the Mediterranean.

The analogy between the declarations of these two political leaders appears to me to be reassuring, for they both seemed to be perfectly sincere.

A second period brought a contest between two different currents. Two aggressive consuls—Roustan and Macciò—were fighting for the field. On June 26, 1880, President Grévy in conversing with General Cialdini deplored the possibility that Tunis, which, in his opinion, was not worth a cheap cigar, might become a source of dissension, and Minister Freycinet expressed his hope of being able to reconcile Italy's wishes with the interests of France. But Léon Gambetta, who was perhaps 'more frank and, certainly, more clear,' said that Italy was wrong in opposing French influence in Tunis. Could she refuse to appreciate the prudence and moderation of which France had given proof by refraining from taking possession of a country which the Powers had been unanimous in offering her?

Cairoli believed that sentimental declarations concerning the sisterhood of the two nations, a clear statement of his intentions, and the threat to alter his policy would suffice to deter France from further advance along the road on which she was already travelling not unwillingly. These verbal arguments failed to produce the slightest impression; but, on the other hand, the interest Cairoli displayed in the Tunis-Goletta railway and the cable to connect Sicily and Tunis—that is to say, in two undertakings which were not private, but

belonged in reality to the Italian government, and were therefore calculated to increase its political influence, did make an impression, alarming France indeed, who was now fully determined to assert her hegemony in the regency. And so Freycinet on July 9, 1880, modified the declaration made by Waddington on August 19, 1878, and declared that, 'for the present, France had no intention of occupying Tunis, but that the future was *in God's hands*.' And he refused to allow the Bey to grant a concession for the laying of an independent cable directly connecting Tunis and Sicily.

During the third period it was the aim of the Cabinet of Paris to establish the supremacy of French influence. The thought of a military expedition was still far off; but a great power—public opinion—had been brought into action, which, incited by the press, ended by determining government action. Speculators did not fail to sow the seeds of discord, and several were denounced in the French Chamber. It was said that prominent personages in Gambetta's following were busily preparing to make money. A few Parisian journalists sought to stem the current, but only brought the reproach of being unpatriotic upon themselves.

Foreseeing that sooner or later he would be forced to occupy Tunis, Freycinet was naturally uneasy concerning the consequences of such an act. Our ambassador was calling upon him on July 25, 1880, when Freycinet suddenly said to him :

'Why will you persist in thinking of Tunis, where your rivalry may one day cause a breach in our friendly relations? Why not turn your attention to Tripoli, where you would have neither ourselves nor any one else to contend with?'

'These words,' Cialdini observes, 'reminded me of a similar phrase which had once escaped the Duc de Decazes, and the conviction was forced upon me that there really exists a permanent and traditional plan concerning the Mediterranean coast of Africa, a plan which all parties not only respect but do their best to safeguard and develop.

'I replied that this proposal reminded me of the advice Bismarck gave Napoleon III., to take Belgium and leave the Rhine provinces alone. I said that we sought possession neither of Tripoli nor of Tunis; that we desired only that the Regency there be maintained *in statu quo*. I added that

Tripoli must not even be mentioned as a compensation, should France one day occupy Tunis, unless Tripoli should meanwhile have ceased to belong to the Ottoman Empire.

““The future is in God’s hands”—a favourite phrase this with M. Freycinet—“and it is not impossible that one day, without doubt, still far off, France might be led, by the force of circumstances, to occupy and annex Tunis. If this event must take place we would not have it brought about at the expense of the friendship which binds us to Italy, and which it is our ardent desire to preserve. You are going away, and I shall be leaving presently. But we shall meet again at the beginning of October, and we will then resume our discussion, for by that time passions will have cooled both in France and in Italy, and we shall be better able calmly to examine the question. I can assure you that France has no intention whatsoever of occupying Tunis, but, as the future is in God’s hands, and as it might possibly happen, sooner or later, that circumstances should force France into so doing, I wish to take this opportunity of assuring you that, in this event, *Italy would be informed as long beforehand as possible, and would receive our most cordial support in obtaining adequate and worthy compensation in the basin of the Mediterranean, in order that equilibrium of power be maintained between us.*””

It appeared manifest that the occupation of Tunis by France was but a question of time, and Cialdini warned his government that the only way to prevent it was by ‘forming other combinations.’

At the end of September M. Barthélemy de Saint-Hilaire (Ferry Ministry) assumed the direction of affairs at the Quai d’Orsay, and, although it was plain that the moment was ill-chosen, Cairoli ordered Cialdini to urge the Paris Cabinet to withdraw its opposition to the concession for the laying of a direct cable which should be independent of the French telegraphic lines. Cialdini unwillingly obeyed, but obtained no satisfaction.

‘There is no question,’ he wrote on November 20, ‘of good reasons . . . but simply of a political programme which France has adopted and from which she will never depart. French influence, banished from Europe by Prince Bismarck, has transferred its energy to Africa, where it need not fear a conflict

with Germany. We shall never obtain any concessions from France by means of diplomacy and reasoning. The Republic is well aware that this policy must wound and estrange us, and we cannot overlook the fact that she is not troubled by this consideration.'

On February 1, 1881, Macciò, the Italian consul at Tunis, telegraphed to Rome.

The French Consul has this day informed the Bey that, in consideration of the conditions now prevailing in Tunis, the Sublime Porte has decided to remove him from office and send Keredine to govern the country in his stead. As France is firmly opposed to this, she will be obliged to make a naval demonstration, and as this would give rise to unpleasant questions in the Assembly, it would be advisable for His Highness to request that a fleet be sent to Goletta. The Bey replied that he must refuse to credit the intentions attributed to the Sublime Porte; that he did not deem it expedient to express a wish for a naval demonstration on the part of France, nor had he any opinion to express on the subject.

The Bey himself has requested me to inform you of what has happened.

Questioned as to the accuracy of the statement made by Macciò—that this was but an attempt to obtain a request for the protectorate from the Bey himself—M. Barthélemy replied that the imputation was unfounded. But although at the time he trusted the minister's word, Cialdini did not exclude the possibility that the consul at Tunis, M. Roustan, was obeying the orders of those more powerful even than the Minister of Foreign Affairs himself, who at that very moment was being made the object of fierce attacks by that section of the press which supported Gambetta.

Upon being informed that Paris denied that pressure had been brought to bear upon him by the French consul, the Bey caused the declaration made to him by M. Roustan to be

written out in full, and forwarded an authentic copy of the protocol to Rome. When this document was placed before Barthélemy he declared his doubts of its veracity. Nevertheless, information which Cialdini obtained, partly through his English colleague, established the fact that not only had Barthélemy himself recommended the plan to Roustan, but had, moreover, sent two men-of-war into Tunisian waters in order to ensure its success.

This scheme having miscarried, a report was spread to the effect that the *powerful* tribe of the Krumirs had made an incursion into Algerian territory, and were threatening the French railway of Bona-Guelma. It was also hinted that an outburst of religious fanaticism might be looked for in Algeria. The French press laid hold of the theme, and proceeded to stir up public opinion. The government despatched ships and troops from Toulon, 'in order to avoid stripping Algeria at a time of peril.'

Great excitement reigned in Italy. The Cairoli Ministry was in danger, and an explanation was demanded. On April 6 Barthélemy assured General Cialdini that the large body of troops had been despatched for no other purpose than to punish the tribes on the Algerian frontier, and that the French government had 'no intention of establishing permanent military occupation, much less of annexing Tunis.' On the morrow this assurance was renewed, with an additional statement to the effect that 'it was impossible to foretell what steps might prove necessary when the struggle was once begun.'

Meanwhile, on that very day (April 7) the French Chamber voted the sum of 5,695,000 francs for the expenses of the military expedition.

The forces of the Republic having crossed the frontier of Tunis without encountering any obstacles, simply making, as was wittily observed at the Palais Bourbon in Paris, 'une promenade militaire,' they advanced upon Tunis, while the men-of-war were landing soldiers at Biserta. On May 11 Minister Barthélemy informed Ambassador Cialdini that the troops would not enter Tunis if the Bey would sign a treaty which was to be presented to him, that the military occupation would cease as soon as the Bey should have given proofs

of his good faith, and of his intentions to respect the treaty, and that Biserta would be evacuated immediately afterwards.

The treaty of guarantee, so called, was signed the next day (May 12) by the Bey and the general commanding the invading army. The Bey, who had made a vain appeal to the Powers, accepted all the conditions imposed, and also consented to military occupation in the form in which it was proposed, *i.e.* to be restricted to certain points, and to last 'until such a time as order shall have been restored.'

However, France did not stop with the signing of the treaty. The agitation that had naturally been aroused throughout the Tunis state by the foreign invasion served as an excuse for extending military operations. Parliament voted a fresh credit of 14,000,000 francs; on July 12 the French fleet occupied Sfax, and on the 24th Gabes; on October 9 the republican troops entered Tunis.

Thus did France establish herself in the Regency.

One after the other all the promises made to General Cialdini by the three ministers with whom he had discussed the question—Freycinet, Barthélemy, and Waddington—were broken, and the trusting faith of Cairoli received but a poor reward indeed. Before the French action had attained its full purpose, Cairoli defended himself at the Italian Chamber by protesting his good faith, which could no more be doubted than his utter incapacity, and he undertook to guarantee that the French would withdraw from the Regency as soon as they should have conquered the Krumirs. But it was Crispi who admonished him, saying: 'You must have forgotten history if you believe that the French army will leave Tunis when they have punished the rebellious tribes.'

Cairoli, furthermore, declared before the House that 'a parity of views' concerning the Tunisian question existed between himself and England, thus seeking to confound those who had affirmed that we were in a state of 'imaginary isolation.'

It is impossible to understand how a man of Cairoli's integrity could have made a declaration that was so far beside the truth. We are forced to conclude that he did not read the official documents, or that, if he did, he immediately forgot

their contents, for the documents at the *Consulta*¹ contained ample proofs of the inaccuracy of his statement.

On January 7, 1879, in the course of a conversation with Menabrea, the Italian ambassador, Lord Salisbury on being questioned concerning certain newspaper reports, according to which Her Majesty's government was also urging France to annex the Regency of Tunis to Algeria, had answered that he was observing strict neutrality in this matter—that is to say, he was abstaining from all interference, and had declared to France that, 'being aware of Italy's objections to the arrangement, he would allow the two Powers to settle the matter between themselves.' When, on February 13 of the same year, Menabrea requested England to declare her desire for the maintenance of the *status quo* in Tunis, Lord Salisbury 'abstained from making any promise concerning the proposed declaration.' On July 11, 1880, Menabrea reported that Lord Granville had declared that, 'Tunis being an independent state, save for the rights of the Sublime Porte, England could not interfere in questions that concerned the internal government of the Regency.' On the twenty-second of that month Cairoli, thinking that England's attitude might change, pressed the matter in the following language: 'It does not seem to us admissible . . . that the other Powers, especially England, should be willing to accept a theory (viz. that Tunis is to be considered as an appendage of Algeria) that would, from the very beginning, disturb the balance of power in the Mediterranean.' But Granville answered on July 29 that 'England, having only minor interests at stake in Tunis, did not wish to interfere in the settling of the misunderstandings that had arisen between Italy and France unless openly invited to do so.' It is unnecessary to add that the noble Lord was quite sure of not receiving any such invitation from France!

Naturally things did not change when the crisis drew near. On February 17, 1881, it became the duty of Lord Lyons, English ambassador at Paris, to inform General Cialdini that 'England was most anxious to avoid any action which might be displeasing to France.'

¹ The palace called 'della Consulta' is the seat of the Foreign Office in Rome.

The *Consulta* at that time flattered itself that it knew what policy was best for England in the Mediterranean, and it allowed this presumption to control its action. In more recent times we have entertained the same illusion on this subject, but in reality, with the exception of one period with which we shall deal further on, England has always found it to her interest to join hands with France.

It is quite possible that in 1878 the English ministers held the views in regard to Tunis which a French writer, Constant d'Estournelle, attributed to them.¹

'If the English government is convinced that Tunis is doomed and that foreign intervention is inevitable, into whose hands should she prefer to see it fall? Ours or those of Italy? Into our hands, most certainly. Of two evils the lesser will always be chosen. England has every reason for not relinquishing to Italy the custody of that broad strait which affords communication between the two basins of the Mediterranean. The advances she made to the Florentine Cabinet in 1871 are proof of this. Now Italy would be mistress of this passage should she obtain possession of the Tunisian promontory, which stretches towards Sicily. Holding, besides Sardinia and the small island of Pantellaria, the point of Cape Bon, the heights of Carthage and Biserta, she would practically command the maritime communications between Europe and the East, and in case of need she would be able, if not to check them entirely, at least to hinder them to a very considerable extent. Certainly England will never favour the creation of such a hindrance, and will never do anything to facilitate the obstruction of that great thoroughfare along which her ships by the thousand sail to-day. On the contrary, all her interests demand that the two sides of the passage should be held by two different nations. In this way only can she be sure its neutrality will be preserved.'

The French conquest of Tunis did not come up for discussion before the Italian Chamber, and the Cairoli Ministry resigned on May 14, as soon as it became aware of the impression produced throughout Italy by the news of the Bardo treaty. Crispi had directed the opposition with the greatest

¹ *La Politique Française en Tunisie—Le Protectorat et ses Origines* (1854-1891), by P. H. X. Paris, Librairie Plon. Pp. 79-80.

moderation, and it was supposed he would follow Cairoli in office, but, as usual, the leaders of the Left were unanimous in their efforts to keep him out of the government. They said that Crispi's name was as a war-cry against France which it would be imprudent to raise. As a matter of fact, but a few days before Crispi had declared before the Chamber that a 'conflict between France and Italy would be a civil war,' and he had deplored the fact that the friendly relations existing between the two countries should have been compromised by an improvident and careless policy. It cannot be denied that, had Italy's rights been boldly defended, the French government would not have been able to raise a barrier between the two states by means of the Tunis undertaking.

That undertaking was especially offensive to us because of the way in which it was carried out and of the haughty manner that was assumed towards us. We were at the time isolated and weak, with disordered finances, and in conflict with Austria; and France not only took advantage of these circumstances to drive us out of a country in close proximity to our own and where our interests were greater than hers, but was even offended by our patriotic and legitimate protests, added threats to high-handed action, and scoffed at our impotent rage.

Is it true, as has been affirmed, that had Italy replied to the French protectorate in Tunis by the occupation of Tripoli, the great Powers would have remained neutral, and England would have supported her?

On May 22 or 23 an English paper, the *Standard*, printed a diplomatic document, hitherto unpublished, in which it was declared that in the course of a conversation between M. Waddington, Count Corti, and Lord Salisbury it had been agreed that Italy might occupy Tripoli in the event of the annexation of Tunis by France.

Count Corti, who at that time was ambassador at Constantinople, could have been in no greater haste to refute an injurious accusation than he was to publish a denial of this statement.

'Such a conversation,' he wrote on May 24, 'never took place either at Berlin or elsewhere. The Italian

diplomats were not empowered to treat of the distribution of any territories belonging to other powers, save of those that might come under consideration in direct consequence of the war.

‘The diplomatic note to which this despatch alludes is, therefore, either entirely apocryphal, or contains an account of a conversation which never took place. It is for this reason that I have taken the liberty of begging Your Excellency to request that this assertion be withdrawn by the English journal.’

The quality of Corti's intellect is clearly revealed by this denial. It is plain that, as a diplomatist, he was as a fish out of water. Perhaps he might have made a good priest!

Marchese Menabrea, to whom Corti's request had been forwarded from Rome, replied on May 31.

I immediately telegraphed to this Ministry in plain language and in the following terms: ‘The *Times* has this day published a despatch from Rome to the effect that Count Corti denies the existence of the conversation he is reported to have had with Lord Salisbury, concerning the cession of Tripoli to Italy in case France should annex Tunis. This question gave rise to an interpellation on the part of Mr. Arnold at the last session of the House of Commons. Sir Charles Dilke replied that there had been no correspondence concerning Tripoli between the English and Italian governments. There were further interpellations in regard to Tunis, but no conclusion was reached.

‘MENABREA.’

On the evening of the same day (May 25) on which these telegrams had been despatched and received, I met Sir Charles Dilke, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, at the Court Ball. He

stopped me to say that he was greatly surprised by Count Corti's denial, as proofs or documents of some kind really did exist at the Foreign Office in which the conversation in question was referred to. He added that on the morrow this would be the subject of fresh questions in the House, but that he should avoid a discussion by refusing to furnish further explanations.

As a matter of fact the questions he had foreseen were put on the 26th. I transcribe the account of what took place from the *Times* of May 27th. '*Tripoli and Tunis.*—Mr. Arthur Arnold asked if there existed any documents containing references to the conversation held with Lord Salisbury concerning the occupation of Tripoli by Italy, as a compensation for the entrance of France into the Tunisian State. Sir Charles Dilke replied as follows: "All the information which Her Majesty's government is in a position to furnish is contained in the documents which have been placed on the table of the House, and I am unwilling to allow myself to be drawn into a discussion of this matter by answering my hon. friend's question."'

This reply struck me as extremely ambiguous, and on the morrow (27 May) I waited upon Lord Granville with a request for a clear statement of the case, in order that all doubt might be removed concerning a fact which had been publicly denied.

His Lordship replied that there had been no correspondence between the two governments in regard to Tripoli, and that no official documents existed dealing with this subject. But at the same time, he declared to me in confidence that he must decline to answer any more questions of mine, or to give me any further information.

On taking leave of Lord Granville, I remarked laughingly: 'I see that Your Excellency is following the example of one of our former ministers, the *Com-mendatore* Calvagno, who on being pressed by the Chamber for some details which he did not wish to reveal, avoided further discussion by pronouncing these words which have become famous: *Je répons que je ne répons pas!* (I must reply that I will not reply).'

His Lordship laughed heartily and answered in French: 'I also reply that I will not reply.'

I saw Lord Granville again on the day following (28 May) at a reception at the Foreign Office in honour of the Queen's birthday. He took me aside and said, very considerately: 'Yesterday I spoke to you in confidence concerning the Tripoli question, but I now see that my reserve is entirely useless, and you are therefore free to report *that I replied that I would not reply* to your questions.'

These events have left me with the impression that at the Foreign Office they believe the question of the cession of Tripoli to Italy as a compensation was ventilated in the course of conversation at the Berlin Congress.

I feel it is my duty to report this fact to Your Excellency both as an adequate reply to the above-mentioned despatch from His Majesty's Ministry, and also in order to place Your Excellency in a position to appreciate the influence which certain incidents have had upon the development of the Tunisian Question.

General Menabrea's impression was correct. The question of the cession of Tripoli to Italy was indeed ventilated at Berlin in the course of conversation which took place between Lord Salisbury and the second delegate to the Congress,

Count de Launay, who had reported on this subject on August 11, 1878. Were they not in the habit of reading official communications at the *Consulta*?

De Launay had written:—

. . . I have recently had a conference with my English colleague on this subject. I mentioned to him the conversations I had had with Lord Salisbury during the last days of the Congress, and said that I had expressed my regret to him that the English government should not, at least, have spared us the surprise of learning through the newspapers of the convention concerning the occupation of the island of Cyprus. The head of the Foreign Office did his best to explain the circumstance, and allowed me to infer from his veiled utterances, *that Italy might dream of expansion in the direction of Tripoli or Tunis*. I was not authorised to enter upon a discussion on this point.

It is, therefore, an indisputable fact that Lord Salisbury felt that compensation was due to Italy, and if his opinion was expressed in such a manner as partially to hide his meaning from de Launay—naturally the English minister could not reveal the understanding with France—it should have become clear enough in 1881, when France had occupied Tunis.

The resolute determination which France exhibited to exclude all Italian influence from Tunis had the advantage of bringing about a radical change in public opinion. Disappointed in the French Republic—which our democracy had exalted at the expense of the fallen Empire—it saw no other way of protecting itself against further scratches from our Latin sister than by a return to the alliance with Germany.

For the sake of historic accuracy, it is well to recall that as early as the year 1880 Count Maffei, Secretary-General of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, authorised by Cairoli, had privately explored the political territory in Berlin ‘with regard to the advisability of giving a more intimate nature to the relations existing between Italy and Germany, and thus

gradually leading up to an official alliance.' Prince Bismarck had sent him a message to the effect that 'the road to Berlin led through Vienna,' and that we must also establish the best of relations there if we wished to renew the old ties that had once bound us to Germany.

Depretis was Minister of the Interior under the presidency of Cairoli, and it is probable that it was by the advice of one who remembered the Crispi mission that Maffei was commissioned to consult the Berlin oracle. But when Bismarck's reply became known, Depretis himself, who shared Cairoli's scruples and doubts about setting forth upon a road that would definitely lead us away from France, declared his aversion to an alliance with Austria.

Maffei, nevertheless, so at least he told Crispi, did everything in his power that this probability of arriving at a complete understanding with Germany might not be neglected, even if it should be at the cost of a treaty with Austria.

Baron Haymerle, who at that time was Chancellor of the Austrian Empire, had once been ambassador at Rome, and had given proof of a conciliatory spirit on several critical occasions. Von Keudell represented Germany, and on his return to Rome after a leave of absence expressed the opinion, which he declared was nothing more than his personal conviction, that the stipulation of a secret agreement between the heads of the Italian and Austrian governments would produce a most favourable impression in Berlin—an agreement to maintain peaceful relations, which might be renewed from year to year. As soon as such a treaty was concluded, Germany would make formal proposals concerning the best means of establishing an alliance with us for the protection of the interests of both nations.

I hereupon suggested to Cairoli to allow me to explore the ground, naturally with all possible reserve, and making use of the person whom Baron Haymerle had pointed out to me as an agent who enjoyed his full confidence. The advantages this plan afforded were quickly recognised. Needless to say Herr von Keudell often came to question me

as to the result of my endeavours, concerning which he was kept posted. He approved of our determination to open negotiations in a strictly confidential manner, and I am also convinced that, through Berlin, Baron Haymerle was informed of what was taking place, that he approved of the undertaking, and that he looked forward with impatience to the arrival of the above-named messenger. Having at length obtained permission to do so, I despatched the agent to Vienna in January 1881. I did not entrust any written document to his keeping, all my instructions being imparted by word of mouth. The peaceful understanding to be established was to coincide in every way with what Prince Bismarck had recommended through von Keudell, and while respect for the treaties already existing became of necessity the basis of the new arrangement, I took advantage of this circumstance to force Austria to recognise most solemnly her obligation not to violate the stipulations of the Berlin Congress by further expansion, to the detriment of Italy, in the Balkan peninsula, and especially along the shores of the Adriatic.

In substance my words to Baron Haymerle's confidential agent were: 'Italy is indeed desirous to be Austria's friend, and intends honestly to fulfil all her obligations, but only on condition that Austria will do the same. The Imperial government must make our interests, our situation, its own; it must respect public sentiment in Italy, for public sentiment would rebel should Austria extend her possessions in the neighbourhood of the Adriatic.' I could not have been more particular, more emphatic than I was on this point, upon which I was determined that all negotiations should turn.

Baron Haymerle's agent went to Vienna, made the communications with which Maffei had entrusted him, and returned to Rome on February 17, 1881, with the announcement that Baron Haymerle and his *ad latus*, Baron Teckenberg, were of opinion that an understanding for a treaty of reciprocal neutrality might easily be arrived at.

With the exception, of course, of a possible change of state and sovereignty in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and of the negotiations which would ensue with the Sultan concerning the future of those countries, Austria-Hungary declares that it is her intention to respect scrupulously the *status quo* in the East, and that she has not the slightest thought of overstepping the bounds laid down by treaty.

Besides the above-named possible changes in the state and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina which, for the present at least, are improbable, and which might eventually be accomplished without in any way violating the *status quo* in the East, and are therefore quite beside the question, Austria-Hungary has *no intention of following a policy of expansion in the East. She will not push forward to Salonica or in Albania, where she will carefully maintain the territorial status quo. On this point all necessary guarantees will be provided to prove Austria-Hungary's firm intention of scrupulously respecting the treaty of Berlin and of abstaining from all expansion.*

The declarations both of the Minister and of his *alter ego* appear to me to leave nothing to be desired either in lucidity or decisiveness, and I believe that they contain the basis for further negotiations for a treaty of neutrality.

Baron Haymerle and Baron Teckenberg are of opinion that the general conditions do not present

any serious obstacle to the establishing of a sincere and close friendship between Italy and Austria-Hungary.

Austria-Hungary is and ever was ready to respect Italy's legitimate ambitions as a great maritime power, and follows her progress with sympathetic interest. She will therefore not only refrain from placing obstacles in Italy's way, but will derive satisfaction from the extension of her sphere of power in the Mediterranean, provided the *status quo* in the Adriatic remain intact, and this sea be not converted into an Italian lake.

Influenced by these sentiments Austria-Hungary will gladly accept any arrangement that may advance the interests of Italy in regard to the Tunisian Question, and further the possible acquisition of Tripoli. Considering in a like manner the growth of Italy's legitimate interests in the Mediterranean, Austria-Hungary has repulsed the Russian proposal to offer the Island of Candia to Greece as a compensation, Austria-Hungary being of opinion—without, however, at present assuming any obligations on this point—that Candia should be given to Italy for the purpose of strengthening her position in the Mediterranean.

Baron Haymerle and Baron Teckenberg concluded with the most cordial expressions of friendly feeling for Italy and her government, and declared that they would be delighted to stipulate an understanding that should guarantee the growth of a true and hearty friendship between the two countries. They are therefore awaiting Your Excellency's further proposals, and they leave it to you to decide whether some one shall be sent from Vienna to carry on negotiations, or whether you deem it more desirable

to despatch to Vienna a person enjoying your full confidence.

Cairoli hesitated, and would not follow his colleague's lead. Meanwhile the development of events in Tunis had naturally diminished Italy's prestige. When Mancini, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs (since May 29), resolutely initiated the policy of closer union with Austria and Germany, and sent the King of Italy on a visit to Vienna at the end of October, his first efforts were strongly affected by the altered conditions, which were all against us. The delegations of November bore loud testimony to the truth of this, when prominent men, such as the ex-Chancellor Andrassy and Kallay, gave a base interpretation to the motives which had prompted King Humbert's recent visit to Vienna.

The negotiations for an alliance, begun at Vienna, were continued between the three Cabinets. Since October 7, 1879, Austria and Germany had been bound by the permanent treaty which was made public on February 3, 1888. The act of establishing the participation of Italy under conditions which are a state secret was signed on May 20, 1882. All that is known of it is that rather than an arrangement for the maintenance of reciprocal neutrality, as Austria had at first desired it to be, it contains a guarantee for the territorial inviolability of the three Powers.¹

'This was a first step towards the casting off of isolation,' Crispi declared, 'towards scattering the war clouds that had oppressed us. Public opinion was satisfied. . . . But for some years the treaty bore no fruit. At Vienna and Berlin the doubts that had been raised by past events were not yet dispelled, nor was the Italian policy in general, either as regards the Interior or Foreign Affairs, as yet calculated to dispel them. Our loyalty in fulfilling the obligations we had assumed was still a matter of doubt. And so there the clauses

¹ F. Crispi. Speech at Florence, October 8, 1890.

stood in writing, awaiting the hour of solemn trial. But meanwhile our country still stood alone in the defence of her own interests.

Faith was born during the second period of this alliance, and we soon felt its beneficent effects. . . .¹

But before taking up the story of Crispi's successful endeavours to render the Triple Alliance 'an honestly cordial understanding,' before turning to him whose influence was felt 'in all the international problems with which we were confronted,' it will be well to recall how, although the direction of Foreign Affairs had already passed into more able hands, Italy missed an excellent opportunity of repairing the injury she had suffered through Tunis, and this because she lacked the courage to venture.

¹ F. Crispi. Speech at Florence, October 8, 1890.

CHAPTER III

THE EGYPTIAN QUESTION IN 1882

Italy refuses to intervene in Egypt when invited by England to do so—Crispi's journey to Berlin and London—Interviews with Count Hatzfeldt and Lord Granville—Nine letters from Crispi on the advisability of Italy's acceptance of the English proposal.

AT the time when, in consequence of Arabi Pasha's 'declaration' (September 1881), the Egyptian question emerged from the state of torpor in which it had stagnated for years, Italy exercised no influence whatsoever in the internal affairs of that country where England and France were each striving to establish hegemony.

When the Khedive's authority was threatened, both Powers deemed it advisable to strengthen it by public declarations of sympathy. Would this sympathy have sufficed to bring about armed Anglo-French intervention? Perhaps so, had Gambetta remained in power. But when he fell, on January 26, 1882, and was succeeded by Freycinet, events developed in such a way that France, who had abstained from action, found herself excluded from dominion. Hence the determined struggle to deprive the British lion of his Egyptian prey, and the manifold concessions on his part for the purpose of disarming his adversary—a struggle which continued for years until the Convention of April 8, 1904, ratified the *status quo*, which meant the definite occupation of Egypt by England.

Mancini immediately took steps for excluding isolated action on the part of other Powers, and, considering Italy's position at the time, it would appear that this was the wisest policy he could have followed. But the European Concert did not act; with the exception of England and France none of the Powers exhibited any interest in Egyptian affairs.

On June 23 the representatives of the great Powers at

Constantinople met in conference at the invitation of the Paris Cabinet ; but nothing positive resulted from the meeting save the exposure of the deceitful nature of the Turkish policy, and the justification of European intervention. At first the Sublime Porte refused to participate in the Conference, and her representative did not appear until the tenth session (July 24), after Turkey had received a Collective Note from the Powers inviting her to send into Egypt, without delay, a force strong enough to 're-establish order, overcome the usurping faction, and put an end to the alarming situation which afflicts the country, has caused the shedding of blood, the ruin and flight of thousands of European and Mussulman families and has compromised both native and foreign interests.'

The English government was well aware that, despite his assertions to the contrary, the Sultan would not send troops into Egypt, and therefore made every preparation for superseding Ottoman intervention. The Suez Canal was in danger, and Lord Granville made an arrangement with France for its protection, and requested Italy to co-operate. Mancini replied that as this question had been submitted to the Conference, he desired to await its decision. At Constantinople, nevertheless, the Italian proposal to 'organise a purely naval police and surveillance service in which all the Powers should be requested to participate for the purpose of guaranteeing free circulation in the Suez Canal' was accepted by all concerned, but was made subject to so many conditions as to render it null in its effect. The English ambassador stipulated the condition that 'in case of emergency' any Power might land troops and occupy such points as it should be necessary to hold in order to ensure the safety of the Canal ; and he furthermore declared that England must reserve for herself 'entire freedom of action as regards military operations, her purpose being to reinstate the Khedival authority.'

When the English government felt that the moment had arrived for the safeguarding of its manifold interests, Mancini should have perceived that the Conference of Constantinople was but a blind, and that the time had come for Italy to take advantage of France's inaction, and to assume the position in Egypt at England's side which had hitherto been denied her.

The following documents clearly reveal the terms in which the offer for co-operation with England in re-establishing the Khedive's authority was made to Italy and refused by her.

From Sir A. Paget to Lord Granville.

ROME, July 28, 1882.

MY LORD,—I called upon M. Mancini to-day, and executed the instructions conveyed in your Lordship's telegram of the 25th instant.

I began the interview by saying that I believed His Excellency must have been already prepared by General Menabrea for the communication I was about to make to him. It was simply this: that, while Her Majesty's government would be glad if Italy would join England and France in securing the safety of the Suez Canal, Her Majesty's government would also welcome her (*serait aussi bien aise*) if she would co-operate in a movement in the interior, which they were of opinion could be no longer delayed, and for which they were actively preparing, but in which the French government appeared disinclined to join.

M. Mancini, after requesting me to express to your Lordship the thanks of the Italian government for this further proof of confidence and friendship, confessed that he had heard of this communication from General Menabrea, and that he had desired him at once (the night before last, I believe) to represent to your Lordship that he (M. Mancini) presumed that your Lordship had made it before you were aware of the answer of the Porte to the Collective Note.

I said that I had reason to think that this might be so, but, at the same time, I was able to state to His Excellency that I knew for a fact that this answer had not in any way changed the intentions

of Her Majesty's government, or made them think the employment of a British force less necessary than before.

How, I asked, was it possible to have confidence in this tardy acquiescence of the Porte in the demands of Europe? It might be quite true that preparations were now, at the eleventh hour, being made to despatch a Turkish force to Egypt, but who would answer that those troops would be employed for the desired purpose when once they got there? The policy of the Porte throughout the whole of the Egyptian business had been marked with so much equivocation that it was impossible to place the slightest reliance upon it as regards the future. As an instance, I said, only in the very last meeting of the Conference, when the proposal had been brought forward by Lord Dufferin, and supported by all his colleagues, that the Sultan should declare Arabi a rebel, the Turkish Commissioner had met it by one of the usual motions of postponement. Then again, quite lately, a secret agent of Arabi's had been arrested by the English authorities at Alexandria, on his return from Constantinople with the most compromising documents in his possession, and if the reports were correct, he had made avowals which proved complicity between Constantinople and the head of the rebels.

I appealed, therefore, to M. Mancini to say whether Her Majesty's government were not justified in their mistrust of the Sultan's intentions, and, at all events, in taking such measures themselves as might effectually thwart any evil designs. My belief was, I added, that Her Majesty's government would accept the co-operation of Turkey, but that they would proceed with their own measures, as originally intended.

M. Mancini, without disputing any of the facts which I had brought before him, or the logical deductions to be drawn from them, replied that, whatever reasons for distrust might exist, it would appear to be a contradiction, at the moment when the Porte had accepted without reserve all the conditions of a note to which Italy and England were parties, for those two Powers to enter into engagements as to another mode of intervention. Time should, at all events, be allowed, in his opinion, to test the good faith with which the Turks were now acting. If there were evidences of their not carrying out faithfully the programme which they had accepted from the Powers, if there was any indication of their showing favour to the party in rebellion, or of their not acting energetically with a view to its suppression, the complexion of things would change, and the new situation would have to be considered by the Powers.

His Excellency admitted, however, that the position of England was different from that of Italy and the other Powers. England had already got her troops in Egypt, and he quite understood her intending to have a sufficient force there to control the conduct of the Turks; but for Italy to enter at this moment into an agreement with England such as that now suggested, would be for her a new departure which would not be justified by the circumstances; but he must wait, he said, to see the course of events, what answer your Lordship would give to General Menabrea, and the public declarations which might be made by Her Majesty's Ministers in regard to this new phase of the question, before giving a positive answer for the Italian government to the present proposal.

In reply to this I expressed the hope that the offer now made to the Italian government would not be forgotten, so that Her Majesty's government might not at any time be accused of having followed an exclusive policy.—I have, etc. . . .

(Signed) A. PAGET.

Earl Granville to Sir A. Paget.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 29, 1882.*

SIR,—At an interview which I had with General Menabrea to-day, His Excellency stated that Signor Mancini appeared to consider that Her Majesty's government were in ignorance, when they made the proposal that Italy should join in operations in the interior of Egypt, of the formal and complete acceptance by the Sultan of the request made to him by the Conference that he should despatch troops to that country. The Sultan had now decided to send troops into Egypt, thus yielding to the desire expressed by the Six Powers in this respect.

General Menabrea observed that, under these circumstances, the Italian government would be open to a charge of contradiction if they were to negotiate with a view to the intervention of any other Power, and that it only remained for them, therefore, to express their thanks to the British Cabinet for having entertained the idea that the friendship of Italy might take the form of an active co-operation.

I replied that I regretted that Italy should have declined to co-operate in the manner indicated, but that I had no protest to make as to a matter which it was for the Italian government to decide, but

that I was, nevertheless, glad of the opportunity which the present state of things had afforded Her Majesty's government of giving Italy a proof of their friendship.—I am, etc. . . .

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

From General Menabrea to the Hon. Mancini.

LONDON, 29 July, 1882.

I have this day personally communicated to Lord Granville the answer contained in Your Excellency's despatch of yesterday to the proposal he had made to Italy to participate in the Egyptian expedition. I was careful to respect the reserve Your Excellency recommended. Lord Granville has taken note of this reply, as well as of the friendly sentiments Your Excellency was pleased to express towards England, which country, his Lordship assured me, *had believed she was giving Italy a proof of her friendship by offering her an opportunity of participating in an action from which she might have derived great benefit.* During my conversation with Lord Granville I went no further than to point out the wisdom of the attitude assumed by Your Excellency in consequence of the determined intervention of Turkey in Egypt. Lord Granville had but little to say to me. He took note of my declarations which expressed the meaning of Your Excellency's telegram, acknowledged that the answer was not what he had wished it to be, and ended by once more most cordially assuring me that in proposing co-operation with England in restoring order in Egypt, the British Cabinet had believed it was giving a proof of its friendship for Italy, by inviting her to participate in an undertaking which would have resulted in great benefit to herself.

MENABREA.

Mancini advised the Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna—that is to say, our allies—of his refusal to accept the English offer. He probably expected to be warmly commended; but Hatzfeldt merely sent his thanks for de Launay's communication, 'most carefully avoiding the expression of any opinion that might appear either favourable or unfavourable to the British proposal,' while Count Kálnoky declared his 'appreciation of the "accuracy and aptness" of Mancini's arguments.'

In early June Crispi left Rome for a journey in foreign parts. First, however, he went to the *Consulta* to take leave of his old friend, Mancini, from whom he received a letter of introduction to the different diplomatic and consular agents, which stated that 'the patriotism of this illustrious fellow-countryman of ours, and the gratitude our country owes him, are certainly sufficient to ensure him a cordial reception from all the representatives of our government in foreign lands. Nevertheless, I wish to provide him with a special recommendation from myself, and I shall be grateful to Your Excellency for any courtesy you may extend to this distinguished representative of our nation.' Besides this letter, Mancini sent his best wishes for a pleasant journey, and begged Crispi to 'collect such information and impressions as may be of use to our country whose welfare stands first in the minds of both of us.'

Crispi went directly to Berlin, where he arrived on the seventeenth, and immediately applied for an interview with Count Hatzfeldt, through Baron Holstein, with whom he had an acquaintanceship of long standing. We find the following note referring to a conversation with Holstein:—

He arrived at 9.15, and we had a long talk. Germany has no direct interest in Egypt. No need to colonise, or rather, the time has not yet come for establishing colonies. In any case, Egypt would never be chosen for this purpose.

Prince Bismarck suffering from neuralgia. Doctors have ordered rest.—Hatzfeldt is the depository of all his views.

An interview with Hatzfeldt took place on the morrow. Here are Crispi's notes concerning it.

18 July, 1882.

Number 136 Königgrätzerstrasse is the third house on the right going towards Voss Strasse. The house stands back from the street, in a garden.

At 1 P.M. Count Hatzfeldt was in his study, and we conferred together until two o'clock.

In discussing the questions of the moment he showed himself indifferent to the solution of the Egyptian problem. He said he had accepted the Conference in order not to furnish the Powers with a pretext for declaring that, by her absence, Germany had prevented a conclusion being reached, but that he had no faith in its success. Germany has no direct interest there. She has no proposal to make because she does not wish to assume any responsibility. She will not sacrifice a penny nor a soldier for Egypt. Let those who have got themselves into this trouble get themselves out again. Hatzfeldt has neither approved nor disapproved of England's attitude. Her right to free passage through the Suez Canal will not be disputed.

The Conference desires that the *status quo* be maintained. Which *status quo*? The one that existed before the military movement? The one that existed before 1879? The phrase is elastic—it says much, and says nothing.

Italy, of course, is directly interested. — Spain and Holland wish to intervene.

Leave the dynasty as it is? Tewfik without authority. Take Halim? A good-natured fellow, well known for the excellent quality of the coffee he serves—nothing more!

The financial position is certainly worse than in

1879, but those who have brought about this state of things must look to that.

Germany will accept any solution the Powers may join in proposing, both for restoring order and as regards the Egyptian government. Egypt will never get on with a Parliament. That is an institution which will never take root there. It will take a prince fully equipped with authority and energy to rule that country. We do not wish to follow the example of the Napoleonic Empire—we will not meddle, unless our interests are threatened.

CRISPI. — The French strove to imitate the Romans, but they copied their vices rather than their virtues. The republic and the empire of the Romans lasted for many centuries, whereas the republics and the empires of the French have lasted hardly twenty years.

HATZFELDT. — The Romans had savage peoples to deal with. To-day the conditions of Europe are altered, and France is surrounded by great and civilised Powers. It is this the French fail to see.

Count Hatzfeldt then spoke of Prince Bismarck and his illness, which at present prevents his participation in affairs of state. Everything is on the Count's shoulders, who complains of this, especially on account of the heavy responsibility he has been obliged to assume, and must still bear, as regards Foreign Policy.

From Berlin Crispi went to London, where the destiny of Egypt was being decided, and through his friend Giacomo Lacaita requested to be allowed to call upon Lord Granville, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Not only did Lord Granville show himself delighted to meet the former Italian revolutionist, but invited him to lunch with him. Here is Crispi's own account of his reception and of the conversation that took place.

29 July.

Lord Granville lives at 18 Carlton House Terrace.

The invitation was for two o'clock, and at a quarter to two, Lacaita and I left the Athenæum, and reached his Lordship's house a few minutes before the hour.

A footman informed us that the Minister was at the House, and begged us to wait for him. We were shown into the library. We had hardly sat down when we heard a rustling of silken garments, and Lady Granville stood before us with her two daughters. Lord Granville came in at the same time by another door. When the necessary introductions had taken place the ladies led the way to the dining-room, whither we followed them presently.

Lord Granville informed us that a Council of Ministers was going on, but that he had left his colleagues in order to join me.

We were seated as follows: Lady Granville between Lacaita and her younger daughter; Lord Granville had me on his left and his other daughter on his right. Between the two daughters was the private secretary, and next to him a nephew of his Lordship's. Another nephew sat on my left, that is to say between Lacaita and myself.

During the few minutes we had spent in the library and while the first course was being served the conversation turned upon the Italian press, on the French Ministry and the probable vote of the French Chamber.

Upon my observing that Freycinet would probably encounter opposition, and that in this case a crisis would result, my host asked:

‘What sort of men will get into office, do you think?’

‘It will be a Ministry of mediocrities.’

‘I believe you are right.’

‘For the time being Gambetta cannot return. He stands for war, and France does not wish for war, cannot go to war. Gambetta revealed his intentions too soon, and in Germany his name means a rising to arms.’

‘That is true.’

‘Freycinet is a guarantee of peace for Germany,’ I remarked.

‘He has involved France in enormous expense with his laws concerning public works,’ said Lord Granville.

‘He is a man of technicalities rather than a politician.’

‘You are right.’

‘There are only two ways open to the French people,’ I said. ‘They must either shut themselves up within their boundaries, develop their industries and ensure their material well-being, or go to war. Lately they have been declaring their disinclination to go to war.’

‘Even if they would they cannot. The French army is in bad condition, the officers are not all capable and the soldiers are undisciplined. But of your army I have had most favourable reports. You have good soldiers and good officers,’ my host observed.

‘Ours is a small army but a satisfactory one. We could treble our forces, but it would cost us a financial sacrifice.’

‘Have you been to Paris?’

‘No, my lord.’

‘To Berlin?’

‘Yes.’

‘And what have they to say to the questions of the moment in Berlin?’

‘That they have no interest whatsoever in the Egyptian Question. That they will leave the solving of the problem to those who are directly interested. In Berlin they give all their attention to France and Russia; those are the only two Powers that cause them anxiety, and only from these quarters do they fear war. Meanwhile, Prince Bismarck is seeking to strengthen Turkey and to help China reorganise her forces.’

‘This is unfortunately so,’ Lord Granville assented. ‘But for the time being, Russia cannot trouble Europe.’

‘I am aware of that, but it will not always be so in the future.’

‘Have you seen General Menabrea?’

‘Yes, my lord.’

‘What is his mood at present?’

‘He told me he felt the soldier within him awakening.’

Lord Granville laughed, and as lunch was finished, Lady Granville, her daughters, the nephews and the private secretary rose and left the room. Lord Granville and I were now alone.

I forgot to mention that a few minutes before lunch was over Lacaita had taken his departure, as he was going out of town, and was pressed for time. He expects to return on Monday. We remained alone in the dining-room. His Lordship drew up a chair, I did the same, and we sat down again.

‘And so you will not join us in Egypt?’ my host began.

‘For my part I would not hesitate a moment to join you.’

‘But Signor Mancini has declined our offer.’

‘I can only regret this,’ I said, ‘and if there were still time and I were in Italy, I should do my best to persuade the Minister to intervene in Egypt, with England. Could you not resume negotiations?’

‘It is impossible for us to do so. The Italian government might. But can you tell me why your government has refused?’

‘I can only guess at the reasons. I have not seen Mancini, and am unacquainted with his views. Perhaps he does not feel he would be able to justify our intervention in Egypt before the Chamber. You will remember, my lord, how we were treated by Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington in 1879.’

‘We have nothing to do with the events of 1879,’ his Lordship assured me. ‘This time we gave preference to Italy in order to furnish a proof of our friendship for her.’ Our officers were delighted at the prospect of an alliance with Italy, and would have been glad to fight by the side of yours.’

‘The manner in which Italy was driven out in 1879 by France and England was disgraceful. You certainly rank first as regards commerce in Egypt, but we do not come last,’ I observed.

‘And your population in Egypt is greater than that of any other nation.’

‘A large amount of Italian capital is invested in the Egyptian loan. I can see that by joining with you we might have regained the position we were deprived of in 1879.’

‘Certainly,’ Lord Granville acquiesced.

‘Minister Mancini could have wished to have

some guarantee for this, in order to reassure the Chamber.'

'But we have no intention of bargaining. I assure you, however, that we do not complain of Italy's refusal, and that our relations with you will remain as friendly as they were before. The proposal was made by us to the Italian government in all sincerity and good faith. We should have liked, should still like, to work with you.'

'Then you might renew proposals,' I again suggested.

'We cannot go down on our knees! England is strong enough to carry this through unaided.'

'How many troops do you believe will be needed for this Egyptian undertaking?'

'The French say we shall need forty thousand men, but we believe from twenty to twenty-five thousand will be sufficient. The war cannot last long. The Pashas are not agreed, and we must profit by their disunion. Arabi Pasha is rather ignorant and not over clever, and it is my impression that some European is directing his operations.'

'How long would it take you to mobilise your army?' I asked.

'We could be ready in one month.'

'That is too long.'

'I may be mistaken on this point. But at any rate, it would not do to go to Egypt at once. The climate is bad for Europeans in the summer.'

'But things cannot long be left as they are.'

'Do you believe that France will intervene?'

'For the time being France intends to confine her efforts to safeguarding the Suez Canal. But should the Freycinet Ministry fall, we cannot tell what the views of its successors might be.'

A short silence ensued, while each watched the expression of the other's face. Then Lord Granville resumed :

‘Our conversation is entirely unofficial. Perhaps I should not have told you that Signor Mancini has refused our invitation.’

‘My lord, I am a private citizen, and I look upon you, at this moment, not as the Minister of the Queen of England, but as a friend of Italy, who is conversing with an Italian patriot. I can never forget, moreover, that you English were our friends before Italy existed.’

As I rose to take my leave, he said :

‘I trust we may meet again before you leave England.’

‘I shall come to say good-bye, as it is my duty to do, my lord.’

‘Do you speak English?’

‘I have not the courage. Besides, I do not understand easily. Mr. Gladstone has spoiled me in that respect, for he speaks Italian so fluently.’

While we were talking, a footman came in with an oblong box. His lordship asked my permission to open it, and drew out a bundle of telegrams, which he read.

‘In your country you use portfolios,’ he said. ‘Here we have boxes.’

He rose, wrote some answers and then gave the box back to the footman.

Lord Granville is a man of medium stature. He wears his beard in the English fashion, has blue eyes and a face that is all kindness. Although he is reserved and cautious, he puts so much cordiality into his conversation that he inspires one with confidence.

The following letters, despatched to Rome¹ at that time, give an account of Crispi's views on the Egyptian question, and of the efforts he made to prevail upon Mancini to accept the English invitation.

LONDON, July 25, 1882.

I left Italy with the intention of making a pleasure trip, but I have come to the conclusion that it would be better to turn it to account by accumulating as much information as possible.

I therefore set out across the Gothard, and journeyed to Berlin, where I remained one week. From Berlin I came to London, via Brussels and Ostend, and shall spend the rest of the month here.

What are my impressions? Certainly not encouraging for our country. If the government does not wake up in time, the injury we have suffered in Tunis will not be the last to be inflicted upon us.

Germany takes no interest in African matters, and leaves everything in the hands of those who have, or believe they have, direct interest at stake there. We must, therefore, make all haste to assume an active part, and this without hesitation, without fear.

The European agreement is a farce, and the Constantinople Conference a child's game. The Powers have met there because there was nothing else to do. The utter unimportance of this meeting is proved by the choice of the person to preside over it.² Any one who may see fit to intervene in Egypt will be tolerated—no war will result from such intervention. And he who intervenes will arrange matters to suit himself.

¹ To Primo Levi, editor of the *Riforma*.

² Since July 24 it had been presided over by Count Corti, Italian ambassador at Constantinople, as *doyen* of the diplomatic corps.

Bismarck's thoughts are all for the Empire, and his policy has but one end in view : that the Empire may be maintained and acquire ever greater stability. He sees only two enemies of the Empire—Russia and France. His alliances are arranged with a view to a war which might come from these two Powers. He has bound himself fast to Austria, and is labouring to reorganise a strong force in Turkey. He takes but little heed of Italy, but he knows that in case of war he cannot be her enemy. . . .¹ If we were armed, our position in Europe would be different. They would need us then, and would do nothing without us. Speaking of arming, you cannot imagine how feverishly they are preparing here. . . .

Mancini hopes for great things from his policy, and he may well do so, for we had indeed fallen low enough under Cairoli. But, so far, this policy has brought us no real profit, and it is not likely to bring us any in the future. We have no enemies, but neither have we any friends, although many would be glad to possess our friendship. But as they lack confidence in us, and as we never do anything to bring ourselves to the fore and never take an active part in any way, all pursue their own ends, and leave us behind.

The time has come for intervention in Egypt. Germany would offer no objection, and would still remain our friend. England desires our co-operation, and would welcome us warmly. If we intervene now, nothing will be done in Africa without us in the future, and, most important of all, we shall make it impossible for others to injure us. If, on the

¹ When Crispi wrote this letter he was evidently unacquainted with the existence of the Triple Alliance treaty which had been stipulated a few months earlier.

other hand, we abstain from action, France will strengthen her position in Tunis, and our chances in Tripoli will be jeopardised. The Mediterranean will be for ever lost to us.

As regards Tunis, I have heard things concerning the conduct of our representatives at Berlin in 1878 which are simply beyond belief. We were shamefully tricked there, and it was all owing to the utter incapacity of our representatives.

At the English court they are pained by the attitude our press has assumed, and cannot understand the cause of our resentment. The Prince of Wales recently expressed his regret at this circumstance, and added that it would be unwise for Italy to miss this chance of participating in the undertaking. England would welcome our intervention because we should act as a counterpoise to France, who is not loved.

Should you wish to submit this letter to Mancini through Fabrizi, you are free to do so. But preserve it, for I have not kept a copy, and one day it may become an important document.

LONDON, 26 *July*, 1882.

England needs a military ally for this Egyptian undertaking. She would be glad to have Italy for that ally. I am aware that a formal invitation to participate was despatched to our Ministry. God grant Mancini does not reply as Corti did in 1878! You know what the wretched consequences were.

A coalition is preparing in France against Freycinet, brought about by his indecision, and it is quite possible a crisis may take place there in the course of a few days. In this event France and

England will come to an understanding, and we shall be left out. It is therefore absolutely necessary that no time be lost, and that the invitation we have received be immediately accepted.

England will consent to any conditions in order to get the Egyptian Question settled in the way she wishes. This morning the *Times* discussed the necessity of a government for Egypt which should be subject to the English protectorate. If Italy refuses England will make concessions to France. Then what I wrote you about yesterday will happen: France will be firmly established at Tunis, perhaps even with permission to attack Tripoli. This would close the Mediterranean to us.

It would not be surprising if Germany, foreseeing all this, and wishing to help Turkey, should persuade her to interfere. This morning, in fact, it was announced as a certainty, that the Sublime Porte had undertaken to intervene, and would presently publish her conditions. You will see that this is but another excuse for delay in order to prevent or at least postpone the intervention of the Mediterranean Powers.

France, however, will not hear of Turkey's advance, for she does not wish that Power to draw any nearer to her African possessions, and England mistrusts the Sublime Porte because she sees the hand of the Turk in every particular of the Egyptian imbroglio.

Our intervention would encounter no opposition from Germany; on the contrary, it would meet with approval in that country. The Grand Chancellor would see in it a means of dissipating the ill-humour that has arisen in consequence of the Tunisian intrigue. He himself, however, will

certainly neither propose it nor invite us to act, because the matter does not concern his interests, and he prefers to wash his hands of it.

LONDON, 27 *July*, 1882.

. . . The question is a serious one, and Italy has too many vital interests at stake in the Mediterranean to allow this opportunity to escape her. I therefore resume my pen, to write of it once more.

The despatching of the gun-boats and the bombardment of Alexandria have been condemned as an attack upon the independence of a foreign people and their government. To-day conditions are altered. Tewfik is no longer with Arabi Pasha, and Tewfik having parted company with his prince, and made use of troops over whom he has no legitimate authority, has become a rebel against the legitimate government of his country. Success alone can legalise his undertaking; he must conquer, overthrow the prince and establish a national government. For the time being, however, his success being doubtful, he is simply a rebel.

What do the Mediterranean Powers really want—that is to say, England and those Powers who shall join with her? The re-establishment of khedival authority, but at the same time, the return of a government which shall ensure order at home and offer a guarantee to Europe. Thus, only yesterday, Gladstone in replying to Sir Wilfrid Lawson, M.P., said that a declaration of war was unnecessary, as the English troops were entering Egypt as friends of the head of the State, and for the purpose of helping him to re-establish his outraged authority.

Therefore, should we intervene in Egypt, we should not be offering offence to the principles of nationality and autonomy of another country. We should be going to Egypt simply for the purpose of regaining, when the government is reorganised, that influence we have a right to exercise, together with the other Powers who have direct interests in that country. Our presence is a necessity for ourselves and a guarantee for Egypt, as no act of conquest would be tolerated under our flag. Even should the three intervene together, no one participant would be able to remain, precisely because of this co-operation, and order once restored, all must depart.

Why did Italy take part in the Conference and demand a European agreement? Simply to break up the Anglo-French understanding. Alone, we were helpless, and because we stood alone and were looked upon with disfavour, we were sacrificed in 1879. The Anglo-French understanding no longer exists. The words of the French ministers and of the English, that prate of this agreement, are but a blind. The two countries have conflicting interests in Egypt, and different ends to pursue. Hence the invitation that came to us from England, who desires to ally herself with a power like Italy, which does not aspire to empire in Africa. The Conference having failed in its purpose, and also as we have not succeeded in obtaining what we wished by means of a European agreement, nothing remains for us save to protect our interests in the Mediterranean.

What is the position of the Europeans in Egypt as regards population and commercial interests? In population—with the exception of Greece—we

come first, then come France, England and Austria, and, last of all, comes Germany. And I say we are first because, as to the French, only half of them are native-born Frenchmen, the other half being French only by virtue of the Protectorate. In respect to commerce we occupy the fourth place. We are followed by Austria, while Russia comes last. Germany does not even figure on this list. The four leading Powers stand thus: England, France, Holland, Italy.

Who are the nearest neighbours on the Mediterranean? Spain, France, Italy and Greece. And how about traditions and the past? Here Italy and Greece take precedence.

If we make a calculation based upon all of these considerations, of direct interests in Egypt and on the shores of the Mediterranean, interests too vital to be neglected, we find that England, Italy and France take the lead. I ignore Spain, Holland and Greece because the first is of no importance in Egypt either as regards population or commerce; the second, although she enjoys a certain importance in commerce, has none at all as regards population. All three, moreover, are second-rate Powers, and held no seat in Constantinople.

These circumstances, while they urge us not only to take up our position but to maintain it, explain why Germany washes her hands of the matter, and why Austria exhibits no great concern. At Berlin they said: 'Let those who have direct interests at stake solve the Egyptian problem. We will never draw our swords for its sake.'

And now I feel I have said enough to show what our attitude should be, and clearly to set forth our rights and our obligations. The question of

supremacy in the Mediterranean is being settled in Egypt, and there is a chance for us to make good our defeat at Tunis.

LONDON, 29 *July*, 1882.

MY DEAR MANCINI,—I most deeply regret that you should have declined England's invitation to intervene in Egypt. God grant your refusal may not be the cause of fresh injury to Italy in the Mediterranean!

You should have accepted without a moment's hesitation. When Cavour was invited to join the Western Powers on their Crimean expedition, he did not hesitate for an instant. The government of tiny Piedmont had the courage that the government of Italy lacks to-day.—Your affectionate

F. CRISPI.

LONDON, 29 *July*, 1882.

This morning, in a moment of irritation, I despatched a note for Mancini to your care, with the firm determination not to talk politics with you. The Italian press is overdoing the sentimental, and is helping the government in defrauding Italy of the opportunity which fortune has offered her. I have just received your telegram saying that Mancini desires my immediate return to Rome. I have replied by wire.

Of course you understand that what I write you . . . is intended to influence Mancini, should it still be possible to remedy the evil done.

In the Egyptian Question the English government has preferred us to the French. It is unnecessary to explain the reasons for this. One day Granville met Menabrea and said to him: 'If we

should invite you to join us in Egypt, would you accept?' Menabrea replied: 'Certainly!' These words were not spoken officially, but simply thrown out to test the situation.

A few days later the Prince of Wales met Menabrea, and congratulated him. I wish you to know that I did not hear these things from Menabrea himself, who always assumes such an air of mystery with me that I shall not go near him again.

At last the invitation arrived, and I, knowing all about it, while Menabrea supposed I knew nothing, was requested by him to telegraph to Mancini in my own name and in cipher, that I was of opinion the Egyptian proposal should be accepted, in case it was really made. Mancini immediately telegraphed his thanks and asked for time to consult his colleagues. Hereupon he sent in his refusal!

Here they say they have no right to complain, and that the relations between the two nations will remain as cordial as ever. They could have wished for a favourable answer, as the offer was made for the purpose of proving their true friendship for Italy.

I am not at liberty to relate what was said this morning at the table of one of the Ministers where I was lunching. . . .

And so Mancini wants me in Rome. Why? Perhaps in order that he may find an excuse for changing his attitude, or rather that he may convince me he has acted wisely? If it is for the first-named reason, I should see the heads of this Ministry again before leaving, but to-morrow is Sunday, and they all go to sleep for four-and-

twenty hours. If it is for the second reason, my return to Italy will be quite useless.

LONDON, 30 *July*, 1882.

On the 26th I alluded to a possible ministerial crisis in France, and on the 28th I telegraphed you (giving you a day's notice) that the Chamber would vote against the Freycinet Ministry. I have warned you in my letters that if the Italian Ministry failed to join with England in her action in Egypt, England would conclude an engagement with France, and we should be expelled from the Mediterranean. French affairs have turned out as I foresaw. The second part of my prediction is not yet fulfilled, but it is on the road to fulfilment. In order, if possible, to ward off great injury, I telegraphed to Fabrizi yesterday¹ using your cipher, in the hope that he might be able to rouse Mancini from the state of inertia into which he has sunk. . . .

In Italy the papers—both the moderate and progressionist press—have started from a false premise. They believed that an understanding existed between England and France, and that the invitation to Italy came from both Powers. Up to the present no engagement exists between Paris and London, but an agreement may be concluded at any time with the new Ministry. Freycinet fell, not because he wished to occupy the Suez Canal, but because he would not go to Egypt. The grant of money was refused by the French Chamber, not because it had any desire to deny the money to the Ministry, but because the sum demanded was too small. Since the English have bombarded

¹ The telegram to General Fabrizi ran as follows: 'Beg Mancini to resume negotiations with English Ministry. Make haste. All delay injurious.'

Alexandria and begun sending troops to Egypt, the French wish to intervene, and this and no other is the true explanation of yesterday's vote, which event England had hoped to forestall by means of an alliance with Italy. She has not succeeded and we shall have no right to complain if, in her own interests, she unites with France and makes broad concessions to her.

Who will get into office in France? Either Waddington or some of his people. His address to the Senate is considered a masterpiece. As Gambetta cannot go into office and Freycinet may not remain there, there must be a Ministry that will satisfy the parliamentary majority, and take up the African enterprise, as was intended in the beginning. Waddington it was who arranged the Tunisian affair at Berlin, and Waddington who drove us out of Egypt. From him and his, therefore, we know what we have to expect. We shall be blockaded in the Mediterranean, and this time it will be by our own fault.

I shall be in Paris Tuesday evening. . . . I assure you that politics are keeping me in a state of continual unrest, and I only wish I were out of it all.

LONDON, 31 *July*, 1882.

The star of Italy is still shining brightly, and, notwithstanding our mistakes, the state of things is no worse than before—there is still time to remedy our policy.

Up to the present moment (4.30 P.M.) no news concerning the solution of the crisis has arrived from France. Every day that passes is so much gain for us. A great struggle is going on here in the House of Lords over the Bill on the back rents

in Ireland.¹ Lord Salisbury is proposing an amendment which the government will not accept ; if the Lords pass it, no reconciliation between the two Houses will be possible, and in that case it is expected the Commons will be dissolved. The conservatives themselves do not believe they will win at the general elections. Nevertheless Lord Salisbury is determined and it is impossible to move him. I have no wish to contemplate the possibility of a conservative victory, for that event would be a great blow to our prospects in the Mediterranean.

The parliamentary crisis in England—should it indeed take place—and the ministerial crisis in France, which may be followed by a parliamentary crisis as well, will give us time to reflect and prepare for action.

In my letters I have dwelt at length on the line of conduct we should pursue. To-day I have but little to add. Italy in the Mediterranean must go hand in hand with England. That country does not fear the development of our navy, she applauds it indeed, because it constitutes a force to set over against France. As I have said before, England's only anxiety is in regard to France. As the friend and ally of England we should have nothing to fear on the sea. If, however, things develop otherwise, we shall not even be masters of our own shores.

Our Continental policy is another matter. It is our duty to act in concert with Germany. Should we choose another line we must arm ourselves so strongly as to force Germany's respect, and bring her to sue for our co-operation.

The reasons that should inspire our Continental policy are identical with those by which our mari-

¹ Mr. Gladstone's Irish Arrears Bill.—Translator's note.

time policy should be regulated, because in both branches we have the same adversary to contend with. In the Egyptian Question there was this great advantage, that, while joining with England, we might still preserve the good will of Germany. There should therefore have been not a moment's hesitation.

LONDON, 1 *August*, 1882.

As the telegraph will have already informed you, yesterday the amendments to the Bill concerning the back rents in Ireland, which were proposed by the conservatives, were carried by an overwhelming majority. The government cannot allow them to pass, and the Commons will not accept them. As an agreement between the two Houses on this point is impossible, the dissolution of the Commons is considered inevitable. I can assure you that this state of things is causing the Ministry much anxiety.

It is believed by several politicians with whom I conversed this afternoon that the dissolution of the House of Commons will be problematic in its effects. There are those who do not exclude the possibility of a defeat of the liberals. This would not be for England's good because the conservatives offer no guarantee in the Irish Question, and for us Italians it would be a calamity indeed, for Lord Salisbury was the author of all that befell us through Tunis and Egypt. In order to be prepared for any emergency Mancini should bind the English by means of a written agreement. He can easily do this if he will only follow up his last despatch concerning the maritime policy in the Suez Canal. A convention once stipulated, no matter what party may be in power, that convention must be respected.

They are in such a tangle in France that the formation of a Ministry becomes every day more difficult. Our Latin brothers are giving us time to act, and God grant we may know how to profit by it!

The attitude of the Italian press is causing much dissatisfaction here. If the press must combat the views of the English, it might, at least, do so with greater urbanity. We should not forget that those who are in power in England at the present moment are the friends of Italy. Gladstone was the first to raise the Italian Question when Italy was still divided into seven states. His letters against Ferdinand of Naples are known to all. In 1860 it was these men who, by insisting upon the non-intervention policy, made it impossible for Napoleon III. to send his ships into the Straits of Messina and prevent Garibaldi's passage onto the Continent. They alone protested against the cession of Nice and Savoy. They were the first to recognise the Kingdom of Italy. And let me give you a detail.—When on May 29, 1860, one of His Sardinian Majesty's ships refused us powder, it was from an English ship that it was supplied. We should be grateful for so many favours, and even when combating, refrain from harshness.

PARIS, 3 *August*, 1882.

. . . I do not believe that Mancini assumed any obligations concerning Egyptian affairs at Berlin. If he did, he made a great mistake. Germany, as her political leaders are repeatedly declaring, has no direct interest in the Mediterranean. But we ourselves live and have our being on the Mediterranean, and in settling questions concerning this region we should shape our actions according to our

personal interests. Towards Germany our attitude should be one of friendship always and, possibly, of alliance, but never should we stoop to dependence and still less to the sacrifice of our rights, especially when such sacrifice is of no advantage to our ally, and receives no compensation. . . .

Parliamentary matters in England are righting themselves. Gladstone will find a way of getting the Commons to pass an amendment which the Lords can accept. If not, he will close the session and open another in October or November for the purpose of bringing in the back rents bill again, with any modifications which may appear advisable. Thus dissolution will be avoided.

There is talk here of a 'working ministry.' It will probably be a 'recess ministry,' however, which will give place to a new administration when Parliament opens again.

As for us, we have plenty of time to review matters and also to correct our policy.

CHAPTER IV

FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND TRIPLE ALLIANCE TREATY

The original error : the Emperor of Austria fails to come to Rome—Consequently the King and Queen of Italy cannot go to Berlin—A conference between Prince Bismarck and the Duke of Genoa : likelihood of war coming from France and Russia—Prince Frederick William at Rome—The Italian Cabinet dissatisfied with the allies—General Robilant, Minister of Foreign Affairs—A further opinion of Prince Bismarck's on the situation in 1885—Negotiations for renewing the Triple Alliance—The arguments by means of which Prince Bismarck induced England to stipulate an agreement with Italy concerning the Mediterranean—The new treaty of February 20, 1887.

ITALY's accession to the Austro-German alliance, while it redeemed us from isolation and gave a fixed direction to our foreign policy, failed to bear any tangible fruit. For some years no one knew of the treaty's existence ; both in parliament and in diplomatic reunions the ministers of the Triple Alliance denied the existence of any written engagement. Moreover, if there was no visible sign of change in the relations between the three States (save perhaps for the greater cordiality of the Austrian press, which was accounted for by King Humbert's visit), little or nothing was done on our part to render those relations truly intimate and more advantageous. In fact, as far as Austria was concerned, this was no easy undertaking. The *rapprochement* of the two peoples had not resulted from any spontaneous sentiment ; Austrian domination in Italy was still too bitterly remembered by many who had been its victims ; while, on the other hand, Vienna had but little confidence in a government which was based upon the principles of liberty, and which, moreover, showed weakness in dealing with the extreme parties.

An error which Mancini committed even before the treaty was signed enhanced the difficulties already besetting the amelioration of the situation. On forwarding to the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet the announcement of King Humbert's desire to visit the Emperor, he omitted to demand an assurance that the visit would be returned in Rome. The question of restitution, indeed, was not even mentioned; nor was this due to an oversight, for his colleagues, and especially Ambassador Robilant, could not have failed to prompt him. It was rather the result of Mancini's intimate acquaintance with the sentiments that prevailed among the ruling classes in Austria, and his conviction that, should the Emperor's coming to Rome be made a condition, the proposed journey of the Italian sovereign would never take place.

This error damaged the alliance in the eyes of the people; and its effects have been lasting, for it seemed, and still seems, that Austria was not treating us with the consideration we deserved. One of its first consequences was that the King and Queen of Italy were unable to go to Berlin in 1883 to visit that glorious monarch, William I.

Prince Bismarck himself had made the first move by informing the *Consulta*, through Ambassador von Keudell, that Germany was most anxious to welcome the King and Queen of Italy, and that a visit from them would give the Emperor the greatest pleasure. He had, indeed, added at the same time that, although Emperor William would like to go to Rome, it would certainly be unwise to allow an old man of eighty-six to undertake so long a journey, and that Crown Prince Frederick William would return the visit for his father.

Had the Austrian precedent not existed this proposal might have been accepted, as the excuse for the substitution was perfectly plausible; and moreover, the Prince, who had already visited Rome on the occasion of the obsequies of Victor Emmanuel, had left a most favourable impression in Italy. But after Francis Joseph's abstention no concession was possible.

So anxious was Prince Bismarck for a visit from the King and Queen of Italy that on March 1, 1883, he introduced the subject when conversing with Duke Thomas of Savoy, who had come to Germany to wed Princess Isabella of Bavaria, and

who had heard nothing about the much longed-for royal journey.

Apropos of this meeting, it is interesting to recall Prince Bismarck's appreciation of the international situation of that period, which he expressed to the Duke of Genoa.

'He said that the friendly relations between Italy and Germany were a natural consequence of the fact that the interests of these two Powers were not contrary to the general peace, but rather tended to maintain it. The same might be said of the relations existing between the Cabinets of Berlin and of Vienna. Austria,' he said, 'had completely abandoned her ancient policy of hostility against Germany and Italy alike, a policy which had greatly weakened the House of Hapsburg in the past. Germany, therefore, now found herself on terms of perfect intimacy with the neighbouring Empire, a state of things which could not fail to influence the relations prevailing between Austria and Italy. The agreement of these three Powers,' the Prince added, 'offered a substantial and mutual guarantee, as far as defence was concerned. The Berlin Cabinet had no thought of attacking any one, but was ready and indeed resolved, should occasion offer, to resist resolutely any form of aggression. The danger rested with France, where passions were always in a state of ebullition, and with Russia, where, to mention but one circumstance, the army was dissatisfied. The troops being distributed over a vast extent of territory, the officer who is relegated to a small garrison finds time hang heavily on his hands, and prefers war to a life not only devoid of all amusements, but fraught with many privations.'

The King and Queen of Italy did not go to Berlin, but, nevertheless, Frederick William came to Rome officially in December of that year (1883) to thank the King, so at least it was announced, for the cordial reception he had received in Genoa, but in reality because Bismarck wished to give public proof of the excellent relations that existed between his country and Italy, a proof which should act as a warning to the supposed enemies of Germany. This event aroused no little ill-humour at Vienna, for the festivities which were organised in honour of the German Crown Prince brought the coldness of the Austro-Italian relations more vividly before

the public, and revived the memory that Francis Joseph still owed Rome a visit he was in duty bound to pay.

The Depretis-Mancini Ministry, fearing to irritate France, who was already alarmed by the reports which had been circulating in the press concerning the existence of an alliance, was rather embarrassed than gratified by this manifestation of Italo-German intimacy, and allowed its conduct to be influenced by this anxiety to the point of committing an error which has since been repeated, that of failing to draw from the alliance the advantages it offered, and of pursuing the alluring phantom of a friendship with France, whose chimerical nature was clearly established by the Tunisian episode, and which, at any rate, was entirely incompatible with the compact already agreed upon with Germany.

Thus, while the Austro-German alliance was becoming ever more cordial, and had achieved its purpose in regard to Russia by bringing that country to seek the good will of the Central Powers in March 1884, Italy remained ever an object of suspicion to all concerned, and was neglected by her allies.

At the delegations Minister Tisza, in answering a question put by Helfy, had spoken of Austria-Hungary's relations with foreign powers without so much as mentioning Italy; and in the Austrian parliament Minister Taaffe had refrained from interfering when a Dalmatian deputy of Slavic extraction had alluded to Italy in offensive terms. The suspicion and ill will that prevailed among the ruling classes in Austria frequently became apparent. Nor was the German government better disposed towards us, and Prince Bismarck himself openly ignored us on several occasions.

Mancini complained bitterly of this state of things. Beyond the special stipulations of the treaty, did not the very fact of the alliance imply mutual assistance, at least up to the point where the interests of one of the allies might clash with those of another? Mancini had always and under all circumstances interpreted the compact thus, but his allies acted differently where Italian interests were concerned. And why was this?

Mancini remained in office until June 20, 1885. After a short interval, during which Depretis was minister, he was succeeded by Robilant, who on October 6 of that year passed from the embassy at Vienna to the *Consulta*. He had proved himself a

clever diplomatist, and was esteemed by the Foreign Offices of Berlin and Vienna for his straightforward character, his lofty sentiments, and his intelligence. His personal prestige was of great advantage to the country, for it lent sufficient authority to the new ministry to induce Prince Bismarck and Count Kálnoky to include the safeguarding of certain Italian interests in the Triple Alliance.

It may be truthfully said that the renewal of the treaty constituted the extent of Robilant's ministerial activity. He was but ill-satisfied with the stipulations of 1882 for which he himself had negotiated at Vienna, at a time when Italy was offering herself, and experience had taught him their imperfections, which he now set himself about remedying.

The two Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna immediately manifested their inclination to continue the alliance, and Robilant, while consenting in a general way, took time before opening negotiations. He rejected alike the idea of not continuing the alliance and that of renewing it without alterations, but the conditions to be proposed must be well considered, and Italy must not display any eagerness.

On October 19, in replying to the greetings Robilant had sent him on assuming his new office, Prince Bismarck allowed it to be understood that the minister's words had impressed him most favourably, and that, to please him, he would receive Ambassador de Launay at Friedrichsruh.

Count de Launay paid this visit on the twenty-fourth; the day before the French ambassador had waited upon the Grand Chancellor. The Prince referred to the new treaty, expressing his willingness to render it more practical and cordial, and offered no objection to de Launay's observation that, for the time being, all that was demanded was that the ground might be prepared, and the already existing clauses rendered more efficacious. The Prince then proceeded to discuss the situation of the moment with perfect frankness.

‘For the sake of peace, ever since the treaty of Versailles, he had sought to remain on friendly terms with France, and had refrained from placing obstacles in the way of her expansionist policy in Tunis, China, Madagascar and on the west coast of Africa. He had thus allowed her some compensation and enabled her to regain her self-respect; but he had, nevertheless,

made it perfectly clear to her that Alsace was lost to her for ever. Following the same line of thought, he had made himself, in a way, and especially in Egypt, the supporter of French interests. But his efforts had borne no fruit. His attentions, that had frequently amounted almost to servility in the course of the last fifteen years, had been in vain. The great stream of public opinion in France still flows towards revenge, and condemns all such as do not share its animosity. The affair of the Caroline Islands has been the most recent proof of this. Moreover, the result of the last general elections will be to bend the government towards radicalism. Under these circumstances the Chancellor is forced to admit that the importance of an agreement between the three Empires and Italy is greatly increased. He has decided to send Count Hatzfeldt as ambassador to London, who will be better able than Münster to bring about a *rapprochement* with England.'

Minister Robilant, who was determined not to take the initiative in the negotiations, was gratified by the manner in which the Prince had received the idea that the new treaty must be made to satisfy Italy's just and modest demands, and he waited quietly. At last, in October 1886, Prince Bismarck again made a first move by declaring himself ready to open negotiations both at Rome and Vienna. At first Robilant held back, saying that, with or without an alliance, Italy would always co-operate with Germany and Austria-Hungary, but adding that public opinion in Italy failed to perceive the benefits of the alliance; that her allies had never given Italy a proof of their entire confidence in her; and that Bismarck himself never found time to confer personally with the Italian ambassador. These complaints and his reluctance, more apparent than real, to renew the treaty, had the desired effect. As a matter of fact, the rupture of the alliance would have produced a disastrous impression, and Germany, placed between hostile France and none too friendly Russia, would have been ill at ease indeed. Von Keudell himself admitted as much, and thus it came about that the conditions were accepted which Robilant proposed later on, and which, summed up, amounted to the guaranteeing of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean and the Balkan peninsula.

After a long series of proposals and counter-proposals the

draft of the new clauses was drawn up on February 19, 1887, and signed the next day at Berlin.

Count Robilant's demand, that Italy's position on the Mediterranean should be ensured, suggested to Prince Bismarck the idea of an agreement with England. Determined as he was to keep Italy bound to him, and ever faithful to his policy of isolating France in order to incapacitate her for war, the Prince saw the double advantage that would accrue to Germany through an Anglo-Italian agreement: England would afford that maritime security which Germany could not give, and having assumed obligations towards Italy, would find it impossible to lend her support to the French policy.

It was no easy undertaking, at a time when the policy of 'splendid isolation' had so many supporters, to induce Her Majesty's ministers to bind themselves to a Continental power, even if it were only by an agreement which would remain secret. But Prince Bismarck accomplished this with perfect ease.

On February 1, 1887, he went to the English embassy to call upon Sir E. Malet. 'The Italian Cabinet,' he said, 'has requested us to support the desire it has expressed in London that the bonds of friendship between England and Italy may be strengthened.' It seemed to him, he added, that there were many reasons why the English government should comply with this wish. There existed *a sort of alliance* between Germany and Italy; but it was of little value to Germany, as Italy could become an important ally only when she should be able to transport her troops by sea. The Alpine passes bristled with fortifications, and all efforts to co-operate by crossing these would be immediately frustrated. Could Italy but transport her troops by sea, then indeed she would become a powerful ally. But this could only be accomplished with England's help, by which arrangement the two Powers would obtain supremacy in the Mediterranean.

The Prince said he was well aware of the difficulties any British Premier must encounter who should seek an alliance with a foreign power. In the present case, however, all that was necessary would be to conclude an engagement that should hold as long as the present government remained in office. He was of opinion that a friendly understanding would be

warmly welcomed in England, it being in harmony with the popular traditions of the two countries. He, moreover, believed that the existence of such an understanding would be an important factor at the present crisis, as it would make for the maintenance of peace, whereas its absence might prove a cause for war.

In discussing the question of public opinion and of the recognised duty of every British minister to follow its dictates, the Prince remarked that no matter what the usual practice might be, it was always in the minister's power, it was his duty indeed, to shape public opinion. Public opinion is but a great river formed by a quantity of small streams, one of which is the government stream. If the government would but swell its waters sufficiently, it would have a determinative influence upon the great public current. If, on the contrary, government waits to measure the strength of all the other streams which, separately, are all less powerful than its own, it must be overwhelmed by the union of their forces. A government acting thus would be guilty of unpardonable neglect of precautions.

The Prince went on to insist upon the mutual advantages of an alliance between England and Italy, declaring that no ambition of Italy's could ever clash with England's interests. In the Mediterranean, Italy's desires were directed towards Tunis and Tripoli; on the Continent, towards the recovery of Nice.

Sir E. Malet observed that he could understand an alliance between Italy and England as far as Eastern questions were concerned, but that he greatly doubted whether England would be willing to form an alliance that might be the cause of hostilities with France.

Whenever the Grand Chancellor urged the acceptance of any proposal, he never failed to point out what the consequences of a refusal would be.

According to his ideas, it was England's duty to take her part of the responsibility of preserving peace in Europe. He was aware of the existence of a school that preached abstention, on England's part, from all interference in European politics, but he believed that Europe had the right to claim English co-operation in maintaining the balance

of power among the nations. Should England refuse, and all attempts fail to induce her to take the share of danger and responsibility which is incumbent upon every European power, the Powers who had interests at stake would be obliged to resort to other combinations. 'For instance,' said the Prince, 'it would be no difficult matter for me to strengthen the relations between Germany and France by consenting to that country's never-ending demands concerning Egypt. And I should also be able to avoid all danger from Russia by reducing our alliance with Austria to the letter of the treaty, guaranteeing the inviolability of the territory of the Austrian Empire alone, and by allowing Russia to occupy the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.'

Naturally at this point Sir E. Malet pointed out that any attempt of that sort on the part of Russia would mean war with England, and that consequently peace, whose maintenance would appear to be the Chancellor's one aim, would certainly not be ensured by any such combination.

A smile of satisfaction flitted across the Prince's face as he replied that he had but alluded to possible combinations which he trusted might never become necessary.

The conversation ended by an expression of opinion, on Bismarck's part, concerning the dangers of war with France. He said that as long as such men as Ferry and Freycinet remained in power there was nothing to fear; but that, should General Boulanger become Prime Minister or President of the Republic, an event which had already been predicted, danger would immediately threaten, he being already compromised by his general bearing, and having no other means of maintaining his ascendancy than by continuing to sustain the part he had undertaken.

CHAPTER V

CRISPI AND THE BULGARIAN QUESTION

The ministerial crisis of February 1887—Crispi's attitude; his talks with the King; his appointment as Minister of the Interior—The Bulgarian Question and the conduct of the Italian government before and after Crispi's assumption of control of our foreign policy as regards affairs in the East—Correspondence and documents—Italy proposes and prevails upon the Powers to accept the non-intervention policy in Bulgaria—The Triple Alliance for Eastern Affairs.

THE ministerial crisis brought about by the awful slaughter at Dogali on February 8, 1887, was long and strenuous.

The African enterprise, which had been initiated by the landing of Italian troops at Massaua (February 5, 1885), was to have constituted, according to Minister Mancini, an indemnification, a reparation as it were, for the disappointments Italy had suffered in the Mediterranean. 'Why will you refuse to recognise,' he said at the Chamber on January 27, 1885, addressing his opponents, who had accused him of losing sight of the true object of the Italian policy, that is to say, the Mediterranean, 'that in the Red Sea, its nearest neighbour, we may find the key to the Mediterranean?'

Italy, alas! found naught but disaster in the Red Sea, and a fatal diversion, which Crispi had foreseen from the very beginning, as appears from the warning he uttered at the Chamber on January 29.

If, in 1882, the Hon. Mancini had accepted England's proposals, he might now be in a position to initiate a policy of colonisation that would rest upon a solid foundation and from which we might

derive true benefit. As it is, I can only hope, for Italy's sake, that what he has done may not prove disastrous.

Dogali was the consequence of the lightness with which the difficulties besetting the undertaking were considered, and especially of ignorance of the true meaning of Abyssinian hostility. At Massaua, General Genè believed he could hold his own with a handful of men against a whole army of adversaries; and at Rome, Minister Robilant called those fierce tribes, whose lives are spent in continual warfare, a 'band of plunderers.'

Upon the resignation of the ministry over which Depretis had presided—which had been in office since May 29, 1881, and did not enjoy the confidence of the right-thinking portion of the population—the King first commissioned Depretis himself to recompose the Cabinet; but on February 23 Depretis was obliged to resign this commission. Robilant, Biancheri, and Saracco having been requested in turn to undertake the recomposition of the administration, and having all three declined to attempt it, the King on March 5 retraced his steps, and decided not to accept the resignation of the ministry.

What was Crispi's attitude during this crisis, which was to end in his assuming the reins of government?

We must consult his diary.

On February 9 the King summoned him in consultation.

At 9.15 I was at the Quirinal. The King asked my opinion of the political and parliamentary situations, and displayed anxiety concerning the condition of the country, the state of Europe and the great difficulties which encompass us.

I replied: Our position in Europe has certainly not improved during the last few years. Germany holds aloof from us; Austria may have reasons of her own for wishing to keep us with her, but she will not prove a faithful friend. The parliamentary situation could not be worse. Depretis

has created such disorder that not even he himself can count on the support of the Chamber. The parties are numerous, but not one can count on a majority. Nevertheless the party of the Left is the strongest. This parliamentary confusion can be remedied only by an administration composed of honest men, chosen amongst the cleverest members of the Chamber.

THE KING.—I ask for nothing better, and I beg you to point out the person to whom I must appeal.

CRISPI.—It is not my place to give advice of this sort. It is the duty of the Prime Minister who has resigned to do so. That is the way it is done in England.

THE KING.—I do not wish to exclude any one, and a suggestion might render my task less difficult. Apropos of this subject, I wish to tell you that, to my great regret, I read in one of to-day's papers, that at Court your name is excluded from the list. This is false. Not only do I entertain great friendship for you personally, but I appreciate your patriotism, your energy and experience. Nothing would please me more than to have your name proposed to me, or to find it inscribed upon a ministerial schedule. I would gladly place you in authority.

CRISPI.—I thank Your Majesty for the sentiments you have been pleased to express concerning me. . . .

THE KING.—I do not wish it to be believed that I exclude any one.

CRISPI.—I cannot doubt what Your Majesty tells me.

THE KING.—Very well then. Will you kindly tell me how you stand with Count Robilant?

CRISPI.—I stand well with him. I made his acquaintance at Vienna in 1877. I have met him since at the Chamber, but there is no intimacy between us.

THE KING.—This selection is a serious matter. I see that Depretis is too old to bear the burden of the Ministry of the Interior.

CRISPI.—On a former occasion I discussed the question of the Ministry of the Interior with Your Majesty, and I said that Italy has absolutely no preventive police system. It is fortunate that we have a well-behaved population!

A few moments later the King rose and gave me his hand, whereupon I took my departure.

On February 22 Saracco came to Crispi with the offer of the portfolio of Justice in the ministry which Depretis was hoping to reconstruct. In declining the offer Crispi pointed out that he could have been Minister of Justice in 1866 and 1867, and added that he would never accept a position that would prevent his exercising his influence over all branches of politics, especially over the foreign policy, with which other ministers usually refrain from interfering.

Depretis' attempt having failed, Crispi became the oracle of the situation. On the twenty-fifth and twenty-seventh he received the Marchese di Rudinì; on March 3, when Depretis had caused the miscarriage of a composition of Saracco's by refusing it his support because Rudinì's name figured on the list, the dissenters of the Left met and resolved to support Crispi, who received the Deputy Tajani on March 4, Rudinì again on the sixth, the Deputies Lacava and Giolitti on the ninth, who were followed by three other deputies, Baccarini, Cairoli, and Nicotera, and on the eleventh by the Deputies Codronchi and Rudinì, Lacava and Giolitti. On the twelfth he consented to meet the Deputies Bonghi, Spaventa, Codronchi, and Rudinì. We transcribe from his diary.

12 March.—Went to Hôtel de Rome at 5 P.M.,

where I found the deputies Bonghi, Rudinì, and Codronchi. At about 5.15 Spaventa arrived.

After some discussion we agreed on the following points. Possibility of a combination with Depretis. Crispi believes there is no probability of this; nevertheless, should it come about, it would not do to oppose it; we should rather seek to further it.

Foreign policy.—The agreements with the Central Powers to be renewed. It might be dangerous to refuse. Spaventa observes that Germany might doubt us. The position in which the Papacy has placed itself with Bismarck must also be considered. Meanwhile we should also cultivate our relations with England; join with her in Egypt, lending our aid to facilitate the accomplishment of the task she has undertaken, and thus constrain her to be with us in all questions concerning the Mediterranean.

Finance.—Must be strengthened by fresh taxes in order to increase the State's income sufficiently to meet the expenses of the military and those of public works. Army and armament must be strong.

Provincial and communal laws.—The electorate: poll-tax, five *lire*. Must have been through fourth primary class. Municipal employees excluded from polls.

The nature of our agreement to be set before the Chamber at earliest opportunity, and the King informed. Rudinì undertakes to do this. In discussing taxation, an entrance duty on grain was proposed, but this alone will not suffice, as sixty million are needed.

Rudinì says he has seen Zanardelli, who is also of opinion that the only ministry possible would be one of coalition. This opinion is borne out not only

by the conditions of the Chamber, but also by the necessity for levying fresh taxes. Unpopularity must be faced by the patriots of the different parties.

13 *March*.—A call from Marchese di Rudinì at 10 A.M.

He saw the King last night and gave him the outlines of the agreement established between Crispi, Spaventa and the others. This understanding ensures the possibility of an administration in case of a crisis.

The King approved. No matter what happens he now knows to whom to appeal. He asked if he might mention the understanding to Depretis, and Rudinì replied that His Majesty must do as he thought best.

20 *March*.—I accept an invitation from Depretis and am with him at 4.15 P.M. He tells me the King has informed him of his interview with the Marchese di Rudinì concerning the arrangement made at the Hôtel de Rome. He dwells upon the difficulties besetting the situation and of the necessity for composing a new administration. Public opinion points to a Depretis-Crispi ministry. He is ready to accept this adjustment and asks if I am willing to do so also. I replied that I would consent on condition that a Cabinet of lasting stability be formed. We discuss the men best adapted to form part of such a Cabinet. Depretis remarks that he is old and discouraged, and that he cannot remain in office during the interim. He informed me that the treaty with the Central Powers was already stipulated, with more advantageous conditions than the former treaty had contained. We establish a programme. I ask for time to decide.

24 *March*.—At 2 P.M. Rattazzi came to me in the name of the King. His Majesty desires that I should enter the Ministry. A kind message couched in affectionate terms.

28 *March*.—On returning to Rome from Naples I find a note from Depretis informing me that the King wishes to see me. His Majesty receives me at 11 A.M. He thanks me for having consented to accept office. He assures me he is entirely unprejudiced and will accept any names Depretis and I may propose. I inform the King of our negotiations with Zanardelli, and of the necessity for having him in the Ministry. We are bound to prove to the so-called 'pentarchy' how necessary it is that we should all unite in seeking to form a cabinet with Depretis. In any case, we must conduct matters in such a way as to prove our willingness and good intentions.

We have the King's approval.

Francesco Crispi took possession of the Ministry of the Interior on April 4. He was unable to interfere with the foreign policy as long as Depretis remained in Rome, who on Robilant's withdrawal had arrogated to himself the *interim* of Foreign Affairs. But when Depretis was forced by ill-health to leave the capital Crispi demanded that the Council of Ministers be kept posted concerning the action of the *Consulta* in the Bulgarian Question, which had been complicated by the election of Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (July 7).

The treaty of Berlin had established that Bulgaria, as a principality, should enjoy autonomy while remaining subject to Turkey, and had also decreed (Article III.) that the prince should be elected by the people, and his election confirmed by the Sublime Porte, with the consent of the Powers. The treaty had, furthermore, constituted a new province south of the Balkans, to which the name of Eastern Roumelia was given, and which was placed under the political and military control of Turkey.

The election of the first prince, Alexander of Battenberg, by the assembly of Bulgarian deputies on April 29, 1879, had encountered no opposition. During his brief reign of seven years (he abdicated on September 3, 1886) Alexander organised the government and the army, strengthened the national spirit in the Bulgarians by the war he waged victoriously against Servia (battle of Slivnitza, November 28, 1885), as well as by the acquisition of Roumelia, and started the country fairly upon the road to independence by means of progress in all its forms.

Russia's desire to keep the principality in subjection was the main cause of Prince Alexander's abdication, as it was the cause of the difficulties encountered by his successor.

On the morrow of the Prince of Coburg's election Crispi, who was desirous that Italy should assume an active and independent part in the question, opened the following telegraphic correspondence with the President of the Council :—

8 July, 1887.

To the President of the Council of Ministers, Stradella.

The nomination of a new prince in Bulgaria, and the uncertainty as regards Russia's intentions, are causing anxiety in the Council of Ministers concerning this complication of European conditions. The Council, therefore, desires to be informed of the true state of affairs, to know what attitude Italy has assumed and must maintain, whether an agreement with our allies has been arranged on this point, and if so, what its nature may be.

CRISPI.

9 July.

Information desired shall be supplied. Meanwhile kindly relieve anxiety of Council of Ministers, our position being perfectly secure, thanks to our treaties and full agreements with friendly Powers.

DEPRETIS.

9 July.

To the President of the Council of Ministers, Stradella.

We are anxiously awaiting your explanation. You will certainly have informed our ambassadors at Vienna, Berlin, London and Constantinople, and our minister at Sofia, how they are to conduct themselves with regard to the appointment of the new prince. As Vienna and London favour this appointment, we should not be the last.

It is also important to point out the attitude to be assumed by our ambassador at St. Petersburg, Russia being hostile to the nomination proclaimed by the Bulgarian Assembly.

The Bulgarian Question may easily stir up discord, and we should seek to take advantage of our friendships and alliances.

CRISPI.

9 July.

To His Excellency the Minister of the Interior, Rome.

Situation as follows: Bulgarian government must induce the Porte not to raise preliminary objections and also seek consent of Powers to the Prince's election, as prescribed by Berlin treaty. If the Porte consents, preparations must be made to answer the questions it will raise. We are already aware that Russia is unfavourably disposed, that England is favourable, and that Germany will maintain habitual reserve, while France will probably follow example of Russia. Austrian ambassador at Constantinople displaying dissatisfaction, but as I have reason to doubt sincerity of this sentiment, have telegraphed to Nigra to ask the government for plain statement.

I deem it advisable to suspend all action until situation is more clearly developed. Meanwhile

exchange of views to be continued with allied Powers.

DEPRETIS.

(No date.)

To the President of the Council of Ministers, Stradella.

Glad to hear your health is steadily improving.

Regret that you still continue to follow mistaken foreign policy of neither acting nor allowing others to act.

CRISPI.

On July 14 Depretis informed Crispi that he had communicated by telegraph to the different Italian ambassadors and to the legation at Sofia the following declaration, made to the Turkish ambassador :—

In the interests both of Bulgaria and Turkey, as well as of the whole of Europe, it is, we feel, greatly to be desired that the Bulgarian crisis should, with as little delay as possible, be brought to a happy and definite conclusion, by means of the instalment of a Prince at Sofia and the re-establishment of stable and normal conditions throughout the principality. The Sublime Porte may therefore count upon our support of such a solution, which, being the free expression of the will of the Bulgarian people, would be in perfect conformity with the manner of procedure prescribed by the Berlin treaty.

15 July.

To the President of the Council of Ministers, Stradella.

I have communicated to my colleagues contents of Your Excellency's telegram of the 14th, addressed to our embassies and to our agent at Sofia. Several of our number were dissatisfied because message contains no expression calculated to define our policy in the East.

In fact, as Italy has reached no decision, we

desire, at least, to know what steps have been taken and what answers obtained from the other Powers concerning the solution of this problem. CRISPI.

On July 21 Depretis had an idea, and without communicating it to the Council of Ministers, he submitted it to the judgment of our ambassador at Berlin, Count de Launay.

Let us consider the Coburg election as having failed. If the Allied Powers are indifferent to the continuation of the *status quo* and of the provisory conditions at Sofia, we have only to wait quietly and allow events to develop. If, on the contrary, the question is to be settled without delay, the Prince of Coburg might perhaps be despatched to Sofia as 'Prince-Lieutenant' (*un lieutenant princier*) instead of as a sovereign. If the opposition of the St. Petersburg Cabinet is unfeigned, if indeed it is only the validity of the election which it doubts, without any intention of keeping the Bulgarian Question open for purposes of its own, it should be willing to accept this expedient. At Berlin, which is the natural centre of our group, an opinion should be formulated regarding this suggestion, and should it be sanctioned, the Cabinet which is best adapted to taking the initiative must be pointed out.

But de Launay considered the 'expedient' impracticable, as a prince-lieutenant, whose office it would be to prepare for the election of a new prince, might not himself be the candidate to the throne! Moreover, how could Ferdinand, who was already elected prince, present himself in Bulgaria in a position of inferiority?

The habit of following in the footsteps of others had become so fixed with him that it was very exceptional that he ventured to set forth an original idea. The many documents despatched from the *Consulta* during that month of July contain nothing but vague temporising, and expressions of the

firm intention to wait for the decision of the other Powers. While Crispi was exhorting the President of the Council of Ministers to assume a definite position, the following communication was despatched to our ambassador at Constantinople on July 13 :—

The election of the Prince of Coburg having once taken place, we consider a hasty publication of our opinion to be superfluous. It appears advisable to abstain from premature declarations in order to avoid complicating a question which the most elementary rules of consideration for others, as well as of international justice, suggest to us should be left to those Powers to settle who have direct and immediate interests at stake in the problem which is agitating Bulgaria.

Depretis died on July 31, and Crispi succeeded him as President of the Council, also temporarily assuming the duties of Minister of Foreign Affairs by means of a decree dated August 8. On the same day Crispi despatched the following circular to His Majesty's representatives in foreign countries:—

On assuming the direction of Foreign Affairs I wish to express my firm determination to continue the peaceful and conservative policy which has hitherto characterised Italy's attitude in the European Concert.

The position we propose to assume in the Bulgarian Question, which appears to be entering upon a new phase in consequence of the Prince's probable journey to Bulgaria, is in every way compatible with this determination. We have no preference for this prince rather than for another, but by the fact of his election alone Ferdinand represents for us, and will continue to represent, until the contrary has been established, the expression of the will of the Bulgarian people. Italy, who owes her

political constitution to the vote of the people, cannot be indifferent to the high value of that manifestation, by means of which the first and, to us, the most important of the three conditions stipulated by Article III. of the Berlin treaty has been fulfilled.

Our desire being that, in the interest of all concerned, the Bulgarian Question, which constitutes a permanent menace to the peace of Europe, should be settled with as little delay as possible, this government has always declared its willingness to accept any solution which, having for fundamental principles the treaties and that respect which is due to the will of the people, shall ensure a stable government to the Bulgarian nation. Now, the election of the Prince of Coburg, which represents the beginning of such a solution, appears to us to be an arrangement which, if favoured by the Powers, will surely achieve this result, while maintaining the fundamental principles above mentioned. We therefore trust that those Powers who share our peaceful intentions and whose aims are identical with our own, will lend, as we ourselves are prepared to lend, the most hearty moral support to this adjustment. Receive, etc., etc. . . .

On August 7 Prince Ferdinand, having waited in vain for Turkey and the Powers to recognise his election, yielded to the persistent solicitations of the Bulgarian government and crossed the frontier of that country, where he was welcomed with enthusiasm. A month had elapsed since his election by the Sobranje, and the Prince had spent that time in a state of most painful suspense between Russia's uncompromising 'No' and Turkish indecision on the one hand, and his own ambition on the other. On July 29 Ambassador Nigra had telegraphed from Vienna:—

Prince Ferdinand has recently called upon me.

He wished me to advise him. I refused to do so, telling him that, in my quality of ambassador, I had nothing to say to him. But, as his personal friend, I told him that the path he must take appeared to me to be clearly traced by the treaties. He did not strike me as being particularly eager to risk an adventurous excursion into Bulgaria. I am unaware whether he has attempted anything at St. Petersburg. In any case, he would not succeed there.

The *fait accompli*, that is to say, Prince Ferdinand's assumption of the throne and dignities which the Bulgarian people had bestowed upon him, only added to Russia's irritation and the difficulties of the situation.

The question immediately arose as to how the representatives of the Powers were to conduct themselves with the Prince. On August 9 Crispi did not hesitate to telegraph as follows to the consul-general at Sofia:—

A formal recognition by us of Prince Ferdinand as prince of Bulgaria is plainly impossible, until we shall have acquired the certitude that he will effectually represent the will of the people, and until his position has been legalised according to the Berlin treaty.

He followed up these remarks by instructions to His Majesty's agent to abstain from all acts implying recognition, but, at the same time, to treat the Prince with *all due consideration*, and to maintain the necessary business intercourse with his government.

Shortly afterwards Austria-Hungary imparted the same instructions to her representative.

On August 11 the Russian *chargé d'affaires* appeared at the *Consulta* to declare that his government refused to recognise the validity of the election; that it had sought, by indirect means, to dissuade the Prince from going to Bulgaria; and

that it now felt called upon to proclaim the illegality of his arrival in the principality for the purpose of placing himself at the head of the government. The Imperial Cabinet now appealed to the Powers, and trusted that it would not find itself alone in insisting that the treaty of Berlin be respected.

Crispi replied that he would communicate with the other Powers, and that the Italian government had never ceased to look upon the Berlin treaty as the necessary basis for the solution of the Bulgarian crisis.

Being firmly determined to support the choice of the Bulgarian nation, and to seize this opportunity of adding to Italy's prestige and good standing in the Balkan peninsula, Crispi sought, first of all, to secure the support of England, which country, although not ill-disposed towards Prince Ferdinand in the beginning, had recently given Russia to understand that it viewed his election 'with indifference,' and that it 'did not consider the choice of Coburg favourable to the interests of the principality.'

The following documents illustrate how Crispi regulated the conduct of Italy in the successive phases of the question, and succeeded in forming the Italo-Anglo-Austrian group, which enforced non-intervention in Bulgarian domestic affairs.

12 August.

To His Majesty the King, Monza.

Lord Salisbury has instructed his agent at Sofia to treat the Prince of Coburg as a relation of the Queen's. The Cabinets of Vienna and Paris will maintain relations with him as representing the existing government, without touching upon the question of legality.

CRISPI.

15 August.

To the Ambassador at Constantinople.

In our eyes, until conclusive proof to the contrary, the election which has already taken place is the lawful manifestation of the will of the Bulgarian

people. The principle of the will of the people may be taken as the most accurate interpretation of the spirit of the Berlin treaty, when applied to unforeseen cases.

NAPLES, 15 August.

To His Majesty the King, Monza.

I am returning to Rome this evening. I have telegraphed privately to Nigra and Catalani giving them my opinion as to what the conduct of Your Majesty's government should be as regards the Bulgarian Question: to help Bulgaria to rid herself of the provisional expedients by which she is at present hampered, and which constitute an immediate and permanent menace to Europe. The Prince of Coburg, elected by general acclamation and received with enthusiasm, has, at least, the merit of representing an acceptable and half-accomplished solution. We therefore desire to help him as far as is possible without, of course, in any way violating the agreement of principles that exists between England, Austria and ourselves, especially as this agreement is looked upon with favour by Germany. The hope of unanimity of purpose between all the Powers is purely utopian. The Prince or the Russian general who would be the only candidate enjoying the approbation of St. Petersburg would not suit Vienna. I may add that, in order to remain faithful to her traditions, her principles and her interests, Italy must aim at encouraging Bulgaria as well as all the other Balkan States in their efforts to acquire independence. This result being still far off, however, we must, for the present, favour Austrian influence in preference to that of any other Power, which is equivalent to

favouring the displacement of the centre of her interests towards the East.

I also telegraphed to Blanc authorising him (when he shall have reached an understanding with his Austrian and English colleagues) to voice the opinion that, until conclusive proof to the contrary, the election which has already taken place is, in our eyes, the lawful manifestation of the will of the Bulgarian people, and to add that we consider respect for the principle of the will of the people to be the most accurate interpretation of the spirit of the Berlin treaty, when applied to unforeseen cases.

CRISPI.

17 August.

In the name of his government the Turkish Ambassador requests Italy and the other Powers—

I.—To give their opinions concerning the Prince's action in taking possession of the government of Bulgaria.

II.—To furnish information concerning the instructions they have imparted to their agents in the principality, on this subject.

III.—To expose their views as to the best means of removing the present difficulties and arriving at a solution of the problem.

I have replied as follows :—

I.—We recognise that, in taking possession of the princely authority, Prince Ferdinand has, under the present circumstances, disregarded the prescriptions of the Berlin treaty.

II.—That the instructions imparted by us may be summed up as follows : No action implying recognition : Respect for the person of the Prince : Con-

tinuation of all necessary business dealings with the government of the principality.

III.—The solution of the Bulgarian Question must be sought within the peaceful sphere of the Berlin treaty. Under these conditions Italy promises her co-operation in bringing about any form of solution which, while satisfying the legitimate desires of the Bulgarian people, has any probability of being accepted by all the Powers, and above all, by the high sovereign Power.

18 August.

To the Ambassador at Constantinople.

We have two essential purposes in view: the one immediate, which is the maintenance of peace; the other indirect, and to be accomplished later on, which is the definite adjustment, on a solid and rational basis, of those Christian peoples of Europe who have, as yet, no national organisation, although equipped with all the ethnical and moral elements which go to determine nationality. Both of these purposes appear to us of vital importance, the first because it coincides with the interests of our country, which desires peace with honour; the second because it corresponds with those principles of right and justice in conformity with which the Italian nation is constituted, and which form its most solid basis.

Our alliances and agreements will help us in the achievement of the first. Our second purpose will explain our attitude towards Bulgaria.

18 August.

To the Ambassador at Constantinople.

By your report of the 13th of this month Your Excellency informed me of the steps taken by the

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to induce the Porte to adopt energetic measures at Sofia and enforce the withdrawal from Bulgaria of Prince Ferdinand, whose election, according to M. Onou, has met with the disapproval of all the Powers.

As regards our view of this election I can only confirm my telegram addressed to you on August 16, by which I authorised you to seek an understanding with your English and Austrian colleagues for the purpose of expressing an opinion that, until conclusive proof to the contrary, we are bound to consider the election which has already taken place as the lawful manifestation of the will of the Bulgarian people.

As Your Excellency justly remarks, the principle of respect for the will of the people is, in our eyes, the most accurate interpretation of the spirit of the Berlin treaty, whenever it is applied to unforeseen cases.

20 August.

To the Ambassador at Vienna.

Following the example of Austria-Hungary, we must refuse to accept a regency entrusted to a Russian general (Ehrenroth). This arrangement would simply be prolonging and intensifying an endless state of provisional expedients. We entertain no partialities, but to us Prince Ferdinand represents the beginning of an adjustment.

On this point London and Vienna entirely agree with us.

23 August.

To the Ambassadors in London and Berlin.

Russia's proposal to Turkey to drive out Prince Ferdinand and install a Russian agent could only be realised by violence.

It cannot possibly, therefore, be accepted by those who wish to make the Berlin treaty the peaceful basis for the solution of the Bulgarian Question.

24 August.

To all the Ambassadors.

In consideration of the Russian occupation of Varna and Herzerum, which, we are advised, is not improbable should Turkey refuse active intervention in Bulgaria, the Italian government declares itself opposed to all violence and all violation of the Berlin treaty, and desires to know what attitude the other Cabinets would assume.

30 August.

To the Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

In assuming our present attitude in regard to the Bulgarian Question—an attitude of which we make no secret, having openly declared our reasons to Russia—it is our one intention to promote the cause of peace in the East, and our conduct has in no particular been determined by sentiments other than friendly for Russia. We have always desired, and still desire, to remain on terms of the warmest friendship with Russia, there never having existed any reasons for disagreement between the two countries.

31 August.

To the Ambassador at Constantinople.

At the present moment, in discussing the relative advisability of regents, of prince-lieutenants and of commissaries for Bulgaria, the real facts of the matter are too often lost sight of. Before considering the name and nationality of such and such a candidate,

we should ask ourselves how, supposing he be chosen, he would be received in a country which neither asks for him nor desires his presence. Under a Prince of their own choosing, who, notwithstanding the errors into which he may have fallen, certainly enjoys the support of a numerous party, the Bulgarians are preparing to organise a government. The best policy will be to avoid complicating their task. An attempt at participation, or, worse still, at intervention, would confront Europe with the alternative of either confessing her own incapacity to put an end to the crisis or, should she resort to violence, of herself provoking a contest it is precisely her object to avoid.

2 September.

To the Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have duly received your report of August 20, for which I thank Your Excellency most especially.

The language which Baron di Calice and Sir W. White used to the Porte may be summed up as follows: The Prince of Coburg's election is not illegal; the Porte must neither attempt military occupation nor force a regent upon the Bulgarians who is obnoxious to them, nor adopt any resolution which has not been sanctioned by the Powers who signed the Berlin treaty.

You, on your part, and in accordance with instructions received, have declared that, until conclusive proof to the contrary, the Prince's election is, in our eyes, a lawful manifestation of the will of the Bulgarian people; that we consider the principle of respect for the will of the people as constituting the most accurate interpretation of the treaty of Berlin; that no coercive means are to be used

to force Bulgaria's acceptance of a regent or of any foreign commissary whom she may not desire; and finally, that all isolated action arranged between Russia and Turkey without the previous sanction of the Powers, would be illegal and dangerous.

I am glad to see that Your Excellency's intentions and declarations still continue to be identical with those of your two colleagues mentioned above.

At the very moment when it appeared that the St. Petersburg Cabinet, failing to comprehend the true sentiments of the Powers, had determined to resort to violence in order to regain the influence in Bulgaria which it was rapidly losing, Crispi had a vision of war, and hastened to re-evoke the obligations Italy had assumed for the maintenance of the *status quo*. He was far indeed from desiring war, and did everything in his power to lower the tone of Russia's protests, although well aware that the greater part of Europe was against him. But he felt it his duty to prepare Italy for a possible trial. The memory of the Crimea was ever with him. As then Piedmont, representing Italy, had won the right to raise her voice, so now participation in victorious warfare might cover Italy with glory and endow her with the daring and prestige necessary to the redemption of lost time and opportunities.

Should a conflict indeed break out, by what means could Italy bring her own contingent into the field of action? This had not been thought of, and Crispi therefore telegraphed as follows to the Italian ambassador in London on August 29:—

Let us hope the need of united action may pass away, but Russia's threats against Bulgaria which were mentioned in your despatch of the 26th, cannot fail to arouse anxiety, especially should she repeat them or put them into execution. Under these circumstances I feel it is necessary that the two governments should decide upon the general outline of possible armed intervention, and establish

the manner in which England and Italy must co-operate.

If his Lordship is of the same opinion it would be advisable to look to the stipulation of a military convention, for which purpose we will gladly send one of our officers to London, should his Lordship not prefer to send an English officer to Rome.

In this matter we should not await the moment of danger, but rather hold ourselves in readiness to take advantage of a favourable opportunity.

The Italian *chargé d'affaires*, T. Catalani, replied on August 31 :—

Lord Salisbury has charged me to convey his thanks to Your Excellency for your proposal concerning a military convention. He told me that, should occasion present itself, he would be proud of the Italian army's co-operation, and that a time might come when it would be necessary. His Lordship added that until war really threatened, the political constitution of this country and the traditions he has inherited from his predecessors make it impossible for him to stipulate an act of this sort.

For the time being it would seem that no real danger threatens in Bulgaria. M. de Giers has not only emphatically denied the plan of occupation attributed to Russia, but has also attenuated the sense of the message to Charkir Pasha, and expressed his desire to maintain peace.

Moreover, the German Ambassador who had just left the Foreign Office had assured Lord Salisbury that Prince Bismarck believes that the horizon is clearing, and a communication received from Count Kálnoky views the situation in the same light. There is no longer any question of despatching

General Ehrenroth, who, moreover, would never be allowed to enter Bulgaria, for the Bulgarians would keep him out by force.

There is, therefore, nothing to justify the stipulation of a convention which would create a danger for the government, because no matter what precautions might be taken, it would be impossible to maintain perfect secrecy, and questions in the House would force the government to reveal the existence of the arrangement.

Nevertheless, should the situation alter, 'for politics,' Lord Salisbury said, 'are as changeable as the climate of this island,' there will still be time to stipulate a military convention.

A letter from Catalani to Lord Salisbury, who meanwhile had gone to Royat, reveals the fact that Crispi had commented upon the English Premier's arguments, but had not insisted in his proposal. Catalani wrote:—

Signor Crispi is grateful for your kind explanations. He understands your position, being, as you are aware, an admirer of the English political constitution, with which he is well acquainted, and which, as you point out, would prevent the stipulation of a military convention until danger becomes really apparent. But Crispi asks himself whether this danger is indeed so remote as to render precautions unnecessary? Let us suppose that a Russian army should enter Bulgaria, whose lines of defence are no longer so strong as they once were, should we have time to discuss and conclude a military convention with the rapidity which modern military movements would make imperative? Shall we allow ourselves to be taken unawares?

The Hon. Crispi does not believe this supposition to be absolutely groundless. Did not you yourself tell me, on the 25th of last month, that you had informed Russia indirectly that it would indeed be an easy matter for an army to enter Varna, but far less easy for it to get out again, as it would encounter the barrier of the united forces of England and Italy?

However, as you decline to discuss the proposal, Signor Crispi will not insist, and the question is herewith dropped.

Nevertheless, the identity of interests, which had become apparent during the acute stage of the Bulgarian Question, suggested a special agreement concerning Eastern affairs between Italy, England, and Austria-Hungary.

Salisbury is entirely of Your Excellency's opinion as regards initiating negotiations between the three ambassadors at Constantinople for the purpose of establishing an understanding. CATALANI.

The firm and active attitude of the new Italian Premier did not appeal to Russia, and henceforth Crispi was destined to suffer unpopularity in that country. His views on the complex Eastern Question, which he had frequently explained in Parliament, would not admit of the adoption of any other policy; and that pursued by him cannot be said to have been a poor one, as it succeeded in welding the three Powers into a formidable force, which met with Bismarck's approval and was encouraged by him, and which inspired Turkey to resist the pressure the Muscovite Colossus had brought to bear. That this agreement was entirely due to Crispi's influence is proved by the fact that it did not survive his first term of office.

4 October. — Kálnoky told Count Reuss, the German Ambassador, of a conversation he had had with King George. When at Copenhagen, King

George had discussed Bulgarian matters with the Czar. The King of Greece is of opinion that, although the Russian Cabinet still pretends to support General Ehrenroth's mission, which matter is still under discussion between St. Petersburg and Constantinople, the Emperor himself has long since relinquished any such idea. The Czar believes the affair might have been carried through before the Prince of Coburg went to Bulgaria, but that now it is not to be thought of. Hence the Czar's irritation against the Prince, who has thus upset Russia's plans by his untimely intervention in Bulgaria. Russia had counted upon discord among the Bulgarian statesmen, and on the dissolution this discord must bring about. The Emperor did not say what he intends to do.

Here is an appreciation of Russia by Crispi.

Russia occupies a privileged position. She can assail her European enemies, but it is difficult for them to assail her. She is therefore free to choose the hour that suits her best for declaring war. Consequently, all delay is to her advantage.

Her position since 1871 has been much better than it was before. Detached from France by the Concert of the Central Powers, Russia has one enemy less. The alliance of 1854 is no longer possible.

Russia cares little whether or no France redeem Alsace and Lorraine. I might even say that it is to her advantage that France and Germany should remain unreconciled.

Germany has declared that she has no interest in the Eastern Question, and has proved the truth of this by refraining from any direct intervention in

the settlement of the questions that have arisen in the Balkan Peninsula since 1871. Therefore, only Italy and Austria, two military Powers, and England, a naval Power, may be mustered against Russia. If Russia proceeds to complete her armament and waits until this has been accomplished, I much doubt whether her adversaries will be able to produce a force sufficiently strong to overcome her.

Austria and Italy might redouble their forces, but this the state of their finances forbids. Then again, should France go to war to redeem her lost provinces, and Russia seize that opportunity to attack in the Balkan Peninsula, the position of the Central Powers would become most difficult. Engaged on the Rhine and in the Alps, they would not be able to spare any large contingent for the East. There would be the risk of Russia's being pitted against Turkey alone, as happened in the late war, for England would be unable to bring a large contingent of land forces into the field.

We must furthermore consider that Turkey could hope for no help from the small Balkan states, first of all because several of them, like Montenegro and Servia, are under the influence of Russia, and secondly because others, like Bulgaria and Greece, are seeking to obtain possession of the several territories they have long coveted, in order to perfect their nationality.

As for Austria, she is certainly always an obstacle in Russia's way, when she is not her friend.

In the wars of 1854 and 1876 the Czar succeeded in inducing Austria to remain neutral. In 1854 a campaign against Hungary threatened, and Emperor Francis Joseph owed the conquest of the Kingdom of St. Stephen to . . . In 1876 Austria was com-

pensated for her neutrality by the cession of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

To-day the situation is no longer the same. Austria and Russia are rivals in the East. Austria cannot allow Russia to reach Constantinople, for this would shake the very foundations of her autonomy and compromise her future.

In the neighbouring Empire a war with Russia would be popular. The Russians are detested at Buda-Pesth, nor indeed are they greatly beloved at Vienna. The Hungarians have not forgotten 1849.

CHAPTER VI

THE FIRST JOURNEY TO FRIEDRICHSRUH

Crispi and France—Crispi's opinion of the Empire and of the Republic—The Paris Exposition of 1889, and monarchical Europe—Crispi's first journey to Friedrichsrub to see Prince Bismarck; their conversation—The Turin speech.

WHEN Crispi undertook the direction of affairs in Italy, France was passing through a period of unrest. On May 17 the Goblet Ministry, that had been in office only since December 13, 1886, had resigned, and M. Freycinet, charged with the task of recomposition, encountering insurmountable difficulties, had relinquished it, which the President of the Republic had then offered to M. Rouvier. Rouvier succeeded, but excluded from the new Cabinet General Boulanger, who was already immensely popular, and whom the radical party had warmly recommended as the only man capable of saving the country. The Rouvier Ministry, however, seemed destined to be but a transitory administration which would eventually make way for an 'opportunistic' cabinet, to be presided over by Ferry and supported by the Right party. But events did not develop precisely as had been anticipated, for at the end of a few months Rouvier resigned his authority to the Tirard Ministry (December 12, 1887), which itself remained in office but four months. The position of the President of the Republic himself, M. Jules Grévy, was greatly shaken, and his withdrawal was believed to be but a question of time. That event, however, was looked forward to with anxiety, as it was feared the radicals and royalists would join hands in raising General Boulanger to office.

Crispi's views on the condition of France were well known.

He was deeply versed in the history of that country, and his long residence there had familiarised him with her conditions. But although he admired the genius of the French and the great services they had rendered to civilisation, as an Italian, all the traditions of the past, the different conditions of social development, and the warring interests of the two countries, contributed to convince him that an Italy, proud of her own worth and jealous of her rights, would never find France other than an overbearing adversary.

Did the attitude of the Republic towards Italy differ from that of the Empire which had preceded it?

For the sake of greater accuracy we give Crispi's own appreciation and opinion of the two epochs.

What benefits did Napoleon III. confer upon Italy?

In 1849 the fire of the Italian revolution was slowly dying out on the different hearthstones where it had burned so brightly—only Sicily, Venice and Rome still held out. France did not intervene in our favour, but, with the excuse of defending its liberty, assailed the Roman Republic instead, invaded Rome and reinstated the Papacy. At the same time she seized the Sicilian arms and ships, supported the Bourbon in his efforts to make himself master of Sicily, and once more Italy was oppressed by despotism. But France was punished. Despotism oppressed her also. . . . It was during this period of Italy's most abject servitude that a delicate question was raised, or rather resuscitated, in France: the question of her boundaries. As early as 1858 pamphlets had begun to circulate that argued the necessity of fixing the boundaries of France upon the Rhine and in the Alps. This must be accomplished, but how was it to be done? By a war of conquest? The tyrant wisely declared his conviction that this was inexpedient. It would

be better to make it a matter of business, and it has been clearly demonstrated that to Napoleon III. the Italian war was indeed nothing more than a matter of business.

By virtue of the Franco-Sardinian alliance France engaged to assist Piedmont in acquiring Lombardy and Venetia, while, on the other hand, Piedmont promised to indemnify France by bearing the expenses of the war and also guaranteeing her the coveted boundaries.

In Napoleon's mind a great project had begun to shape itself, and he flattered himself that, by following in his uncle's footsteps, he would be able, in a way, to legalise his usurpation and strengthen the foundations of his tottering throne.

Events and his own personality combined to ruin him. The war with Germany, which should have crowned all his endeavours, proved the final cause of his undoing.

Meanwhile, it is well to verify and establish the fact that at the time of the stipulation of the Franco-Sardinian alliance, the thought of Italian Unity had no place in the mind of Napoleon III.

But besides the question of Alpine frontiers, Napoleon III. hoped by his descent into Italy to realise another aim. He had left our country in 1831, when the thought of Italian Unity had existed only in the minds of a few of the elect, the masses being still strangers to this ideal. He was consequently under the impression that the principle of federation would still prevail with the masses, and he hoped, by reviving the old Franco-German antagonism, whose field of action had been our country, to overcome Austria, to expel her from the part of Italy he coveted, and to form that part into

a confederacy of weak and puny States, which, being the slaves of France, would be allowed a certain amount of liberty in times of peace, and become her allies in times of war.

The historian who undertakes a profound study of this most important period in the world's history—and I say 'world's history' advisedly, for it was through Italy that the principle of nationality obtained recognition—is struck at this point by a strange coincidence: this same Napoleonic ideal was cherished by Austria also, but for her own reasons.

Perhaps she foresaw the new epoch and sought to forestall it by working a transformation in her domination, and making her political interests one with the material interests of the Italian people.

Being unable to extend her influence to Naples, where the Bourbon had never tolerated Austrian interference, Austria at that time proposed for the Duchies and the Holy See certain treaties of commerce which, supported by Austrian garrisons, were intended to unite the Italian States in a *Zollverein* which she herself would rule and direct.

It is in this conflict of ambitions and interests no less than in the desire for the extension of boundary that we must seek the true reasons for the Italian war. If doubt were possible in the beginning, it was soon dispelled by the way in which the war was conducted.

The Mazzinians, who may be said to have been the only apostles of the idea of union at that time, felt all this keenly. Mazzini himself accurately defined the purpose of the war, and foretold what its end would be; and, so firmly persuaded was he of this, that he declared, in one of his proclamations, that the war would be controlled by Napoleon and

brought to a close by him whenever it might suit him to do so.

Meanwhile, in order to familiarise the minds of the people with the idea of federation, Napoleon had sent an army corps into Tuscany under Prince Jerome.

The Emperor intended that Tuscany should become the kingdom of Etruria, of which Jerome himself would be king, or rather vice-regent, as the State would have to look to Paris for all directions concerning its political and commercial existence.

But Napoleon's plans miscarried. Instead of a reception with shouts of *Viva la Toscana! Viva la Francia!* Jerome was greeted with loud cries of *Viva l'Italia!* The seed sown by the Mazzinians had sprung up, and the idea of federation, upon which Napoleon had counted as a means of dominating those petty States whose formation he contemplated, had given way before the great conception of Italian Unity.

The reproaches which were brought against us by many Frenchmen were, therefore, entirely unfounded. Like Thiers, Napoleon III. believed, as Napoleon I. had believed before him, that it was to the advantage of France to maintain a weak and disunited Italy, and it was precisely for the purpose of keeping her in a state of weakness and disunion, of wrenching her from the Austrian domination and making her a vassal of France, that he came into this country.

It was not his fault if he failed in his undertaking. Events greater than he, and beyond the control of his will, proved his undoing; but he neglected no means both of checking their onward rush and of obliterating their consequences.

In fact, on becoming aware of the enormous progress the idea of union had made, he abandoned the programme with which he had flattered the Italians in order to obtain their co-operation, and after a victory which should have made it possible for him to expel the Austrians from every part of Italy, he concluded an armistice, and without so much as a word of warning to his ally, signed the preliminaries of that peace of Villafranca, in whose existence the ministers of Victor Emmanuel himself at first refused to believe.

Savoy and Nice gave France the boundaries she had coveted, and much more besides. In the first place, Nice in France is a geographical anomaly, and the fifty millions the French received as an indemnity covered all the expenses of the war. Then came the treaty of Zurich, through which that other plan for Italian federation was materialised.

Rather than accept the idea of a united Italy, Napoleon III. chose to share with Austria the control of that confederation over which the Pope would preside, Austria being represented by Venetia. Unskilful statesman that he was, he failed to perceive that he was thus planting the seed of endless strife.

The treaty of Zurich, however, was so unfavourable to Italy that she refused to recognise it. Italy was not deceived concerning Napoleon's aims, and was fortunately endowed with a just appreciation of the value both of intentions and events. Thus it came about that Tuscany and the Emilia declared their own autonomy and proclaimed the principle of union.

Foreseeing the total collapse of the air-castle of his hopes and designs, Napoleon opposed the union

of these provinces with Piedmont, and checked the movement in the Papal States. Nor was Garibaldi allowed to pass Cattolica.

But Italy's great day had dawned. Palermo rose; as by a miracle was organised the fabulous expedition of the Thousand, which recognised no obstacles and overcame every kind of obstacle which all sought to place in its way. . . .

At this point, had Napoleon been indeed the great statesman which many for too many years have striven to believe, and to make others believe he was, he would have seen that the time had come for him to alter his policy, and that, as it was impossible for him to make Italy his vassal, it would at least be well to make her his friend, his ally. . . . And Garibaldi reached Naples, entirely against Napoleon's wish . . . triumphed over the Bourbon at the Volturno and immediately prepared to march on Rome. But Napoleon would not yield, and like a miser forced to part with his treasure, he consented only when constrained by events to do so, and intervened only to obstruct. Thus it happened that, confronted with the danger of seeing Rome merged in the movement for Italian union, and becoming its mainstay and rallying point, he signed a convention with Victor Emmanuel, in consequence of which a body of royal troops entered Umbria and the Marches, which were annexed to the monarchy, in order that Garibaldi's further movements might be checked.

The French fleet, meanwhile, was protecting the Bourbon at Gaeta, thus enabling him to resist, and, thanks to France, to prolong a useless war. . . .

The heritage of Peter once saved, and placed under the protection of French arms, Rome became, under France, a hot-bed of Italian reaction. The

refuge of deposed princes, it was here that, under the very eyes of Napoleon, all the conspiracies against our union were planned, and here that brigandage was organised, for the purpose of maintaining so important a part of the new kingdom in a state of horrible unrest.

In very truth this was but a caricature of what the policy of a great state should be, but it was a bloody caricature, and one not to be easily forgotten!

Outraged Italy's efforts at revolt were strangled at Aspromonte, and thus did France cause the dawn of a new kingdom to be overshadowed by a tragedy which still lives and rankles in the heart of every Italian.

But the French policy was not altered. Brigandage, as already organised, no longer sufficing for her purposes, France openly offered it the most efficacious protection. On July 10, 1863, the *Aunis* of the *Messagerie Maritime* anchored in the harbour of Genoa, having on board six brigands who had chosen exile rather than capture. One of these was the famous La-Gala. The Italian government sought to obtain possession of these men, but France not only protested against their seizure, but demanded that they be consigned to her. Her request was complied with, and the French flag became the guarantee for the lives and liberty of common murderers, while Italy smarted with the shame of being prevented from punishing crime, crime against the country and against humanity.

But even this was not enough.

Although far from being a great statesman, Napoleon could not fail to foresee that the proclamation of Rome as the capital of Italy would not put an end to the burning question. In order,

therefore, to close the subject, he thought out the Convention of September 15, 1864, which had no other meaning, and was intended to have no other meaning, than that of a final relinquishment of Rome. By its means, indeed, the capital was removed to the centre of Italy, and the country bound itself not only to recognise the Papal States, but to protect them against attack. She was forced, moreover, to undertake the extinction of a part of the national debt of the Holy See, thus providing the funds necessary for the organisation and maintenance of that army whose office it was to prevent Rome from becoming Italian.

It was generally expected that Napoleon would respect this September Convention, which was so humiliating for Italy. Nothing of the sort.

The Convention contained the written stipulation that France should withdraw her troops from the pontifical territory. She appeared, indeed, to do so, but in reality the French soldiers were drafted into the Papal army.¹

But was it Rome alone of which Napoleon sought to deprive Italy?

The year 1866 brought the Italo-German alliance. Napoleon III. was graciously pleased to permit this alliance, but himself prescribed the way in which the war against Austria should be conducted and the time of its duration. He was aware that war could not be avoided, but he feared that Italy would come through it victorious and emboldened. His endeavours were consequently directed against the

¹ Upon the Pontifical Zouaves who fell at Mentana were found enlistment papers (*livrets d'hommes de troupe*) which showed that they really belonged to the French army, although now in the service of the Pope. I have before me the papers of a certain Estienne Haslen, of the 33rd infantry regiment of the line, who had been enrolled in the Roman Legion.

achievement of any signal victory by our arms, and so well did he manage that the war ended in a shameful defeat of our policy, the Italian government being forced to accept Venetia from the hands, not of Austria, but of France herself, and Italy was now left without a fixed boundary on the East, after having been robbed of her frontier on the West.

Count Vitzthum, the confidant of Count von Beust, had been entrusted by him with a secret mission to the Imperial government of France. He arrived in Paris on June 26, 1866, just as the news of Custozza was coming in. He has thus described the impression produced there by this news, in his book entitled, *London, Gastein and Sadowa* :—

‘I found the Capital in a state of rejoicing and enthusiasm over the Austrian victories in Italy.

‘I was assured, and I was also able to satisfy myself of the truth of the report, that all classes of the population were united in rejoicing over the defeat of the Italians, and that in the barracks the enthusiasm defied description.

‘Everywhere the soldiers were insisting upon illuminating their quarters in honour of the Austrian army, and I do not hesitate to affirm that this state of things has produced a profound impression upon the *Imperial champion of Italy at the Tuileries* (*sull’italianissimo imperiale delle Tuileries*).’

. . . Memory, indeed, recalls another date and another name: *Mentana*, over against which Italian generosity has set still another date and still another name: *Dijon*.

. . . In 1869 Napoleon proposed to the Powers to place the pontifical territory under the protection of Europe, hoping, by means of an international

treaty, to prevent Italy from conquering her capital ; and he would have achieved his purpose had not Berlin and London offered opposition.

Fate was rushing Napoleon on to ruin. The phantom of United Italy influenced him even against his own interests.

In 1870 even Austria saw in which direction the true interests of France lay, but Napoleon did not see. Austria herself urged Napoleon to yield Rome to Italy in order to obtain the Italian alliance—but Napoleon would not. And it was for this reason that all attempts at negotiation miscarried, and France, through her own fault, found herself isolated from the rest of Europe.

In this isolation it was upon Italy that the blame was laid. Now, no words need be wasted to prove that not only would it have been foolish, but very criminal on Italy's part, had she taken up arms against a friendly and allied power, in support of a master who, while seeking our co-operation, refused to recognise our rights and persisted in his efforts to oppress us.

Nor may we believe that this mistaken view of affairs was held by Napoleon III. alone. Napoleon fell, dragging France down with him in his fall, but not even then would she relinquish Rome.

Italy came to Rome at last, indeed, but Thiers' views differed in no wise from those of Napoleon. Italy came to Rome, thanks to those very German victories she had been expected to prevent, and France, reduced to a state of impotence, tolerated the conditions without accepting them. A French man-of-war rode at anchor off Civitavecchia, as a permanent protest, and sign of the protectorate France still pretended to exercise over the Holy See.

It was years before that vessel finally took her departure, and then only through ridicule, the one force which is virtually effective in France, and which then threatened the country precisely on account of this episode.

After 1870 the policy of France towards Italy became but a series of acts of reprisal and malice. Convinced that Italy had not wished to aid France in her terrible struggle with Germany, the republican government, accepting the prejudices of its imperial predecessor, and maintaining the same scornful attitude, instead of seeking to dispel ill-feeling and gain the friendship of the Italians, insulted us, scorned us and threatened us, thus adding fuel to the fire of hostility. Had it studied the past it would have seen that the Italians were justified in hailing as a deliverance the downfall of that Empire whose demands and arbitrary pretensions had weighed despotically upon Italian administration and had prevented the redemption of Rome. We may add that, even had she wished to do so, Italy could not have helped the Empire, because, only a few months previous to the outbreak of hostilities, her incautious and short-sighted government had disarmed. And had we exposed ourselves to all the dangers that threatened, not excepting that of losing Rome, who was there to vouch for Austria's conduct? Was it not probable that Prussia, seeing herself attacked by Italy, who had not the slightest motive for waging war upon her, would have found a means of establishing an understanding with Austria? Situated as we were we might easily have forfeited all we had gained in the cause of our country's union during the last ten years!

Consequently, in consideration of all these circum-

stances, the government of the Republic should have adopted a conciliatory policy in order to gain the friendship of Italy which the Empire had forfeited. A policy of peace, of respect, of fraternal regard would have prevented the formation of the Triple Alliance, and would have been the forerunner of the union of the Mediterranean Powers.

The third Republic in France came into being after a national calamity. It was the result neither of a revolution nor of a conspiracy.

The Empire which was destroyed at Sedan could not rise again; Bismarck alone could have given it life, and he would not.

The Monarchy by Divine Right was not ready to occupy the throne. The July Monarchy lacked the courage to grasp the power, and at that moment of profound dejection in consequence of her unexpected defeat, no one would have dared to exalt a dynasty which had done nothing to endear itself to France.

The post being vacant, it was an easy matter for the Parisians to proclaim the sovereignty of the people. They did so timidly and as if in dread of what the morrow might bring forth. The temporary government assumed the title of 'defender of the nation,' and organised itself according to the necessities of the moment, and in a way to meet the demands of the times, which were to repel foreign invasion.

When, on September 4, the news that the Republic had been proclaimed in Paris reached the *Sala dei Cinquecento* in Florence, those who remembered the prodigious events of 1792, believed that France was about to give another proof of her energy, and that the Prussians would be immediately expelled.

But the more prudent reflected that times had

changed, and that the Europe of to-day was no longer the Europe of 1792. They pointed out that heroism had ceased to mean what it meant in the past, and that the result of the battle no longer depended on the valour of the soldier. The modern weapon is a machine that acts at long range, and makes a hand-to-hand engagement impossible. He will conquer who has collected the most numerous army, who has armed his soldiers with guns whose action is most rapid and whose missiles carry farthest. Nor can insurrections hope now to enjoy the success they once achieved.

I greatly doubt whether an insurrection would have been possible in Paris, and whether the Republic could have been the outcome of a popular uprising. Generally speaking the French are unskilful conspirators; this I observed and became convinced of during my residence in the great capital.

After the days of June 1848, after the *coup d'état* of December 2, first Cavaignac and then Louis Bonaparte had purged Paris of that mass of social outcasts who lead lives of perpetual irregularity, who thrive amidst disorder, who form the vanguard of insurrection and whom all political factions make use of in turn.

To-day France must forget the history of the supremacy and influence she once wielded on this side of the Alps. She must recognise that the Italian nation is as good as the French, and that, like the French, it must be allowed to enjoy its independence and profit by it, with the full consent of all nations.

For the first time, on June 25, 1887, at the Chamber of Deputies, Crispi made a declaration concerning France. He

spoke from the ministers' bench, and in place of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was absent. The government had been asked to declare its 'precise intentions as regards participation in the international Exposition to be held in Paris in 1889.'

That glorification of the great revolution, and consequently of the overthrow of monarchy in France, accompanied by all the only too well-known horrors, could not be acceptable to the monarchical governments of Europe, and in fact all, beginning with England, had declined the invitation to participate officially in the Paris Exposition. Russia had declared explicitly that 'it was impossible for the Imperial Government to take part in a solemnity for the glorification of principles that are in direct opposition to those upon which the sovereignty of the Czars is founded.'

When Crispi announced the intentions of the Italian government, the other governments had already declined the invitation. He was therefore in a position to declare that, should Italy accept when the other great Powers had refused, her acceptance would assume a political significance it was not intended to possess. He concluded with cordial expressions of friendship for France, who, he said, could not complain if Italy did not participate in an International Exposition, which would not be international after all.

However, the French press did not lose the opportunity of accusing Crispi of anti-French prejudices and of passive obedience to Germany, which country, by the way, had begun by enveloping her refusal in circumlocutions and promises to encourage German manufacturers to exhibit, and had altered her attitude only when certain anti-German demonstrations took place in Paris on the occasion of the first representation of *Lohengrin*.

When, at the end of September, the French papers were the first to announce that Crispi was on his way to visit Bismarck, it was made to appear that an event of exceptional importance was about to take place, and those who had undertaken to inflame public opinion hinted darkly at enterprises of a war-like nature to be concerted at Friedrichsrh. His enemies, both secret and open, had denounced Crispi as a man swayed entirely by impulse, and consequently dangerous. Had he followed in the footsteps of his predecessors they would have

tauntingly pointed out that the policy to which he, as a simple deputy, had always been opposed, could not have been so bad after all if, as minister, he saw fit to adopt it. But as he struck out along an entirely new line they predicted dire calamity.

Heretofore it had not been customary for Italian ministers to cross the frontier and confer with their foreign colleagues. Robilant had even replied, when it was proposed that he should seek an interview with Prince Bismarck, that he 'had nothing to say to him.' But Crispi felt he had many things to say to the Grand Chancellor of Germany; he had confidence in himself, in the efficacy of his personal powers, and he furthermore remembered that in 1877, at Gastein, he had succeeded in getting the value of an Italo-German alliance appreciated, at a time when it was but a remote possibility.

The invitation came from the Prince himself. In a private letter of September 18, Count de Launay informed Crispi that he had the day before received a visit from Count Herbert Bismarck, who was just returned from Friedrichsruh. The Count had talked of many things: of the Bulgarian Question; of the situation of the German government as regards the policy of Italy and Austria and that of Russia; of what had passed between the Prince and Count Kálnoky on the occasion of the Count's recent visit to Friedrichsruh; and of the value which both chancellors attached to the alliance with Italy. He had ended by delivering a confidential message from the Prince, to the effect that he would be delighted if it could be made possible for him to meet his Italian colleague in the same way he was in the habit of meeting Count Kálnoky, who had been coming to see him regularly once a year since 1881. His age and the state of his health prevented his going to Italy, and the Prince might not venture to propose to Crispi to come and confer with him, fearing such an act would appear inconsiderate. Nevertheless, should some 'favourable breeze waft him in the direction of Friedrichsruh, Varzin, or Berlin,' Bismarck would receive him with the same pleasure he had experienced on the occasion of his friendly visit to Gastein in 1877. It was for Crispi to decide whether such a visit were advisable, and should personal or political motives render it inexpedient, no blame could possibly attach to him.

Crispi wrote to de Launay to say that a meeting with Prince Bismarck was 'one of his most ardent desires.' He could have wished that the meeting might have been arranged in such a manner as to appear accidental, but he saw that, although the choice of the place had been most courteously left to him, the Prince would honestly prefer to receive him at Friedrichsrub, where the Austro-Hungarian Chancellor had been so recently.

Crispi, who did not lack the courage openly to acknowledge his friendships, immediately decided to start, and as he had to be back in Rome again by the beginning of October, he took advantage of these last days of September to visit Germany. In the following pages he himself has left us an account of his journey and of his interviews with Bismarck. Before he left Italy, however, there was an exchange of courtesies between the King, Crispi, and the German Chancellor.

To His Highness Prince Bismarck.

I take pleasure in expressing to Your Highness my congratulations on the 25th anniversary of your elevation to the office in which you render such valuable and glorious service to my revered friend the Emperor, and to the nation which is our faithful ally. May God preserve Your Highness for long years to come, to the greatness of Germany, the peace of Europe as well as to my friendship and admiration, which sentiment I share with the entire Italian people.

HUMBERT.

To His Majesty the King of Italy.

I beg Your Majesty to accept my most humble thanks for the gracious congratulations with which you have deigned to honour me on the occasion of my anniversary. I am gratified by the august approval Your Majesty is pleased to express in connection with my zeal in carrying out the desires of the Emperor, my Master, by maintaining His Majesty's policy upon the path traced by the alliance

and guaranteed by the providential friendship which unites the Sovereigns, the dynasties and the people of Italy and Germany.

VON BISMARCK.

To His Most Serene Highness, Prince Bismarck.

On this 25th anniversary of the day upon which an enlightened Sovereign appointed you his counsellor, my thoughts revert to the great deeds you have accomplished. Germany united under one glorious sceptre, the German Empire raised from its ruins and guided for sixteen years along the paths of peace and conservation—such are your titles to the gratitude and admiration of all your contemporaries, who will hand down the story of the glory of your achievements to posterity. Nowhere more than in Italy is the magnitude of these achievements appreciated. Thanks to political genius supported by the strength of arms, but a few years have sufficed to convert two dismembered nations into two great States worthy of each other's confidence.

Your Highness is aware of the nature of my personal sentiments towards you, and I beg that I may be allowed, on this occasion, to renew the assurance of my devotion.

CRISPI.

To His Excellency, Signor Crispi.

I thank Your Excellency most heartily for your telegram containing your kind message. The analogy that exists between our pasts, our national ideals and the dangers that may threaten us, have created between our two countries the strong bond of common interests which must make them faithful and natural allies.

I am glad to be able to co-operate with Your Excellency in the noble task of directing our policy

in accordance with the friendship existing between our Sovereigns, and the principles of peace and conservation, which govern Their Majesties' intentions, and of affording mutual support, both moral and material, against any attack upon the independence of the two allies.

The lofty sentiments Your Excellency entertains and the national traditions with which the present generation is imbued in Italy as in Germany justify us in believing that our policy will be crowned with success.

VON BISMARCK.

1 Oct.—At 8.30 A.M. we start for Friedrichsruh. Shortly before reaching Büchen, Count Bismarck joins us.

We reach Friedrichsruh at 9.15. The Count suddenly announces: 'Mon Père!' The Prince is at the station to receive me, and comes to the door of the carriage as if to help me to alight.

I drive with him to his house, which is near at hand. I am received by the Princess, who remembers me. I present my secretaries: my nephew Palamenghi-Crispi, Pisani Dossi and Mayor.

An informal reception.—Dr. Schweninger arrives.—We retire for the night.

2 Oct.—I get up at 6.30.

At 11 the Prince comes to my room. He apologises for having risen late. He has had to obey the doctor's orders. He is now going to look over his letters, but will be free in a quarter of an hour. I am then to come to his study. Presently I am summoned, and going down to the ground-floor, pass through a suite of rooms to the entrance hall, on the right side of which is a small apartment whence a few steps lead up to the Grand Chancellor's

working rooms. The third one is his study, which is furnished very simply.

The Prince is seated at his desk. He rises to greet me, and we then sit down facing each other.

The Prince begins by giving me an outline of general politics in their bearings on Germany.

He desires peace and much regrets to be obliged to admit that two Powers, and two Powers only, France and Russia, are likely to disturb it. But he has no fears. The Triple Alliance is a strong guarantee for the maintenance of peace.

He has done all he could to gain the friendship of Russia, but has failed. In 1878 he assumed the whole responsibility of the Berlin Congress, in order to render its consequences less painful to the Czar. When he was requested to take the initiative he refused, but later, when Schouvalow came to him in the Emperor's name, he consented. What was his recompense? Russia massed two hundred thousand men on the German frontier!

He repeats that he desires peace, but that, although he might deplore the necessity for war, he does not fear it. Germany can get one million and a half men under arms at once, and in case of pressing need, by mustering all the able-bodied men, she can mobilise three million soldiers. And there are uniforms and arms for three million, and everything that is necessary to bring several armies onto the field of battle. With a million men on the southern frontier and a million along the northern line, Germany need fear no injury.

The allies must provide for other contingencies.

Russia is not sure of her army. The troops, officers and soldiers alike, have been tampered with by the revolutionists. The great Empire appears

invulnerable, but it is not entirely so. Poland is a source of weakness, and Austria is popular in Poland. With some slight encouragement the Poles could be made to rebel, and after the emancipation, a State might be formed for some Austrian archduke to rule over.

Alexander III. is no friend of war. Even did he wish to go to war it would not do for him to carry it into Bulgaria, because Transylvania is too near at hand, and the Austrians might easily fall upon the Russians in that region.

Prince Bismarck cares little whether the Russians go to Constantinople or not. Russia would only be weakened by such a conquest.

He takes little interest in the solution of the Bulgarian Question, and even should war result from it, he would take no part in it as long as France kept quiet. The conduct of France alone might force him to take up arms.

He sets great store by the Triple Alliance, and has faith in the two friendly Powers. He does not doubt Austria's loyalty.

The alliance with Germany and Italy is popular in Austria. An understanding with Russia would be unpopular. Against Russia war would be welcome; with Russia impossible.

I replied by outlining the conditions of Italy. Although we have not quite a million soldiers, our army is now sufficiently strong and compact to answer for the obligations implied by the two alliances. By April we shall be able to bring half a million men into the ranks, besides the reserves and the militia.

Our country is quiet; we do not fear subversive parties. The Internationalists are rare amongst us,

and will never become active. In case of attack from the outside, all classes would unite in defence, and in case of an expedition into a foreign country, we should be able to use all our strength, having no fear of insurrection at home.

We cannot boast that we have no interests at stake in the Eastern Question. We could not allow Russia to go to Constantinople. Once there, Russia would be mistress of the Mediterranean, and might make use of the sailors for which Greece is celebrated, for the bond of religion existing between the two countries would facilitate an understanding.

I am not of opinion that the possession of Constantinople would weaken Russia. This great Empire, while enlarging its dominion in Europe, might make this a base of operations, and easily hold sway both in the Orient and in Europe.

In order to prevent this, Italy will follow her traditional policy. In 1854 Cavour joined with France and England and took part in the Crimean War precisely for this purpose; and to-day Italy could not act otherwise.

We are fully alive to the dangers that threaten Europe, and in order to avoid them we have sought to prevent any act on the part of either Russia or Turkey which might lead to a European war.

It is much the same to us whether Alexander of Battenberg or Ferdinand of Coburg reign in Bulgaria. What we desire is that peace be maintained in that country. But its peace would be disturbed should the great Powers accept Russia's proposal to overthrow what already exists in Bulgaria by sending a prince-lieutenant to Sofia. Prince Ferdinand would not leave the city willingly, and even should he do so, the Bulgarians would

offer armed resistance to the Russian Lieutenant and to the Turkish Commissary alike.

I entertain no illusions concerning the condition of Turkey. That country is in a state of dissolution, and we may expect to witness the beginning of its dismemberment at any moment. During the nine years that have elapsed since the treaty of Berlin, the Sultan has done nothing towards the reorganisation of his administration. It is a miracle indeed that he has been able to maintain his position, for his government lacks the principal vitalising element of the state—money. Article xxiii. of the Berlin treaty enjoined him to provide his provinces with regulations resembling those of Crete, but the Sultan has done nothing, and the Powers have failed to admonish him to fulfil his obligations.

The disorder at present prevailing in Turkey may be to Russia's advantage, for Russia is on the lookout for the chance of giving Turkey a death-blow. But this state of things cannot suit the great Powers, who must not allow Russia to possess herself of that territory.

Under the circumstances we must choose between two lines of action: either to unite in reorganising the administration in Turkey, defending her, should this prove necessary, and preventing her downfall, or we must prepare the basis of a government or of several governments which will take the place of that of the Sultan.

In this second case, I see no better way than to respect the autonomy of the different regions such as Macedonia, Albania, Servia, etc., and to organise them much as Roumania, Bulgaria and the other Balkan States are organised to-day.

This idea of autonomy is favoured by Vienna.

The despatches from our ambassador in that city all tend to confirm the fact that Count Kálnoky desires that the autonomy of the different Balkan States be respected. I do not know in what way Kálnoky expects to realise his desire, but it is enough for me to know that we agree as to principle.

The Prince now spoke, saying that he entirely approved of this group of three Powers, and that he hoped it would become still more closely united and make its authority felt.

Bulgaria is no concern of his. It would have been better if Prince Alexander had remained there. But he was imprudent, and had hastened his own end by violating the Berlin treaty. He had done worse still, and offended English susceptibilities by his matrimonial projects. However this may be, he is no longer Prince.

Russia still urges the acceptance of her proposals. Bismarck will support them if Turkey makes them her own. But he is of opinion that they will lead to no result. Of course Italy is free to follow her own policy in the East, and Germany will always be with Italy wherever the interests of peace are at stake. Should a breach of peace occur in the East, Germany would join with her allies, but would keep in the background.

‘As regards Eastern questions,’ the Prince added, ‘you must arrange with Count Kálnoky. Establish and combine your line of conduct with him. This might even lead to a special treaty.’

Hereupon I resumed the conversation, declaring that peace was my one desire and the object of all my endeavours. I expressed my regret at the peculiar conditions in which we are placed at Massaua. That act of occupation was not my doing

—I found it already achieved. But it is my duty, the duty of the Italian government, to make good the injury sustained. It will be a war of little importance which we are forced to undertake; and it is a war we cannot avoid.

I can only hope that France will keep quiet, but I must point out that the treaties of May 1882 and of February 1887 are incomplete. The question of mutual co-operation between the two Powers in case of war was provided for, but a military convention was omitted, which seems to me to be most necessary.

No one can foretell either how or where war may break out. It may come unexpectedly, and we must not wait for its advent to agree upon the part which each one of us must bear in the common defence. It will be well to get a plan of defence or attack established as soon as possible, which shall provide for all emergencies, in order that, should war break out, we may each know exactly what to do.

After all, a military convention is the proper complement of a treaty of alliance.

The Prince replied that he recognised the reasonableness of my proposal and accepted it. But he must of course consult His Majesty the Emperor and the head of the army, on this point, and receive his orders.

I answered that, as he was willing to recognise the principle underlying my proposal, I had nothing further to add, save to express the desire that the same arrangement might be concluded with Austria.

‘Austria,’ I observed, ‘is what she is: a polyglot empire composed of various nationalities. I respect her because I am bound to respect our treaties.’

‘I consider Austria’s existence necessary for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. I

freely admit this, and Italy will prove herself a faithful ally to the neighbouring empire.

‘I wish to make this declaration, because I was once her enemy, and conspired against her as long as she held on to the Italian provinces. I wish to be perfectly outspoken, and beg you to use your influence with the Vienna Cabinet in a question which interests both Austria and ourselves.

‘There are many Italians who are Austrian subjects and who form a population which is important in every way, and which it would be to Austria’s advantage to propitiate.

‘I ask for no special privileges for the Italian population. I ask only that they be treated as all the other nations of the Empire are treated. The Austrian government could only gain by this, for all ground for complaint would be removed, and friendly relations established.

‘Your Highness can have no idea of the amount of harm this ill-treatment occasions, and of the embarrassing position in which the Italian government is placed. Every time news reaches Italy of acts of violence on the part of Austria against Italians, the spirit of nationalism is roused, and the political parties take advantage of these conditions to disturb the country’s peace.

‘Be this as it may, Austria cannot live and acquire strength save by respecting the various nationalities which go to make up the Empire.’

The Prince thanked me for my open declarations, and promised that he would speak to Kálnoky about these conditions.

I then judged it expedient to introduce another subject which interests Italy and Germany alone: the exercise of civil rights by Italians in Germany,

and by Germans in Italy, on a footing of perfect equality. I begged him to hasten the actuation of this principle.

The Prince, who had not forgotten the promise made me through the German Ambassador at Rome, declared that the matter was being examined and that he would hasten its progress. 'We are studying a Civil Code for the whole Empire, to take the place of the numerous codes now prevailing. Of course the Ministers of Justice of all the States have had to be consulted. It takes time, but we shall soon have finished.'

It was now half-past twelve o'clock. The Prince begged to interrupt the conversation, which we would resume after lunch, and proposed that we should take a walk in the forest.

The Chancellor, Herbert and I, each equipped with a walking-stick—they had given me one of those stacked in the hall—started down a path on the left of the house. We walked for half an hour, and every now and then our political discussion was interrupted by the information the Prince imparted concerning the spots we were passing.

The Prince asked me about Cucchi—an Italian deputy who, during the war of 1870, was sent to German headquarters by the Committee of the Left—and desired to be remembered to him. This brought us to the beginning of our intercourse before the war of '70, to a discussion of von Holstein's trip to Florence, of the help afforded Prussia by our refusal to allow Italian troops to be sent to France.

We walked rapidly. In recalling 1870 we naturally spoke of France, and I had the opportunity of informing the Chancellor how the *Matin* had construed my journey to Friedrichsrüh. It had declared

that the purpose of this visit was to arrange for a reconciliation with the Pope.

‘Precisely the one subject we have not touched upon,’ the Prince said. ‘The French are on the look-out for what does not exist (*ils cherchent midi à quatorze heures*)!’

‘As a matter of fact there was no reason why we should discuss that subject,’ I replied.

‘It is a question which does not concern us,’ Bismarck commented, ‘and in which we may not interfere. You must know that not a single Prelate has appealed to me concerning the temporal power. They are all too well aware what my answer would be.’

In speaking of historical events I mentioned Father Tosti and his pamphlet; the intentions of the Pope and the many conflicting currents; of Leo XIII.’s letter and of that written by Rampolla, which had forced me to use scant courtesy in certain matters where we might otherwise have been able to compromise, and still keep within the limits prescribed by the laws regulating the Pontifical Guarantee.

We returned to the house a few minutes before one o’clock, and went in to lunch at once.

After lunch we adjourned to one of the rooms leading from the dining-hall. It contained an enormous walnut cupboard full of writing-paper, pens, etc., which was presented to the Prince by several stationers’ firms on one of his anniversaries. ‘It contains more than a hundredweight of paper,’ said the Princess, laughing.

The Princess brought forward an Album which was really *albus*, its pages being still perfectly blank, and requested that I be the first to write in it. I

wrote: 'In this sanctuary of patriotism, where vigil is kept for the maintenance of the peace of Europe, I leave a memory—F. Crispi—2 October, 1887.' The thought gave much satisfaction, and the Prince exclaimed in a serious tone: 'Your Excellency has read my intentions aright. I labour for the maintenance of peace, I live for that alone. . . . We have done enough for war; now let us work, and work together, for peace.'

Towards half-past three the Prince invites me to drive with him in the Park. I accept.

The Princess, fearing that my overcoat is insufficient, throws a heavy military cloak of her husband's over my shoulders.

We drive through the forest in all directions. It rains for a few minutes, and then the clouds scatter only to unite again, so that we are at last obliged to have the hood up. Finally, however, the sky grants us a truce, and shows us a streak of blue.

We return home towards 5.30.

During our two hours' drive we had resumed the discussion of the morning, and had reached a conclusion.

A military convention must be concluded. When the Prince has received the Emperor's orders he will write a letter proposing negotiations, and we will accept the proposal.

We dine at six. The party is composed of my secretaries, the two counsellors of the chancery, Herbert, the physician in attendance on the Prince and Princess, the Princess, the Prince and myself.

After dinner we adjourn to the drawing-room. Bismarck stretches himself in a great armchair and begins smoking his pipes. I ask him when it will be possible to open negotiations. The Prince asks his

son when the Emperor is returning, and on learning that he will be back on October 20, he says: 'As soon as the Emperor reaches Berlin, I will send the proposal.'

The conversation touches upon various subjects, on Napoleon III., the war of 1859, the formation of the Kingdom of Italy. Bismarck is of opinion that Napoleon III. was good-hearted, but wanting in intelligence. He told us that, as early as 1857, the Emperor had confided to him his intention of waging war against Austria, and had commissioned him to persuade the King of Prussia to become his ally. He promised Hanover or some other German State in compensation. Bismarck had answered that it would be a mistake to acquaint his Sovereign with the project, for the King would immediately reveal it to Austria.

3 Oct.—I rise at six. Towards seven, Count de Launay, the Italian ambassador at Berlin, comes to see me, and I inform him of what has passed between the Prince and myself. He is much pleased.

Half an hour later the Prince is announced. I tell him of what has happened at Morocco, and what Italy's attitude would be in the event of the Sultan's death, in order to prevent the occupation of the throne of the Shereefs by a French candidate, and also to prevent France from extending her frontiers towards Morocco.

At 8, we get ready to leave. The Prince and Princess accompany me to the train. While we are exchanging last greetings, and after the train has begun to move, Bismarck says: 'We are perfectly agreed on all points. . . . We may congratulate ourselves . . . we have rendered Europe a great service.'

At 11, we reach Hanover, where we find M. von Bennigsen, leader of the national-liberal party, who had been informed of my arrival by the Grand Chancellor. We lunch together, and I then pursue my journey.

We reach Frankfort at 8.30, and spend the night there.

4 Oct.—I am 67 years old to-day. One of my secretaries comes to wake me and brings me the following telegram :

‘DEAR COLLEAGUE,—My wife and I send you our hearty congratulations on this anniversary of the day of your birth, and our best wishes for your health and success in the service of your country.

‘VON BISMARCK.’

At 1 P.M. we are in the train again and on our way back to Italy by the St. Gothard.

5 Oct.—At 7 A.M. I am at Monza, where I confer with the King.

At one I start for Milan, where I spend the night.

6 Oct.—At 10 A.M. Count Nigra, the Italian Ambassador at Vienna, comes to see me. We converse until 11.30. Count Nigra communicates to me a proposal that has been made by Baron Calice, Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople, which is intended to serve as a basis for an understanding between Italy, Austria and England, in the Eastern Question :

(1) Maintenance of peace. (2) *Status quo* founded on the treaties, and exclusion of compensations. (3) Local autonomy. (4) Independence of Turkey, of the Straits, etc., as regards any predominating foreign influence. (5) The Porte may not transfer its rights in Bulgaria to any other Power. (6)

Turkey must participate in guaranteeing above-named clauses. (7) In case of resistance on the part of Turkey and of unlawful demands on the part of Russia, the three Powers will settle among themselves how far she is to be supported. (8) In case of connivance or quiescence on the part of Turkey, the three Powers will co-operate in occupying certain points in order to maintain the balance of power.

We leave for Rome at 8.15 P.M.

Crispi's visit to Prince Bismarck was most scathingly criticised by the French press, whose sentiments were echoed by our own radical papers. But the great majority of the public grasped its importance, and were gratified by the manifestations of good will in which the entire German press indulged. The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* published a noteworthy article in which, after pointing out how the analogy existing between their political conditions and community of interests must constitute strong ties between Italy and Germany—two countries which had arisen in the name of a national ideal—went on to pronounce the meeting at Friedrichsruh a fresh testimonial of the peaceful intentions of the two Powers. The *National Zeitung* declared that the confirmation of the understanding between Italy and the Central Empires would serve to 'strengthen the peaceful elements both in France and Russia.' Even the clerical *Germania* observed that since Italy really existed, and Crispi was directing her policy, it was certainly comforting to know that Italy would lend her strength to those Powers who were labouring to maintain peace.

On October 25 a grand banquet was given in Turin in Crispi's honour, at which almost all the ministers were present, as well as most of the leading members of the two legislative bodies. The banquet had been organised by the Deputies Giolitti, Roux, and a few other members of parliament, assisted by the most prominent men in Piedmont. On this occasion, which was also memorable for the cordial welcome which Piedmont offered the first southerner who had ever been appointed to direct the government of Italy, Crispi made

some important declarations concerning the line of conduct he intended to pursue in regard to foreign policy. It will be well to transcribe them here.

. . . I am thus brought to speak of the policy by means of which we propose to maintain and strengthen it. This is a delicate and dangerous subject, for foreign policy calls for skilful handling and few words. It is a subject, however, on which you all expect me to open my heart, and so I have decided to speak, openly and simply, in compliance with the dictates of modern diplomacy, which despises the lying and deceitful methods of the past.

Peace! That is the supreme end we have in view. Peace, which is of such vital importance to our development at home, to the accomplishment of the reforms we desire to achieve, to the proper and fruitful employment of our capital, and to the execution of those numerous and indispensable public works of which so many regions in Italy still stand in need. And what methods have we adopted to ensure this state of peace?

We are on friendly terms with all the Powers, and we desire to maintain the best of relations with them all.

To some, indeed, we are more closely bound than to others. But while, on the Continent, we are allied to the Central Powers and are in perfect harmony with England on the seas, we harbour no intentions that other Powers can consider in the light of a menace.

My recent visit to Germany has caused anxiety in France.

Fortunately, however, it has not shaken the confidence of the French government, which is well aware of the honesty of my intentions, and is

convinced that I would never conspire against the nation who is not only our neighbour, but to whom Italy is bound by analogy of race, of traditions and of civilisation. I lived two years in France, from 1856 to 1858, and the sons of that noble people, whom I knew so intimately and from whom I had no secrets, are well aware of my affection for their country, and that I shall never be guilty either of provocation or offence. They are aware also that I should reckon that day the happiest of my life on which I might be enabled to contribute towards bringing peace to the hearts of the French people.

No one can possibly wish for war between the two countries, for not only would victory or defeat be alike disastrous to the liberty of both nations, but the balance of power in Europe would be disturbed.

Inspired by such convictions as these we are but acting in our own interests in labouring to maintain peace.

Our system of alliances, then, is intended for conservation and not for offence—for the preservation of order and not for the creation of disturbance. It is a system by which the interests not only of Italy, but of all concerned, must profit.

Nor are we the only European nation which aims at progress through conservation, at fruitful labour amidst peaceful surroundings.

The history of the epoch in which we live is dominated by one name, the name of a statesman, for whom I cherish an admiration of long standing, an admiration that dates back to the beginning of that personal intercourse which has bound me to him. It is the name of a man whose plan of government is remarkable for the marvellous co-ordination

of the different parts of a single purpose. This purpose, double in appearance, but single in reality, is peace, and the greatness of his country. For thirty years he laboured to achieve his purpose, which, once accomplished, he set himself to preserve. The name of this statesman, who was determined to succeed, who was steadfastly determined from the very beginning, is in the minds of all present. You all know him for the great patriot he is, and I wish to add that he is an old friend of Italy's, has been her friend from the first, was a friend in her days of calamity and servitude, for in the year 1857 he was aware of what Cavour's policy was secretly striving to bring about, amidst such overwhelming difficulties, and it was he who enjoined silence upon those who might have spoken, knowing well how much opposition an open declaration would arouse, and conscious how his own country would gain through the consummation of Italy's destiny, for the unity of Germany and the unity of Italy were preparing side by side.

I will not dwell upon my recent conference with him. I wish simply to state that the harmony of thought and sentiment which has ever existed between us has endured unchanged through varying conditions, and has received fresh confirmation since I have had the honour to direct my country's affairs. It has been said that conspiracy was the purpose of our meeting at Friedrichsrub. If such were indeed the case, the word could hardly alarm a hardened conspirator like myself. Yes, if you will, we did conspire, but it was for peace, and therefore all who desire that supreme blessing may join our conspiracy. Of the many memorable declarations I listened to, discretion permits of my

mentioning but one, which was pronounced at the moment of parting, and which contains the very synthesis of our conference. It is this: 'We have rendered Europe a great service!'

Here, in my own country, I am proud to remember this, for never before as in this close and cordial union between Italy and her allies has her dignity been so loyally respected, have her interests been so firmly guaranteed.

But besides furthering its maintenance by means of alliances, we also seek to establish peace by enforcing justice. This, gentlemen, is the explanation of our policy in the East. What we demand there is respect for the rights of the peoples, which must, in as far as is possible, be reconciled with respect for the treaties that represent public and European rights. What we hope for is the gradual development of local autonomic conditions. There are four distinct nationalities in the Balkan peninsula, each with its own language, its home where it has dwelt for centuries, its traditions that have been handed down through the ages, and—most important of all—the consciousness of its own individuality as a nation, and aspirations towards independence. Let us then help these peoples (who, like all bodies instinct with life, long for freedom of action) to come into their own once more, and without a struggle, without bloodshed, without fresh martyrdom. Is not this a most fitting policy for Italy, and one most in harmony with her origin and with our principles? And I furthermore beg you to reflect, gentlemen, that this is not a policy of principles and sentiment alone, but one calculated to promote the true interests of all concerned. The Balkan peoples, who repre-

sent not only youth with all its inexperience, but the future with its hopes and its power as well, will not forget the disinterested support Italy may afford them. Have we ourselves forgotten any of the disinterested services that were rendered us? Let him who may feel inclined to launch this accusation, ask of England, to whom we are bound by nearly forty years of untroubled friendship, if she has ever had a more faithful ally than ourselves, a more loyal friend than Piedmont in times gone by, and Italy to-day.

And, even in France, is there a single individual of impartial and honest judgment who would be willing to confirm the accusations of ingratitude which are often hurled against Italy from that country so dear to the heart of every Italian?

But peace without interchange of traffic is but a barren peace, and it is for this reason that we have sought to establish commercial intercourse with the neighbouring Powers. A treaty was on the point of being dissolved, but I made it my first duty on entering office to arrange for the renewal of the agreements, and sought means of avoiding even the beginning of a tariff war between two countries whose interests are as closely commingled as are those of France and Italy. Another treaty with a friendly and allied empire was about to terminate. I did not hesitate to open negotiations for its renewal. These negotiations, which were begun at Vienna, are being carried forward in Rome, where, just before leaving, I had the pleasure of greeting the Austro-Hungarian negotiators, who share our firm confidence in a speedy conclusion.

The protection and encouragement by either party of their different industries and products, which,

amidst the warring theories of the economists, is the one practical guide whose counsels we may safely follow, offers us a broad basis for the establishment of just compensations to be obtained on terms of perfect equity. And success will be all the more welcome because the two States, between whom there already exist loyal and active political ties, no longer recall the conflict, now happily of the remote past, save each to praise the other's valour.

Crispi's 'platform speech' was not only enthusiastically received in Italy, but was considered throughout Europe as representing an event of high import in international politics. The following documents will serve to demonstrate this.

The Italian *chargé d'affaires* at Paris wrote on October 27.

During an audience granted me yesterday by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, I laid before him the text, as Your Excellency had telegraphed it to me, of the references to foreign affairs contained in the address delivered at Turin the day before. M. Flourens appeared satisfied, and assured me that while the French government had never doubted Your Excellency's sentiments towards itself, the peaceful and friendly declarations of good feeling for France contained in your speech were, nevertheless, calculated to influence public opinion most favourably and happily, although the first impression which had followed the surprise of Your Excellency's visit to Friedrichsruh had already lost much of its intensity.

M. Flourens did not allude to the passages concerning England and Prince Bismarck. He could not agree with them, and so preferred to pass them over in silence.

As regards the reception the speech has met with in the Parisian press, no favourable and dispassionate criticism was to be expected in that quarter. To the French we remain the allies of Germany, and in their eyes this fact alone outweighs every other consideration. 'Let us admit that the protests of friendship on the part of this former revolutionary are sincere,' says the *Matin* of this morning, 'this revolutionary upon whom during the years of his exile in France hospitality was lavished, which he still remembers; nevertheless, it is impossible not to harbour a certain distrust of the statesman who so eagerly accepts the invitation of our arch-enemy.' That, in a few words, is the real feeling of the great majority. The *Journal des Débats*, while accepting Your Excellency's expressions concerning the possibility of a war with France, in the spirit in which they were uttered, asks, nevertheless, why Italy, whom no one has threatened, should feel the necessity for alliances that may force her, against her will, into a war, the very thought of which she repudiates, and which would in no wise further her personal interests? The paper declares that its only anxiety is precisely concerning what Your Excellency has seen fit to pass over in silence. The *Temps* recognises that our expressions of regard for France are entirely unreserved, and lays stress upon the declaration that we shall never be guilty either of provocation or of offence.

On the whole, we may conclude from the comments of the press that the Turin speech has bewildered many of those who have been most ill-disposed towards us. A few, lacking serious arguments, attribute Your Excellency's expressions of friendship to the desire to establish a treaty of

commerce with France which shall favour our interests especially. Others would have been better pleased had you revealed the clauses of our treaties of alliance, some of which they declare are offensive.

The *chargé d'affaires* at Berlin sent in the following statement, after having communicated the text of the address to the Imperial Chancery :—

Count von Bismarck sent me word this morning that he would like to see me, and informed me that he had forwarded the copy of Your Excellency's telegram which I had given him, to Friedrichsruh, and that the Prince Chancellor had charged him to express to you through me his hearty thanks for the communication, and at the same time his most sincere congratulations on your 'fine' speech. His Highness furthermore desired to express his gratitude to you for that part of the address in which he is personally alluded to. As regards the several opinions you have expressed concerning foreign policy, Prince Bismarck wishes to assure Your Excellency that he shares them in full, but that he has a suggestion to offer about the paragraph in which the 'four distinct nationalities' of the Balkan peninsula are dealt with. He fears that passage may be made use of by those Powers who have an interest in balking our action in Constantinople, for the purpose of arousing a fresh outburst of mistrust of us in the mind of the Sultan, who is ever strongly inclined to suspicion. In order to avoid this danger the Prince would advise Your Excellency to commission His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to explain that your expressions allude only to the state of things actually existing in the Balkan region. The Chancellor believes that Your Excellency might

easily find an adequate explanation, either by envisaging the matter from the ethnographical point of view, that is to say, of the four nationalities, the Roumanian, Greek, Slavonic and Ottoman, which exist in that peninsula, or by following out the present political distinctions of the four States—Roumania, Servia, Greece and Bulgaria. He feels that by one or other of these means the point of the arrow, which will certainly be forged from the material you have supplied, may be blunted, even before it leaves the bow to lacerate our common interests.

Among the criticisms of leading newspapers on the Turin speech we may quote that of the *Times*.¹

I have the honour to forward herewith to Your Excellency the translation of part of an article from to-day's *Times* dealing with Your Excellency's address at Turin. The appreciation is remarkable and quite worthy of the journal's reputation. In a masterly manner the *Times* has herein summed up the opinions of both the conservative and liberal press of the United Kingdom upon the importance of this speech as regards Europe. The newspaper articles on the subject are so numerous that it would be practically impossible to give an account of them all.

I have the honour to be, etc., etc. . . .

T. CATALANI.

‘It falls to the lot of few statesmen to secure the universal approbation which has been won by the speech delivered by Signor Crispi a little more than a week ago in Turin. In Berlin it was hailed as a conclusive proof of the existence of an alliance between Italy and the German Powers, while in Paris it gave no less satisfaction on account of the

¹ Editorial from the *Times* of November 3, 1887.

sympathy with the French people shown by the Italian minister.

‘The speech was not less agreeable to Signor Crispi’s countrymen, and he has had the honour of being complimented by King Humbert. It appears that Prince Bismarck has declared himself able to subscribe to every declaration made by Signor Crispi upon foreign affairs, an endorsement which is all the more remarkable when we remember that upon some points the Turin speech went considerably further than Germany has ever gone in express terms.

‘In dealing with the Bulgarian question for example, Signor Crispi espoused the cause of local autonomies in the Balkans with a warmth which contrasts superficially with repeated declarations of Germany’s indifference.

‘But although Prince Bismarck has turned a somewhat stern countenance to the Bulgarians and has occasionally lectured them in terms of some severity, German policy has all along been essentially favourable to their liberties, because always scrupulously mindful of the treaties which, by placing Bulgaria under the tutelage of Europe, remove her from the exclusive control of any single State.

‘Signor Crispi, while speaking with sympathetic warmth of the Bulgarian struggle for liberty, and recalling the feeling with which Italians regard those who held out the hand of friendship to Piedmont, was not less careful than Prince Bismarck to point out that treaties must be strictly and scrupulously observed. Thus Prince Bismarck’s adherence to Signor Crispi’s declarations furnishes welcome proof of the existence of a clear understanding between Italy and the German Powers,

resting upon a basis which all can appreciate and which excludes the element of caprice and of secret designs. Prince Bismarck and Signor Crispi meet upon the platform of the inviolability of arrangements formally sanctioned by Europe while England, all whose interests are bound up with peace and the orderly evolution of affairs, throws her influence upon the side of this eminently conservative combination.'

And here are the opinions of two of the leading German papers.

Article from *Die Post*, No. 297, October 30, 1887.

THE TURIN ADDRESS

On the 25th of this month the banquet took place which Turin (that city now risen to such importance, where the foundations of new Italy were laid) has long intended to give in honour of Prime Minister Crispi, who is a Southern Italian. At the outset the celebration was intended to be a demonstration of the perfect fusion of the North and South of Italy, and of the free renunciation of her ancient prerogatives which Italy's birthplace has gladly made for love of that much longed-for union. Meanwhile it happened that the statesman to be honoured received an invitation to visit Friedrichsrh, and the result of this visit, which was accomplished under most auspicious conditions, was joyously welcomed throughout Italy as a confirmation and sign of that country's growing importance which could not have been more openly acknowledged. And so the Turin festivities assumed another aspect. The fruit of long labour was gathered at last, since Italy now stood before Europe occupying an undisputed place among the great Powers, and this fruit, moreover, brought with

it the promise of a still more brilliant future. So, instead of a joyous banquet, there was a solemn function. All the ministers were present except the Minister of War, who was occupied with the final preparations for the Abyssinian expedition. The number of deputies, senators and other government officials who participated amounted to 600. Crispi's speech was the only one of the evening, with the exception of a few words of welcome to the guest of honour spoken by the president of the assembly. We have not yet received the whole of the Premier's address, but the telegraphic extracts certainly contain the most important passages. The speech dealt both with foreign and domestic politics.

For the last few days the press of Europe has been commenting upon that paragraph of especial importance dealing with Prince Bismarck and the meeting at Friedrichsruh, which, curiously enough, reveals nothing concerning the results of the conference, beyond what we all knew or presumed before. It is a fact that a man of genius may say nothing, and still give satisfaction. Crispi has proved himself a master in this respect. It was certainly settled at Friedrichsruh that Signor Crispi should be the first to make public mention of the meeting, and undoubtedly it was also there that the boundary between silence and disclosure was established. The German Chancellor is not fond of personally announcing great events, and on this occasion he was probably more than willing to grant precedence to the statesman who is also his friend, as politics are handled differently in Italy than with us. In Italy the heart-strings must be played upon. How, then, did the orator proceed? He declared that there had been accusations of conspiracy at Fried-

richsrüh; that such an accusation could not affect him, the hardened conspirator, but that, as a matter of fact, the only conspiracy had been in the cause of peace, and one in which all might freely join. This is most cleverly and strikingly put, but it cannot possibly satisfy the curious, who wish to know what provisions the two statesmen made for the preservation of peace, and from what quarter disturbance may be expected. For did no fears of disturbance exist, conspiracy would be superfluous. We have all heard of eloquent silence, but here we have an example of silent eloquence, and we who judge the situation from the German standpoint can but grant it our approval and applaud the statesman who has given such convincing proof of his skill in this art.

But let us examine those parts of the address which contain something further than a clever paraphrasing of silence. These are of the greatest importance. The orator states that Italy has never formed so complete and cordial an alliance; that her dignity has never been so fully respected nor her rights and interests so safely guaranteed. These are words which may mean anything, but they must be taken together with that other declaration, that the conspiracy was in the cause of peace. The *Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, in its issue of October 6, has shown us how we are to reconcile these statements, by declaring that Signor Crispi's visit has proved the perfect understanding existing between the two statesmen in their determination to prevent—with the help of Austria-Hungary, and in as far as is possible—a European war, or, in case of necessity, to stand together on the defensive. If this be indeed the case, then the two Ministers have

certainly arranged the way in which an attack would be repulsed, and herein would lie the supreme importance and also the secret of the conference.

And now we, being of opinion that any attempt to force this secret would be entirely out of place, have but one observation to make. The Prime Minister announced to a large assembly of political leaders in his own country, that Italy had never formed so complete and cordial an alliance. This act of paramount importance was carried out by the King and his Minister alone, and no protesting voice was raised, yet Italy is reputed to be one of the countries enjoying the greatest liberty. We believe this reputation is well deserved and that, moreover, Italy is far more worthy to enjoy this liberty than many another country. No minister would have been able to form such an alliance in any other country ruled by the parliamentary system—no one, either in England or in France. In France it might, perhaps, be possible if all parties were convinced that the secret stood for *revenge*. There was indeed a time in England when the ministers might have accomplished something of the sort. The governing parties being of one mind as regards the foreign policy, each party in turn was satisfied that its successor would fulfil the obligations assumed by the preceding government. But even under these conditions the prerogative was but seldom resorted to. It sometimes, however, became necessary to resort to it, for during the period of the great wars one man stood alone at the head of affairs in England, remaining in that position until the day of his death. This was William Pitt, and if he had no secrets from Parliament it was because the position was so perfectly clear and the country in a state of

open warfare. To-day such conditions would be impossible in England, and her world-dominion, indeed, is on the decline. But a people capable, when necessary, of placing full confidence in the will of a single individual, of equipping him with an unhampered mandate, and of refraining from every attempt to place obstacles in his way, proves itself worthy of liberty, precisely because it knows when to lay down those arms it holds in liberty's own defence.

Article from the *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 300 (morning edition), October 20, 1887.

Although we are not yet in possession of the text of the address delivered in Turin by Crispi, which has been the object of so much comment, nevertheless the authentic telegraphic extracts confirm in every way what had leaked out from reliable sources concerning the alliance that was formed last Spring, and its public confirmation by means of the meeting at Friedrichsrhuh. Crispi was especially emphatic in denying that the alliance was of an offensive nature. He pointed out that any government might espouse the peaceful aims of the agreement, and he furthermore implied that this agreement had long existed, and that his visit had but brought it before the public. On this point we would remind our readers that to-day the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, while abstaining from all comment, has printed an article from an Italian journal in which it is openly declared that no new treaty was stipulated at Friedrichsrhuh. Also, as regards the position towards England, many mistaken opinions are now prevalent. As has already been said, there exists no fixed agreement with England, either as to

Continental or naval action. Crispi's language on this point coincides almost to the letter with what has more than once been stated in these columns, as for example, on the 1st and 15th of March, immediately after the conclusion of the alliance. It was then announced and the statement confirmed, that, of the agreements formed between the three Powers, one had to do with Austria, its purpose being the maintenance of the balance of power in the Mediterranean, with the sanction and consent of England, and that this was precisely the broader basis which Italy had made a condition if the alliance were to be renewed.

Although indeed, if we are to credit information derived from reliable sources, no formal arrangement has been entered into with England, and for well-known reasons, the above-named understanding will nevertheless certainly serve as a guide to those who may be the successors of the present Ministry in England, were it only in consideration of community of interests, and, like the other agreements, will contribute towards the maintenance of peace.

CHAPTER VII

THE RUPTURE OF COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

Negotiations for the renewal of the Franco-Italian treaty of commerce—Boselli's semi-official mission to Paris ; his letters to Crispi—Political and economic reasons which led to the tariff war—From Crispi's diary for October and December 1887 ; international questions—A conversation between the Czar and Prince Bismarck—False documents—The consular incident at Florence.

ON December 15, 1886, by vote of parliament, and after mature consideration, the Franco-Italian treaty of commerce of December 3, 1881, was rejected by the Italian government, at the same time as the Austro-Italian treaty. At the act of repudiation the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Robilant, declared his intention of opening negotiations for a fresh treaty that should be better adapted to Italy's new needs, or rather to her newly discovered needs. The French press, however, saw in the repudiation simply an act of retaliation in consequence of the attitude of the French Chamber of Deputies, which some months before had thrown out the convention of navigation that had already been passed by the Italian parliament.

Public opinion in France had been prejudiced against us ever since 1882, owing to our acceptance of the Austro-German alliance, and now foretold an unfavourable ending to the negotiations for a new treaty of commerce. These had not yet been opened when Crispi assumed the direction of Foreign Affairs on August 8, 1887. A few days later, on August 12, he wrote to the Italian ambassador at Paris that ' . . . we are greatly hoping to achieve the stipulation of a treaty of commerce. Meanwhile we will not attempt to hide the fact

that a second failure in the French Chamber would produce an extremely unpleasant impression in Italy, at the very moment when we are most desirous of seeing the friendship between the two nations strengthened. We have resolved to take the first step, but not, of course, until the French Ministry shall have declared its willingness to respond to our initiative, and shall have assured us there is a fair probability of concluding an agreement.'

On August 21, Crispi not having as yet received satisfactory assurance from the French Premier, M. Rouvier, wrote again, saying :—

. . . But as M. Rouvier does not appear to feel justified in vouching for the French Parliament in the matter, as I myself can unhesitatingly vouch for ours, I should prefer not to expose the two countries to the exasperation that would result from a third rejection by the French Chambers.

Nevertheless, upon Rouvier's suggestion that our demands be placed before him semi-officially and as a preliminary, either by means of a confidential agent of the Italian government or through the embassy, Crispi entrusted this mission to the Deputy Paolo Boselli, who, as director of the negotiations for the convention of navigation, had become acquainted with the French minister, and had since maintained friendly relations with him.

We choose the most important passages from Boselli's letters to Crispi of the fifth, seventh, and tenth of September.

The fact of the matter is that M. Rouvier cannot foretell, with any degree of certainty, what fate would await a new treaty of commerce in the French Parliament unless he be previously informed, in a general way at least, of the Italian government's demands, concessions and intentions, which government, having been the first to denounce the treaty, is, in M. Rouvier's opinion, bound also to be the first to set forth the fundamental demands

upon which the new commercial and maritime treaty is to rest. He is, however, already in a position to affirm that the French Parliament would refuse any treaty that should be stipulated to last beyond the year 1892, when the treaties which France has with other countries will terminate. Nor has he, unfortunately, any reason to hope that it would be possible to obtain the stipulation of a more liberal treaty than the one Italy has recently rejected. He has received no precise information on the subject from the Italian government, and has seen only two articles, which, he is told, were inserted at the suggestion of our two Negotiators, Ellena and Luzzatti. One of these articles deals with the duty on cattle, while the other is simply the expression of the desire to reduce the new to a limited number of heads. M. Rouvier is of opinion that it would be neither easy nor indeed possible to satisfy this demand; on the other hand, he would be disposed, while maintaining the present duty, to modify the article concerning cattle. But he has already encountered opposition on this point from the Minister of Agriculture, and foresees still stronger opposition in the Chamber.

M. Rouvier, deeming it impossible to conclude a new treaty of commerce and to get it approved by the two Chambers (the French Parliament will be prorogued on Dec. 15, for the senatorial elections) in time to put it into execution by January 1, 1888, and conscious that the application of the general tariffs between the two countries should be avoided, both for economic and political reasons, feels that it would be most expedient to prolong the present treaty for one year, or even for six months, pushing forward negotiations in the meantime.

M. Rouvier is fully alive to the necessity of avoiding a third rejection by the French Parliament, but he suggests that, when he has once been informed, even semi-officially, of the Italian government's demands, he will be able to form a more reliable judgment, and to demonstrate by means of the calculations in plain figures with which you are already acquainted how, if the demands themselves do not clash with certain deep-seated prejudices in the French Parliament, a favourable vote may be obtained. As you see, Rouvier's dispositions and intentions are excellent, but in order to reach a definite understanding it will be necessary to drop vague declarations and acquaint him—semi-officially and as a preliminary—with the general, but distinctly traced, outline of our demands. This can easily be accomplished through the Embassy, but I feel it should not be done until our Negotiators have been consulted.

M. Rouvier fully understands how disastrous the political consequences of the rejection of the maritime convention must have been in our country, and he attributes this rejection to the opposition of the maritime *courtiers*, and to the confidence of the Premier then in office, that the convention would be approved, for which reason he failed to give it the necessary support.

I have protested repeatedly and warmly against the hostile movement of which our workmen in France are being made the victims. M. Rouvier, who has always sought to minimise the gravity of these events, has nevertheless expressed regret at what is now taking place. . . .

He was unaware that the French government had excluded Italians from work on public constructions

as well as from participation in other branches of work under public administration, but he promises to seek information on this point, and to give me an explanation. He shows himself willing, indeed, to do everything in his power to stem this current of hostility against Italian workmen, which I told him was causing much just resentment in our country. I urged him to grant us some mark of favour, such as, for example, a circular to all the Prefects which should publicly manifest the disposition of the government. But he replied that in those regions where ill-feeling prevails, the open interference of government might tend to increase the agitation, and that a better result may be obtained by imparting private instructions to the Prefects. (However, he has not assumed any formal obligations as yet.)

For the last few days several of the leading papers have been treating the question in a just and liberal spirit. Nevertheless, I have not neglected to urge M. Rouvier to instruct those government organs which have the widest circulation and are most popular in the provinces, to seek to calm these passions and prejudices which, no matter what he himself may say, threaten to become widespread. M. Rouvier is bound to admit that the treaty which is still in force, and that between France and Spain, give us the right to protest against any offensive movement that may threaten the freedom of labour of our workmen in France, and he declares his determination to enforce respect of these rights. In the course of future conferences we shall resume the discussion of this highly important topic. Politically the frank utterances of a *friendly voice* found an echo in M. Rouvier's breast, but he replied by

calling my attention to the fact, which we must both deplore, that events have not always developed as we could have wished. It being my intention to render a fuller verbal account of the interview I have already had and those I may still have with M. Rouvier, I will limit this report to a summary of the main points in to-day's conversation.

He recognises the justice of the views Your Excellency had exposed to me, and which I placed before him, but he declares that the understanding between France and Russia concerning the Egyptian Question gave rise to the supposition that the relations between the two countries were more intimate than is really the case, for no written contract exists between them, whereas something in writing *does* exist between Germany and Italy. He is aware that our understanding with Germany concerns only a war of *defence* on the part of Germany, a war, he adds, which will never take place, for *France will not open hostilities against Germany*. (These words must, of course, be taken simply for what they are worth.) The party, so-called, of *revanche*, and of war against Germany, represents, so Rouvier says, but a very small minority in France; and as for Italy, no Frenchmen, or at least very few, either wish for war with her or would seek to bring it about. He does not believe General Boulanger will ever become a power in France; the enthusiasm concerning him was but a blaze, which is fast dying down; it had been a hard task indeed, and one that demanded great firmness, to keep him out of office under the present Ministry; President Grévy would never consent to his return to office, and, as he possesses no sterling qualities nor personal and permanent

means of establishing his influence, it is not probable he ever will return.

Rouvier honestly declares that Italy and France should enter upon a new era of more cordial *entente*, and is ready to bring his every endeavour and the broadest views to bear upon this point.

The long and friendly interviews that I am having daily with M. Rouvier are giving me a very full understanding of the situation. I saw him to-day, after he had received *Cavaliere* Ressman's communications concerning the negotiations for the treaties of commerce. Personally he is quite willing to allow preliminary, semi-official and secret negotiations to be carried on before official negotiations are opened, but he desires to consult his colleagues on this point. He thinks, however, that it would be impossible to arrange for these semi-official negotiations to be carried on at some intermediate point between the two countries, one reason being the difficulty he would experience in finding a suitable person to undertake the mission; and he believes there will be a greater chance of success if he conducts negotiations himself. As to the place best adapted to the official business, he must refuse our proposal on account of the objections raised by his Minister of Foreign Affairs. He promises to discuss the matter with his colleagues, and to do his best to bring it to a conclusion that shall be mutually satisfactory.

It might, indeed, be a good plan to introduce these first secret negotiations through the Embassy, if the Italian government will but consent to their taking place here. But as for my taking any part in the business, I immediately informed Rouvier

that this would be impossible, both on account of my intentions, with which he is acquainted, and out of regard for our Negotiators, who are highly esteemed colleagues and friends of my own. Indeed, in order that my protracted stay in Paris may not give rise to misunderstandings, and lead to the belief that we have, in a way, opened those preliminary negotiations which our government desires should take place elsewhere, I have concluded it will be well for me to leave this city in the course of four or five days.

M. Rouvier has asked me if it were the intention of the Italian government to join the navigation treaty to the treaty of commerce, from which, personally, he would desire to separate it.

As regards our workmen, M. Rouvier has repeated to me that it is his firm intention to defend those rights with which the international agreements now in force have endowed them, but that he does not find any evidence that the governmental administrations have excluded Italians from work on public constructions. As to communal and departmental administrations, he has no power to control the resolutions they may have passed for the purpose of obliging contractors to employ French labour only.

I was emphatic concerning certain stipulations which, it is declared, have been inserted in the regulations for contracts compiled by the governmental administration for use in several undertakings, whereupon M. Rouvier promised me to re-examine the matter, and give me a final answer. Should it be possible to obtain either satisfactory assurances or other guarantees, the Italian government would be able to protest officially, and provoke such declarations as shall have been previously estab-

lished. But on this point M. Rouvier has, as yet, given me no positive assurance, nor can I communicate any such to you. M. Rouvier, however, has repeatedly assured me that he believes the present hostile movement against foreign labour to be the result of mistaken conceptions, and entirely contrary to the great basic principles of the French revolution.

To change the subject, I wish to inform you that M. Rouvier takes a perfectly reasonable view of the difficulties in the way of Italy's participation in the Exposition of 1889, since certain Italian radicals have become its promoters; and you must also know that he entertains a vague hope of an alliance between the Latin nations to take the place of other international combinations which to-day are unavoidable.

It being absolutely necessary to be with *some one*, he admits the expediency for France of maintaining a good understanding with Russia, but he does not feel that the principle of nationality is really at stake in the Bulgarian Question, and as regards the Egyptian Question, he believes that here the interests of Italy and France are identical; that is to say, the English occupation must be followed by the rule of an independent vice-regent who shall govern with the aid of Consuls appointed by the Great Powers, the country thus acquiring the character of neutrality, as it were. (These are Rouvier's personal views, but you know as well as I do that the views which really control the French policy point to the exclusion of England and the establishment of French supremacy in Egypt. However, as I am simply reporting, I will refrain from comment for the present.)

You will receive M. Rouvier's answers to the three communications through the Embassy.

Meanwhile I am in a position to tell you what they will be.

Having first consulted his colleagues, M. Rouvier answers that :

There is no objection to the opening of secret and semi-official negotiations, but they must be carried on in Paris. He has no one whom he could send elsewhere for this purpose ; should he send some prominent person especially chosen for this mission, the negotiations would cease to be secret ; in the interest of the cause, he desires to conduct proceedings himself.

As regards the place to be chosen for the final negotiations, he has been unable to obtain the consent of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and consequently cannot promise that they shall take place in Rome. This can be settled later on. Should the preliminary negotiations miscarry, this point would cease to exist. If, on the other hand, all important points are settled during these preliminaries and only certain details left to be concluded later on, then there would be no difficulty about appointing the French Ambassador at Rome to conduct official negotiations together with, for example, the Director-General of Customs and the Director-General of Foreign Commerce, who would go to Rome especially for this purpose, and bring the matter to a satisfactory conclusion. If, on the contrary, important points are left to be settled by the official conference, then the original objections once more obtain—and these are that Rouvier does not know whom to send to Italy, and negotiations must therefore be carried on in Paris.

Meanwhile he is of opinion that the preliminary semi-official negotiations will reveal the necessity for postponement.

I pointed out to him that these answers will hardly satisfy Italy. If we admit the expediency of his conducting the semi-official negotiations himself, it should certainly be arranged at the same time and at once, that the official negotiations shall take place in Rome, and I laughingly added that, were I the person commissioned to handle this matter with him, I would not consent to the semi-official negotiations being carried out as he proposes save on condition that Rome be chosen at once for the seat of the final arrangements.

He, however, insisted in declaring that, under the present circumstances, he cannot possibly bind himself, and that the question of place will depend entirely upon that of *matter*, by which he means, upon what is left for the official negotiations to accomplish. Moreover, he assures me that the objections he raises against Rome as the seat of either set of negotiations are not due either to political or state reasons, but simply because, owing to the real difficulty of the matter and the state of public feeling in France, he does not know whom to send to Rome. A protectionist would spoil everything, an advocate of free-trade would compromise the result with the opposite party—it is therefore much to be preferred that he himself should handle the matter, especially as he alone can foretell the course events are likely to take.

M. Rouvier told me all this yesterday. He is leaving Paris to-day for a short trip in the country, and I shall take leave of him to-day and start the day after to-morrow, by way of Switzerland, for

Cumiana, whence I shall immediately repair to Rome.

The impressions I am taking away with me tally entirely with Rouvier's declarations :

I.—The great majority of Frenchmen do not wish for war, nor are they suffering from the fever of *revanche*, and there is no reason to presume that France intends to attack Germany. On the contrary, she will resist all incitement to do so as long as this is possible.

II.—With regard to Italy, there are but few who would desire war with her. Here it is generally believed that we, with Germany, are about to attack France, and many hints are thrown out to us of the danger that would threaten us should France be *destroyed*.

III.—The Kingdom of Italy and its government are here held in high esteem.

IV.—Even the *Catholic question* is considered of little moment here, and only a very small party would be ready to interfere on behalf of the temporal power.

V.—Rouvier, who is convinced that Italian politics, under your firm guidance and influenced by your views, will assume a more active part in the settling of international questions, was delighted to learn the nature of your sentiments from my friendly assurances, and trusts to these sentiments to bring about *better relations* between the two countries.

VI.—Among other things Rouvier assured me that, as far as Italy is concerned, all *plans for military action* prepared in France are on the basis of a war of defence.

VII.—The labour question he declares to be merely one of *rivalry as to wage*, and not one of *national antipathy against Italy*.

But of all this more when we meet. I wish only to add that, on the whole, my conversations with Rouvier have *not* been *superfluous*, and that they will be followed by *further correspondence*, for which he himself has expressed a desire.

It having been arranged, thanks to Crispi's unyielding attitude, that the preliminaries and semi-official negotiations should take place in Paris, and the official negotiations at Rome, the Italian delegates, Luzzatti, Ellena, and Branca, reached the French capital on September 28. From the very beginning, however, the French government claimed that negotiations should be based not on our general tariff, as it was obvious they should be, but on the treaty that had been denounced. On October 6, before setting out for Rome, the Italian delegates telegraphed to Crispi that the French technical delegates were unprepared on the most important points, and that the government was less favourably disposed than at first. On November 2 Ambassador Menabrea wrote: 'I had a talk with M. Rouvier yesterday about our treaty of commerce. He is well aware of the difficulties it is bound to encounter in Parliament.'

At the beginning of December Ambassador de Moüy requested Crispi to consent to a prolongation of the treaty, which would otherwise terminate at the end of the month. Crispi replied that he could not comply with this request unless there were good reasons to believe an agreement would eventually be reached, and also unless the French delegates came to Rome. Towards the end of the month the negotiators, Teisserenc de Bort and Marie, arrived, and the treaty was prolonged for two months. But the hostile sentiments of the French Chamber were revealed by the law that was passed on December 15 concerning the Customs Commissions, in virtue of which the government was authorised to apply the general tariff to Italian merchandise, with an increase capable of running as high as one hundred per cent.

After a first meeting the conferences which should have taken place between the Italian and French delegates were interrupted, and on January 5 Crispi telegraphed the news

of this interruption, which he looked upon as an evil omen, to the ambassador at Paris, and added :—

I regret this delay the more because we were, and indeed still are, animated by the best intentions for promoting a speedy conclusion of the negotiations, which would have been conducted in a conciliatory spirit. I will not allow myself even to suppose that France was seeking simply to obtain a prolongation of the old treaty, and nothing more.

A few days later the conferences were resumed, only to be interrupted again at the desire of the French delegates, who left Rome promising a speedy return. On January 24 Ambassador Menabrea telegraphed :—

A letter I have received from M. Flourens on another subject contains the following passage: ‘I have carefully examined the state of mind of both of our Chambers. Unless Italy can be brought to make further concessions, I am convinced the negotiations for a treaty of commerce will be checkmated.’

Crispi’s efforts to induce the French government to conduct negotiations in a spirit of conciliation were vain. On February 6 Senator Teisserenc de Bort, the French commissary, said to Ellena on taking leave of him: ‘As long as you remain in the Triple Alliance no commercial agreement between Italy and France will be possible.’ And Minister Flourens declared that the utmost he would be able to obtain from the protectionist spirit that prevailed in both Chambers in France would be a renewal of the treaty of 1881. Crispi could not possibly accept this arrangement without violating the wishes of our parliament, which had decreed the denunciation of that same treaty. Moreover, Flourens might be mistaken, and we should only be exposing ourselves to a fresh rejection on the part of the French Chamber. That eminent political economist, Léon Say, admitted, in a private letter to an Italian friend written on January 21, 1888, that the French Chamber might consent to a prolongation, but certainly not to anything more.

The French Chamber had decided to denounce the old treaty with Italy before your denunciation was sent in. The opinion of the Chamber was formally declared during the discussion, but the vote was postponed at the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The next day your denunciation became known.

The French Chamber is therefore justified in considering that its members were the first to decide that they would no longer tolerate the treaty, which they looked upon as disadvantageous.

It would have been little better than butting against a wall to ask the Chamber to accept anything more than a prolongation.

What now happened—the application of the general and differential tariffs, which led to economic warfare—was charged against Crispi. It was declared that his journey into Germany had aroused the spirit of hostility in France which determined the rupture of commercial relations. The fully authenticated account of the matter which we have given above will suffice to prove how groundless such accusations were. The negotiations and demands for concessions were, indeed, subsequent to the journey; nevertheless, could she have obtained the advantages she demanded, France would have accepted the treaty.

Politics certainly facilitated the victory of the protectionists, but those French deputies who declared themselves opposed to a commercial agreement with Germany's ally were opposed to Italy not because of the journey to Friedrichsruh, which neither altered nor could alter the situation, but rather because of the existence of the alliance itself—and for this Crispi was not responsible.

On the other hand, to Crispi belongs the merit of having rendered the alliance more cordial and more useful to Italy, so that, when France closed her frontiers against us, the consciousness that we did not stand alone gave us the strength and confidence necessary to bear the crisis, which, after all, was not entirely a calamity, since it tempered Italian commerce to the struggle and led it towards fresh markets.

From Francesco Crispi's diary.

6 Oct. 1887.—The Balkan Question: in consequence of a note from the Secretary of State at Berlin, Kálnoky, who was in favour of granting autonomy to the Balkan States, consents to settle the basis of an understanding with Italy.

Bulgaria: Russia insists upon Ehrenroth's mission, which she desires shall last six months, and she demands that Turkey make this proposal. This is, however, contrary to all coercive measures.

16 Oct.—The French are roused and are seeking to create disturbance in Morocco.

News from London: France and England are trying to arrange an international convention for protecting the liberty of the Suez Canal.

22 Oct.—The Spanish Minister has been to talk to me about his government's views, and its intentions concerning Morocco. It is simply a repetition of what our Minister, Maffei, telegraphed. The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs has communicated to Paris a Note, concerning a conference, issued last August by the Sultan.

23 Oct.—The Austrian Ambassador has been to tell me of an interview the Spanish Minister at Vienna has had with Count Kálnoky concerning the affairs in Morocco. Kálnoky, it appears, advised an agreement between France and Spain.

28 Oct.—The French *chargé d'affaires*, Gérard, congratulates me on the Turin address and thanks me for my friendly allusions to France. We discuss the past.

31 Oct.—A visit from Count Solms, the German Ambassador. Military conversation; the Emperor accepts my proposal; Moltke is at work.

The eight clauses of the agreement concerning

Eastern matters (as already scheduled) are communicated to Salisbury and myself by Kálnoky.—Salisbury accepts them in a general way, but must submit the matter to the Council of Ministers on Thursday. I have communicated them to the Embassy in London, in order that we may co-operate with Salisbury when we find out what Bismarck's attitude is going to be. Solms is of opinion that I have more influence with Salisbury than Bismarck has.

Morocco : We accept the Conference on condition that all questions be discussed and finally settled. I am in favour of the three clauses proposed by France.

Convention for Suez Canal: not yet signed; exchange of views among the three Powers.

1 Nov.—A visit from the Austrian Ambassador, von Bruck-Pellegrini; the Catholic demonstrations.—News concerning Constantinople and Bulgaria.—Neapolitan 'majorat' estates for the Countess of Trani, sister to the Empress.—Convention for Suez.

2 Nov.—Visit from the French *chargé d'affaires*.—Treaty of commerce.—Stipulation concerning Massaua; the Greek condemned; Greek protection; General Saletta's orders concerning release of the Greek, and their significance. My conditions: no stipulations, but a state of war. The French champion the stipulation plan; I do not. The treaty concerning Suez Canal signed on Oct. 24; communication to Turkey.

3 Nov.—A visit from the Spanish Minister, Count Rascon.

Morocco: proposal to divide with France; suspicion on the part of England, who favours neutralisation. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Flourens, accepts the conference on condition that its programme be previously arranged between France and Spain. Spanish pilgrims.—The Golden Fleece for Prince Amedeo.—Canovas del Castillo : his speech against the government at the Conservative Club ; best not to notice it.

A call from the Greek Minister. I complain of the French protection business, and threaten to deal severely with foreigners.

6 *Nov.*—Another call from the Spanish Minister. On the fourth, a despatch from the Spanish Minister at St. Petersburg reached Madrid. The Russian Cabinet very politely advises the Madrid government to come to an understanding with France concerning the Morocco Question. This declaration is extremely important. It will be well to await the result of the negotiations with France. This clearly implies a Franco-Russian understanding in the Morocco Question, which may entirely do away with the proposed conference.

10 *Nov.*—A visit from Count Solms. He tells me of Prince Bismarck's illness, of the Czar's journey and of the Emperor's irritation. Bearing of Russians towards Germans. Much ill-feeling occasioned.

The Spanish Minister. He brings me news of the Italian journalists' visit. Desire for a demonstration.—Grand Cross of Isabella for the Hon. Bonghi ; in exchange, that of the Crown of Italy for M. Gaspar Mugnoz de Arce. Conventions for the Suez Canal ; Spain awaits our decision.

A call from the English Ambassador. Painful news of the Crown Prince.—Suez Conventions ; changes ; simultaneous presentations of France and England. By order of the Queen, the Duke of Norfolk will come to Rome to thank the Pope for

having sent Ruffo-Scilla to her jubilee, and to congratulate His Holiness on the occasion of his own jubilee. Other Catholic peers and deputies will arrive towards the tenth of January.

11 Nov.—Count Solms comes to inform me of Radovitz' mission to the Sultan for the purpose of converting him from the very bad opinion he holds of me. They had made him believe that I desired the constitution of an Albano-Macedonian State. Radovitz has succeeded in his undertaking.

French against Italians in Tunis. Cardinal Lavigerie, with the support of his government, has become aggressive, and has won over the Maltese.

Egypt: Courts of Reform.

He informs me that the French Council of War has thrown out the proposal to establish Alpine regiments.

Morocco: France threatens the Sultan, who is said to have refused indemnity for death of Captain Smith.—He tells me how necessary it is that Morocco should be neutralised: this subject should be the main object of the Madrid Conference.

13 Nov.—I call upon the Austrian Ambassador and the Baroness, who are out. Von Bruck reads me a note from the Austrian Ambassador at Paris telling of an interview with the French President, Grévy. He spoke of Bulgarian affairs and of the parliamentary investigation in France. Grévy is said to have expressed his opinion that the Coburg election is legal and that the Ehrenroth mission would have had no better success than the Kaulbar mission. He believes the best way will be to let Bulgarian affairs alone. In speaking of the investigation, he declared that it was most distressing to him. However, he will not resign, and this for

reasons of patriotism. His presence in the government is necessary if peace and quiet are to be maintained. Should he desert his post France would immediately become involved in serious disorder.

14 Nov.—Count Solms comes to see me.

Turkish finances: my proposal. He believes it would set the Sultan against us. I reply that I have made no formal proposal. In fact the idea of a reform of Turkish finances had come from Constantinople, in consequence of a conference between the ambassadors of the three allied governments.

Solms asks me if I have had any news of the negotiations between France and the Vatican. France is said to have promised the Pope any support he may demand.

... The French *chargé d'affaires*, M. Gérard, comes to see me towards 4 P.M. at the Palazzo Braschi.

He tells me that he has been charged by his government to communicate to me the project for a Convention concerning the Suez Canal which has been arranged for with England, and also to acquaint me with the contents of a letter from M. Flourens and another from Salisbury. In speaking of the treaty of commerce he expressed the confidence which both he and his government entertain that I shall be able to bring about a satisfactory result.

Expulsion of the Greek, Nicopuolo; he declares he regrets it. I reply that Nicopuolo should have been satisfied with getting out of prison. Generally, foreigners are not expelled until after they have served their time, and this is also what is done in France.

17 Nov.—I informed the French *chargé d'affaires* that England had communicated the convention for the Suez Canal to me. I am waiting for some further documents before giving a final answer, but,

on the whole, I am in favour of it and will use my influence with the friendly governments that they may also accept it.

. . . Count Solms reads me a letter from von Holstein written in Prince Bismarck's name, in which the Prince thanks me for the information I have sent him and for the attitude I have maintained in all the questions that have been handled between the two governments. I beg Solms to return my thanks to the Prince and to assure him that he will always find me well disposed, and desirous of maintaining a perfect understanding with him.

A note from Berlin, dated Nov. 11, brings news of the Morocco Question. Bismarck is opposed to a European Convention for the sole purpose of protecting the natives. The neutralisation of Morocco appears necessary. Féraud, the French Minister, has returned to Tangier to act in the interests of the French.

Moret refuses to comply with French demands. A project for the division of Morocco has been presented, but the Queen Regent is opposed to this and expressed her astonishment at such a proposal.

18 Nov.—The French *chargé d'affaires* came to inform me that yesterday he telegraphed to his government my answer in favour of the Suez Canal Convention, and my promise to use my influence with the friendly governments. M. Flourens thanks me for having been the first, and for my promise. My warning against intrigue on the part of the monarchists. My advice to keep careful watch in order to avoid surprises. It is to Italy's interest that the Republic be maintained, that government being one of the guarantees of peace. Let Grévy remain at his post.

... Count Rascon came to tell me that the French Ambassador had communicated the Suez Convention to him.—He asks whether Italy will accept, and whether she advises Spain to do so also. I reply that, on the whole, Italy is in favour of the Convention. However, not having as yet received all the documents, she has not sent in her final answer. I request him to wait until Tuesday.

19 *Nov.*—The English Ambassador brings me the letter of Nov. 4, in which Salisbury instructs him to communicate the Suez Convention to me and place the documents concerning it before me.

20 *Nov.*—Count Solms acquaints me with the following telegram from Prince Bismarck :

‘His Majesty the Emperor Alexander, while at the Court of Berlin, emphatically declared to His Majesty the Emperor and also to myself, in the course of a long audience which he granted me, that his sentiments are entirely peaceful, and that it is his firm determination never to join any aggressive coalition and never to attack Germany. We shall see whether His Majesty’s peaceful sentiments will have a sedative effect upon the attitude of the Russian press, upon that of his officials and ambassadors, and, most especially, upon that of the ambassador at Paris.

‘We have never believed that, personally, the Emperor intended to attack us, either now or for some time to come.

‘In consequence of official communications on our part, Emperor Alexander is well aware that, in case Russia should attack Austria, our treaties would oblige us to come to Austria’s aid, and he was again reminded of this fact yesterday in the course of our conversation.

‘On the other hand the Emperor knows that the future of Bulgaria would never induce us to cast off our neutrality, and that our diplomatic attitude in regard to the Bulgarian Question will continue to be controlled, as it has been in the past, by the stipulations of the treaty of Berlin.

‘The two monarchs have not entered into any engagement. The future will show whether we are to be relieved of the anxiety caused by ever increasing unrest both in Russia and France, for which state of things the Russian government has rendered itself responsible by its passive attitude towards the instigations of its officials and of its press. The future will also show whether this unrest is to be allowed, sooner or later, to become a menace to peace, or whether Emperor Alexander will indeed remedy all this on his return to Russia.’

21 Nov.—Visit from Baron von Bruck.

He tells me of the Czar’s peaceful declarations to Bismarck. What he says coincides exactly with what Solms told me yesterday. He alludes to the Bourbons’ right to a restitution of their private possessions, and asks for a general declaration, such as that made to Spain by Lamarmora, when Spain recognised the Kingdom of Italy. I reply that it will be necessary to examine this particular case, and see if the Bourbons really still possess property in this Kingdom. I promise to give my attention to the matter as soon as I am in possession of the facts of the case.

... A call from the French Ambassador, Count de Moüy, who is just returned from his vacation.

We discuss the crisis in France. He is not sure as to how it will end. He tells me that in Paris he saw the Hon. Villa, President of the Committee

for the Exposition of 1889, and that he did what he could to serve him. The Italians thus obtained a certain position, which they had coveted.

De Moüy thanks me for my adhesion to the Convention for the Suez Canal. I reply that I accept the Convention as a whole, but that I shall not be able to give an official answer until I have received and studied all the documents relating to this grave question. In Articles v. and viii. of the Convention I find what Italy demanded.

My trip to Friedrichsrüh also comes under discussion. Of course it could not fail to produce an unpleasant impression in France, but fortunately that is passing away. Upon my observing that at Friedrichsrüh nothing was established against France and that our conference had been entirely for the maintenance of peace, he replied that so long a journey to accomplish so little would seem superfluous. I reminded him of Gambetta's proposals in 1887, and of the necessity that the two countries should come to an agreement. He is of opinion that a *modus vivendi* is possible between France and Germany, but that as long as the question of Alsace-Lorraine exists, it will never be possible to establish an agreement. France desires peace—he added—and needs peace. Although she possesses a formidable army she will not allow herself to be tempted to go to war. He therefore deems it strange that the other Powers should form alliances to maintain a peace which France will never think of troubling.

M. de Moüy alludes to the treaty of commerce. I observe that the French government sent two Notes only, and that the one in answer to our requests contained demands with which it was impossible to comply. I add that this was a proof

that there was no desire to conclude a treaty with us. He defended his own position by attacking ours. In his opinion the treaty is of greater utility to us than to France. France would gain by an application of the common tariff *régime*. I reminded him that after the events of 1878 we had been under that *régime* for six or seven months. He replied by reminding me that we give France less than we take from her, and that if export be weighed against import, there will be a money balance in our favour. He ended by declaring for a prolongation of the present treaty.

22 Nov.—Count Solms tells me of the intrigue that is being carried on around the Sultan. Russia is harder at work than any one else, and is intimidating the prince. The danger which threatened the Grand-Vizier Kiamil Pasha of being replaced by one who favoured Russia.

Morocco: the Emperor of that country has invited the notabilities to consider what concessions may be made to the foreign Powers. This is believed to be a preliminary to the Conference.

25 Nov.—A visit from Count Rascon.

The Suez Canal Convention.

Elevation of the Legation to the rank of Embassy. Spain, being represented at the Vatican by an Ambassador, wishes to be represented at the Quirinal in the same way. Of course Italy will have to follow suit. It appears the Spanish government has made the same proposal both at Berlin and Vienna. I consent in a general way, and assure him I will consult my colleagues and take His Majesty's orders on the subject.

27 Nov.—Count Solms comes to announce that England has consented to allow the Morocco Con-

ference to be based on the question of protection. The representatives of the Powers at Tangier should have a meeting and decide the other questions. France consents to allow the Conference to deal with all questions touching Morocco. Moret would like to despatch the letters of invitation at once.

From Berlin we hear that, since the interview at Friedrichsruh, certain precautions have been taken in the province of Tripoli. The Sultan also takes exception to the reorganisation of Italian schools in Tripoli. They are intriguing against us at Tunis also.

. . . Solms asks if I have any news of the documents which are declared to be false, and which are mentioned by the *Kölnische Zeitung*. He mentions the importance of that paper on account of its relation to Bismarck. I reply that I have no other information than that furnished by the press. His Majesty has also inquired about these documents. They remained in the possession of the Czar, and were seen by no one. Prince Reuss, who was said to be the author of one of the letters, appealed to Prince Ferdinand for an explanation. His cousin replied that he had never received any letter from him and was unaware of the existence of the one in question.

The Ambassador mentioned the lofty position to which Baron Blanc has been raised at Constantinople, according to information received from the German Chancery.

Concerning the documents alluded to by Count Solms, Crispi received the following information in December :—

VIENNA, 18 Dec. 1887.

The false documents mentioned by the *Kölnische Zeitung*, which were sent to Copenhagen to H.M. the

Emperor of Russia shortly before he left Denmark, were four in number.

I.—A letter from Prince Ferdinand of Coburg to Her Royal Highness the Countess of Flanders, dated August 27, 1887.

II.—A note purporting to have been sent by Prince Reuss, German Ambassador at Vienna, to Prince Ferdinand of Coburg, which is enclosed in the preceding letter.

III.—A second letter from Prince Ferdinand to the Countess of Flanders, dated Sept. 16, 1887.

IV.—A synoptic note purporting to have been sent from Brussels to Prince Ferdinand, and bearing the date, Oct. 28, 1887.

These documents were forwarded from Paris to Copenhagen (by means, it is believed, of a certain M. Hansen) and were brought to Emperor Alexander's notice. At the same time copies of the forgeries were sent to St. Petersburg, to M. de Giers. In writing to the Emperor concerning them, Giers expressed his opinion that they were not authentic. But the Czar was not convinced that they were forgeries until after his interview with Prince Bismarck in Berlin, and until Prince Reuss had made out a written denial of all knowledge of the letters—which denial was submitted to His Majesty—and the Countess of Flanders had declared she had never received the letters attributed to Prince Ferdinand. The four documents were compiled for the sole purpose of proving to the Czar that, whereas Prince Bismarck had publicly and officially declared that he would take no part in settling the Bulgarian Question, and was, indeed, favourable to the Russian policy in that country, he had, all the while, been secretly supporting Prince

Ferdinand's candidature, and was now seeking to strengthen his position on the throne of Bulgaria.

The author of the forgeries is still unknown. It is suspected, however, that he is of Russian extraction and resides, or once resided, in France. The false nature of the documents is clearly revealed both by their contents and form. They are declared to be translations (into French) from the German, but it is evident they were composed in French. They betray the fact that their author was in the habit not only of perusing diplomatic documents, but also of composing them. But, at the same time, they contain inaccurate appreciations both of men and things, and even errors in stating facts. Thus, for example, in the first letter, Prince Ferdinand is made to allude to his meeting with the Countess of Flanders at Ischl, where that princess has never been.

The last document on the list contains a statement to the effect that, at the meeting which took place between Your Excellency and Prince Bismarck, the Bulgarian Question was discussed, it being decided between you that Prince Ferdinand was to be maintained on the throne at Sofia.

It would appear that Prince Bismarck desires this matter to be dropped. Nevertheless, it is believed the search for the author will be continued.

Diary:—

28 *Nov.*—Count de Moüy gives me a Note, dated Nov. 25, which contains the proposals on the part of France concerning the silk manufactories, in anticipation of the conclusion of a new treaty. He desires that an understanding be reached, in order to avoid the raising of the 'Chinese wall' of tariff

between the two countries. I am also hoping we may reach an understanding; we must find some way of arranging a compromise.

News from France: de Moüy thinks it probable that Freycinet will be elected President of the Republic. He would be glad, because it was through him that he obtained his appointment as ambassador. I reply that I am also of opinion that his election would greatly benefit France, whose quietness I praise. If the radicals commit no excesses and act patriotically, the safety of France is ensured. De Moüy regrets these delays, and hopes for a satisfactory ending.

29 Nov.—The two governments of Berlin and Vienna have decided to acquaint me with the secret treaty that was concluded between Germany and Austria in 1870. They feel that nothing should be concealed from Italy. By means of a letter from Bismarck of Nov. 20, and one from Kálnoky of the 24, the two ambassadors have been instructed to call upon me and present me with a copy of the treaty. Bruck was the first to come, and then Solms. The two ambassadors pointed out the importance of this act as a manifestation of the confidence which the two Cabinets have in me. In thanking them I assured them this confidence is not misplaced.

1 Dec.—Arming going on in Tripoli. I have given Solms two of my Notes protesting against French intrigue in that region.

The Russian Ambassador, Baron Uxkull, assures me the Czar was greatly pleased with his journey to Berlin; but he has not altered his opinion concerning the Bulgarian Question, although it has now been set aside. He asks whether Count

Greppi, former ambassador to St. Petersburg, will return to his post. I answer that he will not, but that his successor is a person whom the Czar likes.

. . . The Spanish Minister again consults me concerning the proposed Morocco Conference. The local agents will arrange an agreement. An answer to a Spanish Note is being looked for from France. Russia has no direct interest in the matter, but is ready to take part in the Conference if the other Powers do so also.

. . . A call from Count de Moüy. He speaks of several matters, among others of a certain 'Société d'histoire diplomatique' to which several diplomats belong. He asks me to join. They had asked the Queen to allow her name to be placed upon the list of members, but an unfriendly article against Italy forced them to relinquish this hope.

He also remarks upon the circular I have just issued, to the effect that henceforth we shall correspond in Italian with those Powers who use their own language in writing to us. He believes this measure is directed against France, but I persuade him that such is not the case.

12 Dec.—A call from Ambassador Solms.

Atkinoff, Chief of the Cossacks, would not visit the Russian Embassy in Paris. Russian armament : dangers.

The King: Bismarck believes that the King is not greatly interested in the army. I convince Solms that this is not so. The King now takes a lively interest in all that concerns the army and in our international relations.

Bavier, the Swiss Minister, calls. We discuss the treaty of commerce. I inform him that I cannot

possibly accept a prolongation simply of the treaty that is about to terminate. If he will point out the articles to be discussed, I am ready to negotiate. I have asked Parliament to authorise me to conclude and establish the Italo-Swiss treaty. Bavier replies that he will request the Federal Council to point out these articles. He informs me that public opinion in Switzerland is greatly excited over our tariffs. All the more reason, I declare, why we should conclude the treaty. If you wish it to be a temporary arrangement, let us keep to a few articles; if it is to be permanent, let us discuss and settle all the articles which the Federal Council may point out. We decide that Bavier shall telegraph to Bern requesting that the technical delegates be sent.

. . . Count Rascon comes to ask whether he may announce that the Convention has been concluded for the cession to Spain of a tract of land in Assab, to be used as a coaling-station, as Minister Moret must mention this in Parliament. I reply that he may say he believes the Convention has been signed.

. . . I discuss Russian armament with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. The news not alarming. Austria has from 150,000 to 200,000 men in Galicia, and the railways are in a condition to transport immediately more troops to the threatened regions. He leaves me a memorandum concerning the Bourbons' property.—I also discuss Russian armament with the Roumanian Minister. Peaceful news, but it will not do to trust such report too far.

16 *Dec.*—Photiades-Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador, reads me a Note from Said, which deals with

the rectification of the Tripoli frontier. The Turkish Minister assures me that nothing has been altered, and that the information contained in the *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* is inexact.

He also informs me of the dinner which the Sultan has given for the Italian Ambassador, Baron Blanc and his wife, and of the honours bestowed upon them.

18 *Dec.*—Count Rascon comes to inform me that his Minister, Moret, has written to the Spanish representative at Tangier to send in a report which can be used as a basis for the Morocco Conference. Rascon requests that the same orders be imparted to the Italian Consul. The report should deal with the protection question and with everything connected with it.

. . . In a few days the documents necessary for prolonging the treaty of commerce will arrive.

. . . De Moïy comes to consult me about the treaty again, and to ask for a prolongation of the present one. I refuse. To prorogue it now, after the vote of the French Parliament (which authorises the application of the general tariff, increased by the addition of the differential tariff, to the extent of one hundred per cent.), would be unworthy of Italy.

You—I said—place us in a position in which a government that respects itself has no choice. You threaten us with war if we do not accept the prolongation pure and simple of the treaty as it now stands. The law only authorises me to stipulate a temporary treaty.

De Moïy asks for a prolongation that will, at least, enable us to come to an understanding. The spirit of protection which prevails made it difficult

for the French government to pass the law as it now stands, and it would be next to impossible to pass another. I reply that this is not my fault. I said several months ago that I would grant a prolongation pending negotiations, but this is out of the question if there is no hope of concluding a new treaty. Let the French government send one or more delegates to handle the matter. Prove to me that you really wish to negotiate for the purpose of establishing a treaty, and I will grant the prolongation. De Moüy observes that time presses, and that it will be hardly possible to arrange anything before the end of the month. I reply that there is still plenty of time to show a willing spirit. I am even ready to prolong the treaty by means of a Royal decree, but your delegates must be here and provide me, by their presence, with a means of justifying my action before Parliament. De Moüy promises to write to Paris at once and request that the delegates be despatched. I ask him to consider what I have said to him as confidential. If the press begins to discuss this I shall consider myself released from my promises, and refuse the prolongation. We are agreed on this point.

When about to leave he asked me whether he had better mention our conversation to the King. I replied that he had better not.

21 *Dec.*—Count Solms has given me a Note to read, sent by Count Bismarck on the fifteenth of this month. The Count had protested at Vienna against the clerical demonstrations. Kálnoky promised that he would take measures for preventing public functionaries from participating in these demonstrations in the future. The letter states that the governor, Baron Weber, happened quite by

accident to be present at the Linz meeting. He is said to be a liberal.

Another Note deals with the Tripoli affair. Radovitz mentioned it to the Grand-Vizier, who denied the existence of any convention with France for the rectification of the frontiers of Tunis. It is stated that the Grand-Vizier has furthermore ordered the governor of Tripoli to have nothing more to do with the French.

. . . Solms asked me what were the terms of the cession of a tract of land in Assab, to Spain. I replied that we had adopted the terms of the Fernando Po contract.

. . . He read me a Note in which it is declared that great importance is attached to the Italian Navy, in France.

. . . At Constantinople, Russia has once more begun to clamour for the payment of the war indemnity. The Porte having replied that it was unable to pay owing to the deplorable condition of its finances, Russia retorted that the Sultan had spent many millions for new guns, and that he would have done better to pay his debts.

24 Dec.—De Moüy comes to inform me that the French negotiators will arrive here almost immediately, and that the authorisation for the prolongation of the present treaty has been despatched.

He mentions an event which has occurred in Florence, and which affects the French Consul. The magistrate is said to have gone to the Consulate, to have forced the door, violated the archives and placed seals upon several documents they contained. I assured him that I was unaware of this occurrence, and that I would have it examined.

27 Dec.—Photiades : Vernone, the Tripoli frontier.

The French, who had previously proposed that the boundary be finally settled, have taken advantage of the Porte's silence, to act. The Grand-Vizier, Said, gave Vernone a declaration to the effect that he had never received any proposal. The Sublime Porte was never consulted.

. . . The Minister of Holland has been to inform me that his Sovereign is sending a Chamberlain to the Pope's jubilee, and that he has been instructed to tell me that the Dutch government attaches no political significance to this mission, it being merely an act of courtesy.

As regards the Florentine incident above alluded to, Crispi immediately ordered two investigations to be set afoot, one juridical, the other administrative, and before coming to any conclusion he twice consulted the Council of Diplomatic Contention.

The first opinion delivered by the Council on the conduct of the magistrate who, at the residence of the French consul, had used violence to enforce a sentence which had been pronounced by the court, was that it had been judicially correct but over severe, because in enforcing the law as he did he failed to use that consideration which the law itself would admit under the circumstances, and which was all the more indispensable as he was dealing with the representative of a friendly nation.

This opinion was founded on the hypothesis that the rules of the consular convention between France and Italy might be applied to the estate of the Tunisian subject in question; but Crispi doubted whether this convention were indeed applicable in this case, the estate having been left by a non-French subject, and he therefore asked the Council for a second opinion on the judicial position of Tunisians in Italy, on the validity of the Italo-Tunisian treaty of 1868, and, in this particular case, on the French consul's share in the matter.

The Council's answers left no room for doubt: despite the French occupation of Tunis the judicial position of Tunisians in Italy remained unchanged, and the treaty of 1868 still held.

The action of the French consul in Florence was therefore pronounced both unjustified and illegal.

Supported by these irrefutable opinions, Crispi declined to satisfy the French government's demand for satisfaction as long as that government refused to recognise its consul's mistake, and throughout he firmly defended Italy's remaining rights in Tunis.

In France the diplomatic discussion to which this incident gave rise was, of course, judged in the usual spirit of hostility against Crispi.

CHAPTER VIII

FROM CRISPI'S DIARY: DIPLOMATIC INTER- COURSE FROM JANUARY UNTIL THE END OF JUNE 1888

Germany and Russia in a conversation with Prince Bismarck—The publication of the Austro-German treaty of 1879—Italy and Russia in a conversation between Crispi and the Ambassador Uxkull—Flourens wishes to avoid the Franco-Russian alliance—Information concerning the internal situation in France—Military preparations in France—The Crown Prince of Germany in Liguria—Death of William I.—The Italian and Austrian fleets at Barcelona—Cordial relations existing between Crispi and Bismarck—A sharp verbal encounter between Bismarck and Ambassador Herbette—Death of Frederick III.—King Humbert expresses his desire to go to Berlin.

3 Jan. 1888.—Count Rascon presents me with a copy of his credentials as Spanish Ambassador to the King of Italy.

9 Jan.—Count Solms reads me a Note containing the information that the usual intriguers are at work convincing the Sultan that Austria and Italy are united in seeking to take Macedonia and Tripoli from him. In connection with a letter from the German Consul at Tripoli, he also mentions the danger that threatens on the Tunisian frontier.

. . . The Sultan has sent the 'Grand Chain' to the King of Greece, thus hoping to purchase the friendship of the Balkan princes.

. . . At St. Petersburg the new Italian Ambassador, Marocchetti, is much liked.

. . . Good news from Bulgaria. The Sultan

said to be on good terms with the Bulgarian government.

18 *Jan.*—Solms has received a Note dealing with the Portal Mission.¹ Nothing new; the news herein contained has already been communicated to us through recent reports. The Negus does not wish the Italians to remain in their present possessions . . . neither at Massaua nor at Sahati. The French missionaries are acting as spies for the Abyssinians.

. . . The Italian Ambassador, Baron Blanc, is working to protect the Catholic interests at Constantinople. I believe he has sent in a report on this subject to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. France still refuses to yield, and Austria also aspires to supremacy. The only way would be for the Pope to send an Apostolic Nunzio to Constantinople.

. . . The Morocco Question is once more to the fore. Much antagonism against the French at Tangier.

. . . Baron Calice, the Austrian Ambassador, had a long talk with Said about the Lobanoff band, in Bulgaria. It has been discovered that the Russian Consul at Burgas had forty thousand Turkish francs, of which sum only a very small part was spent in helping the Bulgarian churches, the rest being used in support of the insurrection which was attempted but failed.

19 *Jan.*—Count Solms: Churchill in Russia; England does not want war with Russia.

. . . In consequence of an official communication

¹ Allusion is here made to a mission sent out in November 1887 by the English government, which was entrusted to Mr. Gerald Portal, secretary to Sir Evelyn Baring, the British diplomatic agent at Cairo.

from the Spanish government, France has abandoned all thought of a treaty, and has returned to her first demand that the Madrid Conference shall confine itself to the question of protections. France furthermore desires a previous understanding with Spain on the Schaar-al-Abel question, with which we are unacquainted. It would thus appear that France proposes to prevent a discussion concerning neutrality. And as this matter interests Germany far less than it does England and Italy, Count Solms wishes to know my opinion in regard to the exclusion of the question of neutrality from the programme of the Conference.

27 *Jan.*—The Roumanian Minister of Public Instruction, M. Stourdza, being in Berlin, expressed a desire for an interview with the Grand Chancellor, who invited him to Friedrichsruh on the 22 of this month. The Prince made the following political declarations to him: ‘I desire that peace be maintained. I owe this to the Emperor, who is too far advanced in years for any great undertaking; I owe it to the Crown Prince, who has been attacked by a mysterious malady, and is more seriously ill than is generally believed; I owe it to my country, which would gain nothing from a victorious campaign against Russia.

‘In fact, Germany, whose boundaries are firmly established, has nothing to take from her neighbour on the East. What territory could she think of annexing? She has enough of Poland already. By seeking fresh conquests, the German Empire would only be exposing itself to perpetual warfare with Russia and France, who is simply waiting for an opportunity for avenging Alsace and Lorraine. Under these circumstances warlike proposals, no

matter whence they might come, would not fit in with my programme.' The Prince furthermore declared that war will not be brought about by the allied Powers. Neither Germany nor Austria will attack Russia. The attack would have to come from the Russians themselves. In discussing the probability of Russia's resorting to aggression, he said that as long as the present Emperor and M. de Giers are able to dominate the situation, the mines will never be fired. Nevertheless, it is true that there exists in Russia an undercurrent of malcontent, a spirit of pan-Slavism, which might one day burst forth, and force the hand of the Czar himself. In anticipation of such a possibility the allies must continue to maintain their armaments, and be ever ready. As far as Germany is concerned, she is already in a condition to defend herself. 'I am ready, and fear nothing. Nevertheless I cannot endorse the opinion of those who believe we should rush to arms to-day, for fear war may be declared against us to-morrow.'

. . . It is plain why, in speaking with a Roumanian statesman, the Prince should have dwelt especially upon the attitude towards Russia. His words imply that, although war may not seem to be near at hand, nevertheless the maintenance of peace demands eternal vigilance.

31 *Jan.*—The Ambassadors of Germany and of Austria-Hungary come to inform me that their governments recognise the advisability of publishing the text of the secret treaty between Austria and Germany that was signed on Oct. 7, 1879, as a warning to Russia not to disturb the peace. They ask my opinion. I reply that the German and Austro-Hungarian governments are the best judges

in a matter which interests them especially, and I express my thanks for their consideration in consulting me.

On February 3 the treaty was published simultaneously in Vienna (*Wiener Abendpost*) and in Berlin (*Reichsanzeiger*), and was accompanied by the following Note:—

The governments of the German and Austro-Hungarian monarchies have recognised the expediency of publishing the treaty of alliance which was concluded between them on Oct. 7, 1879, for the purpose of silencing doubts of the absolutely defensive nature of this agreement, which have been raised in various quarters, and which have been made use of in many ways. The two allies have been moved to adopt this policy by their desire for the maintenance of peace, and their determination to do everything in their power to prevent a disturbance of peace. They are convinced that a knowledge of the text of their treaty of alliance will banish all present doubt on the subject, and it is solely for this reason that they have decided to publish it.

In the opinion of Count Nigra this publication 'proved that the situation was quite other than reassuring, and that Prince Bismarck, who had taken the initiative in the matter, had as yet been unable to obtain from Russia the satisfactory guarantees of peace which he desired.' The impression the publication produced was enormous; not so much upon the governments, who were already aware of the existence of the treaty—the Czar, indeed, had been acquainted with its text for the last six months—but upon the press, and consequently on public opinion throughout Europe. The *Times* called it a 'slap in the face' which the two Powers had been obliged to inflict upon Russia in order to avoid exposing themselves to the accusation of having concealed what might have prevented war. In Russia the war party was not pleased with the challenge, and one of the leading papers, the *Novoie Wremia*, being

unable to declare openly that it did not desire peace, declared instead that the allies themselves did not desire it. Another important organ went still further, proclaiming the Austro-German alliance to be the cornerstone of German hegemony, and the publication of the treaty but an excuse for shifting the responsibility of the war they were determined to wage from the shoulders of the allied Powers. It concluded by stating that this publication justified the tacit alliance between Russia and France.

3 *Feb.*.—Solms : the news received by Solms concerning the unrest among the different parties in Roumania corresponds with what I myself have received.

. . . A letter was found on Nabukoff's body which had been sent to him by Ignatieff, the brother of the Minister. It contained compromising passages regarding the Russian Minister at Bucharest (Hitrovo). It is this Hitrovo who encourages the conspiracies against Bulgaria, in Roumania. The local party of opposition is with Russia, and it has a pretendant to the throne already, in the person of Prince Bibesco, to whom Hitrovo renders royal honours whenever he comes to the Russian Legation. Bibesco has had his children educated in Paris.

. . . The negotiations for the Suez Canal are still going on. The Sultan would like to take this means of regaining morally, at least, his supremacy in Egypt.

. . . Ismail Pasha has gone to Constantinople and is trying to get back into Egypt. He sent the Sultan ten English horses, which the latter declined to accept. The Sultan is undecided, but he does not wish to go against France, whose susceptibilities he respects.

. . . Minister Moret is in an uncomfortable position as regards the Morocco Conference. He

is anxious to have it take place, for parliamentary reasons.

5 *Feb.*—A visit from Bavier, the Swiss Minister. The treaty of commerce. I refuse all prolongation of the old one. We are ready to open negotiations for a new treaty, and we will do our best to make them successful. Bavier says he would deeply regret a tariff war, especially on account of its effect upon public feeling in both countries. I reply that we are on friendly terms with our neighbour, Switzerland, and that we desire to continue so. We will make all concessions that are possible, but we must have a treaty. If not, by the first of March we shall have the general tariff.

... Solms: Flourens is annoyed at the publication of the treaty.

... The French and Spanish Agents at Tangier had arranged the programme for the Morocco Conference. Flourens declares he will not be responsible for his Agent.

... Uxkull: what is the impression produced by the publication of the Austro-German treaty? I declare it can have had no other purpose than that of dispelling doubt concerning its purpose. The Note that accompanies the publication explains that the two allied Powers have no aggressive intentions, and this cannot but be gratifying to Russia. 'We did not need that,' he replies. 'We have known all about the treaty for the last six years. And how about your own? You have joined that alliance.'— 'We have nothing to do with the treaty. Russia and Italy are so far apart that there can be no conflicting interests between us.'— 'Well, well! Then why did you join the alliance?'— 'Our treaty has nothing to do with the one that has just been

published. And, after all, ours is also a defensive treaty.'—'But we shall not attack, and should we go to war, our troops would be sent in a different direction. But if we are attacked we shall defend ourselves.'—'Who, do you suppose, is going to attack you? Russia need not fear a war of aggression. Her climate defends her as well as her soldiers. Napoleon I. bitterly repented of having sought to invade your country. If Russia really does not want war, why does she not join with the rest of Europe and settle the Oriental Question?'—'Are you also one of the believers in the fable of Peter the Great's will and testament? All we want is the freedom of the Straits.'—'Then why do you not propose an arrangement?'—'To whom would you propose giving Constantinople in that case?'—'That would have to be settled.'—'We uphold Turkey, and you are doing the same.'—'We cannot do otherwise. Nevertheless, you have frequently assailed her and you have declared that she can no longer sustain her position, and should be done away with.'—'Well then, let us allow her to go on.'

7 Feb.—By order of Prince Bismarck, Solms comes to apologise on behalf of the Prince for an *étourderie* of which he was guilty in the speech he delivered yesterday, in the course of which he mentioned the alliance with Italy, without having previously asked my permission to do so. The Prince wishes to express his regret at this. I reply that I am ready to send His Highness the Papal absolution! At any rate, silence would have been of no use. All are aware of the existence of the Italo-German treaty. I acquaint Solms with the conversation I had on the fifth with the Russian Ambassador.

... The Minister of the Navy informs me that a couple of French officers, disguised as artists, have been haunting Spezia recently, and that there are many so-called French artists in Italy this year. The Jubilee has facilitated this invasion of officers.

10 *Feb.*—Ressman, our *chargé d'affaires* at Paris, sends me word that M. Flourens has grasped the necessity of giving M. Mouÿ a successor, and has promised to do so. He feels, however, that he cannot recall him at once, as he is much embarrassed concerning the choice of a new ambassador. Ambassador Menabrea had also urged M. Flourens at least to grant that diplomatist a speedy leave, if he did not see his way clear to recall him at once, and not to wait for a second Florentine episode.

The French Minister desires an agreement on the position of Tunisian subjects residing in Italy, as regards the French Agents, and also on the interpretation of the Italo-Tunisian treaty of 1868. Flourens gladly accepted the proposal for an exchange of Notes or declarations to establish the inviolability of consular archives.

In answer to our protests against the attitude of a part of the French press, M. Flourens and M. Tirard, the two Ministers, replied that they had nothing to do with it; Tirard declared his readiness to publish any declaration we might choose to send him, for the purpose of repudiating the attacks against the Italian government and its head.

It appears that the venomous attacks against myself which have appeared in the *Figaro* have been inspired by the Vatican, whose mouthpiece is Monsignore Galimberti.

11 *Feb.*—Solms: arrival of the English Channel

Fleet in the Mediterranean has excited suspicion on the part of France.

. . . Several papers state that the Emperor of Germany has written to the Negus. This report is false.

. . . There is no longer any chance of Zeila being restored to the Sultan. Salisbury's colleagues were opposed to its being given to Italy for fear of complications with France. Said Pasha is in favour of Zeila being left to the English, as he fears the French may establish themselves there.

Russian loans : at The Hague, 300 million with the *Comptoir d'escompte*, Bank of Paris, Bank of the Netherlands.

12 Feb.—A visit from the Turkish Ambassador : he mentions strife at Beyrout between Christians and Mohammedans.

He presents a protest against the cession of Assab. I reply that I must refuse to consider it, as our acquisition is perfectly legal.

. . . Rascon, Spanish Minister :

He announces that the Spanish delegates for the treaty of commerce have arrived. I will receive them to-morrow at Palazzo Braschi.

Rumours of war. Evil impression at Madrid. France supposed to be threatening war. The Spanish said to be sending a body of troops to encamp near Perpignan, and another to Bayonne.

14 Feb.—I learn that M. Flourens has said to Lord Lytton, the British Ambassador at Paris, that the alliance between Germany, Austria and Italy places France in a very painful position. This treaty must, he says, force France to fling herself into the arms of Russia. To avoid this, Flourens has proposed a secret treaty between France, Eng-

land and the other Powers who have an interest in maintaining the *status quo* in the Mediterranean.

20 Feb.—Count Solms has been to inform me of the communication made by the Russian Ambassador at Berlin to the Grand Chancellor, concerning the Bulgarian Question. In a letter of the 13 of this month, Count Schouvalow requested Prince Bismarck to join with Russia for the purpose of persuading Turkey to declare the illegality of Prince Ferdinand's remaining in Bulgaria. Two documents were enclosed with this letter, one without date or signature, in which the intentions of the Grand Chancellor were already set forth, and another of the 31 Sept. 1887, signed Giers, in which the purposes of the St. Petersburg Cabinet were explained. Bismarck believes that a declaration of this sort would flatter the Czar's vanity, and that we should seek to obtain it. I answer precisely as I answered Uxkull, for I have my fears as to the consequences of such a declaration; they will certainly be unpleasant.

. . . Solms tells me of the impression Elliot's publication made upon the Sultan. The Sultan is displeased with Kiamil Pasha, the Grand-Vizier, whom he suspects of being partial to England. He is also in constant fear of an attempt on his life. Only with difficulty was his equanimity restored.

. . . French exasperation over the Damascus episode has subsided. In consideration of its slight importance France has decided not to act.

. . . France protests against Turkey's participation in the Morocco Conference. Turkey took no part in the treaty of 1880, and has no interest in Morocco. M. Moret, on the other hand, would appear favourable to this intervention.

23 *Feb.*—M. Flourens has complained of Italy and of myself to the English Ambassador at Paris. He accuses me of having assumed a hostile and provocative attitude. This accusation is too vague to carry any weight. The tendency of the French government is to pose as a victim. If they will take the trouble to examine my actions one by one, they will see that in every case I have carried concession to the furthest limit.

At the beginning of February Crispi received the following information concerning the political situation in France:—

The government appears to become weaker every day in dealing with the exigencies that are thickening around it. A daring and irresponsible minority is continually forcing its hand, the champions of order, still numerous, especially in the provinces, being powerless to check this movement. Clever and unscrupulous speculators, many of them foreigners who would disappear at the first sign of danger, subsidise a press that is without personal convictions, but which, under their guidance, directs the currents of public opinion in a way which will soon place the government at the mercy of the Stock Exchange.

At the close of the year 1887, the government, although already weakened, still resisted. The old President Grévy stood for peace and moderation, and the Ministry was competent enough, and contained no compromising elements such as Boulanger and Admiral Aube. But precisely for these reasons it was not in favour with the masses, who were continually complaining that the President favoured opportunism. The radicals therefore decided to fight it, and found an easy pretext in the indecorous

conduct of the President's son-in-law, the deputy Wilson, a political schemer whose character has long been known in parliamentary circles. The scandal set public opinion on fire, and President Grévy was forced to resign.

Amidst the confusion that reigned during the presidential crisis, the radicals changed their position. Dismayed at the prospect of Ferry as a substitute for Grévy, they sought to reverse the current of public opinion, and to obtain Grévy's re-election, while they threatened to erect the barricades in Paris if Ferry were appointed. A strong current was influencing the Versailles Assembly to give its vote to Jules Ferry, who was considered the most energetic and capable of all the candidates; but, as a matter of fact, France and indeed Paris herself exhibited the greatest indifference concerning the solution of this strange and unexpected crisis. The radicals alone were active, especially the Parisian radicals, who found a certain number of allies in the Right Party at the Assembly, who, hating the Republic, had every reason to wish to see it become weak and even communistic, in order the sooner to rid themselves of it.

While Congress was in session at Versailles every arrangement was being made by the radical majority in the Communal Council to proclaim a temporary government in case M. Ferry should succeed in collecting the greatest number of votes. The Communal Councillors had declared themselves in permanent session, and had summoned several delegates of the Central Revolutionary Committee to the *Hôtel de Ville* in order to be able to make use of them at once, in case of need. They had also sought to obtain, from the Prefect of the Seine, the

keys of the doors that close the subterranean corridors which connect the *Hôtel de Ville* with other public edifices, especially those leading to the *Lobau* and *Napoléon* barracks. The Prefect having refused to give up the keys, the Communal Councillors barred the passage with an iron chain in order to prevent the building being entered by means of these corridors.

The threats of the radicals bore fruit: the majority, always timid, were now terrified, and believing a great danger to be near at hand, threw over Ferry and elected M. Sadi-Carnot, who was without a party and without friends.

It is a matter of general knowledge to-day that, had Ferry been elected, a few thousand roughs would indeed have poured down from Montmartre and Belleville. But the Military Governor of Paris had strengthened his garrison both in Paris and at Versailles, and having taken every precaution, was ready to face any emergency, and it would have been a most excellent thing to have rid Paris, at one blow, of a crowd of *souteneurs*, thieves and murderers who are a disgrace to the capital, and to have freed the government from the tyranny of the extreme left, which paralyses it.

The presidential crisis then became a ministerial crisis, which ended with the formation of a powerless Cabinet. In order to form an idea of the difficulties that had to be overcome in composing the Cabinet, it will suffice to consider the manner in which General Logerot became Minister. That portfolio, which had been offered to many and steadily refused, was vacant when the President of the Council, Tirard, presented himself at the *Elysée* to announce that the Cabinet was composed.

Tirard, having related the unsuccessful steps that had been taken to obtain a Minister of War, recommended that the composition of the ministry should be announced without waiting to fill that vacancy. But this proposal did not suit M. Carnot. In seeking a means of extricating themselves from this difficulty, the President happened to remember that near Dijon, where he owns an estate, he had heard some one say (he could not recall whom, perhaps some forest-guard or gardener), that the general commanding the garrison was a good man. He did not know what his name was, but an officer who was quickly consulted informed him that the army corps stationed at Dijon was the eighth, and its commandant a certain General Logerot. M. Tirard was promptly instructed to telegraph to him at once and offer him the portfolio of war. Logerot answered: 'I shall be in Paris to-morrow at 9 A.M.' These words were taken as an acceptance, and on the morrow the *Journal Officiel* brought the announcement of the new ministry, with Logerot, Minister of War. When that gentleman arrived at 9 A.M. prepared to decline with thanks, the thing was done, and he allowed himself to be persuaded to keep quiet, in order not to place the government in an embarrassing position, or worse still, to expose it to ridicule.

From the very beginning this Cabinet possessed so little vitality that hardly had it taken its seat (and even before the budget for 1888 had been discussed) when the Chamber refused to grant it more than 'three provisional twelfths,' and those who go about foretelling ministerial crises proclaimed its speedy death at each fresh parliamentary episode.

However, although it was weak enough at home,

it exhibited some energy in dealing with foreign affairs, and stood its ground against Russian blandishments. Russia has long been cultivating French soil, and the fruits of this culture are already apparent. Grand-Dukes and Grand-Duchesses come and go, seeking to ingratiate themselves with the best society. French men of letters, more or less sincere, and probably well paid, translate Russian novels which are full of coarse and barbarous simplicity, and bear strange titles that render them unique. Journalism calls Russia 'la nation sœur,' and the French people are thus getting used to look upon her as an ally. Nor have military demonstrations been wanting, such as certain acts on the part of General Boulanger, an address by General Saussier and many speeches delivered by the Russian military attaché. But, up to the present, the government does not appear to have been affected by these currents, perhaps because it is aware it can float out upon them whenever it wishes to do so, and the efforts of the Russian Ambassador, Baron de Mohrenheim, who neglects no opportunity to flatter the Republic, have, so far, been in vain.

In one of the recent ministerial crises Floquet appeared to be the only person capable of forming a cabinet, but he was set aside in order not to displease the Czar, who still remembers the cry of '*Vive la Pologne, monsieur !*' which Floquet flung at the Czar Alexander in 1867. A year ago Floquet was still carefully avoided by all Russians. One day Baron de Mohrenheim, calling upon the Marchesa Menabrea, seated himself beside Madame Floquet, and conversing with her without knowing who she was, found her extremely amiable and *spirituelle*. When she withdrew the Baron inquired her name, and on

being informed, started to his feet as if he had been shot out of a gun, uttering a 'bigre' that greatly astonished the company, from whom he did not seek to hide his irritation. This happened only a few months ago, and some two or three days since, at a reception given by the Minister of Commerce, M. de Mohrenheim requested the Minister of Foreign Affairs to present him to the President of the Chamber, M. Floquet.

There is, indeed, a vague foreshadowing of a Floquet Cabinet on the horizon, in case of a crisis, and this act on the part of the Russian Ambassador would appear to be intended to convey the knowledge that Russia is willing to absolve Floquet for love of the Republic.

On January 21 Reuter's Agency announced that great activity had been noted in the Arsenal at Toulon. A fleet of ironclads and cruisers was being prepared, experiments in mobilisation were taking place, and the hands at the Arsenal were putting in extra time. The *Petit Journal*, the paper having the widest circulation in France, declared that this unusual activity was due to the irritation that had been caused by the Florentine incident.

A car-load of dynamite and a quantity of ammunition reached Modane during the months of February and March; the fortresses of Esseillon, Braman, Sassey, and Replaton had been reinforced to the extent of one thousand infantry, artillery, and engineers.

On February 3, Ambassador Menabrea telegraphed: 'It is my duty to inform you that much anxiety is felt at the German Embassy on account of the mobilisation that is going on, and the concentration of the greater part of the French fleet in the Mediterranean. The Maritime Prefect of Toulon has received instructions to prepare the evolution

and reserve squadrons, fourteen cruisers all told, which are to be ready in the course of a few days. Besides these, eight other ironclads must be ready to go into service within a week or two. Only five or six cruisers would thus be left in the Channel, besides a few vessels used for guarding the coast, and not intended to go to sea. It would be well to find out what England and Germany think of this concentration.

A few days later the arrival of the Channel Fleet in the Mediterranean was announced.

In the field of finance France had begun hostilities while the negotiations for renewing the treaty of commerce were still pending. A violent newspaper campaign artificially depressed Italian securities, beginning with the Preferred Bonds, which the exchange organs had contemptuously dubbed 'macaroni,' and the many who had been in the habit of investing their small savings in Italian securities were advised to withdraw them.

Through the kind offices of Prince Bismarck, German finance did what it could to lessen the evils caused by this war, and prevent depression of Italian Bonds, both by buying largely at the Paris Bourse and by promptly honouring our commercial bills of exchange, thus showing that confidence in us which France denied us.

At the session of the Chamber of Deputies held on March 5 Sonnino expressed in cordial language his desire that the House should despatch a telegram expressive of its good wishes to the German Crown Prince, who had come to seek health in the genial climate of our Liguria. The manner in which the Chamber welcomed this proposal, which was warmly supported by Crispi, produced the most favourable impression. Prince Bismarck thanked the Italian Assembly for its 'noble manifestation,' which proved that the friendship existing between the two countries did not rest upon the identity of their interests alone, but was also established upon the solid and more durable basis of their common desire for the maintenance of peace.

But Frederick William's stay in Liguria was destined to be of short duration. On March 7 the German ambassador communicated the following telegram from Prince Bismarck to Crispi :—

I beg Your Excellency to inform M. Crispi privately that the state of His Majesty the Emperor's health has recently become alarming. His Majesty has been unable to receive any communications, and is therefore unfortunately unaware of the cordial demonstration that took place at the Italian Chamber. I had intended to take His Majesty's orders concerning an answer to His Majesty King Humbert, but the Emperor's state makes this impossible. Since this morning we have been in great anxiety.

BISMARCK.

Two days later Emperor William I. passed away, and the Grand Chancellor answered Crispi's telegram of condolence in the following terms :—

Your Excellency's telegram, which I have just received, shows me that you appreciate the grief into which I have been plunged by the loss of the Sovereign whom I had the happiness to serve until the very hour of his death. I thank Your Excellency for this proof of sympathy. It brought me much consolation at this moment of bitter trial, and has moved me profoundly. It is from my knowledge that our mourning is shared by all honest men that I shall draw the strength necessary to continue in the performance of the duty that is incumbent upon me.

VON BISMARCK.

Frederick III. was obliged to leave at once to assume the duties of his new office and render the last honours to his father. King Humbert desired to offer his personal condolence to his august friend on Italian soil, and he arranged to arrive at the station of Sanpierdarena at the same time as

the German train from the Riviera. The meeting between the two sovereigns on that cold and rainy morning of the tenth of March could not have been more sad. The Emperor, shut up in his carriage, received the King and Crispi with every sign of deep emotion. He could not speak. He could only listen and write his answers upon the leaves of his notebook. He handed Crispi a leaf on which he had traced the words: 'I was very much touched by the words uttered in the two Chambers.'

It is a fact which has never been published, that during Frederick William's stay on the Riviera the anarchists had decided to make an attempt on his life. A report on this subject gave the following information:—

In the meetings already alluded to, it had been decided that an attempt should be made to assassinate the Crown Prince by means of bombs filled with dynamite on the occasion of the visit of His Majesty the King of Italy, who was to suffer with the Prince. The King did not go to San Remo, and the execution of the crime was therefore postponed.

Another meeting has recently been held in Nice, when it was decided that the assassination of the Crown Prince alone should take place some time during that same week. The individual charged with carrying out the crime is supposed to be a certain G. A., a scullion employed at Mentone.

The anarchists are well aware that the success of their plot can have no political consequence which will further their cause; they simply wish to demonstrate the power of their party by a startling deed.

Diary:—

27 March.—Count Solms informs me that Moret has withdrawn the invitation which he had despatched to the Porte to take part in the Morocco Conference. He asks my opinion, and I assure him

I am opposed to this step, and have also expressed myself in that sense to Count Rascon. I have telegraphed to London to know Lord Salisbury's opinion. Solms tells me that Austria has answered that she will accept the opinions of the Mediterranean Powers.

27 March.—In consequence of a private letter from the Italian Ambassador at Madrid, Count Tornielli, in which it is stated that Minister Moret hopes Italy may see fit to manifest her good feeling for Spain on the occasion of the inauguration in May of the Barcelona Exhibition by the Queen Regent, I telegraph to Count Nigra at Vienna:

‘I find that the Spanish government would be highly gratified if our fleet, under the command of the Duke of Genoa, could be at Barcelona towards the middle of next May at the time of the Queen Regent's arrival there. This manifestation, which would serve to strengthen the monarchical principle in Spain at a time when France is seeking to weaken it, and also emphasise the good feeling that exists between the nations, might acquire a still greater political significance if the Austro-Hungarian fleet joined ours. I see no reason why that government should be opposed to such an arrangement. Kindly mention this to Kálnoky, and let me know by telegraph if the idea meets with his approval.’

29 March.—Nigra's answer:

‘Kálnoky tells me he is quite of Your Excellency's opinion concerning the advisability of sending the fleets to Barcelona during the Queen Regent's stay there, but that he must inform the Emperor and take his orders. He promises to communicate His Majesty's decision to Your Excellency.’

(?) *April*.—The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador communicates the following telegram from Kálnoky to me :

‘Kindly inform His Excellency the President of the Council that we shall be glad to participate in his plan for uniting our fleets in saluting Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain at Barcelona, and that we look upon this meeting and union of our fleets as most important, insomuch as the flags of the allied Powers will be seen united. His Majesty the Emperor and King gladly accepted the proposition, and has already despatched the necessary orders to the Navy Department.’

6 *March*.—I had proposed to Count Kálnoky that the Italian and Austro-Hungarian fleets should arrange to arrive at Barcelona at the same time as the English fleet, and Ambassador Nigra has just communicated to me that the Imperial fleet left yesterday for Barcelona, where it will arrive on the eleventh. The two fleets can leave Barcelona together.

30 *March*.—The Spanish Ambassador: I advise him against opposing Turkey’s participation in the Morocco Convention. Spain, having sent the invitation, cannot well withdraw it.

1 *April*.—I telegraph to Prince Bismarck: ‘I beg Your Highness to accept my best wishes on your birthday. When I compare the Germany of today, which is largely of your creation, with the Germany of 1815, the year that gave you birth, I cannot but admire the magnitude of your genius and the power of your will. I am proud of the friendly relations that exist between us, and I rejoice in the thought that my country goes hand in hand in the history of our epoch with that country

whose destinies Your Highness so firmly and securely controls.'

. . . Count de Launay telegraphs me that he has been to call upon the Grand Chancellor. 'He told me,' so de Launay says, 'that he was much touched by your telegram on his birthday, which was charming in every way. The Prince is entirely satisfied with the friendship which exists between the two governments. The future being so uncertain, a perfect understanding is all the more important. No one can foresee what will happen in France, where the extreme parties dominate over the conservative element. "We shall never attack," he said, "because we will not act the part of the aggressor, and your government also wisely avoids everything that resembles provocation, but, should war break out in spite of this attitude of ours, we are in a position to face it successfully." I seized this opportunity to thank the Grand Chancellor for the support he continues to afford us in preventing the depression of our securities. His Highness assured me that it gave him great pleasure to do this for us. These are services which friends must be ever ready to render each other.'

3 *April*.—Solms reads me a Note in answer to a telegram of mine, in which I requested Prince Bismarck to persuade Salisbury to permit our troops at Massaua (who are suffering from the heat in that Red Sea port) to spend the summer in Egypt. But the English government has replied by offering us the Island of Cyprus instead, to which proposal I answered that we might as well bring the troops back to Italy.

4 *April*.—Count Rascon comes to talk to me

about Turkish intervention in the Morocco affair. Morocco refuses to tolerate such intervention.

13 *April*.—Solms informs me of a Note from Radovitz from Constantinople, which states that the French have led the Sultan to believe that we have sent eight thousand men from Massaua to Suez, with the intention of occupying Egypt.

. . . On the evening of the tenth, Radovitz dined at Yildiz-Kiosque. Shortly before dinner the Grand-Vizier communicated to him the news he had received from the French Ambassador, that our troops had been sent to Suez, and he added confidentially that Count de Montebello had offered Turkey all the support France could give in promoting those measures it might be thought expedient to adopt in consequence of this event. This was simply a manœuvre to rush Turkey into a hasty decision. The Grand-Vizier himself doubted the accuracy of the information, but he could not help being alarmed by it. The Sultan appeared to be greatly disturbed, and repeatedly discussed the subject with the German Ambassador during dinner. Radovitz did not fail to point out to him that, as the information came from a source that could not be called impartial, it must not be accepted without confirmation, and that before pronouncing any judgment he must assure himself of its accuracy. Radovitz said that it was his personal conviction that the Italian policy absolutely excluded any attack upon the territory of the Ottoman Empire and the rights of the Sultan. These words appeared to reassure His Majesty somewhat.

15 *April*.—Photiades Pasha informs me that he has received inquiries from Constantinople con-

cerning the report that we are sending eight thousand men, under General Saletta, to Suez. He states that he has contradicted these reports, and explained that it is simply a question of the return of our troops from Massaua. The insinuations are believed to have been thrown out by the French Vice-Consul at Massaua.

3 *June*.—Count Solms informs me of a conversation which has taken place between Count Bismarck and the French Ambassador at Berlin, M. Herbette. In refusing the demand that Germany should participate at least in the fine-arts exhibit in 1889, the Count used very emphatic language. He is reported to have said that the French government would be incapable of guaranteeing the hospitality Germany would have a right to expect, and that, should the French offer any insult, or in any way injure German works of art, the French government would find itself in a very difficult position. And, as Germany is determined to maintain peaceful relations between the two countries, it will be well to avoid any occasion for friction. After the Belfort episodes the Germans can no longer feel safe in France, and they do wrong to go there. They would be safer, and be exposed to fewer dangers, in the heart of Africa.

Herbette was greatly moved by this language, and exclaimed: 'You are indeed the conquerors and we the conquered!' (*C'est que vous êtes les vainqueurs et nous les vaincus!*)

Bismarck replied that there had been other wars between the two countries, and that the Germans had not always been victorious, but what happened after 1870 had never happened before, for never had feeling in France reached such a point of hostility

as to render the maintenance of those relations which must prevail between civilised peoples a matter of difficulty.

Herbette remarked that there are 30,000 Germans doing business in France.

‘There were more than 300,000 before 1870,’ Bismarck retorted. ‘And this great mass of our fellow-countrymen were forced to withdraw. I wish the great wall of China stretched between France and Germany, and that there were no reasons for intercourse and discord.’

Herbette expressed the opinion that, could Germans and Frenchmen be brought closer together and see more of each other, they would grow to know and esteem each other. Count Bismarck, however, does not cherish the same hope.

And here the conversation ended.

... Solms once more mentions the fable that the united fleets of Italy, Austria and England are going to Constantinople to make a demonstration. Radovitz declares that this piece of information was sent to Constantinople by Photiades Pasha. This individual is said to be the mouthpiece of the two legations of France and Russia at the Quirinal. Gérard and Papparigopuolo are supposed to be the moving spirits in this intrigue.

15 *June*—King Humbert receives the following telegram:

‘Bowed down with grief, I announce the death of my beloved father, the Emperor and King Frederick III. He passed away quietly this morning at a quarter past eleven.
WILLIAM.’

I receive this despatch from the King:

‘The death of the German Emperor forces upon

me the painful duty of calling your attention to the arrangements which must be made under these sad circumstances.

‘ You will have noted that in several papers and at different times mention has been made of the probability that I would go to Berlin to give a further pledge of friendship to the august invalid.

‘ Has the step I could not look upon as expedient while the Emperor still lived become desirable and opportune now that he is no more ?

‘ Certainly, I should be acting in harmony with the promptings of my own heart and perhaps also gratifying the delicate sensibilities of the Italian people by rendering this last act of homage to one who for long years was Italy’s best friend and my own.

‘ But as sentiment must not be the only nor even the chief guide in matters of state, it becomes our duty to examine whether considerations of a political nature lead to the same conclusion.

‘ I will not seek to hide the fact that I have no great desire to pay the first visit to the new Emperor, who is younger than I, and who has, as yet, had no opportunity of accomplishing anything which entitles him to marks of especial honour.

‘ On the other hand, I would not refuse to undertake the Berlin journey should it prove a means of strengthening our relations with the new Emperor and rendering them more intimate, and also afford him the opportunity of returning my visit here in Rome, at a time to be previously specified by Your Excellency with Prince Bismarck.

‘ My act would be fully justified in the eyes of Europe by my well-known friendship for Frederick William and my intimacy with his family.

‘I beg you to consider all these points and to telegraph me whether you consider a journey to Berlin necessary to the interests of the country; in which case let me know whether you will be able to make previous arrangements with Prince Bismarck.

‘However you may decide, I shall be grateful if you will telegraph me your proposals as soon as possible.

‘I have telegraphed my condolence to the Emperor of Germany, nevertheless I beg you to express my sense of deep regret to the Ambassador, Count Solms.

‘I press your hand.—Affectionately,

‘HUMBERT.’

. . . My answer to the King: ‘The Council of Ministers desires to express its admiration for Your Majesty’s self-sacrificing affection. The Council, however, was unanimous in its opinion that, politically, it would be undesirable that the King of Italy should go to Berlin, especially as Emperor Frederick’s obsequies (by express desire of the deceased) are to be unofficial in form, and will be carried out without the participation of foreign princes or special delegations.

‘A visit to Berlin will come under consideration later on, when the conditions of the two Courts and of the two countries shall make it expedient.’

. . . I telegraph to Prince Bismarck: ‘The loss your country has sustained has also plunged Italy into mourning. Although long foreseen and dreaded, this tragic end, at once so simple and so grand, is a cruel blow to our Sovereigns, who are losing a faithful friend, and to the Italian people, who saw in Frederick III. the beloved and revered personification of our faithful ally, the glorious German nation.

Through me His Majesty's government desires to express to Your Highness and to the Imperial and Royal government its profound grief, and its fervent good wishes for the prosperity of the new reign. Personally I beg Your Highness to accept the assurance of the large and sincere share I take in the mourning that oppresses you. All that indomitable moral courage of which Your Highness has so often given proof will be necessary to enable you to resign yourself to these painful and almost simultaneous losses.'

16 *June*.—I receive this answer: 'At this time of severe trial through which Germany is passing Your Excellency's words of sympathy, which I have communicated to the other members of the Imperial government, have brought consolation which will help us to bear the heavy griefs that have oppressed our country for the last three months. The sentiments of the noble Italian people, who now share with us the same regrets, the same hopes, will find a grateful echo in every German heart; the condolence Your Excellency addresses to me personally touches me deeply. I beg you not to doubt this, and to believe in the sincerity of my gratitude and affection.'

'VON BISMARCK.'

. . . A visit from Solms: Thanks for the words spoken at the Chamber and in the Senate on the occasion of Emperor Frederick's death. Solms praises the new Emperor.

. . . In consequence of a rupture in the relations between Italy and the Sultan of Zanzibar, Count Bismarck has deferred despatching the decoration which it had been decided to confer upon him. It

will not be despatched until an agreement has been concluded.

17 *June*.—Ambassador Rascon announces the formation of the new Spanish Ministry. Moret has the portfolio of the interior, and Marquis de la Vega that of foreign affairs. The Cabinet is a shade more democratic.

24 *June*.—A call from de Moüy : he mentions the taxation at Massaua, and I reply that we are well within our rights, as, since our conquest, the Capitulations have ceased to prevail. I had a discussion on this point with Gérard last summer, at the time a certain Greek was sentenced there.

CHAPTER IX

ANOTHER FRANCO-ITALIAN INCIDENT

The question with France concerning taxation in Massowah ; three diplomatic Notes by Crispi on Italy's rights and the annoyance caused by France—The Powers decide in favour of Italy—From Crispi's diary ; Spain and the Vatican—King Louis of Portugal alarmed concerning our sovereign's excursion into Romagna—Crispi pays Prince Bismarck a second visit—The Austrian Grand Chancellor meets Crispi at Eger.

THE question of levying a municipal tax upon the inhabitants of Massowah, both Italians and foreigners, to which de Moüy had alluded, and which was raised again presently by the French government, was but another proof of the tendency of France to seek pretexts for quarrelling with Italy.

Crispi was accused of provocation and of acting in obedience to Prince Bismarck, who wanted war, and also of helping the Triple Alliance to assume an alarming attitude. For many years the French press, and also that part of the Italian press which reflects its views, have harped upon these accusations, and even in certain publications of recent date Crispi has been described as arrogant, domineering, and over-hasty in his judgments.¹

How devoid of foundation such accusations were is clearly demonstrated by the history of the Massowah taxation incident.

The episode that gave rise to it and the arguments used by Minister Goblet, Flourens' successor, for the purpose of preventing Italy from establishing her sovereignty over the country where so much Italian blood had already been shed, are set forth in the documents here transcribed.

Crispi's answers to the French objections were contained in three Notes, two of the twenty-fifth and one of the thirty-first of July, which were addressed to our ambassadors, to be com-

¹ Comte Charles de Moüy, *Souvenirs et causeries d'un diplomate*, p. 256. Paris, Librairie Plon, 1909.

municated to the Foreign Secretaries of the great Powers. We give a synopsis of them here.

In order to meet the expenses of works of hygiene, lighting, etc., the general in command at Massowah, on the 30th of last May, ordered a tax ranging from two to seven *lire* a month, to be levied on all householders and tradesmen residing in Massowah, both Italians and foreigners. Another decree, issued on June 3, for the same purpose, placed a licence tax on all bars, grocery stores, etc. Twenty-three tradesmen have refused to pay these taxes, and of this number two are Frenchmen, one a Swiss, and the other twenty Greeks, who, as they have no consul of their own, enjoy the protection of the French vice-consul, the only foreign agent in Massowah—such being the state of things we found there at the moment of our occupation.

The French government upholds them in their refusal, contests our right to levy taxes on French subjects or on others enjoying French protection, and appeals to the Capitulations *existing at Massowah*.

If, for the sake of argument, we accept our opponent's hypothesis that the Capitulations really do prevail at Massowah, does it follow that we may not levy a municipal tax upon foreign subjects and those enjoying foreign protection without the consent of their government?

Let us see how this matter is arranged in the former Ottoman provinces, although judicially their position differs widely from that of Massowah, and also from that of other countries ruled by Capitulations. In Bosnia-Herzegovina all fiscal and municipal privileges in favour of foreigners were swept away at the moment of the Austro-Hungarian occupation. In Cyprus the faculty of

taxing foreigners is regulated by the treaties of commerce with Turkey and not by the Capitulations. Bulgaria, which has but recently established its municipalities, has been obliged to levy communal taxes against which the European Powers have raised no objections.

Egypt has introduced a law subjecting all foreigners to a licence tax, and, up to the present, no government has protested at Cairo. The Sublime Porte has attempted to apply this licence tax within the boundaries of the Empire, and the representatives of the great Powers, while recognising that the Capitulations were thereby violated, offered no opposition to it as a principle, and simply demanded that its application be properly regulated. At Tunis, the city government, a French institution, collects the taxes.

But the premiss that the Capitulations are in force at Massowah is entirely mistaken. In the first place, Turkey has never held indisputable sway at Massowah, and the Ottoman courts have never dispensed justice there. But even had they existed before, they would have disappeared with the Italian occupation. When a Christian nation undertakes the administration of the affairs of a Mussulman country, the Capitulations have no longer any reason to exist. They are alone possible when great differences in religion, habits, laws and customs prevail between two peoples, one of whom has taken up its abode on the territory of the other for purposes of trade. Without exceptionally strong guarantees from the very moment of the introduction of national justice, there would be no security for foreigners, either personally or as regards property. Now such is certainly not the condition of

things at Massowah, where a regular administration, affording all necessary guarantees of order and impartiality, has been exercising its functions for the past three years. Moreover, we have established taxes of a fiscal character at Massowah, such as the harbour, maritime and customs tax, which all alike have paid, and against which no one has rebelled. A further anomaly is also worthy of note. The very Greeks who now, in obedience to pressure and instigation which we must refrain from qualifying, have refused to pay a tax that is of local importance, have all recently appealed to Italian justice, or, rather, have accepted its sentences without demur.

In conclusion, it is perhaps not superfluous to point out that the Greek government, before its conversion to the French view of the case, did not seek to base its claims upon the Capitulations, but upon Article II. of the treaty of commerce of 1877 between Italy and Greece, wherein it is set forth that 'the subjects of either country shall be considered as being on a footing of perfect equality with the natives, as regards the payment of taxes.' The tax in question having been levied alike on the Italians and Greeks residing at Massowah, Greece was forced to admit that we were in the right.

We have followed our opponents on the field of debate they themselves have chosen, and have successfully confuted their arguments; but discussion is no longer necessary for us, as the sovereignty of Italy at Massowah is now an accomplished and incontestable fact.

Italy occupied Massowah on Feb. 5, 1885, under circumstances which it is well to recall.

The alarming progress of the Mahdi's insurrection had obliged Egypt to concentrate her forces and call

in many outlying garrisons. Massowah, situated beyond the line of defence mapped out by the Khedival government, had to be evacuated. Turkey refused an invitation to occupy it, and by this refusal forfeited entirely all those, certainly very doubtful, rights which she had arrogated to herself in regard to that important point on the Red Sea.

Thus abandoned, Massowah was exposed to the double peril of invasion by the Mahdi's insurrection and by anarchy. It was for the general good that one of the Powers should occupy the city and defend it if necessary. Italy was ready; she already possessed a colonial establishment not far distant, which might also be threatened. The friendly States accepted the idea of the extension of Italy's authority on the shores of the Red Sea without jealousy or animosity, even perhaps with satisfaction, and so the occupation of Massowah was decided upon.

Not only did Italy occupy Massowah at a time when, owing to the refusal of the Porte, all rule had ceased there, but she immediately began to exercise the rights inherent in sovereignty. Not ten months had elapsed before the public services were all in our hands, while the last traces of the preceding occupation were rapidly disappearing. . . . The occupation of Massowah was brought to the knowledge of the great Powers by means of two despatches, one of the 9th, the other of the 13th of Feb. 1885. . . .

The protests, however, do not come from Turkey, who, after some slight hesitation, accepted the accomplished fact. We need bring forward no further proof of this than the text of the Suez Canal Convention, emended by the Porte itself, where, under Article x., it is formally recognised

that Turkey holds no possessions on the Red Sea save those on the East shore.

As usual the objections come from France, who has succeeded in attracting Greece within the orbit of her protests; who sees in the peaceful progress of the Italian nation a lessening of her own power and authority, as if the African continent did not afford sufficient scope to all the Powers who occupy its territory for activity and legitimate ambitions to civilise.

31 *July*.—The despatch which I addressed to Your Excellency on the 13th of this month, and the two others of the 25th, which I authorised you to submit to the Foreign Secretary of the country to which you are accredited, who was also to be supplied with copies, have, I feel sure, clearly demonstrated Italy's right to Massowah, and also shown how France, without any plausible motive, tried to raise the question of the Capitulations against us, which may no longer be invoked in that country, now the property of a Christian and civilised Power.

It now becomes my duty to show what the attitude of the French agents at Massowah has been since the first moment of our occupation, because the present difficulties have been brought about by that attitude alone.

In the first place, let it be understood that France is the only Power which maintains a representative at Massowah, although she has no commercial interests in that region, and only two subjects residing there, who trade in a small way, and are but recently arrived.

Under these conditions her reasons for maintaining a representative cannot be other than political.

It is declared that the presence of a Lazarite Mission in Abyssinia necessitates this representation, but unfortunately the attitude of the agents points to a very different and far broader purpose.

When we occupied Massowah we found no French consular agent there, nor was it until eight months later, on Oct. 20, 1885, when the Egyptians had abandoned this locality, leaving us in undisputed possession, that M. Soumagne arrived, proclaiming himself French vice-consul.

After a simple exchange of civilities with our resident authorities, instead of cultivating that cordial intercourse with them which alone could have justified his presence at Massowah, he sought rather to form ties with Abyssinians. In the following spring he journeyed to Adigrat, where a meeting took place with Ras Alula, and a few months later, in August 1886, he was at Adua, visiting King John.

He made no secret of his intimacy with the Negus, describing it to our commander-in-chief himself, to whom he furthermore confessed that he had proposed to the King the conclusion of a formal treaty with France. As was discovered later on from other sources, the most important clause of this treaty would have been France's protection for Abyssinia excluding any other Power.

These secret dealings and schemings between the French Agent, the Negus and Ras Alula, justified the suspicion that he was plotting against us, and when he left Massowah in March 1887, for reasons of health, the authorities experienced a sense of relief, as if an enemy had been removed.

Unfortunately, however, the conduct of his successor differed in no wise from his own. This

was a certain M. Mercinier, who had been clerk at the French Consulate at Alexandria, and whom M. Soumagne presented to our commander-in-chief, shortly before his departure, as the person appointed to take temporary charge of the French vice-consulate.

This was the beginning of an uninterrupted series of protests and difficulties raised by the new French representative, who lost no opportunity of interfering in the most inconsiderate manner in matters with which he had no concern. He kept an open register at his office for inscribing the names of those who desired to be taken under French protection; and he issued 'protection papers' not only to Greeks, but also to Persians, Turks, Swiss, and even to a North American subject, it being patent that these 'protection papers' were generally granted only to such as maintained intercourse with our enemies.

It would be superfluous to mention here all the protests and objections systematically raised by M. Mercinier against nearly every measure adopted by the Italian authorities at Massowah. He even went the length of threatening violence against our authorities and of stirring up resistance and open rebellion, as he has recently done in the matter of the municipal taxes, which were levied alike on all the inhabitants of Massowah, regardless of nationality. It would also be unavailing to dwell upon the abuses of authority of which he was frequently guilty, abuses which reached the point of threatening the infliction of fines, and even the expulsion from the country of those among the 'protected' who should disregard his orders and pay the taxes above mentioned.

The continual and open hostility of the French

agent, and the necessity for maintaining order in a military station and a territory which are still in a state of war, not only for the benefit of the natives for whom we are responsible, but also of the foreigners who frequent this region, have made it impossible for us to tolerate longer the conduct of M. Mercinier in the position he has assumed of director of the French vice-consulate. It being impossible to withdraw the *exequatur* from a functionary who was temporarily performing the offices of a vice-consul who himself had not received it from His Majesty's government, General Baldissera could only notify him (on July 23) that he must decline to have any further dealings with him.

I need hardly point out that M. Mercinier, having thus been reduced to the position of a private citizen, could no longer communicate with his government in cipher, this method of correspondence being strictly forbidden to all private individuals residing at Massowah.

I consider it necessary that Your Excellency should be acquainted with these particulars that, should occasion present, you may be in a position to discuss the question intelligently with the Foreign Secretary of the country to which you are accredited.

As was but natural, Minister Goblet¹ did not yield to the

¹ In the volume already mentioned, on pp. 257-8, Count Moüy draws this portrait of Goblet: 'Serious objections to M. Goblet's accession to the office of Foreign Secretary had been raised in the French press. It was said, and with reason, that this politician, although generally esteemed a fluent orator and a clever logician, was nevertheless but ill adapted—thanks to his unbending and fiery temperament—to the management of diplomatic business which he was handling for the first time. His harsh opinions and unattractive style were commented upon. I myself was not entirely easy on this point, and I regretted the withdrawal of M. Flourens, whose perfect knowledge of our delicate position at Rome, whose urbanity and sagacity, I thoroughly appreciated.'

arguments advanced by the Italian government, and the wrath of the French press was poured out upon Crispi. But Crispi was inflexible. On being attacked he defended himself energetically indeed, but without invective. He carried the contest before the Chancelleries of Europe, demonstrated to them that France was sustaining a false thesis, and that she was not moved either by questions of principle or dignity, but rather by rancour at the spirit of independence by which the Italian policy was animated.

As may be gathered from the following documents, the whole of Europe recognised the justice of Crispi's arguments, who, having obtained that acknowledgment, put an end to the debate by declaring he would answer no further communications from M. Goblet.

PARIS, 25 July, 1888.

To-day Goblet has been complaining to me because Your Excellency has as yet been unable to receive M. Gérard, and also because the military commandant at Massowah has declared to M. Mercinier that he has ceased to regard him as the representative of France, he being unprovided with the regular *exequatur*. It seemed the proper moment for acquainting M. Goblet with the contents of the last two despatches from Your Excellency concerning the Massowah incident, but your excellent arguments failed to disabuse him of his first idea. He persists in quoting the Capitulations which we do not recognise, and in pretending that all action for levying the taxes in question should be suspended, a protest having been raised against them, whereas we hold that there will be time enough to examine these protests when obedience has been rendered to the governing authorities. Goblet became more and more excited, and I promptly declared that owing to our total disagreement on the two all-important points before mentioned, I

could not continue the discussion, which might lead to undesirable results. Among other things Goblet informed me that France was disposed to acquiesce in our demands if we, on our part, would make certain concessions. He did not specify what concessions, but I concluded he meant to allude to Tunis, as the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador here, who has had an interview with him on the subject, told me in confidence that, in speaking of Massowah, Goblet had also alluded to Tunis.

I am assured that much uneasiness is felt at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs with regard to Greece, whence no communications have been received for some days past. . . . MENABREA.

LONDON, 26 July.

Salisbury tells me he has declared to the French Ambassador and to the German Ambassador as well, that, in the opinion of the English government, when a Mussulman country comes under the administration of a civilised, Christian nation, the Capitulations have no further reason to exist. I proposed to Salisbury the immediate signing of a document similar to that existing between England and Austria-Hungary, but His Lordship expressed his confidence that Your Excellency would be perfectly satisfied with the clear and explicit declaration he had made to me. CATALANI.

Letter from Lord Salisbury to *Commendatore* Catalani, written on July 29, 1888.

You ask for the opinion of Her Majesty's government concerning the Capitulations in countries which, like Massowah, have been under Mussulman administration but are no longer subject to it.

I reply as follows: Her Majesty's government denies the validity of the Capitulations under these circumstances. The Capitulations owe their origin to the difficulty of adapting the peculiarities of Mussulman law and administration to the needs of those merchants who trade with Christian countries. Therefore, in countries which have become subject to the administration of a Christian government, like that of Italy, the Capitulations can no longer be applied, and lose their reason for existing.

ROME, 3 August.

To His Excellency the Ambassador, Count Nigra.

Your Excellency has informed me that His Excellency Count Kálnoky, in reply to the questions you addressed to him in the name of His Majesty's government, has declared that the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian government considers the Capitulations as inapplicable at Mas-sowah, and that consequently all Austro-Hungarian subjects must submit to the legislation there prevailing.

Your Excellency is herewith instructed to inform the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian government that His Majesty's government has taken note of this declaration, and I also beg you to thank His Excellency Count Kálnoky. CRISPI.

In the end the endeavours made by France to induce Turkey to protest against Italy failed completely. M. de Radowitz telegraphed on August 6 that he believed the Porte would not allow itself to be influenced by France, and that he had declared to the Sultan that, should he make himself the tool of France and Russia, he would no longer be able to remain on friendly terms with the Triple Alliance.

From the diary.

A visit from Count Solms: question of passports for missionaries in China. Germany following same policy as ourselves. She has informed the government of the Celestial Empire that no Catholic Germans bearing passports other than German are to be received.

. . . During the visit of the fleet to Barcelona a banquet took place at which both the Italian Ambassador Tornielli and the French Ambassador Cambon were present. The Spanish Minister forgot to include France in his toast. Tornielli immediately rose and made good the omission. It was after this toast that the Italian and French fleets drew closer together.

28 *July*.—Solms expresses his hope that the Zanzibar question may be settled peacefully. Germany has no objections to Italy's acquiring territory in that region. I remind him of the line of conduct pursued by Cecchi, of the Sultan's excuses, and express my confidence in a friendly arrangement.

Massaua: Germany compromised in the question of rights, she having sustained a thesis contrary to our own. She is ready to set the Capitulations aside as long as the Italians remain at Massowah.

3 *August*.—The Ambassador at Madrid, Count Tornielli, has conferred with Minister de la Vega de Armijo on the Rampolla Circular concerning the so-called Conciliations between Italy and the Vatican. 'As soon as the Nunzio, Monsignore di Pietro, broached the subject to me,' the Minister said, 'I immediately interrupted him, saying: "Monsignore, I must beg you not to begin on the

necessity in which the Pope finds himself of leaving Rome. Two things are equally impossible—that the Pope should leave the Vatican, and the Italians their capital. Certain incidents, although they may give rise to some difficulties, will never render the impossible possible. It would be a better policy to accept peacefully what is an accomplished fact.”” M. de la Vega de Armijo added that he then led the conversation on to the subject of the acts of provocation of which the Holy See has recently been guilty, and which could not fail to cause much resentment in Italy. Before complaining of its position the Holy See should have carefully avoided earning the reproach of having incited the clergy to rebel against the application of the law of the tenths, and in its political attitude the Vatican should have concealed any vexation it may have felt concerning the intimate relations that have been established between Germany and Italy. It would appear that the Nunzio, who, as a matter of fact, is never very emphatic in making communications of this sort, soon allowed the discussion to drop, and has never since sought to resume it.

6 *August*.—Solms communicates to me that the German consul at Zanzibar has forwarded information to the effect that the Sultan of that country is ready to go to the Italian consulate or even on board the *Archimede* to offer his apologies to the Italian government. I assure the Count the incident is about to be closed.

8 *August*.—Solms reads me a telegram despatched last night by Prince Bismarck. The Prince will be delighted to receive a visit from me at Friedrichsruh. He cannot leave his home there, and this year will be unable to go to Kissingen.

. . . Solms reads me a second despatch from the Chancellery concerning Emperor William's visit to Peterhof. The visit is said to have removed all mistrust, and rendered the friendship between the two Sovereigns more cordial and intimate. There would appear to have been no political discussions, but the opinion that peace will be maintained has been strengthened.

Emperor William returned well satisfied with his visit.

On the eve of the Italian Sovereign's excursion into Romagna where they had never been, as this region had always been considered dangerous and inhospitable, owing to a wide diffusion of republican principles, Crispi, who had advised the journey in defiance of supposed dangers, received from King Louis of Portugal, father of the unfortunate King Charles, a warning to the effect that an anarchist plot threatened King Humbert's life.

BERLIN, 12 *August*, 1888.

I have just seen the King of Portugal, who was in a great hurry to meet me and tell me that he has received information 'from a perfectly reliable source' to the effect that, on the occasion of our August Sovereign's excursion into Romagna, an attempt will be made upon his life at Bologna or elsewhere. Taking advantage of a moment in which the royal equipages are surrounded by the crowd, the conspirators will, so he assures me, mingle shouts of 'Long live the Republic! Down with the King!' with the acclamations of the throng, and make use of a revolver against His Majesty. In a way, this would be but a revised, emended, and better planned edition of Passanante's attempt at Naples. I asked the King of Portugal if he could give me further particulars, and above all,

begged him to tell me whence he had derived this information. His Majesty, without making any further explanation, repeated that he had it from a 'perfectly reliable source,' adding that I must understand his ardent desire that a warning be transmitted to the proper quarter without delay. The King showed much emotion while talking with me, and it is with no less emotion that I make this communication to you, as I promised to do, in order that all possible precautions may be taken to frustrate the conspiracy, and preserve an existence which is as precious as it is necessary to Italy.

LAUNAY.

13 August, 1888.

Launay, Italian Ambassador, Berlin.

King Louis would have spoken to better purpose if, instead of describing the way in which the plot was to be carried out, he had revealed that 'perfectly reliable source' whence his information was derived. The mystery with which he has surrounded his utterances awakens apprehensions without supplying the thread which might lead to the discovery of the supposed criminals.

The government has already taken every precaution that everything may proceed regularly.

CRISPI.

BERLIN, 13 August, 1888.

The King of Portugal, upon whom I waited again to-day, for the purpose of obtaining further details, tells me he can supply no more information, as he was sworn to secrecy by the person who warned him of the plot, but that, at our first interview, he gave me all the particulars precisely as

he received them from a person deserving of all confidence.

That person reported to him what he had discovered by the perusal of certain letters despatched probably from Paris by the socialist leaders to the revolutionary committees in Romagna. On previous occasions His Majesty has received warnings from this same individual, in regard to movements that were being prepared in Spain, and these warnings have always proved well grounded. The King, Don Louis, added that the source may therefore be considered reliable, and that he was but fulfilling a duty of affection in warning us. LAUNAY.

13 August, 1888.

Count Nigra, Italian Ambassador, Vienna.

(Private and personal.)

At Berlin, the King of Portugal spoke to Launay in mysterious terms of a plot for assassinating our August Sovereign, to be carried out at Bologna or in some other town, on the occasion of the approaching military manœuvres in Romagna.

My agents confirm my belief that we have nothing to fear for our patriotic dynasty. Nevertheless, I beg Your Excellency to approach King Louis and press him to reveal the source of his information, that we may judge of its value and take all necessary steps to discover the authors of this plot, if it really exist.

Silence on the part of His Portuguese Majesty would be inexcusable. Having sown the seeds of suspicion in our minds, let him now open the door that may lead to a discovery of the truth.

CRISPI.

VIENNA, 13 *August*, 1888.

(Private and strictly personal.)

The King of Portugal will not arrive in Vienna until the 18th of this month. I will be at the station, ask for an audience, and execute the commission with which Your Excellency has entrusted me for His Most Faithful Majesty.

Meanwhile, I doubt not that Your Excellency will have taken every precaution, but as you are probably aware, King Louis frequently sees mystery where no mystery exists.

NIGRA.

13 *August*, 1888.*Italian Embassy, Paris.*

Revelations made by a person in high position have warned us that a plot has been laid between some of the French Socialists and those of Romagna for assassinating our King on the occasion of the military manœuvres about to take place there, and of the royal visit to several towns of those provinces.

As the improbable is by no means impossible, I herewith invite you to cause all necessary investigations to be made through our agents, in order to discover if there be any foundation for this information.

Our relations with France are not such as to allow of an appeal to the police of that country, who might even prove hostile to us, and we therefore beg you to make use of Italians only in the execution of this delicate mission.

Keep me informed of all developments.

CRISPI.

VIENNA, 21 *August*, 1888.

I have requested the King of Portugal to reveal the sources and details of the conspiracy mentioned

to Launay. His Majesty assured me that he could do so only to the King himself, but that Her Majesty Queen Maria Pia had written a full account of the affair to her august brother.

All that I was able to elicit from King Louis was the statement that the information had come through the Socialists of Geneva and Zurich.

NIGRA.

Diary :—

14 *August*.—Solms informs me of a conversation which M. Raindre, French *chargé-d'affaires* at Berlin, has had with Count Bismarck.

M. Raindre complained of the mistrust of France which Signor Crispi had exhibited on account of her protests against the municipal taxation at Massowah. France, he said, has no desire to create difficulties for us, but wishes only to bring about the final settlement of a question of principle.

Bismarck defended the conduct of the Italian government, and gave his reasons for so doing. He advised coolness, and begged the French government not to enlarge upon a matter so small and unimportant in itself. He added that he had advised coolness at Rome as well.

M. Raindre replied that the French government was ready to recognise Italy's claims to Massowah, but that, in return, Italy must relinquish all claim upon Tunis.

The Count assured him that the two questions could not be confounded, the positions of the two governments not being the same at Tunis and Massowah. They differ because there is a Mussulman Sultan at Tunis and also because Tunis consists of a great stretch of territory, whereas Massowah is but

a small corner of land. He ended by repeating his advice to be prudent, and by the admonition that, should serious trouble arise, Germany would be obliged to place herself on the side of Italy.

M. Raindre reminded him that the minor questions which had arisen concerning the German frontier had been easily settled between the two Powers. If Italy would but be as considerate as Germany, the question between France and herself might be settled in a friendly manner. Hereupon Bismarck pointed out that the Florentine and other equally trifling questions had already been settled.

. . . Count Solms assures me that Kálnoky admits the principle that the Capitulations cannot be applied at Massowah and that the Italians have a perfect right to exercise there jurisdiction there.

. . . Salisbury is said to have written the *chargé-d'affaires* at Athens, requesting him to advise the Greek Cabinet not to persevere in the attitude it has assumed, but to accept the opinion of the British Cabinet concerning the Capitulations at Massowah.

. . . The director of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, M. Charmes, is reported to have said to Münster, that France would gladly see Italy occupy Tripoli. The German Ambassador is said to have replied that France would thus be giving away what was not hers to give and permitting what she could not forbid.

16 *August*.—M. de Meyendorf reads me a Note from M. Giers of August 9 (28 July, Russian style).

M. Giers is in receipt of the two Italian Notes of July 25. He can express no opinion concerning the question of the Capitulations. He does not doubt that the Italian administration is to be preferred to

the Mussulman. Nevertheless, he does not feel that the mere fact of Italian occupation of Massowah has sufficed to abrogate the Capitulations. M. Giers reminds us that in 1885 Mancini declared to the Powers that Italy had advanced into that region simply for the purpose of maintaining order and ensuring safety, and of saving it from the Mahdi's followers.

17 *Aug.* 1888.—I leave Rome at 9.45.

18 *August.*—Reach Sant' Anna di Valdieri at 7.40 P.M., to confer with the King. He is waiting for me on the terrace of the Royal Cottage (*Casina*). We dine; afterwards the King grants me an audience which lasts from 9.40 until 11.15.

21 *August.*—At 9.30 we arrive at Friedrichsruh. Cheering announces that the Prince is at the station to meet me. I descend, give him my arm, and together we enter the carriage that in a few minutes conducts us to the Prince's residence. The large crowd that has gathered salutes us with applause and shouts of 'Long live Italy!' The Princess is at the baths of Homburg. Countess Rantzau, the Prince's daughter, does the honours with her husband. The three Rantzau children welcome us in Italian.

We have a cup of tea and then go out to see the fireworks that have been arranged in my honour.¹ Later we return to the drawing-room for conversation. We speak of the war of 1870, of the treaty of peace, of Nice, of Garibaldi, and of the Empress Eugénie. The danger of a return of the Empire

¹ The fireworks were set off beyond the great gate that gives access to the Bismarck estate. The Prince mingled with the shouting crowd, which was swelled by a large contingent from Hamburg, and led the cry 'Long live Crispi!' This they did three times, the Prince standing bareheaded the while.

hastened the signing of the treaty of peace. Thiers was threatened, and little Lulù might have re-entered Paris at the head of the two hundred thousand men, then prisoners of the Germans.

We retire at a quarter past eleven.

22 *August*.—I am up at 6.30. At a quarter past eleven the Prince comes to my apartments. He has several documents with him.

He begins to talk of Massowah at once, and spreading out a map, requests me to point out the spot where the last encounter took place. He hopes Italy will not allow herself to become too deeply involved in that region, but will confine her attention to the fortified points. I describe the Sanganeiti fight, and he agrees that it can in no wise diminish the prestige of our arms. He says that Austria also fears we shall compromise ourselves in Africa. England: we must keep in favour with her. But she herself has pressing need of improvement both in her army and navy.

As to Zanzibar, he ends by promising to write and request Salisbury either to settle the matter himself or leave us free to act.

Turkey: The advantage of preserving friendly relations with the Sultan and the advisability of treating him with consideration. He still holds to his old conviction that Russia would be less strong did she possess Constantinople. She might be attacked and crushed in the Balkans. This could never happen within her present boundaries.

France: Boulanger. He does not fear war, but prefers peace.

The Pope: The Catholic Church, and the Greek Church. War with Italy would be to the advantage of the Greek Catholic Church.

Schiaffini.

Telegraphic agencies.

Emperor Frederick's last days . . . a weak man . . . allowed himself to be ruled by his wife, who, in turn, was ruled by her mother. He wished to Anglicise everything. One day he was discussing something with the Emperor and appeared to agree with him, when, his wife coming in and expressing a contrary opinion, His Majesty immediately changed his views.

After dinner there is a small reception. Many anecdotes. The war of '66 . . . Italy weak . . . the King wanted to go to Vienna and thence into Hungary: Bismarck opposed to this. Discussions and reproaches. He does not wish to take provinces from Austria in order not to humiliate her. She is neither humiliated in Italy, thanks to Napoleon III., nor in Germany, thanks to Bismarck.

23 *August*.—The Prince comes to my apartment at 8.30. He informs me that he has telegraphed to London, but fears Lord Salisbury is not there. We again discuss the Zanzibar question. I express the opinion that it would produce a doubly favourable impression in Italy if the Prince should accompany the Emperor on his visit to Rome. He replies by explaining the reasons why he could not go. 'If the Emperor wished me to accompany him I should certainly do so; but it is his place to ask me. I would have gone to Russia with him, but he did not invite me. As a matter of fact, the young Emperor gets along better with Herbert.'

Our conversation ends at 9.15.

I prepare to leave. A most cordial farewell. The Prince, his daughter, his son-in-law and the children, are all at the entrance where the carriage awaits me.

'*A rivederci l'anno venturo!*' (Come again next year!) they cry. At 9.30 I am off.

24 August.—From Leipsic via Dresden to Karlsbad.

VIENNA, 21 August, 1888.

Kálnoky has repeatedly expressed a desire to meet Your Excellency. I feel it would be unbecoming to disregard this desire. In any case, should Your Excellency not wish to accept, kindly give me instructions as to what I am to say to Kálnoky.

NIGRA.

VIENNA, 23 August, 1888.

Kálnoky thinks Karlsbad is dangerous as there are so many acquaintances of his there. He proposes to Your Excellency to meet him at Eger, which is not far distant, and says he would await your arrival at Hotel Wenzel, on Saturday the 25th, any time after 7 A.M. It is important that Your Excellency should reply at once.

NIGRA.

LEIPSIK, 23 August.

Count Nigra, Italian Ambassador, Vienna.

Eger is as bad as Karlsbad, for no matter where the meeting may take place it will be known of at once. Be this as it may, I will stop at Eger on Saturday the 25th, and go to Hotel Wenzel.

CRISPI.

WITTENBERG, 23 August.

To His Majesty the King, Milan.

I am on my way back from Friedrichsruh, where I remained from the evening of the 21st until nine o'clock this morning. The prince has charged me to present his homage to Your Majesty. Bismarck and I agree on all points. I have found in him not

only the Prime Minister of a powerful and trusted ally of Your Majesty's, but a friend who is both faithful and devoted.

Always at Your Majesty's service. CRISPI.

24 *August*.—In answer to my thanks for the warm reception offered me, Prince Bismarck telegraphs to assure me of the 'sincerity of his personal and political friendship for you and for the great nation whose government your Sovereign's wisdom has entrusted to your direction, and whose alliance with us forms one of the strongest guarantees for the peace of Europe.'

25 *August*.—I leave Karlsbad at 8.30 A.M., and reach Eger at 10.10. The Austro-Hungarian Chancellor, Count Kálnoky, has kindly come to the station to meet me. We go to the Hotel Wenzel, where we discuss the questions of the day. Bulgaria, Tunis, Turkey; her financial position, which keeps her in a state of subjection; the Sultan steering his course between the two parties; his cleverness; Russia: Kálnoky is of Bismarck's opinion that she would only weaken herself by going to Constantinople. In 1877 she could no longer carry on the war. Difficulty of reconstructing the Black Sea fleet; lack of marines. Deplorable internal conditions: every one steals in Russia. The King of Greece declares himself anti-Russian; it is to his advantage, but it is not the policy of his government. Tricoupis a liberal; brought up to English ideas. Germany: Alsace will become Germanised, but not so Lorraine; the Alsatians in France. Injury to industry and commerce. The latest law is indeed draconic, but was necessary. Manteuffel treated them well, but in 18 years failed to Germanise

them, and the system had to be altered. . . . Emperor Frederick a weak character. . . . Difficulty of governing Austria on account of many nationalities. Confederations. Two million Roumanians. . . . Roumania not Russian; the opposition party poses as favourable to Russia, but should it get into power it would display the spirit of nationalism. . . . King Milan is intelligent. Kálnoky has advised him to make peace with his Queen. Probably the Consistory would not permit a divorce, and should it consent, there would be no end to the questions to be settled. Natalie must take the initiative. . . . Necessity for our union. The benefits to be derived from it in dealing with all European questions. . . . The Pope; querulous complaints; Galimberti. . . . In 1849, before the battle of Custoza, Austria was disposed to yield Lombardy to Charles Albert, but not Venice, because it was believed Venice would also mean Dalmatia, where language and traditions are still Italian.

At 2.45 P.M., after taking a most cordial farewell of Kálnoky, I start for Italy.

On the way, at Ratisbon, I despatch the following telegram to the King:

‘Have spent four hours at Eger with Count Kálnoky, who came from Vienna on purpose to meet me. I am thoroughly satisfied with my interview. Always at the orders, etc. . . . CRISPI.’

26 *August*.—At 3.45 P.M. I reach Milan. At 6.30 I am at Monza where I report to the King concerning my conversations with Bismarck and Kálnoky. I then return to Milan.

28 *August*.—I telegraph to the Ambassador at Berlin: ‘I mentioned to the Prince the necessity

for uniting the Italian, German, and Austrian telegraphic agencies for the purpose of establishing a service all over Europe. The Prince welcomed the idea enthusiastically. I have this day instructed Nigra to take steps at Vienna to facilitate this union. He also considers the accomplishment of the plan to be eminently desirable and will certainly do all he can. It will therefore be well for the Prince to notify Prince Reuss, in order that he may co-operate with Nigra in pushing this matter.'

The German and Austrian Press immediately grasped the importance of Crispi's visit to Friedrichsruh. The comments of the *National Zeitung*, in its issue of August 23, are especially deserving of notice. After pointing out that Crispi had been to see Prince Bismarck again within a year of his first visit, the writer of the article went on to express his opinion that, of the three allied Powers, Italy at that moment was in the most exposed position. 'Austria has to deal with a power whose foreign policy is directed by diplomats of experience, who do not allow the passions of the masses to sway them overmuch, and who offer a solid guarantee that the interests of the Czar's empire will be safeguarded without in any way trespassing upon the vital interests of the neighbouring country. But in France, government is in the hands of such men as Floquet and Goblet, whose sovereign is the *aura popularis*, simple tribunes, as it were, devoid of cool discrimination and moderation, and absolutely dependent upon the favours of a people as vain, ardent, and quarrelsome as the French. And this state of things can but be intensified by a change of government, which would place the affairs of the nation in the hands of General Boulanger. His recent peaceful declarations notwithstanding, his own past, and the support afforded him by the most ardent branch of the *chouvins*, would force him to assume an attitude of provocation, should he fix his gaze upon Alsace-Lorraine, or aspire to regain lost supremacy in the Mediterranean. In either case Italy would be involved in a war with France, either in company of Germany or of England. The recent unfortunate military encounters in Africa would

appear to have revived the courage of the politicians on the Seine, who are persuaded that the Italo-German alliance implies the help of Germany only in the event of French invasion of the Peninsula, and who reckon upon the possible abstention of Germany in case Italy should declare war against France, in consequence of an attempt on her part to occupy Tripoli. Nor would the danger to Italy be less if the Egyptian Question should be revived, where her legitimate interests would make it necessary for her to lend all her support to England in combating the claims of France. Under the circumstances,' so the article ends, 'the meeting between the two statesmen who direct the politics of Germany and Italy was certainly made necessary by conditions of an especially positive nature. Not, indeed, that catastrophes are imminent or absolutely inevitable; the strength of the Central European League, the glory that surrounds the German arms, and the dread they inspire, are so many excellent arguments for the maintenance of peace among the nations. But since October 3, 1887, conditions in France have moved several degrees nearer to the point where chaos begins, and where it becomes impossible to foretell events even of the near future. When Signor Crispi came to Friedrichsruh last year, the general impression concerning French conditions was fairly hopeful. The Goblet-Bou langer Ministry had fallen, and the moderate Rouvier Ministry was directing the affairs of the Republic. Reasonable people still fail to perceive any threatening spectre; nevertheless, they tell themselves that we are rapidly approaching another explosion in Paris, and that no one can foretell how far the splinters and sparks may carry. At the present moment the Italian Premier's journey will have a salutary effect upon those restless spirits who haunt the Seine. Used as he is to consider the alliance between Germany and Italy in the abstract, it produces its justly intimidating effect upon the Frenchman of the lower class only when placed before him in a tangible and substantial form.'

3 Sept.—M. de Goedel, the Austro-Hungarian *chargé-d'affaires*, has read me a Note containing a report of a conversation which Count Kálnoky has had with the French *chargé-d'affaires*. The French

representative wished to know Count Kálnoky's opinion of the latest French Note and also of the Turkish one relating to Massowah. The Austro-Hungarian Minister advised great caution. He declared that it would be an unwise policy to give too great importance to the question and that it must be allowed to drop. His conference at Eger had convinced him that Minister Crispi would have no more to do with it. Above all Kálnoky advised that the debate be localised, and warned France against bringing it from the Red Sea into the Mediterranean. As to the Turkish protest, the Count expressed his opinion that no great importance need be attached to it, and that Turkey's interpretation of Article x. of the Suez Canal Convention should be disregarded. It was not just that France should uphold Turkey. France cannot possibly have forgotten the Sultan's protest against the occupation of Tunis in 1881. Certainly the protest concerning Tunis made in 1881 was not less important than the present one concerning Massowah, and if France disregarded the first, she must treat the second in the same way. The French representative was at a loss to confute this argument. He stated that the French government would consider the incident closed after Goblet's last Note. He fears, however, that Italy does not intend to do the same; she may have wished to demonstrate her warlike intentions by recently sending her fleet into oriental waters. Count Kálnoky assured him that the Italian fleet had no other object in view than the execution of its annual manœuvres.

... Count von der Goltz has shown me a telegram he received from Berlin yesterday. It reports that

Count Hatzfeldt has communicated Lord Salisbury's answer concerning the Kisimayo affair to Prince Bismarck. His Lordship desires the Italian government to wait for a concession of territory, he, meanwhile, guaranteeing that Kisimayo shall not be ceded to any one else. England will make every effort to comply with Italy's demands. Lord Salisbury furthermore desires that the terms of the promise made to Italy by the late Sultan of Zanzibar be communicated to him.

I assured Count von der Goltz that I would wait for England to act, and immediately order a copy of the act of concession to be forwarded to Lord Salisbury. I begged Goltz to thank the Prince for the interest he has taken in the matter.

4 Sept.—M. de Goedel has been to assure me that Count Kálnoky's opinions coincide entirely with our own, and that he refuses to second the demand advanced by the government of the Netherlands for the modification of Article ix. of the Convention for the freedom of the Suez Canal.

15 Sept.—At Count Kálnoky's request, M. de Goedel has been instructed to acquaint me with the instructions imparted to the Austro-Hungarian *chargé-d'affaires* at Constantinople concerning certain questions put by Sadullah Pasha. The Turkish Ambassador had asked if, at the Eger conference, Crispi had expressed his views in regard to the intentions of the Italian government in Africa, and whether anything had been settled about Bulgaria. Kálnoky replied that the Massowah question is closed, nor does Minister Crispi propose to make it the subject of further discussion. At Eger he expressed only the most peaceful sentiments, and it would in no wise profit him to enter

into further debate upon a subject which is entirely exhausted. France, however, will do well to refrain from rekindling the contest by advancing claims in the Mediterranean. In that case the matter might attract the attention of those Powers who have an interest in maintaining the *status quo*. As regards Bulgaria, the Italian government agrees with Austria that it will be wise to allow time to solve the problem there. Nothing will be done to re-evoke questions that have now been laid aside, and once more expose a nation, which is successfully managing its own affairs, to the interference of Europe. Italy and Austria will make strenuous efforts to maintain peace in the Balkans.

24 Sept.—Count von der Goltz, who has come to Naples, has been discussing various topics with me, all of them more or less important. The mission composed of Abyssinian priests that was despatched to the Russian government was unsuccessful. The Abyssinians offered the Czar an island in the Red Sea, but this offer—problematical enough in itself, as the island does not exist—failed to tempt the Sovereign. Giers, however, did not conceal the fact that, owing to the common religion, Russia cherishes a certain regard for Abyssinia.

. . . German missionaries in China: they obtained everything they asked for from the Emperor of the Celestial Empire, and the Berlin government would like to know if we have also obtained what we wanted, as it is desirous that Italy should enjoy equal privileges. German missionaries going to China with passports other than German will not obtain recognition. I repeated the answer made to the *chargé-d'affaires* at Berlin. The German Minister

at Peking will support the demands of the Italian government.

. . . Russia expected that Bulgaria would proclaim her independence on the 18th of this month. It was simply newspaper gossip, and everything went off quietly enough.

CHAPTER X

A THIRD INCIDENT WITH FRANCE

A spurious letter from Félix Pyat—William II. in Rome—Conferences between Crispi and Count Herbert Bismarck—Documentary account of the incident concerning Italian schools at Tunis—From Crispi's Diary—The situation in France at the close of the year 1888.

AT the beginning of September Crispi received the following letter. (From the French original):—

PARIS, 7 Sept. 1888.

MY DEAR CRISPI,—Before writing to you I waited for the expression of some peaceful sentiments on your part. The press has recently been accusing you of such sinister intentions that even those who are best acquainted with you have been disconcerted. But at last Truth is rising to the surface . . . you have never intended to bring about a war between the two nations.

All those who are animated by a love of Progress and Democracy must suffer acutely from this state of tension in the relations that exist between our two great and magnanimous nations. We were made to understand and love each other—at least, so you yourself thought at one time. How is it that you now fail to find the means of overcoming what are but wretched prejudices?

I assure you, my dear Crispi, that our Democracy sympathises with Italy, that noble home of the Arts and of Liberty!

Men who, like myself, are deeply attached to you are in despair at what is now taking place.

Make an effort on your side. In the name of civilisation we entreat you not to allow all intercourse between us to be broken off. Floquet made the first advances at Toulon; it is for you to do the rest. The world would heartily commend you.

Receive, my dear Crispi, the renewed assurance of my old friendship for you, and my most sincere good wishes.—FÉLIX PYAT.

Instead of replying directly to Pyat, Crispi telegraphed to the Embassy at Paris in the following terms :—

I am in receipt of a letter despatched from Paris by Félix Pyat, in which he exhorts me to do everything in my power to reconcile France and Italy. I am not answering him directly because I wish to avoid starting a controversy, but I beg Your Excellency to go to him and tell him that my feelings towards France are the same as those I cherished two and thirty years ago, when we were exiles in London. I have defended myself against diplomatic provocation of which I could not have believed the French government capable. Our policy is one of defence, not of offence, and never will France be forced into war by us. I desire to maintain the most cordial relations with the neighbouring people, but the French are so completely deceived by their press that I am beginning to despair of restoring friendly relations between the two nations. Now, if Félix Pyat feels capable of persuading his fellow-countrymen to regard us less unfavourably, by convincing them that they are being deceived, I shall indeed be more than delighted, and you may assure my friend Pyat that Italy will not fail to do her part.—CRISPI.

But the Pyat letter was spurious.

FROM PARIS, 14 *Sept.* 1888.

(Private.)

The letter despatched to you signed Félix Pyat, is a forgery. Pyat himself has just assured me that he neither wrote it, inspired it, nor has any knowledge of it. However, as he expressed the warmest good feeling for Italy, and as there can be no doubt of the sincerity of his declarations, I told him I was glad to be able to show him what Your Excellency's personal sentiments really were by reading him your despatch of the eleventh. He was highly gratified, and immediately forgave the forger who had called forth these declarations. He promised to do everything in his power to render his fellow-countrymen more friendly and less unjust towards Italy and yourself, and assured me that when the time comes for the revisions, he and his colleagues will make a great effort to remove that permanent provocation to Italy, the maintenance by the French Republic of a representative at the Vatican. He inveighed against the President of the Chamber of Deputies and against this republican government which has a king at its head, and he praised you for denying to small and ignorant communes the right to elect their own mayors, reserving this right to the larger and more enlightened municipalities, whereas here it is still denied to Paris itself, the most enlightened commune in France. He reminded me that at Marseilles his arguments in favour of more cordial relations with Italy were enthusiastically applauded, and he promised to continue to sow the seed in that region, whither he is returning shortly. He ended by asking me if I would leave him a translation of Your Excellency's telegram, promising not to make use of it save with your consent and my

own. I replied that I could not do this without first consulting you, as Your Excellency could not be supposed to have answered a letter he had never written, and that I had been authorised only to communicate the contents of the despatch to him in confidence. Kindly send me your instructions on this point. A few conciliatory and friendly words spoken yesterday by His Majesty the King, during the audience he granted the French delegates sent by Prince Napoleon, have produced an excellent impression here.—RESSMAN.

15 Sept. 1888.

I read in to-day's issue of the *Journal des Débats*, that some comment was caused by the presence in the corridors of the Chamber of Deputies of M. Ressman, the Italian *chargé-d'affaires*, who came to confer with M. Pyat. Pyat, who came up to Paris in the forenoon, had indeed appointed the Chamber as our meeting place. It is as if we had returned to the manners and customs of the days of the 'Most Serene' Republic of Venice, for even if this bit of news, so insignificant in itself, be not intended as an insinuation, it proves, at least, with what open suspicion our every step is watched. I believe it would be well to seize a favourable opportunity, which may offer at the ordinary session to be held on Wednesday next, to say a few words to M. Goblet in order to acquaint him with the purpose of my conference with Pyat, and at the same time show him Your Excellency's eminently conciliatory telegram, which so clearly expresses your personal sentiments. I beg that you will send a telegraphic message authorising me to take this step.—RESSMAN.

Naturally, Crispi gave the desired authorisation, and Goblet was provided with one more proof of the Italian minister's loyalty.

The excellent relations existing between Italy and Germany received solemn confirmation in October of that same year, when Emperor William decided to visit King Humbert in his Capital. William was the first Sovereign of a great Power to come to Rome, and the reception he received was on the grandest possible scale.

On this occasion the following telegrams were exchanged between Crispi and Bismarck, and between Emperor William and the King.¹

ROME, 11 Oct. 1888.

Amidst the enthusiasm that welcomed and now surrounds your August Sovereign, the friend of our King and the head of the great nation who is our country's ally, my thoughts cannot but revert to Your Highness. I wish that the echo of the applause with which Rome rings might reach you, and tell you how great is the Italian people's affection for Germany, and how thoroughly they appreciate the friendship of that country which, thanks to Your Highness' wise direction, has attained to such greatness and glory. May our union ever remain as intimate and cordial as to-day, for the glory of both dynasties, the welfare of the two nations, and the peace of Europe! CRISPI.

FRIEDRICHSMUTH, 10 Sept. 1888.

I thank Your Excellency most heartily for having thought of me at the moment of this meeting between our Sovereigns, which is the solemn expression of the cordial friendship existing between two great nations.

The consciousness of having laboured together to

¹ These telegrams were all written in French.

strengthen this bond of friendship between our Sovereigns and our countries, and our mutual determination to maintain it and render it ever more indissoluble, form a precious link, as it were, between the brilliant festivities that are taking place in Rome and the lonely forest, where, two months since, Your Excellency walked in affectionate converse with me.

BISMARCK.

ALA—ROME, 20 Oct. 1888.

Before leaving your beautiful and hospitable country I cannot resist the desire to tell you how happy I have been in Italy, and how grateful I am for the friendship you have shown me. I beg you to believe me when I assure you that I heartily reciprocate it, and that I shall never forget the magnificent reception you gave me at your Capital. I embrace you most warmly, and I kiss the hand of Her Majesty the Queen.

WILLIAM.

ROME—ALA, 20 Oct. 1888.

Before you leave Italy I wish once more to express my gratitude for your welcome visit, and my deep regret at your departure.

Italy and I will never forget the striking proof you have given us of your friendship. You have heard a whole nation raise its voice and salute in you the trusted and much longed-for friend, the faithful ally, the august representative of your great and noble people.

Our good wishes go with you on your journey; they will accompany you throughout your career, which we trust may be rich in glory and happiness. The Queen and my son desire to be remembered to you, and join me in begging you to lay our homage

at the feet of Her Majesty the Empress, your August Consort.

HUMBERT.

Count Herbert von Bismarck accompanied the Emperor to Rome, and Crispi had two conferences with him.

Diary :—

19 Oct. 1888.—6.30 P.M.—A visit from Herbert Bismarck. He gives me an account of the conversation that took place between the Czar and Prince Bismarck.—Russian troops on the frontier (between 5 and 6 hundred thousand) and the Czar could offer no explanation. Danish influence with the Czar. All the Princesses, the Czarina included, antagonistic to the German government. These ladies influence the Czar, and have made him believe Germany intends to attack him. Bismarck did his best to convince him of the contrary, assuring him that the Triple Alliance has a purely defensive purpose. Since the publication of the Austro-Hungarian treaty of alliance there are no more secrets. The two Powers do not aim at aggression. Should Russia attack Austria, Germany would be obliged to defend her.

The positions of Germany and Italy are identical. Unless one of these Powers were attacked by France it would not be able to claim the *casus foederis*. But even did no treaty exist, this would be the same. Germany could not allow Italy to be attacked without coming to her aid. Italy would also stand by Germany should France seek to cross the Rhine. It is generally held that, should France overcome Germany, she would immediately turn her attention to Italy, and endeavour to overwhelm

her also, in order to regain that European hegemony to which she aspires. She would act in the same way towards Germany, should Italy be conquered first.

The Triple Alliance has no interest in dragging Turkey within its orbit. Had Turkey any desire to join us we should soon find it out, for the Sultan is incapable of keeping a secret. Turkey has good troops, but they would be formidable only in defensive warfare. It is therefore absurd to suppose that we are seeking to draw her into the Triple Alliance. It would be perfectly useless. Bismarck's plain but honest language impressed the Czar, who left Berlin convinced of the favourable disposition of the German government.

The Czar invited Emperor William to attend the grand manœuvres to take place in Russia next summer. Both Emperor William and Prince Bismarck are convinced that peace is ensured at least for a twelvemonth.

Alexander III. is believed to love and wish for peace. His habits, his studies, his want of experience in governing, his neglect of everything that concerns the army, his very physique, make him desire rest and quiet. There are, however, several generals always in his immediate neighbourhood, who, the Prince fears, may influence him. Matters would be no better under his successor, who is still young and has not been sufficiently trained in the art of governing.

20 Oct.—Second conference with Herbert Bismarck. I explained that Austria has altered nothing in her methods of governing. Composed as she is of many peoples with different languages and civilisations, she can become stable and defy the dangers

of disintegration only on one condition; and that is, that she respects all the different nationalities. Well, in that Empire, only Hungary, possessing an independent government, is able, thanks to Tisza's good sense, to maintain herself in a solid position; throughout Austria the government favours the Slavonic element and holds with them to the detriment of the German and Italian population. Now this is a mistaken policy, and one which causes us much annoyance. If the Italians in Austria were well treated and their autonomy respected, our own people would have no reason to complain, and all excuse for the Irredentist movement would be removed.

The harshness exercised at Trieste is most impolitic . . . the Empire gains nothing by it, and we suffer from it. Then think of the protracted trials. The Ulmann case has been going on for over five months; it never should have been begun, but having been begun, it should now be brought to a speedy close.

Count Bismarck acquiesced in my views. He blames Taaffe, who will resort to any means in order to remain in office. The Emperor trusts his minister, which is unfortunate. Herbert assures me he has written to his father on this subject, asking him to speak to Kálnoky, who is going to Friedrichsruh in the course of a few days. I replied that it is a question of the greatest importance. Austria is not beloved in Italy. She has not known how to make us forget her domination on Italian soil, but rather keeps the memory of it green by her present rule at Trieste. We must hold to the Austrian Empire, for we may not place ourselves between two enemies, one on our right, the other

on our left. But Austria should consider that an alliance with us has its advantages for her also. Bismarck agreed with me and I continued:—

I will not conceal from you that the alliance with Germany is the one that is preferred in Italy. I do not know whether the Prince, your father, has ever acquainted you with the matter of our conferences at Gastein in 1877. At that time I had no further desire than to bind Italy and Germany together as firmly as possible, and, in part, with a view to possible hostilities against us on the part of Austria. The Prince was then preparing the alliance between the two Empires, with Andrassy, and deemed it practically impossible that Austria—who, after all, has interests in Poland that are at variance with your own—should ever become your enemy. At that time I was opposed to the cession of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria. It is true your father proposed a territorial indemnity for Italy which she never got, but the fact remains that Austria came out of the Berlin Congress stronger in the Adriatic than she had been before, while all my hopes were dashed.

(*Count Herbert*) That is true! But in 1878 you were no longer in office, and the fate of Italy was in the hands of a minister who coquetted with France.

(*Crispi*) I can express no opinion on that subject. But France was also helped, and was allowed to occupy Tunis when the time came.

(*Count Herbert*) My father believed that, by helping France in Africa, he might distract her attention from European affairs.

(*Crispi*) I understand. But all this is ancient history, and we need remember it only that it may make us wise in the future. One thing is beyond doubt,

however, that Italy's frontiers are not yet sufficiently firmly established, and that at the first opportunity Germany must help us to fix them. For the present let us hold together; let us make the alliance between the three Powers as close as possible, and we shall have nothing to fear.

(*Count Herbert*) The three united Powers are in a position to maintain peace. But we must not lose the friendship of the English government, whose strength is so necessary to you in the Mediterranean.

(*Crispi*) For my part I have done what I could to acquire Lord Salisbury's friendship.

(*Count Herbert*) And you have succeeded. I believe I shall be guilty of no indiscretion if I reveal what Lord Salisbury said to the Emperor when he was last in England. His Lordship declared that he intends to act in accordance with Italy in the Mediterranean, and added that with this in view, he had imparted special instructions to the commandant of the English fleet in your waters.

At this point our conversation was interrupted by the arrival of the King and the Emperor.

The laws concerning public instruction and associations in Tunis which were issued on September 15, 1888, by Ali Bey, 'holder of the Kingdom of Tunis,' were simply an attempt at retaliation on the part of Goblet for the check he had received in the matter of taxation at Massaua. Those regulations, although apparently intended for general application, really affected only the Italian schools and associations, and a semi-official sheet, *Le Petit Tunisien*, openly declared as much.

When France imposed her protectorate upon the Bey of Tunis by the treaty of Casr-el-Said, it was declared that the government of the French Republic would guarantee the execution of the treaties already existing between the government of the Regency and the different States of Europe.

Article 1 of the treaty of September 8, 1868, between Italy and Tunis, confirmed the Italians in the Regency in the enjoyment of 'all rights, privileges and immunities' that they had acquired, either by usage or by treaty. The government of the Republic, therefore, made itself responsible for those rights derived from the Capitulations by which the Italians benefited.

It is true, indeed, that in 1884 the Cabinets of Paris and Rome had arranged for regulating the exercise of jurisdiction in Tunis, and the Cabinet of Rome had consented to the *suspension* of Italian consular jurisdiction, but it was expressly stipulated in the Protocol (January 25th, 1884), that all other immunities, privileges and guarantees secured by the Capitulations, by usage and by treaty, should remain in force.

Under these conditions it could not but strike Crispi as strange that the Bey should have published the above-named regulations, and that they should, moreover, bear the name of the representative of the government of the Republic.

The law which aimed at subjecting the Italian schools to the inspection of the director of public instruction in the Regency, or of his subordinates—at making him the judge of the validity of all diplomas—at rendering the teaching of the French language obligatory—at subjecting all Italian teachers wishing to open private schools to arbitrary conditions, and imposing fines and punishments, was evidently an attack upon our privileges, and was prejudicial to our rights. The same could be said of the other law that sought to impose conditions upon Italians wishing to form associations, and to dissolve such associations as already existed. The following were some of the 'immunities, privileges and rights' that had been guaranteed by usage and by treaty with the Regency: (1) Italian schools and associations in Tunis to be subject to Italian law alone: (2) the privilege granted our fellow-countrymen to have their children educated in Italian institutions controlled by Italian laws, also the right to form associations, as had always been done, for purposes of charity, mutual aid, etc., etc.: (3) the guarantee that the *status quo* would not be disturbed as long as these treaties existed.

Crispi's protests and the incident that they brought about are clearly set forth in the documents given below ¹ :—

22 *Sept.* 1888.—From Tunis. (Berio, Italian Consul-General.) I hereby inform you that a law issued by the Bey, but inspired by annexationist ideas, subjects all schools to French inspection. Another decree forbids associations that have not been authorised. Both measures are evidently directed against Italian institutions only.

23 *Sept.*—Crispi to Berlin, Vienna and London. He calls attention to the fact; considers that the Bey's new laws cannot be applied to Italians: (1) because of the rights they derive from the Capitulations (article 2 of the Protocol of Jan. 25, 1884): (2) because of article 14 of the treaty with Tunis of Sept. 8, 1868. Local government is to be informed of these conditions, and it is to be pointed out that said laws are a move towards secret annexation, and also retaliation in consequence of recent events at Massaua.

24 *Sept.*—From Paris (Ressman). The *Havas* announces that the decrees concerning schools and associations are permanent in character and were issued by the Bey in the exercise of his high sovereign rights. Goblet sent an indirect message to Ressman to the effect that the greatest prudence and consideration will be used in enforcing these laws where Italians are concerned.

¹ Count de Moüy, in his *Souvenirs* (pp. 264-266), acknowledges that Minister Goblet, by creating the incident in question, sought revenge for the check he had received concerning taxation at Massaua, but he gives a most inaccurate account of the way it was developed. He declares that Crispi had *un esprit trop fin et trop pratique pour soulever la moindre objection* (!) Now the documents we have given clearly prove how many 'objections' Crispi did raise, and how he succeeded in achieving his purpose. In explanation of de Moüy's error, it must be remembered that he was no longer Ambassador when the incident relating to the schools at Tunis took place.

28 Sept.—Crispi to Paris—He repeats that the Tunisian decrees violate the Capitulations which both the Bey and France had recognised. ‘If the Bey of Tunis were an independent prince,’ Crispi telegraphs, ‘I should know what to do. But as he is under the protection of France, like a ward under his guardian, I am obliged to apply to the protecting Power for an explanation of this very serious matter. There are 28,000 Italians in Tunis. . . . We cannot relinquish our privileges. . . . It must not be forgotten that consular jurisdiction at Tunis is *suspended*, not *abolished*. . . .’

29 Sept.—Crispi to the Italian Consul at Tunis—He has received the text of the Tunisian decrees from Paris. The Bey has the right to re-organise the public schools, but his right ceases at the threshold of schools instituted by private individuals or by foreign societies. Crispi hopes the law in question will respect the right acquired and explicitly recognised. He observes that it defines as crimes certain acts whose authors must be brought before the courts. The consular jurisdiction is not abolished but only suspended. He charges Berio to communicate these objections to the French Resident, in order that our silence may not be interpreted as acquiescence.

29 Sept.—From Paris (Ressman)—Has had an interview with Goblet, whom he reproached for having decided upon such an act without a previous friendly understanding with the Italian government. Goblet replied that the Massaua affair had discouraged him. He maintained that the Bey’s decrees could not be said to violate either the Capitulations or any acquired right, as everything depended upon the way they were applied. Goblet

had instructed Massicault not to attempt to put these decrees into execution without first seeking the consent and support of His Majesty's Consul. Goblet does not see how we can contest the justice of a school inspection for purely hygienic purposes, to which he himself would not think of objecting should we see fit to order it in French institutions established in Italy. He declares that he wishes to avoid all debate and intends to respect both the Capitulations and our rights; but he demands that we recognise the right and duty of the protecting Power to guide the Power protected on the path of civilisation. Goblet wonders at our susceptibility, as we ourselves had announced our intention of establishing a board of school inspection and direction of our own in Tunis. He ended by saying: 'Wait for the application of the decrees; they will either not be applied at all, or they will be applied with all consideration and according to an agreement between your consul and ourselves.' Ressman announces that the fall of the Ministry is believed to be imminent, and that an understanding may perhaps be more easily established with Goblet's successor, who will not be smarting from the wounds inflicted by us at Massowah and Zula.

30 *Sept.*—From Paris (Ressman). The *Havas* has published an account of the interview between Ressman and Goblet. The debate has broken out afresh. They accuse us of a desire to fire the mine. Goblet is absent. Ressman asks for instructions as to the line of conduct he is to pursue at their next interview.

1 *Oct.*—Crispi to Paris.—'A self-respecting government, in treating with another, abstains from publishing the interviews that take place between

its members and foreign ministers. Such publicity is resorted to only when there is no intention of bringing the contention to a peaceful issue. Neither directly nor indirectly can we admit the Bey's right to stipulate the regulations that shall control the instruction to be imparted privately by fellow-countrymen of our own in Italian institutions in Tunis. I repeat what I have said before. Should Europe acknowledge such a right, we should feel bound to apply like decrees to all foreign institutions and corporations here in Rome, most of which are French. Had we desired to stir up a debate by our protest, we should not have telegraphed to you as we did. But M. Goblet appears actuated by widely different sentiments. In conclusion, we cannot rest satisfied with the assurances given us concerning the way the decrees will be applied to our institutions. We repudiate the decrees themselves, as based upon an illegal principle, as violating our rights and as contrary to the Capitulations and the treaties still in force. . . .'

1 Oct.—From Paris (Ressman). Will discuss the Tunisian decrees again at his next interview with Goblet. To show with what consideration he intended to treat us, Goblet declared that he had instructed Massicault to appoint the director of one of the Italian schools, a member of the Council of Public Instruction, to be established in the Regency.

3 Oct.—From Paris (Ressman). Has an interview with Goblet who repeats all the arguments adduced at their previous meetings. Ressman declares to him that we repudiate the decrees. Goblet replies that he has never asked us to accept them. For his part, he maintains that the Bey, or rather the Protectorate, had a perfect right to issue

them, they being calculated to aid good administration and promote civilisation. Goblet demands only that we reserve our judgment until such a time as they shall be applied, which will not be attempted at Tunis without the consent and support of the Italian Consul.

7 Oct.—From Tunis (Berio). Has had a consultation with Massicault. This official proposes to exempt such schools as are already established from obligatory authorisation, and to use the utmost consideration in carrying out the inspections which are to take place only after previous notification to His Majesty's Consul and in his presence. But he insists that schools to be founded in the future shall be properly authorised, and submit to the right of surveillance. Massicault does not believe that the Capitulations give us any rights in this respect. Berio proposes to Massicault (*ad referendum*) to send him an annual or semi-annual report on our schools, containing all statistical particulars, and an account of their moral and material situation. Massicault accepts this proposal, and will inform Goblet of it.

9 Oct.—From Berlin (Riva, Italian *chargé-d'affaires*). The German Ambassador at Paris has informed the government of the Republic of the Berlin Cabinet's desire that the question be treated diplomatically and not administratively. At the same time he let it be understood that the text of the Capitulations in no wise sanctions the new Tunisian decrees. This would appear sufficient to convey to the French government that, as in the case of the Massowah episode, should France persist in the attitude she has assumed, she would find herself confronted by Germany also.

11 *Oct.*—From Paris (Ressman).—Münster (German Ambassador) has read him a Note from Bismarck containing instructions to the German Ambassador at Paris identical with those described in the preceding document.

12 *Oct.*—(Ressman).—Goblet's declarations to Münster were conciliatory and pacific in the extreme. France is in a position that obliges her to avoid complications: Italian schools already existing to be respected absolutely: no inspection to be carried out save in the presence of the Italian Consul. Lord Salisbury himself has declared he sees no objections to the application of the Bey's decrees to English schools at Tunis. Goblet added that our threat of retaliation upon French schools at Rome would please the French radicals, as most of those institutions are convent schools. Goblet repeatedly assured Münster that he intended in every way to respect our rights and the Capitulations.

16 *Oct.*—Crispi to Paris.—Ressman must declare to Goblet that the Bey's two decrees are not applicable to Italian citizens residing in the Regency. Münster will sustain the same argument. Crispi desires to settle the question in a friendly manner.

19 *Oct.*—Crispi to Berlin, Vienna and London.—As regards the Bey's decrees, Italy's position differs from that of all the other Powers, who have neither schools nor associations in Tunis. For them it is simply a question of principle, whereas for us, it is a question both of principle and of fact. It is probable that questions will be put on this subject when Parliament resumes its labours. The incident must therefore be settled at once.

19 *Oct.*—Crispi to Paris.—Berlin replied to the French Ambassador, Herbette, that Germany will

support us, the jurists of the Empire being unanimous in declaring in favour of our thesis concerning the question of rights. We shall be satisfied if Goblet orders Massicault to declare to Berio that the decrees will not be applied to our institutions.

21 Oct.—Crispi to Paris—‘It would really appear that M. Goblet desires to repeat the fable of the Wolf and the Lamb, but I have not the slightest intention to act the part of the lamb. We protest against the Bey’s decrees of Sept. 15, which offend us, and he would make it appear that our protest is a provocation. The provocation comes from him who offended, and we are the party provoked. Our position in Tunis is peculiar and unlike that of any other European Power. No other Power has schools in the Regency and a colony so numerous, for whom the means of education must be provided. By accepting the Bey’s decrees without protest the other Powers are yielding nothing to France, for no right of theirs is being assailed. To them it is merely a question of principle. Wishing to give Count Bismarck a proof of my willingness to compromise, I told him I would not insist upon the publication of a new decree revoking that of Sept. 15. I shall be satisfied if M. Massicault will declare to our Consul, Berio, that the new legislative regulations do not apply to our schools and associations in Tunis, and that they shall never be enforced against them. I believe Count Bismarck telegraphed this to Count Münster, and I desire to acquaint you with this fact that you may know that the conciliatory proposals for the solving of this problem came originally from us, and not from Berlin. You must know, furthermore (but this is in confidence), that, five days since, the Nunzio telegraphed to the

Vatican that Goblet was greatly perplexed how to act; that he was disposed to yield to Italy, but wished to safeguard his dignity. Now I am not particular as to form—it is the substance that interests me, and the solution I have proposed and which is supported by Germany, should satisfy both parties. Under these circumstances the Ambassador at Paris must shape his course in such a manner as to obtain justice.'

21 Oct.—From Vienna (Avarna, Italian *chargé-d'affaires*). Kálnoky recognises that Italy is in the right. But Austria-Hungary has no personal interest either in Tunisian or in Egyptian affairs.

21 Oct.—From London (Catalani, Italian *chargé-d'affaires*). The Foreign Office, which has taken the opinion of the Crown's legal advisers, has meanwhile expressed the following views: (1) that France had no right to cause the Bey to issue a decree which he himself would have had no right to issue before the French occupation: (2) that England, when she consented to the abolition of the Capitulations as regards the administration of justice, did not grant France any power in matters concerning English schools.

22 Oct.—From Paris (Menabrea).—Münster has informed Menabrea of Crispi's conversation with Herbert Bismarck concerning the Bey's decrees. Menabrea went to Goblet for the purpose of acquainting him with Crispi's conciliatory proposal. Goblet replied that he had instructed Massicault to arrange the matter with Berio, and that he would therefore prefer not to discuss it with Menabrea. This gentleman asked what instructions had been imparted to the French Resident. Goblet answered that 'none of the existing conditions would be

altered, and that the decrees would not be applied to our present schools and associations, save with the consent of the Italian Consul.' To this Menabrea replied 'that it was not a question of the present only, and that His Majesty's government would never consent to allow the decrees to threaten future institutions.' I begged Goblet to consider the consequences of a conflict, should His Majesty's government refuse to allow the inspections under these conditions. Goblet clung obstinately to his first answer, and would listen to no comment, interpreting our treaty and the Protocol of Jan. 25, 1884 in his own way, despite the fact that the second article is extremely explicit. I could not refrain from telling him that, as the decrees in question were destined to work a radical change in the institutions of the oldest and most numerous European colony in Tunis—the French residents being about 3000—it would have been fitting to consult Italy on the subject. To this Goblet retorted: 'Our troops are there to protect the interests of you Italians.' Hereupon I flew into a rage, and declared to him that I knew well enough how the French had entered Tunis, and that Italy stood in no need of French protection. She was quite capable of protecting herself, as she had done before the arrival of the French at Tunis, of which country we had never had to complain in any way. Moreover, I added, Italy has a right to be respected, which is a fact but insufficiently grasped in France, and I brought this most unpleasant conversation with this hot-headed and quarrelsome individual to a close, by repeating to him Your Excellency's conciliatory *ultimatum*. He would not accept it, and I withdrew, leaving with him all the responsibility of the con-

sequences of his refusal. It is apparent that he wishes to leave a door open by means of which fresh annoyances may be created in the event of the foundation of new institutions at Tunis. I think Berio should be instructed to maintain firmly Your Excellency's proposal in dealing with Massicault. Before going to see Goblet I asked for an account of his previous interviews with Ressiman, whom I cannot but admire for his firmness and forbearance, and for having so long borne with the arguments of his antagonist.'

23 Oct.—From Berlin (Riva).—Has had a conference with Holstein to whom he presented a memorandum. Holstein remarks upon the favourable change in the attitude of the English Cabinet, which is due to German influence. England's anxiety concerning the Maltese schools at Tunis is a good sign. In the interests of peace he feels that everything directly humiliating to the French government should be avoided. Italy might accept a purely practical solution of the incident, that is to say, be satisfied with a tacit engagement not to execute the decrees, and reserve the right to point out and protest against such acts as should imply a violation of that engagement.

23 Oct.—Crispi to Tunis.—The Consul must confine himself to declaring the decrees inapplicable. The Ministry has decided to treat the question exclusively at Paris. The Consul will therefore be careful not to compromise himself with the French Resident.

20 Oct.—Crispi to Paris.—Menabrea's conduct is commended. The question can only be dealt with at Paris. Berio has been instructed simply to declare that, in our eyes, the decrees are null. Goblet has shown himself incapable of appreciating

the moderation with which we have acted. Menabrea is authorised to make a last effort with him, after having consulted Münster. If this fail, we will decide what steps to take. Ressman's attitude has been praiseworthy throughout.

24 Oct.—From Paris (Menabrea). A conference with Goblet. Our conversation was less heated than on the occasion of our first meeting. We each repeated the arguments before used. Menabrea pointed out that by these decrees the Bey had perpetrated an act which the Sultan himself, his sovereign lord, would never have dared to put into execution in the Ottoman Empire, and against which the French would be the first to rebel. The three ambassadors of Germany, Italy, and England all happened to be at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the same time (24th). Münster had already urged Goblet to assume a more yielding attitude, and Lord Lytton, who is entirely of our way of thinking, had told Menabrea that it was untrue that Lord Salisbury had accepted the decrees, as Goblet affirmed, but that the question had been submitted to the legal advisers of the Crown. Although Goblet has not as yet accepted Crispi's proposal, he appeared much shaken, and is perhaps convinced that the best thing for him to do will be to yield when Berio makes his declarations.

26 Oct.—From Vienna (Avarna).—Has had an audience with Kálnoky, who admires Crispi's moderation in handling this matter. Although Austria is not directly interested in it, it nevertheless interests her indirectly, she being especially anxious that peace shall be maintained, and that her ally Italy be not involved in a contest. Kálnoky is aware of the advice sent to Paris from London

and Berlin. This will surely induce France to avoid strife.

26 Oct.—Crispi to Paris, Vienna, Berlin, (private). Announces that he has been informed that Lord Salisbury, in the course of a conversation with His Majesty's *chargé-d'affaires* in London, concerning the Bey's decrees, said that he had already expressed his opinion of them from a political point of view, and had informed Goblet that he considered their issue to have been both impolitic and ill-advised.

26 Oct.—Crispi to Tunis.—‘The arguments contained in Massicault's Note (communicated by Berio) are entirely worthless. To us, Tunis is a Capitulation country, both because it is subject to Mussulman rule and in virtue of the uncontested right which Italy has enjoyed there from time immemorial. This right is set forth in article 1 of our treaty, which is binding with the Bey, and was recognised by France in the Protocol of Jan. 25, 1884. According to the Capitulations, everything relating to the moral, intellectual and juridical life of the Italian colony is independent of the authority of the Bey's government. Articles 15 and 18 are mistakenly quoted, as they relate only to the material and financial side, and cannot be applied to the schools and associations that are not industrial: they furthermore constitute an exception, and before the law exceptions do not admit of elastic interpretation. As to the Convention of June 8, 1883, between France and Tunis, it is evident that it cannot affect the stipulations existing between the Bey and other Powers. It is, moreover, anterior to the Protocol of Jan. 25, 1884, between France and ourselves, wherein it is especially stipulated that all immunity and every privilege derived either

from the Capitulations, from usage or from treaty, shall remain in force. In other words, before the Protectorate, the Bey would have had no more right to issue these decrees than Turkey would now have to issue them in the Ottoman Empire, and should she attempt to do so, France would immediately protest. Now the Protectorate cannot alter the judicial condition of third parties: (1) because it was established without their consent; (2) because the Bardo treaty declared the rights of third parties to be inviolable; (3) because our rights, immunities and privileges were recognised and guaranteed by the protecting Power herself. The Bey, occupying as he does, the position of vassal to France, we cannot deal with him as we should with an independent sovereign. Furthermore, the decrees having been drawn up at Paris and signed by the Bey simply as a matter of form, it is at Paris that we must seek the solution of the problem. Confine yourself therefore, to declaring that, in the eyes of the Italian government and for the reasons above stated, the decrees are inapplicable, and must not be applied to our institutions or to our present or future associations. You will also demand a formal guarantee of these conditions. Should the Resident refuse, you may declare that you have not been authorised to discuss the matter further.'

27 Oct.—From Paris (Menabrea).—Has informed Goblet of Crispi's telegram to Berio (see document, 26 Oct.) declaring the decrees to be inapplicable and insisting that they be not applied to our institutions (schools and associations) present or future at Tunis.

He begged Goblet to take Note of this declara-

tion. Goblet did so, protesting on his part, that he still persisted in his previous interpretation.

24 Oct. 2, 7, and 14 Nov.—From Tunis (Reports).—Berio (contrary to the ministerial orders) entered into a discussion with Massicault. His reports are full of details concerning his conversations with the French Resident. The only noteworthy report is the one in which Berio deals with the probabilities of success of a plan suggested by the Ministry, to draw the British Consul into the discussion and, through him, the director of the English College of the Jewish Society at Tunis. This director, a certain Perpetuo of Leghorn, a weak, ambitious individual, but clever and well-educated withal, had ingratiated himself with the French Resident, and could therefore hardly be of use to us.

4 Nov.—Crispi to the Consul at Tunis.—‘You have failed to carry out my instructions of Oct. 24. You were to demand that the Bey’s government take formal note of our declarations that the Tunisian decrees are not applicable and will not be allowed to be applied to our institutions and associations, present or future. If the Bey’s government refused to take note of this, you were to declare that you were instructed to abstain from all further discussion. You should therefore have refused to receive Massicault’s fresh proposals even *ad referendum*. The legal position of His Majesty’s government is absolutely impregnable, and it intends to maintain this position. Inform M. Massicault that you exceeded your powers in accepting (*ad referendum*) the proposals he has made, and which His Majesty’s government refuses to examine. The Bey’s government has only to take note of your declarations,

and should it refuse to do so, we intend to transfer the debate to Paris.'

11 *Nov.*—From Tunis (Berio).—He admits that, in the course of conversation with Massicault he discussed the means of arriving at an understanding, but without assuming any obligations.

31 *Dec.*—From Paris (Menabrea).—Goblet spoke to Menabrea of a misunderstanding between Massicault and Berio concerning the faculty of settling the question of the decrees between themselves and on the spot. Menabrea had received instructions that it should be discussed at Paris only, whereas Goblet wished it to be arranged at Tunis.

1 *Jan.* 1889.—Crispi to the Ambassador at Paris.—From the very beginning the instructions imparted to Berio had been that he was to abstain from entering into any engagement concerning the question of the schools. But M. Massicault, both by direct means and through M. Benoit, secretary of the Residency, sought to induce Berio to accept certain conditions that might compromise the legal position we had assumed towards the government of the Republic, which is, that neither at present nor in the future are the Bey's decrees to be applied to our schools and associations. Upon his sending in reports of certain proposals made by Massicault, Berio was strictly forbidden to receive such proposals, which might prove prejudicial to our rights, and was ordered to devote his attention to compiling a plan for an adjustment which he must work out alone and then forward to Rome for examination and consideration. He was, however, forbidden to undertake any negotiations with the Residency, under any circumstances whatsoever. Crispi, therefore, can only confirm those instructions already

imparted to Menabrea, that the question is to be dealt with in Paris and nowhere else.

18 *Jan.*—From Tunis (Berio).—Massicault has told him that the question of the schools has been settled between Paris and Rome. The bases of the adjustment are, he says, as follows: the schools already in existence will remain under the régime of the *status quo*; schools coming into existence in the future, to be subject to the Bey's decree.

19 *Jan.*—Crispi to Tunis.—The news imparted to Berio by Massicault is inexact. No adjustment has taken place. The Italian government will continue to refuse to recognise the lawfulness of the Bey's decrees, even as regards schools to be opened later on.

16 *Jan.*—From Tunis (Berio).—Sends a copy of a Note addressed to him by Massicault for the purpose of establishing: (1) that negotiations had not been initiated by himself (Berio), but by the Resident; (2) that Berio made proposals *ad referendum*, and as coming from him personally.

30 *Sept.* 1890.—From Paris (Menabrea).—In the weekly meeting, Ribot reminded Menabrea incidentally of the discussions that had taken place with Goblet concerning the founding of new schools at Tunis, which schools it was proposed to subject to previous authorisation. The matter had remained undecided, the Italian government having declared that at that moment it was not a question of establishing new schools, but only of maintaining those already in existence in the same conditions as before. Now, in consideration of the fact that new schools were about to be opened, Ribot asks whether His Majesty's government still holds the same opinions concerning its rights, and whether, if it must decline to apply for regular

authorisation, the Italian government will not, at least, inform the Bey's government of its intentions in this respect. Menabrea replied that at the present moment he had no authorisation to discuss the matter, but that he was firmly convinced His Majesty's government would not relinquish any rights of which it believes itself to be possessed, for as Italy was allowed to establish schools as best suited her throughout the rest of the Turkish Empire, she maintained that the same right was hers in the Regency, which country, French Protectorate notwithstanding, had not ceased to be considered as forming part of the Ottoman Empire. It is for this reason we still maintain the rights derived from the Capitulations, save in those particulars where we have temporarily compromised, and which have to do with the establishing of tribunals. Ribot, who did not press the point, confined himself to expressing his hope that the Italian government would inform him when new schools were to be opened, and begged Menabrea to communicate with the Ministry on this matter.

11 Nov. 1890.—Crispi to Paris.—Menabrea's language has our full approval. It is not, however, deemed advisable to yield even in so far as to promise to inform the government of the Regency when new schools are to be opened in Tunis. Be this as it may, the question to-day is an idle one, as no new schools have been opened there, nor is there any prospect of any such event.

As has been clearly demonstrated, Italy's rights suffered no violation. The French government was in the wrong, and tacitly recognised the fact. Crispi might have denounced the Protocol of 1884, and have re-established Italian consular jurisdiction at Tunis, which had merely been suspended, but

he did not wish to do so. In France, however, no one gave him credit for the moderation he manifested throughout.

From Francesco Crispi's diary :—

22 Oct.—Solms reads me a Note in which the Sultan of Zanzibar is recommended to the consideration of the Italian government. His position is badly shaken, and he must be helped to reinstate himself.

. . . He (Solms) reminds me of what was arranged with Herbert Bismarck concerning a combined action for the prevention of the slave trade.

. . . The Sultan of Morocco no longer goes to Tangiers: he is said to fear Spain. The conference dealing with the affairs of that country should seek to bring about the stipulation of a treaty to facilitate relations with the different states of Europe. It should furthermore determine the rules for the governing of the mixed tribunals, define the state of those enjoying protection, fix the extent of consular authority over them, and finally ensure the well-being of foreigners.

. . . The journey to Constantinople recently undertaken by the Grand-Dukes Serge and Paul of Russia had no political significance. They visited the Patriarch of Constantinople who talked to them of the mighty Orthodox Church, and asked for the Czar's patronage. The work and influence of the Greek Church would appear to be increasing both in importance and extent in the East, much to the detriment of the Latin Church.

(From the French.)

25 Oct.

To His Excellency M. de Giers,

Minister of Foreign Affairs, St. Petersburg.

This day is a memorable landmark in Your

Excellency's brilliant career, and fifty years of faithful and devoted service have entitled you to the gratitude of your August Sovereign and to the admiration of all right-minded men.

Allow me to congratulate you in the name of His Majesty's government, and in my own. With equal zeal we are both pursuing the same end—the maintenance of order. It is therefore as a collaborator that I express to Your Excellency my most sincere hope that Russia and Europe may long continue to benefit by your sage counsels, which are a precious guarantee for the preservation of peace. CRISPI.

(From the French.)

*To Signor Crispi,
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

I beg Your Excellency to accept my most sincere thanks for your congratulations and the good wishes you so kindly expressed on the occasion of my jubilee. You may rest assured that I value them most highly. GIER.

27 Oct.—Count Solms speaks to me about the new French ambassador, M. Mariani,¹ who is conciliatory, *souple*, and an authority on all matters relating to commerce.

China: passports—those of German subjects, not issued in Germany, are refused the *visé*. Thanks to France for the protection she has afforded up to the present. Italy will do the same. Solms asks for a copy of the Note we shall send to France on the subject.

¹ During his short mission (he died in Rome in 1890), M. Mariani did not, of course, modify the French policy in regard to Italy, but he gained the esteem of all by his impartial views and loyal bearing.

9 Nov.—Solms : he brings me a work on Biserta.

. . . He tells me of the new ambassador Minister Vega de Armajo wishes to send to Rome. Vega himself is a good Catholic, and would be glad to be of service to the Pope. He will keep on friendly terms with the three Powers, without showing any hostility to France.

. . . The French are planning a railway from Oran to Figig—said to be for military purposes.

. . . It would appear from a Note of the 19th, that the Sultan is coquetting alternately with the Franco-Russian group and the Triple Alliance. It would not be to the Sultan's advantage to ally himself with the Three Powers. He would like to know who was the author of the famous letter in the *Correspondance de l'Est*.

20 Nov.—Count Kálnoky, upon whom His Majesty has conferred that highest of Italian orders, the 'Santissima Annunziata,' has written to me expressing his appreciation of this manifestation of the Sovereign's regard and his appreciation of the policy we are following, and protesting the sincerity of his (Kálnoky's) sentiments for me. This high honour conferred upon Count Kálnoky is a proof of the friendly relations that have been established between Italy and Austria. As long ago as last June, Emperor Francis Joseph expressed his satisfaction at the good results obtained through Crispi's policy. Count Nigra wrote in a private letter of June 2 : 'Count Kálnoky told me in confidence that His Majesty the Emperor desires to give you a proof of his especial good-will and esteem by conferring upon Your Excellency the Grand Cordon of the Order of St. Stephen, this being the highest order which is conferred upon foreigners (the Golden

Fleece is reserved for Austrian subjects, and foreign princes and sovereigns).’

27 Nov.—De Bruck.—Comes to inform me of Kálnoky’s apprehensions concerning Tunisian affairs. He has been told that relations between Berio and Massicault are strained and that a rupture may take place at any time. Kálnoky dreads a war in Africa.

I replied that there is nothing to fear. Berio has been instructed not to deal with the question of the schools, which is to be left to our Ambassador at Paris, where the matter must be settled.

. . . The three Powers are agreed concerning Bucharest.

3 Dec.—A visit from De Bruck. Boulanger declares that he desires a tolerant Republic, which shall be open to all. There are those who believe he will become a second Monk. Audiffret-Pasquier declared in the Senate that he has cut himself loose from his friends in the Chamber. At the next general elections the conservatives will vote for their own people, and do all they can to conquer. Should they fail, they will vote for Boulanger.

. . . Boulanger is labouring successfully to prepare for the elections. The radicals are counting upon the ‘opportunists’ to help them fight Boulanger and the Right. Carnot will not authorise Floquet to dissolve the Chamber, as he intends to reserve this expedient for a new Freycinet ministry.

At the beginning of December Crispi received the following report on the internal conditions in France :—

We have passed through a fortnight that has not been devoid of incident and startling events. It began with the announcement of a *coup d’état* that appeared in several newspapers, and which had been

planned, so it was said, by the Floquet Ministry against General Boulanger and his adherents. Certain particulars were given descriptive of the manner in which it was to be carried out, which at first lent a semblance of truth to the report. But it soon became apparent that it was no more nor less than a scheme for bringing about interpellations at the Chamber, thus forcing the Ministry into explanations concerning the projects attributed to it, and, consequently, by obliging it to deny the supposed measures, which it would declare illegal, cause it, in a way, to compromise itself. Although this *coup d'état* was merely a deception, there can be no doubt that such an arrangement was contemplated, that plotting is still going on to rid the country of General Boulanger, whose influence is rather increasing than diminishing, and that the leaders are becoming ever more fearful, as the time approaches for the elections, which will take place next year.

The great demonstration of the second of last December, upon which one party counted to provoke an outburst of hostility against Boulanger, while on the other hand, the municipal body—which is also opposed to him—hoped to make it a pedestal upon which it might install itself and see its attempts to acquire supremacy over the city of Paris crowned with success, that demonstration, we repeat, failed utterly. On the contrary, at the meeting which took place at the same time at Nevers, General Boulanger was able to gather about him those leaders who, while holding conflicting opinions on other points, are unanimous in wishing to put an end to the present system of government, to which the public is daily growing more hostile in consequence of the frequent scandals in which members of Parliament are the

principal actors, accusing each other of peculation, and violating all the laws of decency by their unseemly conduct even during the public sessions of the Chamber. Boulanger's path is thus smoothed for him, and although it is impossible to foretell what his ultimate purpose may be—if indeed he have an ultimate purpose—he nevertheless skilfully avoids compromising his position as regards public opinion, by declaring that all his efforts are directed towards the preservation of the Republic, which is threatened and compromised by the disorders of all sorts for which the present system may be justly reproached. What would the Republic be like under Boulanger? The Orleanist and Bonapartist parties both hope to make use of him for their own ends; but it is far from impossible that, between the two litigants, while the people hesitate in their decision, General Boulanger may take the middle course and himself remain at the head of the Republic, which he will have re-organised, and which may assume various forms while retaining the same name—even that of an empire, as happened under Napoleon I, whose first coins bear on one side the legend—*République Française*, and on the other, *Napoléon Empereur*.

It is very doubtful whether Boulanger will be able to reach this point, and it is entirely useless to speculate as to the future, for in this country more than in any other, the morrow is always uncertain. The utter confusion of views now prevailing in France has given rise to unlimited freedom in the press, which, of course, is abused. The first to protest against this freedom are those very men who once fought for it with conviction, and one of these is ex-president Jules Grévy himself, who, on

one occasion, confessed that he had erred when he supported the press law in Parliament. Among the points which warrant attacks upon the government, one of the most serious is the financial disorder of the state, which drags from one department to another an ever-increasing deficit, that will presently reach the sum of one thousand millions, and which, at present, there is no prospect of the government's being able to cover. An income tax was proposed to meet this emergency, but it has recently been almost unanimously rejected by the Parliamentary Commission, so that, unless the Ministry withdraw the bill, it will certainly provoke a lively discussion in which the ministry will be beaten. At all events, it is the financial question which will bring about the struggle of the parties against the Ministry, some wishing to overthrow it, others to subject it to radical reform. Amidst these intrigues and the parliamentary unrest, the statesman who would appear to have attained to the most solid position and the enjoyment of true esteem, is the Minister of War, M. Freycinet, who displays a talent so exceptional in the execution of his important functions, that, although he is not a soldier, he has acquired the respect of the army, by confining himself to his especial department, and devoting his whole attention to perfecting both morally and materially that powerful instrument which military men are destined to handle. He is ever striving to better the condition both of soldiers and officers; he seeks to banish that spirit of rivalry which has proved so fatal to France; he endeavours to specialise the functions of the various elements of which the army is composed, and place a check upon that supremacy by means of which certain

branches are ever seeking to get the upper hand. For this purpose he has decreed that all branches of the service shall receive the same treatment, and he arranges that the functions of the different elements composing the army be clearly defined so that each may contribute with all its strength towards the accomplishment of the common purpose. Being an engineer of distinction, he takes a lively interest in the organisation of the railways, that mobilisation and concentration may be effected with the greatest possible rapidity, and also that manœuvres, both of attack and defence, may be effectually supported.

The organisation of works of fortification for resisting the powerful means of attack which have but now been introduced into the different armies, forms the object of his particular attention. He also gives especial attention to the manufacturing of new weapons adapted to the powerful explosives recently discovered, and the work of producing these new guns is being so actively pushed that it is expected the whole army will be provided before the middle of next year. There is reason to believe that, in the matter of explosives, France, at the present moment, surpasses all other nations, and it is precisely upon this superiority that the confidence of prevailing both in attack and defence is based. The requisites with which this army will be equipped will be such as to necessitate an entirely new system of tactics. Such a system is in course of elaboration, but as it is without precedent, its rules must still remain somewhat vague. The superiority which France has acquired, and still holds, in the preparation of explosives, is largely due to the fact that that branch of the service is entrusted to a corps of

especially trained engineers, who have nothing in common with those of the artillery, and who give their whole attention to the study of this important subject. The researches which led to the combination of the explosives now in use were carried on in the central powder manufactory near Paris, and the most eminent scientists of the French Institute, such men as M. Berthelot, ex-minister of public instruction and author of a standard work on explosives, were glad to participate in them. The chemical composition of these new powders is sufficiently well known, since several foreign Powers, Germany among others, have been able to obtain samples. But what still remains to be discovered is how they are manipulated. Meanwhile, until equally good results have been obtained elsewhere, it will be well to bear in mind that the French army has an advantage in this respect. An officer who has had experience with these new weapons, and who has witnessed the experiments executed with them, informed me, not long since, that he had been amazed by the projectile force of this powder. It produces hardly any smoke, the noise of the explosion is that of an ordinary cartridge, the trajectory is so tense that up to 500 metres there is no need to alter the gauge, and the penetrating force of the Lebel rifle is such that, at that distance, the bullets will pierce seven or eight centimetres of paper bound together as in a book. The effects produced by the explosion of these projectiles from the muzzle are well known, but another important feature to be taken into account is the intensely poisonous nature of the gases they develop. I will end this military digression by stating that among the present ministers, the one who occupies the

most solid position is, as I said before, M. Freycinet. He is outside the orbit of political disputes, and while giving his undivided attention to his present office, is holding himself in readiness for the future.

There remains for me to speak of the relations that appear to exist at the present moment between France and Russia. It has been observed that recently many princes of the Imperial family of Russia have been making prolonged stays in France, sometimes at Biarritz, but more often in Paris, where they are warmly welcomed not only by the entire population, but by the President of the Republic himself. At the present moment Russia is looked upon almost as an ally; the loan of five hundred millions she has recently contracted with one of the leading Paris banks is the bond that unites the two countries. Consequently the speculators are directing all their efforts towards ensuring the success of the loan, to the detriment of other securities, especially the Italian, which they seek to depreciate by declaring our country to be ruined by the effects of our denunciation of the treaty of commerce with France. Not a day passes that some one, even of the more serious journals, does not contain an editorial on the financial condition of our country, calculated to persuade those who hold our bonds to rid themselves of them, and invest their money in the new Russian securities. However, it would seem that those who are in possession of Italian securities are not easily to be persuaded, and although the conditions of our country are painted in the most sombre colours for their benefit, one cannot fail to perceive here that Italy is looked upon as the *Frugum alma parens, saturnia tellus*, and although

small change may sometimes be wanting to pay the exchange, the country is believed to produce always not only enough to *keep it alive*, but to provide a certain amount of *comfort* as well.

The irritation against Italy is indeed abating, but it is nevertheless far from disappearing entirely. It is maintained by the spirit of *chauvinisme*, which dominates even the best balanced minds in this country, and although the desire is strong in many for a lasting and sincere understanding with Italy, the French people have not yet been able to accustom themselves to the fact that, when she achieved her union, Italy escaped that protectorate, at least of a moral nature, which France had intended to exercise over our nation. Among the most rabid *chauvins* the hope of a dismemberment of Italy has not yet died out, and this would account for the fact that the Pope's lamentations over the loss of the temporal power are loudly echoed, not only by the clergy, but also by the lay population of France, and even among free-thinkers and those who do not practise their religion. I am therefore convinced that by continuing to maintain firmly the principles of independence and of unity upon which the nation has been re-constructed, and, on the other hand, yielding on certain less important points which cannot effect those principles, Italy will succeed in persuading the foreigner that we have become a nation worthy of respect, and in scattering those clouds which still render it difficult to establish truly friendly relations with this country, relations whose cordiality it would be to our advantage to maintain.

CHAPTER XI

1889

The Balkan Federation and Crispi's initiative—The Paris Exposition is inaugurated—The danger of war with France: Cardinal Hohenlohe's mission to Leo XIII.: Cucchi's mission to Prince Bismarck—Italians in Paris—Abolition of differential duties and the hostility of France—Spuller's opinion of the French press.

THE year 1889 brought several painful events, and was one of serious anxiety in international politics.

The Florence, Massowah, and Tunis incidents had exasperated public opinion in France to such an extent, indeed, that the government of that country was tempted to settle the matter of the Italian schools in Tunis to its own advantage by annexing the Regency, and at one time war seemed unavoidable. Fortunately the Franco-Russian alliance was still *in fieri*, for there was also much dissatisfaction in Russia owing to the loss of influence in Bulgaria and Roumania. The Triple Alliance, around which England cautiously hovered, now displayed its power by facing and gradually settling all difficulties, showing itself united and determined, but ever on the defensive. The anxiety that then weighed upon the Chancelleries of Europe is explained by a perusal of the official documents of that period, and we also find in them the justification of the accusations that were brought against France and Russia of being the cause of all this unrest and of making the maintenance of enormous standing armies an absolute necessity.

The friendship and mutual trust that already existed between Crispi and Prince Bismarck had been strengthened by the fire of daily struggle. Italy withheld nothing from Germany, convinced as she was of the perfect sincerity of that country's peaceful intentions. Germany, on her part, being sure of Italy, furthered and enforced respect of her interests even beyond the prescriptions of the treaty of alliance. This

is brought out very clearly by the preceding extracts from the 'Diary.'

At the beginning of the new year the following good wishes were exchanged between the two statesmen :—

FRIEDRICHSRUH, 31/12, 1888.

I beg Your Excellency to accept the good wishes which my wife and I cherish for your health and happiness, and also to continue to grant me your friendship and that political sympathy which shall hold us united in the future as it has done in the past.

BISMARCK.

ROME, 1 January, 1889.

I thank Your Highness for having so kindly forestalled me. The good wishes which Your Highness and Princess Bismarck have expressed for me are identical with those which I cherish for you. My personal sentiments are too well known to Your Highness for it to be necessary for me to attempt to express the depth and sincerity of my friendship and admiration for you. I trust that our political sympathies may remain ever unchanged, for as your friends are ours, so our enemies are yours.

CRISPI.

The idea of seeking the solution of the Eastern Question in a federation of the national groups of the Balkan Peninsula was no new one.

Crispi, who, remembering the principle of nationality that had triumphed in the Italian *Risorgimento*, had long appreciated the value of such a federation, took the initiative in action directed to this end. He first discussed the plan with Bismarck and Kálmoky, and as the immediate purpose was to place a check upon Russian advance and to strengthen the Triple Alliance in the East, the two Chancellors acquiesced.

In April 1889 Crispi proposed a military league between

Roumania, Bulgaria, and Servia, to serve as a forerunner to the federation.

King Charles and the Roumanian liberals, incensed at the ingratitude which Russia, by appropriating Bessarabia, had displayed in return for the invaluable services the Roumanian army had rendered in the war of 1877, were combating Russian influence in their country, and erecting fortifications along the Seret for the purpose of cutting off Russia's best way of invading the Balkan Peninsula.

When the Roumanian minister at St. Petersburg presented his credentials to the Czar at the beginning of that year, His Majesty observed to him that 'Roumania quite misunderstood her own interests,' and expressed himself in strong language against 'the dynasty of foreign princes reigning there.' M. de Giers, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in speaking at this time to the Italian Ambassador, Marocchetti, also deplored the 'continual errors of the Roumanian policy,' and observed that the 'present dynasty, as it did not belong to the Greek Church, could not faithfully represent the true interests of the country.'

When, in consequence of parliamentary conditions in Roumania, the conservative party, which favoured Russia, came into power, M. Lascar Catargi, who was its leader, declared as follows:—

'The foreign policy which M. Carp wished to pursue is so anti-national that, had he the courage to confess to it, he would probably be unable to continue to reside in this country.

'The Rossetti-Carp Ministry, like the government of Bratiano, represented the King's personal government. It is the duty of Parliament to resist all personal government, and if the country wishes to prevent the execution of the King's personal policy in the future, it must abolish all governments of this species. *Let us not fit the handle to the scythe.*'

The outrageous nature of such language as this, and the outspoken condemnation of the foreign policy begun by Bratiano and carried on by Carp, angered the entire liberal press. England herself took up the question, and Lord Salisbury hastened to adopt measures calculated to encourage King Charles and to prevent his allowing himself to be overpowered by Russia.

On April 15 Crispi telegraphed as follows to the Italian ambassadors at Vienna and Berlin :—

From reports received we see that the language used in Parliament by M. Catargi is far from reassuring, containing as it does, a sweeping condemnation of the foreign policy pursued by the late Cabinet ; it is, moreover, most disrespectful towards the Sovereign, who is accused of having sought to establish personal government. The Prime Minister's conduct reveals the gravity of the situation, to which I should deem it superfluous to call the attention of the government to which you are accredited, did it not seem to me both advisable and even necessary for us to establish a common line of action in consideration of possible changes in Roumania.

Kindly explain the causes of my anxiety, and report to me on the subject.

On April 18 Crispi telegraphed to the ambassador at Berlin :—

I learn from St. Petersburg that the Russian government, using as a pretext the expulsion of some Russian subjects from Roumania, has ordered its Minister at Bucharest to demand :

- (1) A thorough investigation.
- (2) The punishment of those functionaries who ordered the expulsions.
- (3) Pecuniary indemnity.

It is clear that such demands can lead only to one of two consequences ; either the Roumanian government will be forced to yield in a matter concerning internal order and police regulations, of which it should itself be the only competent judge, or, if the government refuse to yield, the demands above

stated will be enforced by an action that must compromise Roumanian autonomy.

I have put the Cabinets of Vienna and London on their guard, and I believe it will be well to point out to Berlin that, as a war in the East might find an echo on the Rhine, the Berlin Cabinet has every reason to feel a lively interest in what is taking place in Roumania.

Berlin replied that the German government appreciated Crispi's arguments, but that, as Germany had no vital interests at stake in Roumania, it was rather for Austria to look to the safeguarding of territory in the Danube region. Count von Bismarck was of opinion that, if a common line of action was to be established in consideration of possible changes in Roumania, Crispi should arrange with Austria and England, and 'explain to them the reasons that had inspired his wise proposal.'

Count Kálnoky, on the other hand, replied that he was indeed uneasy concerning the situation, but that he believed the Roumanian Ministry would be short-lived, and that Russia was opposed to war. Under the circumstances, therefore, an understanding would be premature.

On April 20 Crispi despatched the following telegrams:—

To the Italian Embassy, Vienna.

(Strictly private.) I will refrain from commenting upon the opinions expressed by Count Kálnoky in his telegram of yesterday. To us the situation appears more serious than it does to the Cabinet of Vienna, and although Austria is more directly interested than we are in the question, I nevertheless feel it my duty to consider certain possible, I may even say probable, eventualities. As Count Kálnoky does not deem the present moment propitious, you will not insist upon an agreement, but confine yourself to explaining the advisability of

promoting a federal military compact between Servia, Roumania and Bulgaria, so that in case of war, their forces may from the first be directed by one head and follow one line of action. I have reason to believe that this plan would find favour with Cristic, and that King Charles would not be opposed to a union with the other Balkan States, he having, not long since, manifested his desire to conclude a customs treaty with Bulgaria. Should Count Kálnoky approve of this idea, we must arrange the manner of jointly approaching the governments interested, on the subject.

To the Italian Legation, Belgrade.

To the Italian Agency, Sofia.

(Strictly private.) I desire to know whether the idea of a military federation—which, in case of war in the Balkan Peninsula, would unite the Servian, Roumanian, and Bulgarian armies under one head, and direct their movements according to one line of action—would be favourably received by the government to which you are accredited. You must exercise the greatest caution in advancing this idea, and while dilating upon the advantages it offers, abstain from making any formal proposal. When you have carefully explored the territory, you will report.

But the scheme did not meet with Kálnoky's approbation :

I informed Kálnoky of Your Excellency's opinion concerning a military compact between the Balkan States, [so Ambassador Nigra telegraphed on April 23], Kálnoky replied that he could ask for nothing better, but that he believes : (1) there is no probability of the plan's succeeding at present : (2) that it would

have a chance of success only in case of necessity and when events threatened immediate development (that is obvious enough): (3) that the Czar has no intention of going to war, and that the allied Powers should not furnish him with a pretext for changing his attitude by promoting the foundation of a military league in the Balkans.

Crispi met these arguments in the following terms:—

As regards the Balkan federation, I am of opinion that it should be prepared in times of peace, and not when events become imminent. I have reason to believe that the idea of such a confederation is regarded with favour at Berlin, and I am sure that at Belgrade they are strongly inclined to put it into execution. In proposing an agreement upon this question among the allied Powers, I did not intend that its action should be violent or even immediate, but rather that it should proceed with every precaution, in order to avoid arousing suspicions that might lead to a diametrically opposite result. Be this as it may, I will abstain from troubling Count Kálnoky's peace of mind any further, and can only trust that the Powers may not have cause to regret this delay.

On April 25, in consequence of fresh reports of an alarming nature concerning the intentions of the Russian government towards Roumania, Crispi again wrote:—

This latest plan for a military federation in the Balkans naturally cannot and must not be carried out save by joint deliberation, in order that it may appear as the spontaneous desire of the three Powers interested, and not as a suggestion, much less a measure imposed by others. Nor do I feel that we should wait until the last moment to obtain this

arrangement. When war has once broken out there can no longer be a question of federation, but only of an alliance; and alliances are formed according to the necessities of the moment. I do not share Count Kálnoky's optimistic opinion, but I hope for his sake as well as for our own, that Russia may employ peaceful means of settling the question she evidently desires to raise in Roumania.

During the session of the chamber on May 3, Crispi replied as follows to the questions put, and the censure expressed, by several deputies of the extreme Left, concerning the leave of absence granted to the Italian ambassador at Paris on the eve of the inauguration of the Exposition¹:—

The government of the French Republic has not invited the diplomatic corps to participate in the solemn celebration of the centenary of the fifth of May and the inauguration of the Universal Exposition; consequently there can be no question of a refusal on our part. (Laughter on the right.—Protests on the extreme left.)

The President of the Chamber.—I must beg hon. members not to interrupt.

Crispi (Prime Minister).—This being the case, all political questions and all the tales invented by hon. members of the extreme Left, cease to exist, and here I might bring my remarks to a close.

I have nothing to add to the declarations I made on June 25, 1887, in replying to the Hon. Cavallotti. There is no need for me to defend myself against accusations of weakness or of having failed in the accomplishment of international obligations, because such are foreign to the matter in hand, nor am I called upon to inform the Chamber how I propose to

¹ See Acts of Parliament.

govern the country, for during my two years in office it must surely have become familiar with the line of conduct I pursue at home, and the policy I have followed and am still following abroad.

My one regret is that the Hon. Ferrari, after having attacked the living, should have referred to the tomb of a prince,¹ around which the pity and sympathy of the whole world have centred. (Cheers.)

Let us disregard all flights of oratory, all sounding and pompous phraseology! (Laughter.) Let us look at the world as it really is. There is no call for professions of faith—for we are all sons of the revolution, and, gentlemen, what mightier revolution has there ever been than the one by virtue of which we are here to-day? (Cheers.)

Every country has its memorable dates, and I feel that, in choosing this fifth of May, 1789, our French colleagues have not selected the finest moment of their revolution. I could have understood their celebrating the night from the fourth to the fifth of August, 1789, when privileges were abolished and the famous declaration made of the rights of man and of the citizen. However, we ourselves have dates that are even finer—that, for example, of the twentieth of September, 1870 (Cheers from the centre and right), which, by sweeping aside the last remnant of feudalism in politics, conferred absolute freedom of conscience upon the peoples. (Outburst of cheering from all parts of the Chamber.)

We have never expected others to solemnise this date, for every country has its own memories, and I really fail to understand the reason for all

¹ Archduke Rudolph of Austria.

this haste, eagerness, and determination to join in celebrating the dates dear to other nations, when we have our own anniversaries of such glorious memory! (Prolonged cheering.)

As a matter of fact, Ambassador Menabrea had asked for leave of absence in his letter of April 3, which began with the following words: 'Now that the Easter holidays are near at hand, I beg Your Excellency kindly to grant me permission to go to Rome as I have always been in the habit of doing every year, in order to confer with Your Excellency on such matters as are of interest to both France and Italy.'

There was no reason why Crispi should refuse this permission, as he was well aware that all the ambassadors accredited to the French government had received instructions not to participate in the inauguration of the Exposition, and were preparing to absent themselves from the city. What to Italy appeared an act of hostility against France, was but the decision of the whole of monarchical Europe, including Russia herself.

On April 20 a meeting was held of all the ambassadors present in Paris. The *chargé-d'affaires*, Ressman, who represented Menabrea during his absence, informed Crispi that several of the ambassadors demurred about allowing even the *chargés-d'affaires* to take part in the inaugural ceremony. It was finally decided, however, that they should do so semi-officially, and that they should neither wear the diplomatic uniform nor follow the President of the Republic in his inaugural tour of the Exposition. Ressman's report added: 'Foreseeing opposition on the part of a portion of the diplomatic corps, the French government long ago declared that, in order to separate all idea of a political commemoration from that of a purely industrial celebration, the centenary of the meeting of the States General would be celebrated at Versailles on May 5, foreign representatives not being invited to participate; whereas the diplomatic corps would be invited to the non-political ceremony to be solemnised in Paris on May 6. The ambassadors refuse to admit this distinction, and declare that the inaugural ceremony will be quite as much an act of homage to the revolution as the celebration at Versailles. They have therefore decided that it will be

impossible for them to assist either at the banquet offered by the city of Paris on May 11, to which the municipal body has declared its intention of inviting the entire diplomatic corps, or at the review and solemnities to take place on July 14, the centenary of the taking of the Bastille.'

Motives of delicacy deterred Crispi from revealing these particulars when he announced to the Chamber that the diplomatic corps had not been invited. He himself, however, had taken no independent steps in the matter, nor had he shown any greater hostility to France than the Russian Chancellor himself.

The political horizon was not cloudless. The internal conditions of France and the aggressive language of her press had aroused serious anxiety. Crispi had long been devoting much attention to strengthening the national defences, and the following letters to General Bertolè, Minister of War, give a fair idea of the anxiety under which he was labouring.

I.

ROME, 19 *April*, 1889.

DEAR BERTOLÈ,—This year 1889 is one of preparation. It was for this reason that we introduced, and after lengthy and violent debate at last passed, the law of Dec. 30, 1888.

We have reached the fourth month of the year, and I fear that the work of preparing firearms, of strengthening the coast defences, the entrance fortifications, and other defences at Spezia, has made but little progress, if, indeed, it has even been begun.

You must understand, my dear friend, how great is the responsibility which rests upon us both, and should war break out and find us unprepared, you and I might have to bear the consequences of a disaster for which it would certainly be unjust to make me responsible even in part.

I therefore feel it my duty to beg you to see that

the law of Dec. 30, 1888 is put into execution. I have made the same request to our colleagues, the Ministers of Marine and of Public Works, urging the Minister of Marine to look to the fortifications of the Maddalena and to the completion of other undertakings that fall within the competency of his office, and the Minister of Public Works to see to the laying of more railway tracks and the enlargement of certain stations, which would both prove matters of great importance should the mobilisation of troops become necessary.

As I have here had occasion to mention the troops, allow me to call your attention to the system of mobilisation which Italy alone of all the great Powers continues to practise, which is both slow and expensive, and in times of war might prove a source of much danger.

I have discussed this point with General Cialdini, who is in favour of the Prussian method, but who would not be adverse to the adoption of the French system, which would appear to be a compromise between the Prussian method and our own. General Cialdini had but one objection to offer, and that was in regard to the political advisability of a change, but he left it to me to decide this point.

After our country's nine-and-twenty years of life it seems to me strange, passing strange, that there should still be any doubt as to what her future will be. The national sentiment is profound in all classes of the population, and the different elements have been so thoroughly mingled by twenty-nine conscriptions that their fusion is now complete.

We must also consider that the foundation of local corps would have all the advantages that are derived from rivalry. Under the Bourbon the

regiments were formed by voluntary enlistment, and no one ever doubted their valour or energy. At Curtatone one of these regiments was subjected to the severest trials, and left a glorious memory on the field of battle.

Despite the fact that the Austrian Empire is composed of several nationalities, the territorial system has been adopted by its rulers, who might well fear the results of racial divisions and of the differences existing between various peoples, not always friendly among themselves, and often even rivals. Thank God! Italy is all of one piece, and the Peninsula is inhabited by Italians only!

The territorial system in the army would result in a far wider distribution of the military administration, and would greatly reduce expenses. . . .

The territorial system, moreover, already exists in the artillery and among the *Alpini*, and no one has ever had reason to believe that these bodies were less imbued than others with the spirit of nationalism, or that they might more easily fail in the performance of their duty.

Courage, then! and earn for yourself the glory of having brought about this reform I now propose, and which has many supporters in the army.

And now, in conclusion, let me sum up the contents of my letter by urging you to hasten the work of national defence, and transform and improve the method of mobilising our troops.

There is no time to lose!—Yours affectionately,
F. CRISPI.

(Private.)

ROME, 10 July, 1889.

MY DEAR BERTOLÈ,—I wish to call your attention to the desertions that are becoming so frequent

among the *Alpini*. They are the manifestations of a chronic disorder, which must be attended to without delay. . . .

I take this opportunity of pointing out to you that the highest offices in our army are not, in every case, adequately filled. We must recruit the ranks of our generals without delay.

Germany has already accomplished this undertaking, which is as delicate in its nature as it is necessary for the defence of the State. In Germany, moreover, the officers were still surrounded by the glory of great victories, whereas this is not the case with ours.

I will take this opportunity of recommending the greatest care and despatch in the manufacturing of the firearms, which operation, as far as I can judge, would appear to be making but slow progress.

Europe, at the present time, is a volcano, which may burst into irruption without a moment's warning, and we must be prepared. The threat of war is ever with us.

The great Powers are arming in feverish haste. . . . Unfortunately we are behind them all, and ours is precisely the country most exposed to attack.

The neighbouring Republic has made all necessary preparations for attacking us both by sea and land, and the responsibility that weighs upon the Ministry is great. You, to whom the national defence is entrusted, must feel this more than any one else.

I have discussed these matters with the King, and have made His Majesty understand that it is his duty to give them his attention.

The next war cannot be contained within the

limits of those of 1859 and 1866; the irritation and hatred are now so strong and the instruments of war so powerful, that no matter how it may end, it will be a catastrophe.

Remember that this time the glory of a brave fight will not suffice—we must conquer, and conquer at any cost.

In order to justify their own attitude towards us, the French have sought to spread the conviction, both in their own country and in ours, that I desire war, and among my enemies in Italy there are many ardent supporters of this shameful and anti-patriotic manœuvre.

No statesman can possibly wish for war, and I myself even less than another, because I am aware we are not sufficiently strong, and even were we so, I should not dare to face the consequences of a conflict whose results no one can foresee.

I beg you, dear Bertolè, to take what I have said to heart, and to do your part, that our Sovereign and our country may have no reason to complain of us.—Yours affectionately,

F. CRISPI.

In July the irritation in France, which had reached an acute stage, was causing much alarm. Crispi received information from various sources to the effect that France was but seeking a pretext to break with Italy, and he had positive knowledge of French pressure being brought to bear upon the Vatican for the purpose of inducing Leo XIII. to leave Rome. The French ambassador to the Pope, Lefèvre de Behaine, had been to Paris at the end of June and had returned to his post authorised to make a formal promise to the aged Pontiff—who was much ruffled by the recent erection of a monument to Giordano Bruno, in the *Campo di Fiori*—that France would assume the entire responsibility of the ‘Roman Question,’ if he would but furnish the pretext by changing his residence.

On July 12 Crispi’s apprehensions were confirmed by

further information supplied by one high in authority, and who had frequent intercourse with France. Alive as he was to his own responsibility towards the country, Crispi could not disregard these warnings.

The diary says:—

12 *July*.— . . . comes to tell me what he heard from S.

During the evening I send for Rattazzi (Minister of the Royal Household), who arrives towards eleven o'clock. I ask for an audience with His Majesty. At 11.30 Rattazzi writes to say the King will receive me at a quarter-past ten to-morrow morning.

13 *July*.—I am with the King at 10 o'clock. I inform him of the possibility of an attack. The necessity for defensive measures. He must see the Minister of War, Bertolè, and a special Council must be formed, composed of His Majesty, Bertolè, Brin (Minister of Marine), Cosenz (Chief of the General Staff), and myself.

Pelloux (Under-Secretary of State for War) comes to see me at eleven o'clock, and reports further desertions among the *Alpini* at San Dalmazzo.

I write to Brin. He comes at 3.15. I tell him of these desertions, and we decide what measures to adopt. At 11 Rattazzi returns. The King has summoned Bertolè, and has had a long conference with him. Bertolè is ready to do as I desire. He wishes to avoid spreading alarm, and will proceed with the greatest precaution.

14 *July*.—I am with His Majesty at half-past nine.

At half-past two Bertolè comes to the Consulta. We are agreed on all points. Mobilisation, arms, general staff, superior command, commanders-in-chief of army corps. He will consult with Cosenz

and Brin, and make all arrangements to prevent surprises either by land or by sea.

I send the deputy, Francesco Cucchi,¹ to Germany to confer with Prince Bismarck, and I give him the following letter of introduction:—

‘Your Highness will receive this letter from the deputy, Signor Cucchi, whom you have known since 1870. He will inform you of certain serious matters concerning which I cannot communicate with you by letter. Signor Cucchi enjoys my full confidence.’

15 *July*.—Minister Brin comes to Palazzo Braschi with Admiral Racchia at 11.30. We discuss the fleet and the preparations. . . . Brin complains that we are not kept well posted concerning French ports, whereas France knows everything that is taking place here. Racchia (Under-Secretary of State of Marine) gives me reassuring information.

16 *July*.—Catalani, who has been summoned from London, arrives at 12.30. I inform him that in France they are ready for war, and that their intention would appear to be to attack us by sea. The plan is a bold one, I might also say a foolhardy one, but as the information came to me from a perfectly trustworthy source, we must believe the report, and prepare to defend ourselves. I must know what Lord Salisbury’s intentions would be under these circumstances, and whether he purposes to forestall or await an attack upon us. Should we be defeated, England would lose a faithful ally on the seas. Catalani is of opinion that Lord Salisbury will not wait for us to be attacked, and that, in order to

¹ Prince Bismarck had known Francesco Cucchi since 1870, when he had been sent to German headquarters by the Committee of the Left party, of which Crispi was the leading spirit, to obtain an assurance from Bismarck that the occupation of Rome by the Italians would be recognised.

prevent war, he will send a powerful fleet into the Mediterranean. Catalani leaves again to-night, and will telegraph me from London on Friday.

‘ You may tell Lord Salisbury that I shall carefully avoid provoking France and that I shall do nothing that can furnish a pretext for hostilities ; should war break out, I shall have been driven into it.’

Catalani asks whether I have taken steps to reinstate consular jurisdiction in Tunis. I reply that the question has been laid aside for the present, and that I have not even been pressing in my demands for a solution of the Gabes incident.¹

‘ I shall do nothing, and avoid furnishing any pretext whatsoever. The country must know that we do not want war, and that we shall go to war only if we are obliged to defend ourselves against high-handed aggression.’

I request Minister Bertolè to hasten the arrangements for the King’s departure from Rome. At 2.30 he comes to the Consulta to tell me he has already had several consultations with Cosenz. Mobilisation.—Commanders of Army Corps.—Supreme command. It strikes me that Bertolè is undecided, and hesitates about expressing his opinions.

17 *July*.—Rattazzi comes to see me at 11 A.M. I charge him to entreat the King to leave. He is back again at 2.30. I give him a despatch received by the Vatican, and another from Sofia, which he is to show the King.

At 2 o’clock Brin comes. I urge him to make haste. At 3.30 I see Bertolè.

18 *July*.—An audience with the King. We

¹ At Gabes (Tunis) on June 4, 1889, two Italian fishing boats had been searched, in the absence of the Italian Consul, by the agents of the French government monopolies, who had ill-treated the fishermen and insulted the Italian flag.

discuss the situation. His Majesty leaves for Pisa at 11 P.M. In the station waiting-room I give him the latest news from the Vatican, which causes him much surprise. On leaving the station I meet Cosenz. I inquire if he has arranged everything with Bertolè.

Cosenz replies that the Minister never speaks of military matters to him save when danger threatens. I ask him to come and see me.

20 *July*.—General Cosenz comes at 3 o'clock. He is also convinced that the French intend to attack us.—The fortifications at Messina, Spezia and Genoa are finished.—Taranto.—The fourteenth army corps.—The four highest in command.—Duke of Aosta, Pianell, Bariola, Ricotti.—The assembling of the war-ships.—Certain companies in the battalions have been thinned for reasons of economy.—Territorial militia. It would not be possible to resort to a corps of volunteers as in 1866; there is no leader.

A note from Nigra (Ambassador to Vienna):—

DEAR *Signor Presidente*,—Here I am, arrived and awaiting your orders at the Hôtel de Rome, on the Corso.

A telegram from London:—

Although Salisbury does not share our apprehensions, he will nevertheless send strong reinforcements to the fleet in the Mediterranean in August, after the naval review in honour of the German Emperor. Further particulars by courier.—Catalani.

Count Nigra comes to Palazzo Braschi at half-past ten.—I acquaint him with the news we have from France and with what we know about the Vatican. I point out that the pressure brought to bear by M. de Mombel is meant seriously, and he has failed so far simply owing to the Pope's indecision.

Vienna is badly served by her representative at the Vatican, and therefore sees everything in a favourable light. Nigra replies that the Pope's departure could not be concealed from Kálnoky.

Be this as it may, we must know what Austria would do in case we were attacked by France. She would be in duty bound to defend us. It is of supreme necessity that we should stipulate a military convention, which shall establish rules for common action at sea as well as on land. As regards the maritime convention, an understanding with von Bismarck had been initiated which must be followed up. The joint action of the three fleets would overpower France, and if, as is probable, England should join us, we might be sure of victory.

Nigra observes that it would be well to induce Berlin to take the initiative as regards the naval convention. If Berlin would but communicate with Vienna, everything might easily be arranged. The military convention is a matter that concerns two parties only. 'It is the same to me whether it be arranged here or at Vienna,' I reply.

I mention the ill-treatment to which Italians are being subjected at Trieste, and tell Nigra it must really be put a stop to. Austria is afraid of shadows. These demonstrations do not mean anything, and when a government is strong it should not fear them. However, no government can be said to be strong which fails to satisfy the lawful aspirations of the people. What is the good of inveighing against Ulmann, and crowning him with a halo of patriotism? He is of Bavarian extraction, and an Italian only by virtue of a decree obtained under Cantelli. He is one of those who change their nationality for their personal convenience.

The proceedings against Piccoli are absurd ; they had better let him alone.

Nigra agrees with me that the conduct of the Austrians is tactless, and that it would be much better for them if they would discontinue these police persecutions. Consul Durando to be removed, but a good post found for him.

Apropos of Trent and Trieste—the Count declares it was Lamarmora's fault that we failed to acquire the Trentino. He says Austria would have given it to us.

I explained my views concerning Trieste, and he agreed with me that it is better for us not to have that city. He approves of my declaration that it is necessary that the Austrian Empire should continue to exist. Austria must, however, alter the policy of her government. She cannot possibly prosper if she continues to stir up rivalry among the different peoples, which rivalry will sooner or later lead to civil war. Only respect for the different nationalities and equal rights for all will ensure a peaceful future for the Empire.

In discussing with Kálnoky the possibility of the Pope's leaving Rome, Nigra said that in that case Italy would occupy the Vatican and raise her flag above it. It is what would have been done in 1878 if the Conclave had been held anywhere else than in Rome. Nigra assures me that they have full confidence in us at Vienna, and that De Bruck sends in most optimistic reports.

To sum up.—Three missions: demand a more liberal policy for Trieste—naval convention—military convention.

I beg the ambassador to assure Kálnoky that I shall give France no pretext for disturbing the

peace. But there can be no doubt about the fact that troops are being massed upon our frontiers and that France is watching for a favourable opportunity to attack us. Pressure is being brought to bear at the Vatican to prevail upon the Pope to leave. The plan has failed only because of Leo XIII.'s indecision and the opposition offered by the College of Cardinals. But they still hope to succeed.

21 *July*.—At my invitation Cardinal Hohenlohe came to see me at my own house in Via Gregoriana, at 1.30 P.M.

‘In former days Your Eminence used to come and see me,’ I began. ‘Now it is I who have had to beg you to come. I must consult you on a very serious matter, and I intend to request you to undertake a most delicate mission.

‘There is talk of the Pope’s departure, and a certain party is seeking to persuade him to quit the Vatican. I have no advice to offer. If the Pope remains he will continue to be respected and his safety guaranteed as heretofore, even should war break out, which eventuality I shall do all in my power to prevent. We shall offer no opposition if the Pope decides to depart. Even then, and as long as he remains on Italian soil, he will be under the protection of the laws of Italy and will enjoy full liberty and all his rights. Meanwhile I wish to recommend—and this I beg Your Eminence to repeat to the Pope—that he himself be careful not to bring about hostilities, and that he remember what his appeal to foreign arms cost Pius IX. Not only would religion suffer through such an act, but the man himself, who is the sovereign prince of that religion.’

The Cardinal listened attentively, frequently

manifesting his approval of what I was saying by a nod or exclamation. Presently he said :

‘I do not often go to the Vatican, but I will go now, and do what you have asked of me.

‘The Pope will not leave, but one cannot always be sure of him. He likes the world to be talking about him, and is subject to fits of nervous excitement which not infrequently lead to determinations that are imprudent.’

‘It is neither in my own interests that I speak, nor in those of the government,’ I assured him. ‘I myself may at any moment disappear from public life, and the government is strong enough not to fear war. Italy is well equipped with every means of defence, and she has two powerful allies.

‘I speak in the interests of the Pope and of Catholicism. By casting himself into the arms of France, Leo XIII. has greatly benefited the Eastern Church. The Orthodox creed is gaining ground to the detriment of the Catholic, and this indeed cannot be otherwise. France has allowed Russia to manage things in the East, and Russia’s influence there is ever on the increase. The Pope is unaware of these events, which are concealed from him because there are many whose interest it is to hide them.

‘Be this as it may, to return to the subject upon which I desired to speak to you, I must beg you to acquaint the Pope with the following facts :

‘If he remains in Italy he will be respected even if war should break out : if he decides to leave, he will also be respected, and we shall accompany him on his way with all honours. Meanwhile he must carefully consider what is the wisest course for him. It is a question that involves not only his own

prestige and his future, but the future of Catholicism as well. . . .

We separated at a quarter to three, the Cardinal going his way, while I returned to the Consulta.

ROME, 23 July 1889.

MOST EXCELLENT *Signor Presidente*,—I am privately forwarding you the enclosed letter. As nothing can be accomplished save through the master himself, it will be advisable for me to postpone the execution of the commission you have entrusted to me. It would appear that I am mistrusted, although I cannot tell why! Meanwhile I am entirely at your disposition, and I beg you to keep me informed of everything you may deem it necessary for me to know.

It is with the greatest esteem and friendship that I sign myself,—Your Excellency's most affectionate

G. CARDINAL HOHENLOHE.

(Letter enclosed.)

N. 82253.

ROME, 22 July, 1889.

MOST EXCELLENT AND REVEREND, ETC., ETC. . . .
—I beg to inform Your Eminence that on receipt of Your Eminence's note of yesterday, I immediately communicated the desire expressed in it to the Holy Father.

His many occupations and the extreme heat prevent His Holiness from granting any special audiences at the present moment, but he has deigned to authorise me to confer with you, should you care to communicate with the Sovereign Pontiff through me.

I place myself at your disposition, and I have the honour to assure you of the profound veneration with which I most humbly kiss your hand.—Your Eminence's most devoted and faithful servant,

M. CARDINAL RAMPOLLA.

To Cardinal von Hohenlohe.

287.

ROME, 24 July, 1889.

MOST EXCELLENT *Signor Presidente*, — Since writing you last night I have noted down a few points on which I wish to communicate with His Holiness, and I should like to know if Your Excellency approves of my decision. If there is anything you desire to add or suppress I beg that you will do so. The letter will be sure to reach His Holiness.

Kindly return the enclosed notes with any corrections you may choose to make, and they shall be copied at once. I have the honour to be, with sincere respect,—Your Excellency's devoted

G. CARDINAL HOHENLOHE.

(Synopsis of a letter written by Cardinal Gustav von Hohenlohe, 24 VII., 1889):—

On the occasion of the last audience granted me I informed Your Holiness that I had sought and obtained from Minister Boselli permission to build the great stairway at San Gregorio, and that the Minister had also promised further favours. I thought at that time that Your Holiness was pleased, and my astonishment was therefore all the greater when I received a (rude)¹ letter from Cardinal Rampolla. It is now no longer possible to (shut ourselves away from the heads of the

¹ Word crossed out.

Italian government by means of Chinese methods !)¹ The Almighty has allowed matters to shape themselves so that the Church will remain unable to recover the temporal power. The welfare of many souls demands that we accept the inevitable, that we confine our activity within the sphere of ecclesiastical matters, and that we help the faithful, both through our wealth and our teachings.

There is talk of a departure, and (His Excellency Crispi himself recently charged me to inform Your Holiness)² that, should you decide upon that course, he will offer no opposition, and will cause you to be escorted with all the honours that are your due, but that Your Holiness will never again set foot in Rome. He added that should a war result from Your Holiness' departure—with France, for example—the cause of religion would suffer deeply; that Italy will not go to war unless she is attacked by France; that in case of hostilities the Italian government is ready to guarantee the Pope's safety in Rome, but that the Pope must entertain no illusions on one point, viz.: that having once left Rome, he will not return, and the Holy See will suffer a terrible blow.

(Moreover, France is helping Russia in every way to bring about the triumph of the schism in the East, hoping thus to secure the Russian alliance. Little, therefore, can be hoped for from that quarter.)³

We Cardinals are in duty bound to tell the Pope the truth, and so here it is.

¹ Altered by the Cardinal to read: 'shut ourselves away from the doings of the world of to-day. . . .'

² Altered to read: 'A person in the confidence of His Excellency Crispi assured me that the Minister takes the following view of the matter. . . .'

³ Paragraph crossed out.

Under the pontificate of Pius VI., the five million *scudi* which Sixtus V. had deposited at Castello were lost; nevertheless, down to the year 1839, every new Cardinal *swore* to preserve those five millions that no longer existed. Cardinal Acton alone protested against this oath in 1839, and Pope Gregory agreed that Acton's objections were justified. Now to-day the Cardinals are still called upon to take oaths it is impossible for them to maintain, and it is imperative that a remedy be found for these conditions.¹

(Pisani-Dossi's report to Crispi):—

4 VIII., 1889.

The Pope received Hohenlohe's letter on July 27, through his valet Centra. Besides the alterations that had been made in the presence of Pisani-Dossi, the letter has been modified as follows: 1.—at the beginning—‘I send Your Holiness the photographs promised, etc. . . . (I believe the photographs here alluded to were those taken during the King's journey to Berlin, which Pisani-Dossi gave to Hohenlohe.) 2.—A request for an audience, and an allusion to the matter to be brought under discussion—this part of the letter as arranged. 3.—at the end—‘This is what I had to tell Your Holiness.’

On August 3 the Pope sent the Piedmontese, Monseigneur Sallua, commissary of the Holy See and Vicar of Santa Maria Maggiore, to Hohenlohe, to tell him that His Holiness had been much upset

¹ To prevent its being intercepted, this letter was to be entrusted to the Pope's confidential valet by Monseigneur Azzocchi. On the twenty-seventh of July, Cardinal Hohenlohe wrote to Pisani-Dossi: ‘This morning the document you know of is to be delivered.’

(A note by Pisani-Dossi, Chief of Cabinet at the *Consulta*.)

by his letter and also that he could not grant the desired audience. Hohenlohe answered that he himself would have more reason to complain of the Pope's conduct towards him, and that the Holy Father should be grateful to him—Hohenlohe—for having revealed the actual state of affairs to him, adding that the other governments shared the opinion of the Italian. Hohenlohe declared that he looked upon the refusal as an act of provocation, but that he would not give them the satisfaction of adopting any rash measures. They might thank God that he was willing to act with so much moderation, and that the Pope himself had Hohenlohe to thank for it that he had ever been made a Cardinal, for in 1852 Pius IX. had not even wished to receive Monseigneur Pecci, and it had been Hohenlohe who had softened his animosity against him. The Cardinal ended by declaring that it was time to put an end to all these lies and pretences.

Monseigneur Sallua turned pale and began to weep, seeking to excuse the Pope on the score of his age.

Hohenlohe, however, went on to say that Leo XIII. is entirely in the power of a handful of intriguers and agents of Cardinal Monaco's, 'that bumpkin, with coarse boots and a cunning head-piece,' who intimidates the Pope with threats of the sufferings of hell.

In the course of the interview both Hohenlohe and Sallua admitted that this business of the Pontiff's departure is a farce that has turned the majority of the clergy against the Pope.

Hohenlohe, who related this to Pisani-Dossi, almost as if he had been dictating to him, believes

his letter has given the Pontiff a wholesome shock, and that he has succeeded in rendering a real service to Minister Crispi.

Francesco Cucchi to Crispi.—I.

BERLIN, 21 July, 1889.

MY DEAR FRIEND,—I have been here four days, and my first visit was to Holstein. He tells me the Prince is at Varzin and is indisposed. His son Herbert returned to Berlin after a vacation, the day before my arrival. Concerning the serious news I had to communicate from you, Holstein told me the Prince could only be acquainted with as much as they themselves impart to him from Berlin. It would certainly be necessary to have his opinion before settling the measures to be adopted. The news of my arrival and of the mission with which I am entrusted was telegraphed to him. He replied both to Herbert and Holstein that they were to give me all the information possible here in Berlin, and that he would expect to receive me as his guest at Varzin to-morrow (Monday) evening. On Tuesday Herbert will be there also. It is a tiresome journey of eleven hours. Varzin is not far from Rügenwalde, on the Baltic.

Meanwhile, Holstein has presented me to Herbert, to the Minister of War, General Verdy de Vernoy (who comes of a French Huguenot family which fled from France two centuries ago), and to the Counsellor of Legation, Kaschdau, who accompanied the Emperor to Italy and shares the secrets of the Chancery with Holstein.

Here they are entirely incredulous concerning the news that I bring, that is to say, of the possibility of an attack on our frontiers and an attempt at a landing on our southern shores with two divisions

from Toulon, one from Algiers, etc. . . . Up to the present at least, all the information received here from the Franco-Italian frontier and from Paris excludes the possibility of such an event. Nevertheless, they immediately telegraphed to Paris, to Baron Huene, a major on the General Staff and the head of the military office that forms part of the Embassy. He is a very able officer, and has shown great ability in organising a perfect service of information throughout France.

Baron Huene's answer arrived this morning, and is to the effect that there is no unusual massing of troops on the Italian frontier, nor any unusual activity at the arsenal in Toulon. He repeats what he has already stated in a recent report, that in high military circles in France there is much dissatisfaction with the system of fortification along the Italian frontier, and that important works will soon be undertaken for the purpose of remedying existing disadvantages. All this, however, with a view to defence rather than offence. Unfortunately for us the strategical communications by railway are excellent, which would make the massing of troops, which at present is said not to exist, possible in a very short time. The recent naval manœuvres for the purpose of studying the defences of the Mediterranean coast, showed that much is still to be desired. At several points where the railway is too near the sea, they are already at work constructing branches further inland. At Lyons, which is the seat of the army corps that would operate against Italy, there is no sign of unusual activity. Billot is the commanding general. As Minister of War he showed great capacity, but was soon got rid of because he was suspected of harbouring monarchical principles. However, as far

as Italy is concerned, they are all alike in France—the monarchists, republicans, Boulangists and anarchists. On this point permit me to digress for a moment.

Before leaving Milan I met the deputy Mazzoleni, a candid, Christ-like individual who, even at the present time, takes the mission of preaching ‘peace on earth, good-will to men’ quite seriously! He had just returned from Paris, where he had been to take part in the Congress for peace and international arbitration. Pressing questions on my part elicited from him the admission that he had been deeply impressed by the evidences of hostility towards Italy he had met with in all classes of the population in France. He went to the Chamber with Pandolfi, Boneschi, and others whose names I do not remember, to shake hands with those French deputies who came to Italy and made such impressive declarations of friendship and brotherly love at Milan. Well, those gentlemen, who had carefully avoided going to the station to meet our fellow-countrymen, also fled from the Chamber, and could not be found. With the elections so near, to be seen shaking hands with an Italian deputy, no matter how liberal his principles might be, would signify compromising oneself with one’s constituents, and wrecking one’s chances of re-election.

I will now close my parenthesis—I was careful to impress the fact upon our friends here that, although you might be alarmed by the special and positive reports you had received, nevertheless you were of opinion that an attack would probably not take place until October or November. On this point Herbert and Holstein agree that what they believe to be impossible for the present may well become

possible by that time. They are firmly convinced that those now in power in France do not desire immediate war, their whole attention being at present devoted to the elections, a question of life and death to them. The result of the elections alone will give an idea of what may sooner or later be expected from France. They believe that 'Boulangérism' is on the wane, and that the alarming news you have received comes from the monarchical portion of that party, which is intriguing with the Vatican. Be this as it may, should the person who is called upon to control the fate of France after the elections, decide upon sudden action, our friends assure me that they are prepared to meet it. Meanwhile, should some unusual and disquieting event transpire on our French frontier or elsewhere, Herbert tells me that, as was done at the time of the question of the Tunisian schools, the Ambassador would be instructed to inform the French government that, as our ally, Germany must take a lively interest in any event which threatens us, and that they are ready to support us in case of need. But I shall discuss all this more minutely with the Prince at Varzin.

At all events, it is both gratifying and reassuring to observe the value and importance which is here attached to our alliance. They believe and openly declare the Austrian alliance to be indispensable on account of Russia, but they say they have no love for Austria, whereas Italy is a favourite.

I saw Herbert yesterday at half-past three, and he told me that shortly before, Count de Launay had been to see him, and had brought a despatch from you concerning the possible departure of the Pope, who is supposed to be influenced in this

matter by Cardinal Rampolla. Herbert believes that it is precisely because he is a native of my own Island that Rampolla hates me worse than any one else. He says Rampolla told de Launay that if this canker-worm could be removed from Italy, he felt the country would be all the better for it. What will the Prince say? I shall soon hear, and we shall see whether father and son are of one mind.

Of course I shall write to you as soon as I return to Berlin from Varzin, but I shall only be passing through the city, as there will be no reason for my stopping. However, the Minister of War, who is greatly interested in our preparations on the French frontier (a matter on which I was able to give but scant information), wants me to stop at Frankfort on my way back to Italy. He will have me conducted about by an officer, in order that I may form an idea of how well they are prepared here. As it is a matter of only twenty-four or forty-eight hours delay, I have decided not to refuse this invitation. My most cordial greetings. Your CHECCO.

Francesco Cucchi to Crispi.—II.

BERLIN, 24 July, 1889.

MY DEAR FRIEND,—I returned from Varzin this morning, where I received a most delightful welcome from the Prince and Princess, Count and Countess Rantzau and Herbert, who got there before me. They all spoke of you with affection and enthusiastic admiration, and charged me with the most cordial messages for you.

I will give you a résumé of my conversations with the Prince.

He has absolutely no faith in the possibility of an attack on Italy such as is implied by the information

you have received, and which I communicated to him. He says that such an act would arouse the indignation of the civilised world. The responsibility of having brought about war in Europe by an act of brigandage (his very words) would cost France immensely dear. It might even signify the *finis Gallie* (again his own words), and there would be no avoiding the consequences with five billions of money as in 1870. He added that from a purely military and practical point of view this insane attack might be desirable. In high military circles in Germany they would prefer to have war at once or in the spring, rather than two years hence, when France will have completed her armament and fortifications, and filled her ranks. In any case, the Prince says Germany has her eyes open, and is keeping her powder dry. She has long been prepared to meet any form of danger, threat, or unexpected attack. In ten days' time 1,200,000 men could invade France. All requisites of war and the provisions for victualling this huge army for one month, are ready in the cities and fortresses on the banks of the Rhine, in Lorraine and Alsace. Besides all this, matters have been so arranged that no attack need be feared on the part of Russia, with which country the Prince still hopes it would be possible to avoid a rupture, or at least to keep her out of it, until France had received one serious set-back. In this case, as everything is prepared with a view to making the first great battle absolutely decisive, the weight that Russia would throw into the balance would be greatly diminished.

As regards the quality of the French army, they are of opinion here that it is wanting in cohesion and discipline. Without these attributes great

numbers would be of no avail, and might, indeed, prove fatal under certain conditions. They do not doubt, however, that the French army will be better led, at least in the beginning, than it was in 1870-71. The Chief of the General-Staff, General Miribel, is greatly respected. The Germans believe their artillery is stronger, especially that for purposes of siege. They know that the Lebel rifle is excellent, but by next spring the entire German army of the first line will be supplied with new rifles, which are more perfect than any heretofore known. These are being quietly but swiftly manufactured in the arsenals, and 4000 are being turned out every day.

The Prince has great faith, not only in England's good-will, but also that she would help, should France be the first to declare war. He is pleased with the clever way in which you cultivate English friendship, without minding whether Salisbury or Gladstone be in office. Should England really take an active part, as would seem probable, the combined action of the three fleets would completely paralyse that of the French, and oblige it either to take refuge in its arsenals or risk battle against overwhelming odds. This, the Prince says, would greatly facilitate the operations of the land forces against France. By the three fleets he means the English, German, and Italian. I asked the Prince why he did not count upon the Austrian fleet as well. He replied that although he had a good opinion of the Austrian marines, he did not believe the ships themselves were worth much. On the whole, I noticed a certain coldness towards Austria in his conversation. In speaking of the Emperor Francis Joseph's visit to Berlin, he said:

‘Fortunately for us he would have no festivities on account of his mourning.’ On the other hand, the satisfaction with which he speaks of King Humbert’s visit is very marked. Apropos of the mourning, I gathered that Prince Bismarck believes Archduke Rudolph was murdered.

It would take me too long to set down all the views the Prince expressed concerning the policies of England, Russia, Austria, and Turkey, and the attitudes these Powers would be likely to assume should France attack Germany and Italy, or Russia attack Austria and Turkey. I will report them verbally.

I will also give you a verbal report of the Prince’s opinion and that of his followers concerning the line of conduct our foreign policy has pursued. I have gleaned something from every one, and I feel I have thus been able to form a very fair idea of what they think of you and of those around you at the *Consulta*, as well as of some of our representatives in foreign countries. Their view of your foreign policy is entirely favourable, but they say that, as you are forced to look after home affairs as well, you will end by working yourself to death.

As regards the home policy, the Prince has but one fear, and that is that you may fall, through some parliamentary complication, which, he declares, would be fatal. I reassured him by saying that, although it is impossible to manage the Italian Parliament as he has long managed the German, nevertheless, you have a large majority in the present Chamber. I added that I had no intention of examining the qualities with which the Chamber is equipped, but that the fact remains you have a large majority there. At any rate, I told him it

was my firm conviction that the King would grant you the dissolution of Parliament and fresh elections in case of need.

As for the elections, the Prince does not believe it will be possible for Boulanger to get into office, and as long as Carnot remains, he thinks peace will be maintained. Carnot is well aware that, should he decide for war, the Generals would completely usurp his power.

The Prince has no faith that Leo XIII. will leave Rome. He feels that the Pope's prestige rests entirely on the history and traditions of Rome herself, on the treasures and glories of St. Peter's and the Vatican. Outside of Rome the Pope would no longer appear as the representative of a powerful, great, and ancient institution, such as Catholicism, but rather as a species of 'Shah of Persia, travelling about Europe at other people's expense.' To Catholic Powers, and especially to France, the Pope would prove a most embarrassing guest.

He told me that the German Ambassador in Spain had telegraphed but a few days previously that the Pope was expected shortly in Madrid. The Prince's only reply was to forbid the Ambassador to forward any further 'rubbish' (*sic*) of this sort. He is aware that Vienna has also advised the Pope not to leave Rome unless he should be subjected to ill-treatment at the hands of the populace, which the Prince is convinced you would never allow.

Pray excuse the confused manner in which these different pieces of information are set down. Either at Rome or Naples I shall have many details to give you. To-morrow morning I shall go to Cologne and Mayence for the visits I mentioned in my last

letter. On Saturday or Sunday I shall be in Milan, and on Monday or Tuesday in Rome.

Hearty greetings.—Yours affectionately,
CHECCO.

Fortunately peace was not disturbed, partly because the French government, being aware of the military preparations and the diplomatic action of Italy, relinquished her plans, and partly also because she could find no pretext for attacking us. To Count de Launay, Prince Bismarck expressed his opinion that the French would not dare to risk war without an ally, and that they were only seeking by every means to keep Italy in a state of unrest and mistrust, in the hope of thus damaging our credit and our public welfare.

But for the sake of our future security Crispi would not relax his vigilance, and, after all, the alarm had not been entirely without its advantages, as it had given the Central Powers and England an opportunity of manifesting active sympathy for Italy.

BERLIN, 14 August, 1889.

(Private.) I have this day informed the Secretary of State that His Majesty's government, which shared the enthusiasm that prevailed on the occasion of Emperor William's recent visit to England, is now equally enthusiastic concerning the manifestations to which Emperor Francis Joseph's presence in Berlin is giving rise in both countries. Count Bismarck replied that Italy has indeed every reason to congratulate herself; she is considered as being present in spirit at all these meetings. England 'although not one of the contracting parties in the Triple Alliance, is ever hovering near it.' The English government is animated by the best of intentions also towards Italy, in case of provocation on the part of France. The Emperor of Austria declared his satisfaction that our August Sovereign is assisted by a Prime Minister of your

great abilities, and His Imperial Majesty is fully alive to the importance of those bonds that bind Italy and Austria together, and make for the maintenance of peace. Count Kálnoky will do all in his power to regulate the line of conduct to be followed with the Italians of the Empire. Neither Salisbury nor Kálnoky believes war to be imminent, and still less do they believe France will commit the error of declaring war against Italy. LAUNAY.

Crispi's policy towards France met with much opposition from the extreme parties, and the outrageous slandering of the Italian patriot by the French press was, alas, inspired by certain journals of our own. It is a matter of general knowledge how great is the influence exerted by a certain style of journalism over weak and impulsive minds, and on September 13 an individual attacked Crispi and inflicted a severe wound upon him.

This philo-French campaign produced further deplorable results. A group of Italians hit upon the unfortunate plan of organising a pilgrimage of Italian labourers, who went into France to protest against the government of their own country. Concerning this expedition the *chargé-d'affaires* at Paris, Ressman, wrote privately and as follows to Crispi on September 14:—

No matter what may be said to the contrary, the real truth as regards our republican labourers' expedition into France is that they had little reason to pride themselves on the reception they received. Much more noisy demonstrations might have been expected; but, as a matter of fact, the majority of the Parisians remained absolutely indifferent and unmoved, almost ignoring the presence of the Italians. Eye-witnesses told me that the reception at the *Hôtel de Ville* was frigid enough. A few extravagant speeches followed by the usual exaggerated newspaper reports, took the place of what the

organisers had perhaps hoped would be an enthusiastic popular outburst. The more cool-headed Frenchmen entertained no illusions concerning the practical advantages to be derived from the demonstration, and in many, indeed, the disgust occasioned by these bare-faced promises of high treason, routed all thought of political advantage. This sense of disgust even the correspondent of the *Secolo* found it impossible to overcome—the well-known journalist Paronelli, of Asti, the leading Berlin correspondent. He came to me and gave free vent to his indignation, declaring that this exhibition of disloyalty had determined him to break with Sonzogno, as it had now, indeed, become a question of betraying our country's flag.

Among the many Italian politicians who have been here, Alfieri, Visconti Venosta, Imbriani and Nicotera are the ones who have attracted the most attention, and, were I speaking of the first and third alone, I should say, who put forth the greatest efforts to do so. Visconti Venosta held back as much as possible and used great tact in keeping in the background. Nicotera, who was alarmed by the unsought for *réclame* as leader of the opposition with which the *Figaro* greeted his arrival, hastened to disclaim all right to that unwelcome honour by means of a telegram to the *Tribuna*, which he came to read to me yesterday, protesting (in the hope that I would repeat his protest) that, his parliamentary position notwithstanding, he was ready to *fight for Crispi*, if any one should again dare to assert that he was come hither to combat the Premier's foreign policy, whereas, indeed, he was come for the sole purpose of admiring the Eiffel Tower. I assured him that I should never think of doubting that his

sentiments differed in any way from those I myself entertained towards men who, under the present conditions, were capable of coming here to seek French support with which to prop up their own political machinations in Italy.

P.S.—Jules Ferry has sent to ask me for Baron Nicotera's address. Comment is unnecessary.

The fourth of October was Crispi's seventieth birthday, and Prince Bismarck took this opportunity once more to express his affection for his friend and colleague.

To-day, dear friend and colleague, you are celebrating the anniversary that I myself celebrated five years ago, and which furnishes me with the opportunity of joining, on this your birthday, with your fellow-countrymen, in expressing my most hearty good wishes for your happiness and your political future. I trust you may speedily be restored to health, and long be able to exert your powerful influence in the peaceful undertaking that unites us in the interests of our two countries.

VON BISMARCK.

Crispi was ever anxious to establish better relations with France. On October 10 he received the following information from Ressimann:—

I have not had a single audience with Spuller when he has failed to bring in, in one way or another, the assurance of his perfectly friendly intentions towards Italy and His Majesty's government, repeating in almost stereotyped phrases, that never, through any fault of his, shall a misunderstanding arise between the two nations; that he will never allow any disagreement between us to become a conflict, and that he will always strive to give us the most convincing proofs of his good-

will and of the conciliatory spirit that animates him. Only yesterday, during a conversation I had with him, in announcing the speedy arrival of M. Mariani, who will spend his vacation of two or three weeks here, this Minister of Foreign Affairs assured me that he will once more impart to him the strictest verbal instructions in order that, on his return to Italy, he may redouble his efforts to convince His Majesty's government of the cordial sentiments entertained by the government of the Republic, and strive 'with earnestness, unruffled calm, and a pleasant humour' (his own words) to dispel all misapprehensions and draw the two countries ever closer together.

The occasion was propitious, and I gave M. Spuller to understand that Your Excellency and His Majesty's government would be more easily convinced by acts than by words of the sincerity of those intentions, concerning which doubts are all too often aroused, now, because {the Italians cannot believe that the French government is not a party to the bitter, aggressive, and slanderous language as regards the neighbouring Kingdom, in which the Parisian press, as well as that of the provinces, frequently indulges—now, because it would appear impossible not to believe in connivance on the part of the government in the violent attacks upon Italian credit of a certain band of speculators, and, again, because in more than one question that has arisen between the two countries, as in the Gabes incident, for example, the subterfuges resorted to and the delays that have been allowed to prevent a speedy settling of the point at issue, were certainly not calculated to inspire confidence in declarations of friendship

which have been so frequently repeated. I did not hide from M. Spuller that these observations do not represent my personal opinions alone, but informed him that Your Excellency had repeatedly expressed analogous views to me, and that I was anxious to be able to reply to you otherwise than by the expression of my own personal judgment, which might be biassed by a desire to conciliate.

I took my cue in all this, from the telegram Your Excellency sent me on the third of this month.

In replying, M. Spuller began by inveighing excitedly against journalism and the journalists. He recognised the fact, which he said he deplored, that the government is powerless against the press, owing not only to the prescriptions of the laws, but mainly to the character and qualities of the journalists with whom it must deal. 'I, who am every day obliged to see many of these men, can assure you that their ignorance, their absurd prejudices and the fierceness of their passions are beyond belief. This violence on their part is the result of ignorance, for those who are wise, who know and who reason, will never yield to blind passion. To-day our journalists are recruited from amongst the lowest, the most unworthy of those individuals who live by the pen. I desire you to communicate what I have said to your government, that we may not be held responsible for excesses we deplore and which we ourselves are the first to combat.

I observed that we were quite capable of judging between the two sorts of journals and journalism, and that my desire for a change of attitude in the French press referred to the semi-official organs, for which the government of the Republic could not

continue to declare itself irresponsible. M. Spuller answered this by citing *La République Française*, which was once Gambetta's organ and is now his own, and of which he thinks we can have no reason to complain. Hereupon I mentioned *Le Temps*, which is every day receiving communications from the Minister of Foreign Affairs himself, and which, not long since, published some most disparaging accounts of Italian statesmen and conditions. M. Spuller appeared to disagree with me on this point.

As regards the war that is being waged against Italian securities, the Minister would have me believe that the government is absolutely foreign to it, but he had no reply ready when I told him that we must certainly be excused for entertaining suspicions when we consider that the financial bulletins of the entire Parisian press are almost identical in tone, and that this press is guilty of fierce and almost daily attacks upon the credit of Italy.

These declarations made by his old friend Spuller probably suggested to Crispi to pre-announce, in the course of an address delivered at Palermo on October 14, the abolition of the differential duties as applied to merchandise imported from France into Italy.

Crispi stipulated no conditions, but the very fact of his having taken the first step obliged the French government to declare its intentions.

In the course of a conversation he had with Menabrea, on October 23, [so the Ambassador himself telegraphed], Minister Spuller expressed, in enthusiastic language, his desire to support Your Excellency's initiative, but he did not conceal the parliamentary difficulties this would entail. In order to obtain more explicit declarations from

M. Spuller, without involving Your Excellency in further obligations, I told him upon my own responsibility, that, could I but contribute towards the re-establishment of peaceful commercial relations between France and Italy, I would gladly see my career brought to a close. To this Spuller replied that he also would deem himself fortunate could he end his diplomatic career after the achievement of this excellent purpose, for which he is prepared to work with all possible zeal. He requested me to see M. Tirard on this subject.

Another despatch from Menabrea, dated October 25, shows the attitude assumed by the President of the Council, M. Tirard.

In consequence of the conversation I had with M. Spuller on Wednesday last, of which I have already sent Your Excellency an account, I went to see M. Tirard who, meanwhile, had had time to read and thoroughly consider Your Excellency's address.

He declared his appreciation of its merits, and recognised that it was conciliatory and peaceful in tone; nevertheless, he will not admit that the attitude of France forced us into denouncing the treaty of commerce, which was and still is a pretext for so much recrimination against us.

In Your Excellency's announcement of your intention of proposing to parliament the abolition of differential duties on merchandise imported from France, without demanding reciprocity from France, M. Tirard is delighted to recognise an act of concession well calculated to calm the spirit of animosity that now influences all commercial dealings between our two countries. But when I asked him if he would follow in the path Your Excellency has

pointed out, he replied that, before France could consent to abolish the differential duties, certain articles of our general tariff must be reformed, which are absolutely prohibitive in their effects on French commerce. I hereupon objected that, placed in this way, the question becomes an entirely different one, as he was suggesting modifications of our tariff which could be justified only by the stipulation of a new treaty of commerce, which France herself is still disinclined to accept, whereas Your Excellency's declaration concerning the abolition of differential duties was an act of courteous concession, which can be met only by a similar act, if proof is to be afforded that, although the two countries may continue to maintain their commercial freedom, they have no intention of prolonging a tariff war by which neither party can possibly benefit. While showing himself desirous of re-establishing easier commercial conditions with Italy, M. Tirard did not conceal the fact that he feared to encounter opposition in the new Chamber, which it would be practically impossible to overcome. The recent elections having taken place under the influence of the extreme protectionists, it is very doubtful whether, even with the best of intentions, he will be able to comply with the wish his colleague, M. Spuller, expressed to me in such strong language, that is to say, the re-establishment of commercial peace.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the hostile feeling towards Italy is becoming less fierce, and Your Excellency's address produced a deep impression on men of experience. Although the press (which, in general, is swayed by considerations of possible gain) still seeks to feed the irritation

which furnishes it with matter for heated discussion, peaceful ideas are, nevertheless, beginning to prevail.

The President of the Republic, to whom I paid my respects this morning, spoke in the same tone, and expressed the opinion that the European Powers, instead of wasting their substance in the attempt to devour one another, would do better to unite in combating the adversary who looms upon the western shores of the Atlantic, and already threatens European commerce.

French hostility, however, was not to be appeased, and Crispi's peaceful advances met with no response. But Crispi harboured no resentment against the ministers of the Republic, and a proof of the unruffled calm he continued to preserve is contained in the following letter :—

SOMBERNON (Côté d'Or), May 13, 1890.

To the President of the Council.

I have the honour to express to you my most sincere and respectful gratitude for the great distinction of which, acting upon Your Excellency's proposal, His Majesty the King of Italy has deigned to make me the object, by conferring upon me the Grand Cross of the Order of Saints Maurice and Lazarus. I received the diploma from the hands of His Majesty's worthy representative in Paris, M. Ressaun, on the sixth of this month.

It was especially gratifying to me to know that Your Excellency was instrumental in procuring this mark of His Majesty's esteem for me, and I shall be further obliged if Your Excellency will now undertake to express my profound gratitude to His Majesty the King.

I take this opportunity, *Monsieur le Président du Conseil*, to assure you of my most respectful consideration, with which I have the honour to be,
—Your Excellency's most humble and obedient servant,

E. SPULLER,

*Deputy to the French Parliament,
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic.*

CHAPTER XII

1890—TUNIS AND TRIPOLI

Prince Bismarck's dismissal; the Imperial rescripts concerning the protection of the working classes; Emperor William's explanations; Crispi and Bismarck—The proposed annexation of Tunis by France; Crispi's opposition; the support of the great Powers; the Crispi-Salisbury correspondence—Tripoli for Tunis—The fortifications at Biserta—In anticipation of Italian occupation of Tripoli.

ON the evening of March 20, a supplement to the *Staats Anzeiger* published two decrees from the Imperial Cabinet, by virtue of which Prince Bismarck, in compliance with his own wish, was relieved of the offices of Chancellor of the Empire, of President of the Prussian Ministry, and of Minister of Foreign Affairs. General von Caprivi, Commander of the X. Army Corps, was appointed Chancellor and President of the Ministry in his stead, while the direction of foreign affairs was temporarily entrusted to Count Herbert von Bismarck.

Count de Launay wrote privately to Crispi that the withdrawal of the great statesman, who had rendered services of such inestimable value to his country, was the fatal result of the antagonism between two forces: the one still in its infancy, the other in its decline—the one embodied in a man accustomed to brook no opposition and to thrust aside all resistance, the other in a young prince, resolved to occupy the post which was his by right, to play the leading rôle and to do as he wished. 'One foresees very clearly,' so de Launay wrote, 'what the character of his reign will be, determined by a Prince who has a proud, manly spirit, a lively sense of his own responsibility, ardent zeal in the performance of duty and honest purpose. He certainly deserves to see his noble efforts crowned with success.'

Crispi received the following information concerning the

circumstances preceding the event which caused the greatest astonishment in all quarters :—

The beginning of the misunderstanding between the Emperor and Prince Bismarck was the Imperial rescript of February 4, concerning protection for the labouring classes. Various incidents followed which led to an explanation between His Majesty and the Prince the day before yesterday (16 March). The Prince had granted an audience to Windthorst, the leader of the Centre (Roman Catholic) party. Among the members of this party there are certainly some who try to make the interests of their religion coincide with those of the Empire, but Windthorst cannot be placed in this category, for, under the cloak of religion, he is ever seeking to undermine the foundations of the Empire. For the purpose of securing a government majority in the Reichstag the semi-official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* has for some time been working to draw the Centre and Conservative parties together, on the basis of the principle of authority which both represent. An alliance between these two parties was indeed broadly hinted at in an article published in this journal, which sought to demonstrate that, once united, the conservatives and ultramontanes would really hold the majority, and that an understanding on a certain number of points was quite possible between them.

The Emperor blamed the Chancellor for having consented to receive Windthorst.

His Majesty furthermore requested the Prince to withdraw a decree forbidding the Ministers and Secretaries of State to seek an audience with the Emperor without the Chancellor's permission. The Prince refused to consent to this.

Then, in direct opposition to His Highness' opinion, the Sovereign desired to reduce to the lowest possible figure the new military grant which Parliament is to be requested to vote, and which was to be used to increase the artillery by seventy-four batteries. The present Reichstag would certainly throw out the proposed bill, and a conflict would arise which His Majesty is anxious to avoid. The heads of army corps have been summoned to Berlin to decide how far the grant may be reduced.

Further irritation was caused by the Emperor's complaining that he was not kept fully informed concerning foreign affairs.

Prince Bismarck could not keep his impetuous and hot temper under control, and after an outburst of ill-humour, his eyes filled with tears. The Emperor remained perfectly calm during this most painful interview, and on taking leave of his Chancellor, informed him that he should anxiously await the result of cooler reflection on his part.

Yesterday, however, General von Hahnke, chief of the Military Department, went to inform the Chancellor that he was expected at the Palace to settle the details of his withdrawal with His Majesty. Prince Bismarck refused to comply with this summons, and has this day sent the Emperor a memorandum, vindicating his attitude.

The Secretary of State will also ask to be relieved of his office as soon as his father's resignation has been officially announced. Count Herbert von Bismarck is simply acting in obedience to a lofty sentiment, as there exist no motives for dissension between the Emperor and himself concerning foreign policy.

In a word, the true reason for the disagreement

between His Majesty and the Prince must be sought in the utter incompatibility of their natures. The Prince is domineering, intolerant of all opposition, and incapable of accepting a compromise. The Emperor, while he fully recognises the great services the Prince, in the course of five-and-twenty years, has rendered to the monarchy, to Prussia, and to Germany, is nevertheless determined to place the management of home and foreign affairs under his own direct control, whereas the Chancellor was equally determined to keep the reins of government in his own hands, as he had done during the last years of the reign of Emperor William I.

Concerning his successor nothing is as yet known. Certain well-informed persons declare that the Emperor chose him more than a month ago. Be this as it may, nothing will be altered in foreign policy, and the Emperor will remain faithful to the Triple Alliance.

The above information was imparted to me with the request that I should communicate it personally to Your Excellency. The graceful language of which the Chancellor made use to-day in speaking of Your Excellency to Senator Boccardo, may be taken as a farewell to one who has succeeded in acquiring His Highness's friendship and esteem.

The Imperial rescripts of February 4 concerning betterments in the condition of the labouring classes had not been passed by Prince Bismarck without remonstrance. While he appreciated the humanitarian spirit that moved his Sovereign, the Grand Chancellor was nevertheless anxious regarding the risk of failure to which he was exposing himself, the hopes he was arousing, which it would be next to impossible to realise, and the indirect influence the Imperial initiative would have upon the position of the different parties. He feared that at the elections for the Reichstag, which were then pending,

many voters would pronounce for candidates who, beneath the banner of aspirations proclaimed from the highest quarter, would simply be hiding their socialist or anarchist principles. The Prince felt that, for the time being, enough had been done in the way of 'state socialism,' by means of the laws on accidents connected with labour, savings-banks, provisions for disabled workmen, etc., and that the State should confine itself to protecting the liberty of labour without interfering in a contest between employer and employed, wherein its one duty is rigorously to suppress disorder.

On March 23, after the announcement of the crisis, Count de Launay wrote privately to Crispi :—

I am told that as early as the nineteenth of this month the German Embassies at Rome, Vienna, and London, and the Prussian representatives at Dresden and Munich were notified that the changes about to take place in Berlin would in no wise alter the international attitude of the Empire.

To-day, at the Festival of the Orders (*Ordensfest*), I found myself near the new Chancellor, who expressed himself to me in a like manner. From the very beginning he was reluctant to accept his Sovereign's offer. His desire was to continue in active service in the army and, if necessary, die on the battle-field, rather than consume his strength upon a field where he has the misfortune to be the successor of a genius who has long played a leading part in European politics. He consented only when the Emperor appealed to his devotion; as a soldier, courage and obedience are professional virtues with him. He assured me, however, that, as regards foreign relations, he will follow in the footsteps of his predecessor. I told him that I hoped, in the interests of both our countries, to be able to maintain that spirit of mutual confidence which now prevails between them, and that I

should do all in my power to achieve this. General von Caprivi assured me that, in going over the list of members of the diplomatic corps, Prince Bismarck had placed the Italian Ambassador among those diplomatists who might be fully trusted. I alluded to the statement made by several German papers that the new Chancellor was of Italian origin, and told him that our own press had quoted this, placing it in the light of a promise that the excellent relations now prevailing between Germany and Italy would not be disturbed. The General confirmed the fact that his ancestors had originally migrated from Austrian Friuli into Germany, but said the supposed relationship with the Montecuccoli family was doubtful. 'However this may be, I certainly like the Italians,' he added, 'and I beg you to join me in drinking to the prosperity of their country.' I returned the compliment by drinking to the health of the Germans.

After dinner the Emperor took me aside, and desired me to impart certain details of the crisis that has taken place here to His Majesty the King and to your Excellency. After his return from Friedrichsruh, Prince Bismarck appeared entirely unlike himself. He was evidently labouring under great excitement, and it was the opinion of medical authorities that if this state continued, it would end in a nervous breakdown. He was wearing out physically. 'It has been very painful to me' the Emperor said, 'to have been obliged to *retire* an old, illustrious servant of the Crown.' His Majesty expressed his hope that in the future the Prince would not withhold his valuable advice, his energy and faithful services, should the Empire need them. In dealing with foreign countries the peace policy

which Prince Bismarck so wisely pursued, will be remembered, 'and I myself am resolved to support it with all the strength of my will. I shall remain faithful to the Triple Alliance.' His Majesty said that, had it not been for this alliance, Europe would already have suffered from bloody conflicts. 'I have reassuring news from St. Petersburg. Emperor Alexander is animated by the best intentions, and in order to keep him to them, I shall pay him a visit before the year is out, on the occasion of the grand manœuvres at Tsarkoe-Zelo.'

I told His Majesty that I had already stated in my reports that the Berlin Cabinet's peaceful programme would not be altered in any way; that the Cabinet was as determined as ever to maintain the Triple Alliance, which forms so solid a basis for peace. I added that I should hasten to transmit to Rome these fresh declarations on the part of the monarch who holds the reins of state with so firm a hand.

The Emperor added: 'You are well aware that the Italian Ambassador is a favourite with us and that he enjoys our full confidence.'

I further informed His Majesty that I had been careful to discourage those hopes of success which have been raised among the more uncompromising Ultramontanes, who believe the time to be fast approaching when they may once more indulge in dreams of a restoration of the temporal power. His Majesty did not hesitate to declare that he will certainly not encourage any such dreams. 'I am too good a Protestant for that, and I am, moreover, honestly attached both to your king and your country,' he said.

I have been informed that the Emperor also

assured my Austrian colleague that there would be no changes in foreign policy.

His Majesty expressed his satisfaction with the labours of the conference for the protection of the working classes. He hopes their deliberations may lead to some good result, even if it be only to form a basis for a future Conference.

Count Herbert von Bismarck persists in his determination to resign, despite his Sovereign's efforts to induce him to continue in office. At any rate, he will take a long vacation. Count Hatzfeldt, the Ambassador in London, will direct foreign affairs during the interim.

A few days later Count von Bismarck's resignation was accepted, and Baron von Marschall, the Grand Duke of Baden's Minister to the Imperial Court, and a member of the Federal Council, was appointed in his place.

Crispi was deeply grieved by Prince Bismarck's withdrawal from the management of German politics, both because of the friendship that existed between them and of the unstinted and valuable support he had received from him on every possible occasion. On March 21, as soon as he had seen the official announcement in the *Staats-Anzeiger*, he despatched his greetings to the Prince, who answered without delay. Here are the two telegrams:—

ROME, 21 III., 1890.

To His Highness Prince von Bismarck, Berlin.

Although in withdrawing from the high offices where the confidence of three emperors had placed and maintained you, Your Highness bequeaths to Germany the precious heritage of the peace policy to which you had devoted yourself so completely, nevertheless I most deeply regret your determination, my regret arising both from the friendship which binds me to Your Highness and from the

unbounded confidence I place in you. These sentiments can never alter, and of this Your Highness is well aware. You may always count upon my most sincere and cordial devotion.

CRISPI.

BERLIN, 22 III., 1890.

My hearty thanks to Your Excellency for the affectionate message you have sent me. It is but a fresh pledge of that confidence and affection by which you honour me, and which I reciprocate from the bottom of my heart. I was fortunate in encountering a statesman of Your Excellency's capacity when the affairs of both our countries were to be settled, and I beg that you will continue to maintain with my successor those confidential relations which have been of such signal service to both countries. I shall ever cherish the memory of our political relations, and I hope that you will continue to grant me your personal friendship, which will ever remain the unalterable result of our joint labours in the service of our countries.

VON BISMARCK.

The first of April was the Prince's birthday, and Crispi did not fail to send him his congratulations as he had long been in the habit of doing. His telegram was answered by a letter which is but a further proof of the warmth of the sentiments that Bismarck entertained for his former colleague.

April 1, 1890.

To His Highness Prince Bismarck.

I beg Your Highness to accept the sincere and hearty good wishes which I form for you on this anniversary of your birth. You have carried with you into those quiet solitudes you love, the consciousness of a task gloriously accomplished, of a long life of labour consecrated from the first to

the service of a great dynasty and a great people. Yours is an enviable position, and may God grant you long years in which to enjoy it, and preserve you to your Sovereign and your country, that they may profit by the counsel your genius and experience may dictate! May you also be preserved to the affection of your family and the veneration of all who are devoted to you!

CRISPI.

FRIEDRICHSRUH, 21 *April*, 1890.

MY DEAR MINISTER,—Your good wishes on the occasion of my birthday touched me deeply, and I beg you to accept my most sincere thanks.

The spot whence I am sending these lines is endeared to me not only by the quiet of its forests, but also by the pleasant memory of the visits you honoured me by paying me here. To my infinite regret our pleasant official relations have come to an end, but I am sure Your Excellency will ever preserve for me that personal affection which binds us together, and I shall always be delighted to press your hand whenever we may be able to meet.

Dear friend, I beg you to believe in my most sincere affection for you. My wife and son wish to be affectionately remembered to you.

VON BISMARCK.

Under Crispi's government Italian interests in foreign lands were never neglected. Diplomatic and consular representations, schools, missions, commercial agencies, naval stations—every source of influence indeed, was carefully supported or established by him. Our most distant colonies felt themselves in touch with the mother-country, and under Crispi's ever watchful guidance were proud to strengthen the bonds of nationality.

But the Premier's attention was directed especially to Italian interests in the Mediterranean, a subject that was ever uppermost in his mind, and concerning which he entertained

ambitious, uncompromising, and ardent opinions. He did not expect, indeed, that the march of events would turn backwards; we were definitely cut off from Egypt, and Tunis was lost to us forever. He saw, however, that not only might a skilful and firm policy prevent Italy's position on her own sea from becoming worse, but even lead to some compensation for the injury she had already suffered.

When she forced her protectorate upon the Bey of Tunis, France had undertaken to respect the Capitulations and the rights already acquired by other states, and had furthermore agreed not to erect any fortifications in Tunis that might be considered as a basis for military action. As was to be expected, in course of time these conditions began to weigh heavily, and as the spirit in which the French had entered upon the Tunisian enterprise became transformed, it was only natural that they should seek to render their domination absolute and definite. Two states had an interest in combating this undertaking—England and Italy.

The Italian policy had always set great store by the friendship of England, because to Italy it represented a guarantee for the preservation of the Mediterranean *status quo*. But, as a matter of fact, her efforts to preserve this friendship have frequently been frustrated by the divergence of Anglo-Italian interests. In theory England must prefer that Italy, her quiet and faithful friend, should prevail, or at least occupy a strong position, in the Mediterranean; but in practice, England having many interests at stake in all parts of the globe, and being sometimes obliged to reckon with the French, has often been forced to compromise matters and let France have her own way, especially in the Mediterranean.

As regards the Tunisian question, we have seen ¹ how England compromised herself in 1878, and her subsequent ambiguous policy becomes quite clear when we consider that she was placed between France, who had every reason to believe England would not interfere in Tunis, and Italy, who believed in a community of interests which did not exist.

The conditions resulting from this situation rendered the difficulties of Crispi's task almost insuperable, and it is certainly

¹ See vol. ii. chapter ii.

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France in Tunis, and never any of a political nature, which would mean the relinquishment of the Capitulations.'

On July 14 Crispi received a warning from the Italian Consul at Tunis, Machiavelli :—

I have received information from a reliable source that on Wednesday, July 9, the reigning Bey and his two immediate successors on the one side and the French Resident on the other, agreed that the family of the Bey shall cease to reign on the death of the present ruler, France guaranteeing the Prince's civil list, fixed for an indefinite period at two million *lire* for the heir to the throne. The English Consul is making a similar communication to the Foreign Office.

Crispi took this news very seriously. He immediately summoned to Rome the Italian representatives at London and Paris, Catalani, and Ressman, that he might impart verbal instructions to them, and he promptly created a stir in the Chancelleries of the great Powers. The following documents show how energetically and with what intentions Crispi handled the matter :—

ROME, 15 July, 1890.

To the Italian Embassy, Berlin.

On the ninth of this month a convention was signed at Tunis which established that the sovereignty of the Beys shall cease on the death of the present ruler, the benefits deriving from this arrangement to revert to France. In exchange for this concession France undertakes to pay an annual income of two million *lire* to the Prince's heir. This act completes the Bardo treaty, and ensures to our republican neighbour the dominion of a vast territory stretching from the frontiers of Morocco to those of Tripoli.

The disadvantages to Italy that will result from

this arrangement are incalculable. The error committed by the Berlin Cabinet in 1881, when the occupation of Tunis was allowed to take place, will now bear fruit. If Germany permits the above-named treaty of July 9 to be put into execution, we shall not only lose that liberty in the Mediterranean to which we are entitled, but our own country will be subjected to perpetual menace.

If the friendly Powers cannot or will not prevent this new act of spoliation, they must at least join in demanding that Italy be given a satisfactory guarantee against the unavoidable dangers that will threaten the defences of her territory.

Kindly mention this to Count Caprivi without delay, and ask His Excellency to give you a speedy reply, that we may know how to act.

ROME, 16 July, 1890.

To the Italian Embassy, Berlin.

I am forwarding some additions to my last night's despatch. You will oblige me by communicating its contents to the Chancellor of the Empire without delay.

Should the act which was decided upon on the ninth of this month, and by virtue of which France obtains sovereignty at Tunis, fail to be prevented, Italy would be forced to seek the support of Germany.

In case of war, Tunis under the full control of France would acquire great military importance against us.

Biserta, in whose harbour work has long been going on, would become a formidable centre of operations. A journey of but three hours separates

Biserta from Sicily, which island it would be continually threatening. Italy would thus be obliged to maintain a strong force in Sicily, and would be unable to withdraw her fleet from Sicilian waters without incurring serious risk.

In order to forestall still greater misfortune we feel it our duty to inform the government of our ally of these circumstances, that it may co-operate with us in taking the necessary steps in London, and, when the time comes, in Paris as well.

If you are not in possession of the necessary documents, apply to Count de Launay for them.

ROME, 18 *July*, 1890.

I must revert to the question of Tunis once more. The occupation of Tunis by the French in 1881 produced the downfall of the Ministry. The country was deeply mortified, but at that time Italy was isolated.

To-day, however, the Triple Alliance exists, and the change of sovereignty in Tunis would produce two consequences—the withdrawal of the present Ministry and a general conviction in the minds of the people that the Triple Alliance is of no use.

This second consequence would be fatal, and the Berlin Cabinet must take it into serious consideration.

I am convinced that if Germany will make it understood at Paris that the execution of the treaty of July ninth might lead to war, the government of the Republic will consent to an adjustment with Italy.

Communicate this opinion of mine to the Chancellor of the Empire.

TUNIS, 16 July.

To His Excellency the Prime Minister.

In confirmation and completion of my ciphered despatch of the day before yesterday, I have the honour to report to Your Excellency that the information it contained was imparted to me in confidence by the English Consul, who had received it, so he told me, from a member of the Tunisian court circle, who is himself on terms of intimacy with the Bey.

On Wednesday the ninth of this present month, the Princes Taib and Hussein, M. Regnaud (representing the French Resident), the procurator of the Republic, M. Fabry, and Commander Catroux in the capacity of interpreter, met in the presence of His Highness. It is reported that an agreement was concluded to the effect that the Bey's family shall cease to reign on the death of the present ruler, and that France will guarantee the Princes' civil list for all time, the sum fixed upon being two million francs, to be paid to the prince who would have succeeded to the throne had not Ali-Bey and his two immediate successors renounced all rights in the name of the dynasty.

The English Consul added that the exalted position occupied by his informant, the manner in which he imparted this information, and certain hints which a functionary of the Residency had let fall in course of conversation, lent so striking an appearance of truth to the report that he had felt it his duty to communicate it to the Foreign Office without delay, especially as negotiations concerning African matters, which may not be foreign to the Tunisian Question, are now being carried on.

Mr. Drummond's manner aroused the suspicion in my mind that the news had come from the Bey himself, or from some Tunisian prince, for I am well aware that although they lack the courage of open resistance, they would rejoice in the intervention of the European Powers to check the ever-increasing encroachments of the French in Tunis.

The fact has been commented upon that at the interview which took place between the Bey and M. Massicault immediately after his return, the usual interpreter, General Valensi, was not present, although he is known to be devoted to the interests of the Residency, even to the point of servility, but that His Highness's second son acted in the General's stead. This has led to the supposition that matters of much moment and of great delicacy were then dealt with.

G. B. MACHIAVELLI.

TUNIS, 18 July.

To His Excellency the Prime Minister.

In partial rectification of my report of the 16th of this present month, I must inform Your Excellency that instead of Prince Hussein, who was suffering from typhoid fever at the time, another prince of the Bey's family was present at the Marsa conference.

Mr. Drummond has this day given me to understand that he has received information from the Foreign Office, which convinces him that England is not disposed to relinquish her rights in the Regency and allow the Tunisian Question to become merged in that of Zanzibar, as France has sought to persuade her to do. He furthermore added that, be this as it may, he feels bound to

repeat that he believes Her Majesty's government will make no concessions to the Republic at Tunis without obtaining compensation in Egypt when the proper time shall arrive. G. B. MACHIAVELLI.

On July 18 the *chargé-d'affaires* at Berlin telegraphed that he had communicated the contents of Crispi's despatches to the Chancellor, Count Caprivi, and that he had also explained to him how strong would be the feeling the news of a new Tunisian Convention would arouse in Italy.

The Chancellor [so Beccaria wrote] appeared fully to grasp the importance of the matter, but he told me he could not express an opinion until he had carefully examined and thoroughly studied the question. The enormous amount of business which has absorbed his attention since the day of his appointment has not permitted him to go deeply into the Tunisian Question, which there was no reason to expect would so soon be raised, and with which, therefore, he now finds himself unprepared to grapple. He will immediately make it the subject of careful examination. . . . Judging from the reports recently sent in by Count Hatzfeldt, Lord Salisbury is unaware of the latest developments.

BERLIN, 23 July.

I have just had an interview with the Chancellor. His Excellency is of opinion that the co-operation of Austria-Hungary, and more important still, of England, will contribute towards the success of the diplomatic campaign, during which the Tunisian Question will be dealt with. Immediately after my first communications the Berlin Cabinet took active steps in London and Vienna. Although no

result has as yet been obtained, the Chancellor hopes, nevertheless, to be able to arrange for the presentation of collective remonstrances at Paris. . . . He requests me to assure Your Excellency that this government is still, as it has always been, most desirous and eager to be of service to Italy, and that personally he, General Caprivi, will be happy to have the opportunity of testifying to Your Excellency his friendly feeling and the high esteem in which he holds your opinions and judgments, recognising in you, as he does, the experienced and able statesman.

Certain hints which the Chancellor let fall, and information which has reached me from Count Hatzfeldt, have led me to infer that after having tested the conditions in London, the Berlin Cabinet, while it does not doubt the possibility of eventually obtaining the support of England, is convinced of the necessity of proceeding in that direction with the utmost caution, especially at this time, when Lord Salisbury is engaged in conducting complicated negotiations with France concerning Zanzibar and Newfoundland.

BECCARIA.

ROME, 24 July.

To the Italian Embassy, Berlin.

Last night Count Solms came to see me and gave me more or less the same account your despatch had contained. I informed the German Ambassador of the dangers that would threaten the freedom of the Mediterranean and the peace of Europe should France obtain sovereign power at Tunis. I added that should this be allowed to come about without any opposition on the part of the allied Powers, the occupation of Tripoli would

undoubtedly follow. It is therefore absolutely imperative that a means be found of preventing the unrestricted domination of France in Tunis, or, failing this, measures must be adopted to ensure Tripoli to us, as the only possible guarantee against the encroachments of the military and naval power of France. . . . Our desire is to proceed in co-operation with the Cabinets of the friendly Powers, but we are resolved to employ every means of preserving Italy from a blow which might prove disastrous in its consequences.

CRISPI.

BERLIN, 25 July.

I have just seen Baron Holstein who tells me that the Cabinets of Berlin and London have determined to ask the French government (in the most friendly manner), for an explanation of the Tunisian affair.

While the Baron and I were talking a telegram arrived from the German Ambassador at Paris, which read as follows: 'As soon as I mentioned Tunis, M. Ribot unhesitatingly declared that the report which Italy has spread concerning an arrangement between France and the Bey, including an indemnity of two million francs to his heirs, is absolutely false.' The Minister has requested me to communicate this statement to the Imperial Chancellor, in order to avoid a misunderstanding.

BECCARIA.

ROME, 27 July.

To the Italian Embassy, Berlin.

Ribot's denial of the existence of the treaty by means of which France acquires full sovereignty in Tunis is important only up to a certain point, and

must fail to satisfy us when we reflect what the attitude of the government of the Republic has been in the past.

On January 12, 1881, the French occupied Tunis, and the protectorate treaty was signed, while on the sixth of April of that same year, that is to say but a few days previous (*sic*), Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire had declared to Cialdini that the Regency would not be occupied.

CRISPI.

BERLIN, 28 *July*.

Your Excellency has probably already heard from London that Lord Salisbury has questioned the French Ambassador concerning the existence of a convention granting unrestricted sovereignty to the French Republic in Tunis. After having consulted his government, M. Waddington is said to have made a declaration to the English Minister of Foreign Affairs that corresponds in every particular with that made by M. Ribot to Count Münster. After his telegram, concerning which I reported on the twenty-fifth of this month, Count Münster wrote that the French Minister of Foreign Affairs had made his statement in the most formal manner, and that it must consequently be assumed, either that the convention really does not exist, or that France does not feel strong enough to carry out her intentions in the face of the opposition that threatens.

BECCARIA.

Crispi was acting in London at the same time. At first Lord Salisbury was incredulous concerning the existence of the Convention.

He did not see [so Tornielli wrote] how we were to get at the truth about the supposed treaty of July 9th, as certainly neither France nor the Bey

would publish it. A few days later Salisbury announced that although he had been unable to obtain proof of the existence of the treaty by virtue of which Tunis was ceded to France, there were, nevertheless, certain indications which would lead to the belief that an act of some sort had been signed between the Bey and the French government to ensure its succession upon the Bey's death; and he agreed that, if the news which had reached Rome were satisfactorily corroborated, the fact was certainly of sufficient gravity to warrant the Cabinets of those Powers who were the friends of Italy, in consulting together and deciding on the line of action to be followed.

But the ambassador's reply did not suffice to pacify Crispi, who wrote Lord Salisbury the following letter:—

ROME, *July 23, 1890.*

DEAR LORD SALISBURY,—Your Excellency will receive this letter from Commander Catalani, who will place before you my views on the Tunisian Question, one of great importance both to Great Britain and Italy.

France has been nine years in Tunis, and it would now be impossible to expel her, her firm intention manifestly being to remain there as mistress and in all security.

Although I may not lend too great importance to the contradictory reports from Tunis and may even trust M. Ribot's denial, I am nevertheless convinced that, sooner or later, France will manage to acquire full sovereignty in that country.

Meanwhile we must not overlook the fact that, until the sixth of April, 1881, that is to say until about one month before the signing of the Bardo

treaty, M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire had been declaring to General Cialdini that the French government had no intention of undertaking the permanent military occupation of Tunis, and still less of annexing that country.

Should this change of denomination in Tunis be allowed to take place against our will and without encountering opposition on our part, Tripoli's turn would soon come. That the government of the Republic desires to occupy that region is proved beyond doubt by the frontier incursions that are continually taking place.

In this case one Power alone would dominate Northern Africa from Morocco to Egypt, and this Power would control the freedom of the Mediterranean. As for Italy, she would be permanently menaced by France, and Malta and Egypt would not suffice to ensure the position of Great Britain.

In the presence of such peril as this we must prepare ourselves, and prevent the accomplishment of France's plans.

As Tunis cannot be rendered independent and the Protectorate prevented from one day or another becoming a sovereignty, it is of great importance that we provide against future occupation of Tripoli by France by forestalling her in taking possession of that country.

If we held Tripoli, Biserta would cease to be a menace either to Italy or Great Britain.

We are your necessary allies, and our union guarantees your dominion in Malta and Egypt. Thanks to this union Italy would no longer have to fear a double and simultaneous military expedition directed against her from Toulon and Biserta.

I beg Your Excellency to weigh these considera-

tions, and to act in co-operation with the government over which I have the honour to preside. It is a question of our salvation and of your own supremacy in the Mediterranean.

I take this opportunity of assuring Your Excellency of my high esteem etc., etc. . . . F. CRISPI.

On July 31 Catalani, the *chargé-d'affaires* in London, forwarded the following report to Crispi :—

Your Excellency's letter produced a profound impression on Salisbury. His Lordship will, ere long, send you a written answer. For the present he has charged me to telegraph to Your Excellency that 'he is convinced that, *on the day when the status quo in the Mediterranean shall suffer any alteration whatsoever, Italy's occupation of Tripoli will become an absolute necessity.* He himself reminded me that he had expressed this same opinion to me on a previous occasion, and he said he considered it an important point in his policy. He furthermore made the following declaration : ' *The occupation of Tripoli by Italy must be accomplished regardless of what may happen in Egypt, that is to say, whether Egypt remain under British control or in the hands of the Sultan. The interests of Europe demand this occupation, that the Mediterranean may be prevented from becoming a French lake. The only point to be further considered is whether the present moment be the best suited for putting this undertaking into execution.*' Salisbury does not agree with Your Excellency on this point. He feels that the time for occupation has not yet arrived. Consequently the request which His Lordship would make of Your Excellency through me is contained in two words, *to wait.* The same request has been, or will

presently be, sent to Rome from Berlin. In Salisbury's opinion there is every reason to believe that, despite the slight trust to be placed in the French denials, the French government was speaking the truth when it declared that no fresh understanding had been established with the Bey. When I pointed out that the understanding might have been the work of some previous Cabinet, Salisbury declared there was nothing to support this supposition. 'The main obstacle in the way of immediate occupation of Tripoli would be the Sultan's resistance, who would certainly declare war against Italy. Conditions have altered in Turkey since the cession of Cyprus. Turkey alone is not formidable, but she will be supported by Russia, who will seize that opportunity of reducing the Sultan to a state of vassalage, while defending his territory. An attack on Tripoli by Italy would be the signal for the dismemberment of Turkey, a fate to which she will indeed be forced to submit in the end, but for which neither the great powers nor public opinion in England is at present prepared. Italy will lose nothing by waiting, if she is careful to be prepared for action at the first indication that France intends to put her plans into execution.'

Lord Salisbury, on his part, will earnestly admonish France to abstain from introducing any political changes in Tunis. When I requested him to declare openly to the French government that the English fleet would co-operate with the Italian in maintaining the *status quo* in the Mediterranean, Lord Salisbury replied that a declaration of this sort would give rise to a parliamentary incident, as Waddington would immediately inform. . . . His last words were : 'The Italian government will have

Tripoli in the end, but the huntsman does not fire until the stag is within range of his rifle, in order that it may not escape him, even if he only succeeds in wounding it.'

I have brought away from my interview the following impressions: (1) The relations between England and France are far more strained than they were one year ago. (2) Salisbury is more determined than he was a year ago not to allow Egypt to escape him, and an attack on Tripoli by Italy would be quickly followed by the proclamation of an English Protectorate at Cairo.

At the present moment Berlin holds the key to Tripoli. A decisive word from that quarter would inspire Salisbury with the daring he now lacks. His Lordship desires two or three days' time in which to prepare the answer to Your Excellency's letter. I am of opinion that this delay was asked for in order to communicate with Berlin.

On August 5 another telegram arrived from Catalani:

I have received a letter from Lord Salisbury for Your Excellency, which I shall enclose, and consign to His Majesty's Ambassador to-morrow, with the request that it be forwarded by the Cabinet Courier. I beg Your Excellency to instruct Tornielli to despatch the Cabinet Courier to Rome without delay.

If, as I am bound to believe, Lord Salisbury's written communication corresponds with his verbal declarations to me, the exchange of these autograph letters between the Prime Ministers of Italy and England will establish a perfect understanding as regards the question of Tripoli. It is probable that the German Emperor has been informed concerning this correspondence.

Lord Salisbury's reply ran as follows :—

LONDON, 4 *August*, 1890.

(From the French.)

DEAR SIGNOR CRISPI,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's letter, which I have read with the greatest interest.

I am entirely of Your Excellency's opinion as regards the probable future of Tunis. That country is destined, sooner or later, to become French, but I believe this issue to be still distant. I also share your views concerning the danger of further advance on the part of France. The political interests of Great Britain as well as those of Italy cannot allow Tripoli to share the fate of Tunis. When such an event becomes imminent it must be provided against. But I do not believe it to be near at hand. France has a long road to travel before reaching that point.

Now, in dealing with matters of this description, premature precautions may be extremely dangerous.

Should Italy attempt to occupy Tripoli in times of peace and before any aggressive movement on the part of France, she would expose herself to the reproach of having revived the Eastern Question under eminently disadvantageous conditions. The Sultan would not submit to the loss of another province without a loud outcry. He will be willing to sacrifice his independence in order to preserve his territory, and accept the protection and support of Russia.

If, indeed, I might venture to offer Your Excellency a word of advice, I should urge you to act with the utmost circumspection and patience in this matter, and, until such a time as the plans of France shall have materialised, to avoid most carefully all

action which might compromise us irrevocably with the Sultan.

I beg Your Excellency to trust ever in the friendship which the English people and this government cherish for Italy, and to accept the assurance of my esteem and respect.

SALISBURY.

Crispi could not leave this letter unanswered. He entrusted his reply to one of his own secretaries, Edmondo Mayor des Planches, who sent in the following report of his mission :—

LA BOURBOULE, 26 August, 1890.

MOST EXCELLENT *Signor Ministro*,—I have this day consigned the letter entrusted to me by Your Excellency, to Lord Salisbury.

I found his lordship in modest lodgings on the first floor of a *maison-meublée* called *Villa Medicis*. The Prime Minister is drinking the arsenical waters here for the first time, as he has heretofore been in the habit of going to Royat, a place near here, in this same region of Auvergne.

Lord Salisbury, to whom I despatched a note asking for an audience as soon as I arrived, replied by a most courteous invitation. He received me this morning at half-past ten, in his small study.

As soon as we were seated I gave him the letter. Apologising for its slightly crumpled appearance, I said :—

‘I cannot say whether I may prove a clever diplomatist, but I have certainly proved myself a poor Cabinet Courier!’

His lordship laughed and began to open the letter in my presence, but paused to inquire if he was to read it at once.

‘I think Your Excellency may read it at your

leisure,' I replied. 'It is an answer to your letter of the fourth.'

'Very well,' he said, and laid it aside. 'And you came all this way expressly to bring it to me? I am indeed sorry to have given you so much trouble. However, you will have seen a beautiful country. Are you familiar with this region?'

'Not at all,' I replied.

He expatiated on the beauties of Auvergne, and then said:

'How long is it since you left Signor Crispi?'

'Only five days since, my lord.'

'Was he quite well?'

'He was enjoying the best of health.'

'He is also in splendid form politically,' his lordship said, laughing.

'I believe he feels very strong in every way,' I assured him.

'What a wonderful man! I trust he still retains his fondness for the English?'

'For England as a nation he has the greatest admiration, and he holds Your Excellency in the highest esteem.'

'That is most flattering to me. How old is Signor Crispi?'

'He is seventy-two.'

'And he still bears the weight of three secretaryships?'

'Of three secretaryships indeed, and the office of President of the Council implies an enormous amount of responsibility.'

'You will oblige me by giving Signor Crispi my warmest greetings, and by telling him how ardently I hope we may always remain good friends. Are you going directly back to Rome?'

‘Directly—by the way of Paris.’

His lordship laughed once more, and as he appeared to have nothing more to say to me, I rose to take my leave.

‘I wish you a pleasant journey and better weather than we are enjoying here,’ he said.

‘And I wish Your Excellency a good *cure*.’

We had already risen, and having shaken hands with me, his lordship escorted me to the door which he himself closed behind me.

Lord Salisbury is tall, strongly built and inclined to stoutness. He stoops somewhat, and his breath is short and comes in gasps. Even before entering the room I could hear this laboured breathing. He belongs to the type of timid Englishmen. He listens attentively with his head bent forward towards the speaker, upon whom at intervals he fixes a steady piercing gaze. His laugh is frequent, short and stereotyped.

This is all I remember of an interview which may have lasted ten or twelve minutes.—I am Your Excellency’s etc., etc. . . .

The letter which Mayor had consigned to the English Premier read as follows:—

ROME, 16 *August*, 1890.

(From the French.)

DEAR LORD SALISBURY,—Your Excellency will, I trust, be willing to accept a brief reply to your letter of August 4th, which reached me by the last Courier.

When writing on July 23, my intention was to warn Your Excellency of the dangers that threaten us in Tunis, and to point out the necessity of an understanding between Italy and Great Britain in

providing for the issue which I foresee. This purpose having been accomplished, thanks to our two letters and to the interviews which have taken place between Your Excellency and Commander Catalani, there is nothing more to be said or desired in the matter.

I fully agree with Your Excellency that it would be unwise to hasten an action which might throw the Sultan into the arms of Russia. Moreover, for the time being, Italy has no excuse for action.

Nevertheless, a prudent statesman will never allow himself to be taken by surprise, and as regards the matter now under consideration, it is necessary to let Paris know that in no case could we allow the Protectorate in Tunis to become a full sovereignty.

It will furthermore be advisable to notify the friendly Powers that such an event is certainly inevitable, although it may not come to pass to-day, and this in order that we may not be taken unawares and find ourselves unprepared when the time comes to act. Many acts of international injustice have been carried through owing to the unpreparedness or negligence of those who, at a certain moment, might have prevented their accomplishment.

Turkey is not strong enough to safeguard the freedom of the Mediterranean. She is incapable of arresting the encroachments on the territory of Tripoli that have been going on for the last nine years along the Tunisian frontier. It is therefore more than probable that she will be unable to offer opposition to the occupation of this region. Owing to her peculiar position Turkey possesses only 'the strength of the weak'; she is capable only of sowing dissension among the strong, who are obliged

to exercise great forbearance for fear of what may supervene. But this privilege which the Sultan enjoys must not be allowed to constitute a permanent danger to the other States which hold sway in the Mediterranean and whose duty it is to safeguard their own existence there, and maintain their rights inviolate.

And hereupon I have the honour once more to assure Your Excellency of my high esteem.

F. CRISPI.

To His Excellency the Marquis of Salisbury.

While this correspondence was being carried on Crispi deemed it advisable to bind the British Cabinet by means of the following note :—

ROME, August 5.

To the Ambassador.

While Your Excellency, in obedience to my instructions, was discussing with Her Britannic Majesty's Chief Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the best means of forestalling the consequences of the agreement which is supposed to have been formed between the French government and the reigning Bey of Tunis, for the purpose of introducing radical changes in the conditions of sovereignty now prevailing in the Regency, on the death of the present Prince, and while we were still anxiously awaiting further particulars on this subject, His Excellency the Marquis of Salisbury kindly communicated to me, through the English Ambassador at Rome, the formal denial of the report which the French Minister of Foreign Affairs had made. At the time I requested His Excellency Lord Dufferin to present my thanks to his government for this friendly and important service, and I now desire that you express to that

same government, the lively satisfaction I experienced at the declarations which Lord Salisbury made to you, declarations which prove to me that, had not the explicit denial of the Paris Cabinet rendered a further exchange of ideas superfluous for the time being, and had not other opportune considerations made it advisable to drop the matter in order not to complicate certain more urgent negotiations now in progress between London and Paris, the governments of His Majesty the King, our August Sovereign, and of Her Majesty the Queen of England, would have agreed perfectly in designating those States which have an interest in preserving the balance of power in the Mediterranean, and in taking such steps as the prospect of a change in the sovereignty of Tunis might have made necessary. It is the opinion of His Majesty's government, and I trust also of that of Her Majesty the Queen's, that, while the present circumstances have made it possible to suspend the study of issues which do not appear to be imminent, nevertheless, should certain changes take place in these same circumstances, which might necessitate further consideration of our common interests in preserving the balance of power, the reassuring declarations recently exchanged between Your Excellency and His Excellency the Marquis of Salisbury would provide the basis upon which an understanding might be quickly established, and which would certainly suffice to ward off any serious danger which might threaten those same interests. For this reason, therefore, the assurances to this effect which you were able to communicate to me after your interview with Her Britannic Majesty's Chief Secretary of State on the twenty-first of last month,

were especially gratifying, and it is my desire that his lordship be informed how highly His Majesty's government prizes these assurances. Kindly oblige me, therefore, by acquainting the Marquis of Salisbury with the contents of this despatch, and by furnishing him with a copy of it, should he desire to have one.

CRISPI.

The line of conduct pursued by our government at Vienna led to a double result: the Imperial Chancellery was induced to labour in our favour both in London and at Paris, and declarations in support of our interests were provoked. Knowledge of what was really going on between London and Paris was obtained from Kálnoky, who informed Ambassador Nigra that Salisbury, whom Deym, the Austrian Ambassador, had questioned by his (Kálnoky's) order, had declared that the negotiations with France had to do with: (1) the Egyptian conversions; (2) the right of possession of a certain tract of territory in Africa; (3) the revision of the treaty of commerce with Tunis, which concerned the tariffs only, and had nothing to do with the Capitulations. 'According to the treaty now in force, the Tunisian government might have demanded this revision as long ago as 1882. There is no question of granting further political advantages to France in Tunis.'

The revision of the Anglo-Tunisian treaty of commerce—so Kálnoky informed us later on—did not bear the fruit France had hoped for, as Lord Salisbury refused to limit the duration of the treaty. As for the intentions attributed to France to alter the *status quo* at Tunis, the Chancellor himself charged Nigra to assure Crispi 'that the Tunisian Question, although it does not interest Austria-Hungary to any appreciable extent, is being most carefully considered here, and that, for its part, the royal and imperial government is disposed to participate in any action that may be deemed advisable, in co-operation with England and Italy, in order to prevent the altering of the *status quo* in a manner detrimental to the general interests.'

The news that reached Rome at this very time of skirmishing along the frontier of Tripoli, for which the Tunisians were responsible, strengthened the suspicion that France harboured

aggressive intentions concerning the Tripoli region. Kálnoky doubted the existence of these intentions, but he nevertheless declared to Nigra that the Austro-Hungarian government, '*should an opportunity occur, has no objections to Italy's obtaining compensation on the African coast*, but at the same time Italy is reminded in a friendly way that it is of the highest importance for the allied Powers to avoid driving Turkey into the arms of Russia and France, and she is furthermore notified that Austria-Hungary cannot bind herself to furnish any material support.'

Crispi was glad to make a note of this declaration, declaring, on his part, that he had no intention of demanding any material support from Austria-Hungary.

As regards his attitude towards France, after having provoked this diplomatic demonstration of which the preceding documents have given a fair idea, and convinced the French government that without Italy's consent it would be impossible to achieve full sovereignty in Tunis, Crispi turned his attention to extracting from the situation he had created, such advantages as it might offer. The following documents plainly show what object he had in view :—

PARIS, 1/8/90. 4.40 P.M.

Late yesterday afternoon I attended the interview to which Freycinet had bidden me in compliance with my request. I told him that, it being my mission to seek to maintain friendly relations between our two countries, I was, of my own accord, appealing directly to him as the head of the government, for the purpose of calling his attention to the position of Tunis as regards Italy, and to the steps that had been taken towards annexing the Regency to France. I observed that Italy could not remain indifferent to such an act, and that if we failed to make early provision for an understanding calculated to satisfy the demands of Italy, Tunis might become the spark from which a general conflagration would spring, an issue which, for our own part, we are

desirous of avoiding, as it would prove a great misfortune to all concerned. I pointed out that Italy had considered the French occupation of Tunis as an affront and injury, as it deprived her labouring classes of a necessary outlet for their activity, they having from time immemorial frequented these regions, so easy of access from Sicily. Should the annexation which France desires really take place, Italy must receive not only territorial compensation, but solid guarantees for the welfare of her subjects as well, who would not cease to frequent Tunis, which country, moreover, owes much of its prosperity to their labour. I reminded him that several of the French Ministers, Ferry himself among others, had recognised the necessity for this adjustment, and that Ferry had promised me the support of the French government in bringing about our occupation of Tripoli, in exchange for Tunis, of which country France would remain in undisputed possession. Owing to ministerial changes both in France and Italy, this arrangement did not come about. Having made this point perfectly clear, I proceeded to inform Freycinet that it was now his place to discover a means of satisfying Italy and re-establishing an honest understanding which was as much to be desired and as necessary for one country as for the other. In reply Freycinet said that he fully recognised the gravity of the Tunisian Question, and that he had already advised his colleagues at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to avoid any action which might provoke the Italians in Tunis, and to hold the zeal of their functionaries in check. Like myself he recognised the importance of friendly relations between our countries, and did not deny his dread of a war of which the

consequences would be disastrous to all concerned. Freycinet then made a spontaneous declaration to the effect that the supposed agreement for the annexation of Tunis did not exist, and this declaration he repeated several times. He promised me to consult with Ribot and study the best means of solving this difficult problem.

I am therefore looking forward to receiving an answer from Freycinet, who treated me throughout the interview with the greatest consideration.

MENABREA.

Menabrea's allusion to a promise concerning Tripoli made by Ferry is confirmed by a telegram which this ambassador had despatched on May 11, 1884, and which may well find a place here. It would appear that fear of possible complications had deterred Depretis, who was Prime Minister at the time, and Mancini, Minister of Foreign Affairs, from taking advantage of the offer.

. . . M. Ferry finally concluded by declaring that France had had enough of protectorates and annexation in the Mediterranean, and that all she now desired was the maintenance of the *status quo* both in Morocco and Tripoli; that, *if Italy wished to occupy this last named Regency, he, Ferry, would offer no opposition whatsoever*. This declaration was made to me privately and in the strictest confidence.

MENABREA.

On the day following Crispi replied to the despatch of August 1 :—

As you will be seeing Freycinet again after the interview of July 31, and perhaps also have a meeting with Ribot, I think it will be well to outline the main points to be dealt with in future conferences.

In the first place these gentlemen must be con-

vinced that we cannot permit any political alterations in Tunis, and that, should the government of the Republic assume supreme authority in the Regency, our allies are prepared to support our opposition. The Protectorate was permitted because Italy was isolated at that time, but to-day we are no longer in the year 1881.

Tripoli belongs to the Ottoman Empire, and we have no desire to provoke a European war in order to obtain possession of it. If France wishes to give proof of her willingness to facilitate our peaceful acquisition of this territory as a compensation for Tunis, she should exert her powerful influence both at St. Petersburg and at Constantinople, where opposition is naturally to be expected. This must be made quite clear, for the consent of France alone is not sufficient to enable us to occupy the above-named territory.

PARIS, *August 9.*

Freycinet has this day informed me that he has reported our previous conversation to M. Ribot, laying stress upon the absolute necessity of putting an end to the state of irritation now prevailing between the two countries, and of granting Italy some material and moral satisfaction. Ribot replied that he was quite of the same opinion; that he had already studied the question and that he hoped to be able to take the first steps in the matter on Wednesday next, when he would have returned to the city after a short absence. For the moment there is nothing to be done but to await Ribot's return.

MENABREA.

PARIS, 18/8/90. 7.20 P.M.

I have seen Ribot to-day, and continued with him

the conversation begun with Freycinet concerning the necessity for both countries of putting an end to the present state of irritation which was originally brought about by the French occupation of Tunis. I pointed out that France appears to have sought to increase this irritation rather than to allay it, and this especially by maintaining the unjust application of differential duties and by placing obstacles in the way of the development of certain industries that are of paramount importance to us, such as navigation and the fisheries. Among other things I pointed out to M. Ribot that the occupation of Tunis had singularly injured our position in the Mediterranean, even threatening seriously to imperil it should France attempt to convert Tunis into an important naval station, and that the occupation had moreover deprived a part of our population of a necessary outlet for their activity.

Ribot replied by assuring me that he shared my regret at these conditions, which he earnestly desired to ameliorate, but that he was waiting for explicit proposals from Italy.

I could only inform him that, although I had indeed taken the initiative in calling his attention to the present state of things, I had not been authorised to make any proposals whatsoever, and that, as the evil had originated with France, it was her place to suggest a remedy.

Ribot protested his readiness to grant us certain privileges in Tunis, but added that, in his turn, he must demand that we relinquish the Capitulations, which declaration was followed by an allusion to the Triple Alliance.

I replied to these suggestions by saying that the Capitulations form a valuable weapon for the defence

of the few rights we still possess in Tunis, and that, as to the Triple Alliance, it must be maintained until such a time as we shall have obtained satisfaction both as regards our material interests and our outraged dignity, and until its existence ceases to be a necessary guarantee for peace.

Having no authorisation so to do I refrained from making any proposals to Ribot, but left it to him to formulate one to be submitted to Your Excellency, and with this I took a friendly leave of him.

MENABREA.

21 Aug. 1890.

To the Prime Minister.

Yesterday afternoon I had my first interview with M. Ribot since the departure of General Menabrea. I was determined not to be the first to refer to the subject which the Ambassador had handled with this Minister of Foreign Affairs and with M. de Freycinet. But, as I had foreseen would be the case, hardly had we begun to converse than he himself broached the subject by alluding to the General's overtures, and saying that neither he nor Freycinet had really been able to find out precisely what he wanted. A long and minute discussion ensued, I having first warned him that my statements must be considered only as those of a private individual, and that if we were to discuss the matter at all, we must do so non-officially, confidentially, and privately. He immediately expressed his willingness to accept these conditions.

My observations were to the effect that if the French government appreciated the value of more cordial relations between the two nations, which, for our part, we so ardently desired, and if it honestly

wished to facilitate their realisation, it must seek, first of all, to remove definitely the causes for dissatisfaction that divide us. I stated that, first at Rome and later in Tunis, deep wounds had been inflicted upon us; that time indeed, our own forbearance and the present interests of the republican government were gradually healing the first wound, but that the second still festered; that France had never done anything to heal it in the past, and still appeared disinclined to apply any balm; and that finally, the frequent threats of extending the Protectorate may at any moment cause this wound to become envenomed, and lead to consequences of a most serious nature. 'Your first attempt to overstep the limits of the conditions at present existing in Tunis, or any encroachment on our established rights, would immediately encounter our opposition,' I assured him, 'and you must know that we shall not stand alone. It therefore appears to me that the first thing to be done is to remove this permanent source of discord and mistrust, if we are ever again to be on terms of sincere and loyal friendship. But the remedy applied must be proportioned to the injury that has been inflicted, nor will any slight concession suffice to close the Tunisian wound. It would be vain to seek to placate Italy by means of commercial or financial concessions of a more or less temporary nature.'

In the course of our conversation M. Ribot continually reverted to the *quid?* until at last, and almost as if in answer to a question of his own he said: 'I asked General Menabrea if it was Tripoli he had in view, but he avoided the necessity of a reply by declaring that Italy did not wish to quarrel with the Sultan.'

Hereupon, as Menabrea had done with Freycinet, I reminded Ribot of the offers of co-operation which M. Jules Ferry had made in former days, first to me and then to the Ambassador, offers which Mancini had repulsed; and I added that should an offer of co-operation in some *similar undertaking* be made to-day, there was now a Minister at Rome who would certainly be willing to consider it, because, despite all reports to the contrary, I was well aware how anxious he was to bring about a reconciliation between our country and France, if this could be done with advantage to Italy.

I was most guarded in my language throughout, and I must admit, in justice to M. Ribot, that while I was deliberately indefinite, he repeatedly spoke openly and frankly. He himself introduced the subject of Tripoli and freely discussed it, saying that he had been informed that Constantinople was exhibiting anxiety, and suspected the existence of some scheme on the part of Italy, and that the question of cession—a difficult one in itself—would be met with a decided *non possumus* on the part of the Sultan. ‘Public opinion in France,’ he concluded, ‘would furthermore condemn the government should it lend its support to Italy in such an undertaking, unless Italy would, in return, consent to withdraw from the Triple Alliance.’

To dissolve the Triple Alliance—that is the one ardent and ever present desire of all French statesmen. ‘Until the Triple Alliance, which constitutes an even greater offence to the Czar than to the French Republic, has been denounced, no intimacy will ever be possible between Russia and Germany any more than between the Italians and ourselves.

We may not be openly hostile, but we can never be true friends.'

These words which I find repeated in to-day's *Matin* are the straightforward and simple expression not only of Ribot's sentiments but of those of all his colleagues, of all Frenchmen indeed, and the natural consequence is that the policy of France towards ourselves, be it that of Ribot or of another, although it may not become hostile enough seriously to endanger peace, will nevertheless ever make the achievement of the one purpose the price of any real and efficacious service to Italy.

M. Ribot further discussed the situation in Tunis, praising Your Excellency for your forbearance in certain minor incidents. (He here protested that he did not share the unjust prejudices of many of his fellow-countrymen, of which he had always disapproved.) He declared his intention of scrupulously maintaining the *status quo* at Tunis, and showed himself willing to co-operate with us for the purpose of bettering the conditions of our fishermen, of which General Menabrea had complained to him. In speaking of the termination of our treaty of commerce with the Bey, which will take place at the end of six years, he asked whether we would be inclined to negotiate for its renewal at once, to which arrangement he would be willing to consent if we would relinquish certain privileges we now possess in the Regency.

We may conclude from all this that M. Ribot has not ceased to hope for and desire that *an agreement of some sort* may be arrived at with Italy. I can take no further steps until I have received such fresh instructions from Your Excellency as you may wish to impart, as I am in ignorance of

the result of the negotiations Your Excellency has carried out since my departure from Rome, and also of your present intentions. These few lines cannot suffice to render a faithful account of all that I sought to impress upon my companion during an interview which lasted more than an hour. My faith that the seed sown is not wasted would be stronger were M. Ribot more resolute and daring by nature. But I am sure you will not doubt that I shall always make every effort possible to further the realisation of your desires.

I am hoping that General Mayor may be able to return to Paris, as he said he should do, in order to learn from him what your present intentions are, and how best to promote them. In September M. de Freycinet will be at Aix-les-Bains, in the General's neighbourhood, who will then be able to see him again amidst quieter surroundings and in an atmosphere better adapted to facilitate concessions than that of the Minister's audience chamber.

I beg Your Excellency to accept the assurance of my most profound respect and cordial devotion.
—Your Excellency's affectionate servant,

C. RESSMAN.

P.S.—A certain question addressed to me by M. Ribot in the course of our conversation, proves how much anxiety our treaty of alliance is causing these gentlemen. He asked whether, in order to bring about its dissolution, it must be previously denounced, or whether it contained a clause providing for a tacit renewal. I replied that I did not know.

To Commander Ressaun, Italian Embassy, Paris.

ROME, 2 September, 1890.

M. Ribot's attempts to discover our intentions in regard to the renewal of the Triple Alliance are unworthy of a statesman. In politics it is impossible to foresee anything at a distance of a year and a half. It is well, nevertheless, to remember the reasons which obliged Mancini to seek an alliance with Austria and Germany.

From 1879 until 1883 Italy was not only the much abused victim of the government of the Republic, but was threatened by the Austrians and despised at Berlin as well. In 1880 an army forty thousand strong was ready to invade the country because the government at Rome continued to tolerate the Irredentist movement. The French press ridiculed us and the French government occupied Tunis. In 1879 Bismarck pronounced his famous opinion that Italy was not to be feared as a military power, and that a few Austro-Hungarian regiments would suffice to bring us to terms.

Mancini begged and entreated at Vienna and Berlin, and finally succeeded in persuading the two Empires to recognise Italy as an ally.

To-day everything is altered to our advantage, and I will never allow Italy to return to that state of humiliation to which her isolation condemned her up to the year 1881.

Before inquiring as to our intentions concerning the renewal of the Triple Alliance, Ribot should seek to place us in a position where we might be able to dispense with it; he should provide us with a guarantee that, our obligations towards the two Empires once cancelled, France would not renew her Tunisian venture in other regions, that she

would never again betray us in our own peninsula by means of the Vatican, and that she would undertake to ensure our independence. But up to the present nothing has been done to persuade us that the French people and their government desire to become our sincere and loyal friends. CRISPI.

Crispi's efforts to remove the discord that prevailed between France and Italy and establish a firm basis for peace between the two nations were all in vain. He was therefore obliged to continue his close watch of every movement on the part of France which might be calculated to inflict fresh injury upon us.

Although convinced at last that the annexation of Tunis would not take place without our consent, that is to say, without compensation to Italy, he nevertheless continued to watch Biserta, which port the French were endeavouring to fortify. Persons in whom he had all confidence had long been following the progress and nature of the work that was being carried on in that harbour, and had sent in their reports to the friendly and allied Powers, also inciting the English government to co-operate with the Italian in some direct action calculated to check the progress of these works, which were clearly at variance with the obligations France had assumed in 1881, and which threatened to disturb further the balance of power in the Mediterranean. The British Cabinet had recognised that Biserta was the *best strategical position in the Mediterranean*, and, seconded by the German Chancellory, had entered an emphatic protest at Paris. In 1889 M. Goblet had assured London and Rome that '*no intention existed either of enlarging or fortifying Biserta harbour*,' and that it was '*merely a question of excavations which became periodically necessary*.' In 1890 M. Ribot denied that '*any plans for the erection of forts or other military works at Biserta were being prepared*.'

But although the French ministers very naturally denied it, the fact remained that the works in course of construction at Biserta were undoubtedly of a military character, and this Crispi satisfactorily demonstrated in a memorandum. Germany re-

cognised that the question was a serious one, and seconded us in our demand for decisive action. On January 20, 1891, Crispi submitted to England the question whether the time for joint and immediate action had not arrived; but the matter was dropped when Crispi withdrew from office (January 31, 1891), and henceforth both Italy and England ceased to display any interest in Biserta.

As for Tripoli, Crispi hoped for a time, in the year 1890, that it might become Italian without encountering opposition on the part of the great Powers, who had all at different epochs recognised the superiority of our claims in that region. For reasons which concerned general politics he did not wish to break with Turkey, but in order to be prepared for any emergency he planned for the best means of facilitating a military occupation should the Turks offer opposition. He then proceeded to prepare the way by gaining for Italy the sympathy and support of the natives of Tripoli. Grande, the Italian consul there, skilfully seconded his minister's efforts, and the following despatch, which concerns the negotiations with Sid Hassuna Karamanli, who was then the head of the family whose members had been overlords of the *vilayet* down to the year 1835, proves that the work of securing the support of the Arabs was well advanced.

TRIPOLI, 7 August, 1890.

(Strictly private, and to be deciphered by His Excellency in person.)

Sid Hassuna Karamanli having been summoned to Tripoli by the Governor General on account of certain recent happenings along the frontier, I took advantage of his presence here to communicate with him through a friend of mine who enjoys his full confidence. The conference between them took place last night. I had impressed upon my friend that negotiations must be opened unofficially, and the interview be made to appear of his own seeking, in order to enable him to learn the Prince's views and intentions.

Sid Hassuna Karamanli showed himself disposed to support Italian occupation, he being convinced that if we do not occupy Tripoli, others will speedily do so. He declares he can command all of the hill tribes, as they are all his devoted followers. He asked for time to prepare the ground and for money, not for himself but for the *sheikhs*. He would be willing to accept a form of government similar to that of Tunis, and declares that by such an arrangement opposition on the part of the Arabs would be avoided and the country pacified. He has no doubt Turkey will resist our advance, but if deprived of the help of the Arabs she will soon yield before the Italian forces. He recommends the utmost caution, as he is closely watched by the Governor General. He says the country is weary of the Turkish occupation.

Karamanli displays a thorough knowledge of the political situation in Africa, and knows how to seize a favourable opportunity. He is returning to Gibel Gharian to-night, but promises to come to Tripoli again shortly.

GRANDE.

Sure of the acquiescence of England, Germany, and Austria-Hungary in Italian occupation of Tripoli, Crispi might easily have acquired the consent of France as well, by a staunch refusal to relinquish our rights in Tunis until an agreement had been concluded. This once accomplished, the great determination of character which distinguished him would have urged him to plant the banner of Italy on the farther shore of the Mediterranean without delay. As for Turkey, adjustments were easy matters enough under the old régime, and the Sultan, who was a clever politician and fully aware of his responsibilities and the precarious state of the Empire, would have accepted the inevitable, comforting himself with compensations that would have been most welcome to him.

But with Francesco Crispi's withdrawal from power in consequence of the Chamber's vote of January 31, 1891, the keystone of the edifice gave way. The opposition to the fortification of Biserta, which had become peremptory at the end of January, was not sustained by Crispi's successor, and France, being now free to establish her domination in Tunis on a firm basis, was under no further obligation to come to terms with Italy and make concessions to her.

When the question of Tripoli was finally resumed, Italy was forced to sacrifice other interests to France.

FINIS

INDEX

- ABYSSINIAN QUESTION**, diplomatic intercourse *re*, 278.
Abyssinian War, 165-6.
Alexander III., Czar of Russia, false documents *re* Bulgarian Question sent to, 266, 267; peaceful intentions of, 346.
Ali Bey, 349.
Andrássy, Count, Crispi's interview with, 86-9; friendly sentiments towards Italy, 2; 97.
Arabi Pasha, declaration of (1881), 125.
Arce, M. Gaspar Mugnoz de, 258.
Arnold, Mr. A., 115, 116.
Atkinoff, 270.
Aube, Admiral, 288.
Audiffret-Pasquier, 371.
Austria, attitude to Bulgarian Question, 178-92; attitude to Italy, after first Triple Alliance treaty, 156-7; diplomatic intercourse with: Oct.-Dec. 1887, 256-76; Jan.-June 1888, 277-306; *re* Russia and Roumania, 382-3; *re* Tunisian Question, 461-2; 334-8, 370; and Italy, relations between, 3-4, 346-8, 398-400; Italy's alliance with, made conditional by Bismarck, 119; suspicions of Irredentist movement and subsequent happenings, 102-3; and Tunisian decrees *re* Italian schools, 356, 357, 358, 361, 362.
Austro-Hungarian alliance, 1879, publication of, 280-2.
Avarna, 358, 361.
Avezana, General, 103.
BACCARINI, 168.
Balkan Federation, Crispi's initiative, 379-86.
 — Question, diplomatic intercourse *re*, 256-76.
Bardo treaty, 110-14.
Battenberg, Alexander of, election of, to throne of Bulgaria, and reign, 172.
Bavler, M., 271, 283.
Beaconsfield, Lord, 66.
Beccaria, reports *re* German attitude to Tunisian Question, 445-8.
Behaine, Lefèvre de, 393.
Beni Kállay, 86.
Bennigsen, R. von, Berlin banquet, to Crispi presided over by, 55-7; 26.
Benoit, M., 365.
Berio, 351, 364, 365, 366.
Berlin, Crispi's visits to, 26, 39-65, 132-4.
 — Congress, 1878, Italian interests ignored at, circumstances leading to, 97-8; Tripoli, question of its cession to Italy discussed at, 117-18.
 — treaty, Bulgarian clauses, 171.
Bertani, 94.
Berthelot, M., 376.
Bertolè, General, Crispi's letters to, *re* strengthening national defences, 389-393; 394, 396.
Bey of Tunis, alleged French agreement with, *re* succession to throne, 440, 443-4; French imputations as regards Sublime Porte's intentions towards, 109-10; French treaty of guarantee with, 110-11.
Biancheri, 166.
Bibesco, Prince, 282.
Biserta, 441-2, 473.
Bismarck, Prince von, friendly sentiments towards Italy, 2; Crispi's interview with, at Gastein, 26-38; Crispi's Berlin interview with, 58-61; at Berlin Congress, 97; French ambitions in Tunis encouraged by, 103-4; and proposed Italo-German alliance, 119; Italian monarch's visit to Germany urged by, 157-8; international situation, 1882, reviewed by, 158; urges Anglo-Italian alliance, 162-4; renewal of new Triple Alliance treaty agreed to by, 160-4; Crispi's first visit to, at Friedrichsruh, 207-40; courtesies

- exchanged between King Humbert and, 209-10; diplomatic intercourse with, 261, 262-3; forged documents *re* Bulgarian Question implicating, 267-8; declarations to Roumanian Minister, *re* Germany's peaceful intentions, 279-80; diplomatic intercourse with, 287; telegrams from, on death of William I., 295; birthday congratulations from Crispi, 298-9; and French Exhibition (1889), 301; correspondence with Crispi on death of Emperor Frederick, 304-5; *re* Massowah incident, 325-6; Crispi's second visit to, at Friedrichsruh, 327-30; *re* William II.'s visit to Rome, 343-4; and Balkan Federation, 380; and Crispi, good wishes exchanged, 380; Cucchi's mission to, 395; views, *re* probability of French attack on Italy, 407-16; birthday congratulations to Crispi from, 419; dismissal of, 427-36; 305, 320.
- Bismarck, Count H. von, conference with Crispi, 345-9; resigns German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 427, 429, 434; 208, 345.
- Bitto, 85.
- Blanc, Baron, 266, 278.
- Bonghi, 168, 258.
- Boselli, Paolo, letters to Crispi *re* Franco-Italian treaty of commerce, 242-53; 403.
- Boulanger, position of, 372-3; 193, 288, 371.
- Branca, 253.
- Brin, 394, 395, 396.
- Broglie, de, 6, 20.
- Bruck-Pellegrini, Baron von, 257, 259, 263, 371, 399.
- Bulgarian Question, diplomatic intercourse *re*, 256-76, 278; 171-92.
- CAIROLI, BENEDETTO, foreign policy of, 101; and French intentions as regards Tunis, 106-7; Ministry, resignation of, 113; 94, 168.
- Calice, Baron, 278.
- Cambon, 319.
- Caprivi, General von, appointment to German Chancellorship, 427, 431-2.
- Carnot, 290, 371.
- Catalani, T., correspondence with Lord Salisbury *re* Massowah taxation incident, 317-18; *re* English attitude in event of war between Italy and France, 395-6, 397; *re* English attitude to Bulgarian Question, 187-9; *re* Lord Salisbury's attitude on Tunisian Question, 451-3; 233, 358, 440.
- Catargi, M. Lascar, 381, 382.
- Catroux, Commander, 443.
- Cavallotti, 103, 386.
- Charles, King of Roumania, combats Russian influence, 381.
- Charmes, M., 326.
- 'Checco,' letters from, *re* German opinion, 407-16.
- China, German missionaries in, 337.
- Cialdini, *re* French intentions as regards Tunis, 104-6; on Italian demands in event of the French occupation of Tunis, 107-8; 98, 100, 104.
- Coburg, Prince Ferdinand of, election of, to throne of Bulgaria, and Powers' attitude towards, 172-92, 267.
- Codronchi, 168.
- Constantinople, conference of Powers at (1882), 125-6.
- Corti, Count, alleged conversation with, *re* Italy's right to occupy Tripoli, 114-18; at Berlin Congress, 97; refuses English offer to co-operate with regard to common interests in Mediterranean, 96-7.
- Cosenz, 394, 396, 397.
- Crispi, Francesco, secret mission to Germany entrusted to, 7-11; interview with the King, 9; interview with Duc de Decazes, 12-14; on French affairs, 16-26; interview with Bismarck at Gastein, 26-38; visit to Berlin, parliamentary banquet, etc., 39-65; visits Bismarck in Berlin, 58-61; telegram of farewell to Emperor William, 66; arrives London, 66; *re* his German and English visits, 69-73; interviews with Lord Derby and Mr. Gladstone, 73-7; in Vienna, interviews with Press and Ministers, 77-84; at Buda-Pesth, visits Tisza, Andrassy, 84-9; Press comments on his journey, 92-3; an Italo-German alliance hoped for by, 93; becomes Minister of Interior, 93; fall from office, and consequences upon foreign politics, 94-5; attitude towards Irredentist movement, 102; opposition to Cairoli Ministry, 113-14; on Triple Alliance, 123; journey to Berlin (1882), 132-3; interviews Hatzfeldt, 132-4; journey to London (1882), 134; interviews Lord Granville, and views on Egyptian Question, 135-55; warning *re* Abyssinian campaign, 165-6; audience with King *re* composition of new Ministry (1887),

- 166-8; Ministerial situation (1887) taken in hand by, 168-71; becomes Minister of Interior, 171; Bulgarian Question, 171-92; assumes direction of Foreign Affairs, 176-7; Russian position *re* Bulgaria reviewed by, 190-2; and French affairs (1887), 193-208; first journey to Friedrichsruh, 207-40; Turin speech, 225-230; and Franco-Italian treaty of commerce, 241-55; diary, diplomatic intercourse, Oct.-Dec. 1887, 256-76; investigations concerning attack on French consulate in Florence, 275-6; diary, diplomatic intercourse, Jan.-June 1888, 277-306; correspondence with King Humbert and Bismarck on death of Emperor Frederick, 302-5; Massowah taxation incident, 307-18; diary, diplomatic intercourse, July-Aug. 1888, 319-21; correspondence *re* alleged proposed attempt to assassinate King Humbert in Romagna, 321-5; second visit to Friedrichsruh, 327-30; interview with Kálnoky at Eger, 330-2; diary, diplomatic intercourse, Sept. 1888, 334-8; spurious letter from Félix Pyat, 339-42; correspondence with Bismarck *re* William II.'s visit to Rome, 343-4; diary, diplomatic intercourse, Oct.-Dec. 1888, 345-71; Italian schools in Tunis, protests against French attitude towards, 349-67; diary, diplomatic intercourse, Oct.-Dec. 1890, 368-71; report to, *re* French internal affairs (1890), 371-8; and the Balkan Federation, 379-86; and Bismarck, friendship between, 379-80; anxiety concerning national defences, 389-393; danger of war with France, 393-416; diary, diplomatic intercourse, July 1889, 394-416; interview and correspondence with Hohenlohe *re* talk of Pope's departure from Rome, 400-7; birthday congratulations from Bismarck, 419; announces abolition of differential duties as applied to French merchandise, 422-4; report to, *re* Bismarck's retirement, 428-30; condolences to Bismarck on his retirement, 434-6; foreign policy of (1890), 436-8; Tunis and Tripoli Questions, action *re*, 437-476; and Italian ambitions to acquire Tripoli, 474-6; withdrawal from office, 476.
- Crispi, T. Palamenghi-, 211.
- Csernatory, 85.
- Cucchi, Francesco, mission to Bismarck, 395.
- DECAZES, DUC DE, Crispi's interview with, 12-16; 5.
- Depretis, Crispi letters to, 8-21, 39, 40-45, 47-8, 69-73, 74, 77, 80-3, 89-91; *re* Crispi's attitude in Vienna, 78-80; *re* Crispi's German and English visits; 66-9; fails in attempt to construct new Cabinet, 168; letter to Crispi *re* secret mission to Germany, 10-11; Menabrea's correspondence with, *re* Lord Derby's proposals (1878), 95-96; Ministry of, resigns, 166.
- Derby, Lord, Crispi interviews, 73; proposal *re* understanding with Italy on Mediterranean questions, 95; 66.
- Dernburg, F., 39, 46-7, 54.
- d'Estournelle, Constant, English views towards French occupation of Tunis estimated by, 113.
- Die Post*, article on Crispi's Turin speech, 235-9.
- Dilke, Sir Charles, parliamentary answer *re* alleged conversation between Corti and Salisbury as regards Tripoli, 115-16.
- Dogali, 165.
- Dossi, Pisani, 211.
- Drummond, Mr., 443, 444.
- Dunker, 57.
- Durando, 399.
- EBER, 85.
- Egyptian Question in 1882, 125-55.
- Ehrenroth, General, Russia's proposal to entrust a Bulgarian regency to, 183-92; 256.
- Ellena, 253, 254.
- England, attitude towards Bulgarian Question, 178-92; attitude towards French occupation of Tunis, 112; diplomatic intercourse with, *re* Eastern matters, 256; Italian refusal to co-operate with, in Egyptian Question (1882), 125-55; *see also* Salisbury, Lord; Granville, Lord.
- FABRY, M. 443.
- Falk, 85.
- Farini, D., Crispi to, 94-5.
- Féraud, 261.
- Ferrari, 387.
- Ferry, Jules, 289.
- Flanders, Countess of, 267.
- Floquet, M., 292-3, 371.
- Florence, attack on French consulate in, 274, 275-6.
- Flourens, M., and Franco-Italian

treaty of commerce, 254; 258, 261, 283, 285, 286, 288.
 Fortou, 6.
 France, affairs in 1877, 5-6; affairs in 1887, 5-6; at Berlin Congress, obtained permission to occupy Tunis, 98-101; Tunisian ambitions of, encouraged by Bismarck, 103-4; recognition of Italy's right to be consulted in Tunisian Question, 104-6; and Bey of Tunis, imputations as regards Sublime Porte's intentions towards, 109-10; Ministerial attitudes towards Italy and Tunisian Question, changes in, 106-14; Tunisian expedition and treaty of guarantee with Bey, 110-111; occupation of Tunis, 110-11; and Egyptian Question (1882), 125; Press criticisms of first Friedrichsruh visit, 224, 230-2; Italy's commercial relations with, ruptured, 241-76; diplomatic intercourse with, Oct.-Dec. 1887, 256-76; diplomatic intercourse with, Jan.-June 1888, 277-306; political situation (1888), 288-293; another Franco-Italian incident, 307-38; Press comments on second Friedrichsruh visit, 333-4; and Italy, a third incident, 339-42; internal affairs (1890), 371-8; war with, anticipated, 393-416; Italian labourers, expedition to, 417-18; hostility towards Italy, 417-25; and Tunisian Question, attitude towards Italy, 462-71.
 Frederick William, Crown Prince and Emperor of Germany, assassination of, at Nice, contemplated, 296; visit to Liguria, 294-5; visit to Rome, 158-9; death of, 302-7.
 Freycinet, M., interviews with, *re* Tunisian Question, 462-5; views on French aspirations in Tunis, 106, 107; 125, 269, 374.
 Friberg, 26.
 Friedrichsruh, Crispi's first visit to, 207-40; Crispi's second visit to, 327-30.
 GALIMBERTI, Monsignore, 285.
 Gambetta, Crispi, cordial relations with, 16; 5, 106, 125.
 Garnier-Pagès, 20.
 Gené, General, 166.
 Genoa, Duke of, 158.
 George, King of Greece, Bulgarian matters discussed by, 189-90.
 Gérard, 256, 260.
 Germany, attitude towards Italy after first Triple Alliance treaty, 159;

Press criticisms of first Friedrichsruh visit, 224, 232-3, 235-6; diplomatic intercourse with, Jan.-June 1888, 277-306; 319-21; Press comments on second Friedrichsruh visit, 333; and Italy, positions towards France, 345-6; and Italy, relations between, 345-6; and Tunisian decrees *re* Italian schools, 355-6, 360, 362; diplomatic intercourse, 368-71; good relations between Italy and, 379-80; diplomatic intercourse with, *re* Russia and Roumania, 382-3; diplomatic intercourse with, *re* French action in Tunis, 440-2, 445-8; opinion *re* probability of France attacking Italy, 407-16; *see also* Bismarck.
 Ghyczy, 85.
 Giers, M. de, compliments between Crispi and, 368-9; 267, 326-7, 337, 381.
 Giolitti, 168.
 Girardin, E. de, 20.
 Gladstone, Crispi's visit to, 74-7.
 Glaser, 83.
 Goblet, M., *re* Biserta fortifications, 473; and Italian schools in Tunis, 349-67; and Massowah taxation incident, 307-18.
 Goedel, M. de, 334, 336.
 Goldberg, Friedrich, Crispi's interview with, 49-53.
 Goltz, Count von, 335, 337.
 Gorose, 85.
 Grande, report *re* Sid Hassuna Karamanli and Tripoli, 474-5.
 Granville, Lord, correspondence between, and Sir A. Paget, *re* Egyptian Question in 1882, 127-31; on correspondence between Italy and England as regards Tripoli, 116-17; Crispi's interview with (1882), 135-140; and French occupation of Tunis, 112; 126.
 Greek Church, influence of, in Orient, 368.
 Greppi, Count, 270.
 Grévy, M. Jules, 106, 193, 259, 288.
 HAHNKE, GENERAL VON, 429.
 Hatzfeldt, Count, Crispi's interview with, 132-4; 434.
 Hawarden, Crispi's visit to, 74-7.
 Haymerle, Baron, Italian negotiations with, *re* Italo-Austrian alliance, 119-123; 4.
 Herbetste, M., 301, 356.
 Hitrovo, 282.

- Hohenlohe, Cardinal, interview and correspondence with, *re* talk of Pope's departure from Rome, 400-7.
- Holland, diplomatic intercourse with, 275.
- Holstein, Baron von, Crispi meets, 45-6; Crispi's interview with (1882), 132; letter to Crispi, 53; views *re* probability of French attack on Italy; 407-10; 26.
- Huene, Baron, 408.
- Humbert I. of Italy, accession of, 93; visit to Vienna, 156, 157; Crispi consulted by, *re* new Ministry (1887), 166-8; courtesies exchanged between Bismarck and, 209-10; and Crown Prince of Germany, 295-6; correspondence with Crispi on death of Emperor Frederick, 302-4; excursion into Romagna, attempt on his life contemplated, 321-5; Crispi telegrams to, 330-1, 332; telegrams exchanged between William II. of Germany and, 344-5; 394.
- Hussein, Prince, 443.
- IGNÁEZ, HÉLFY, 86.
- Ignatieff, 4, 282.
- Irredentist movement, 3, 102-3.
- Isabella of Bavaria, Princess, 157.
- Ismail-Pasha, 282.
- Italian civil code, negotiations *re*, ostensible purpose of Crispi's secret mission, 7, 14-15, 19-20, 26.
- Italy, foreign policy till 1876, 2; the Triple Alliance, 123-4; foreign policy from 1878 to Triple Alliance, 92-124; French recognition of right of, to be consulted in Tunisian Question, 104-6; Cairoli Ministry and French Tunisian expedition, 110; and English attitude towards the French in Tunis, 112-13; and Tripoli, as to support from Powers, had she proceeded to occupation in 1881, 114-118; German alliance, advisability of, considered, 118-19; alliance with Austria made conditional by Bismarck, 119; refuses to intervene in Egyptian Question in 1882, 125-155; from first to second Triple Alliance treaties, 156-64; Abyssinian enterprise, 165-6; Bulgarian Question (1887), 165-76; Napoleon III. and, Crispi's estimate *re*, 195-206; commercial relations with France, rupture of, 241-76; another Franco-Italian incident, 307-38; third incident with France, 339-78; and Germany, positions towards France, 345-6; and Austria, relations between, 346-8; (1889), 379-426; (1890), Tunis and Tripoli, 427-76.
- KÁLNOKY, COUNT, and Balkan Federation, 380; diplomatic intercourse with, 132, 256-7, 298, 326, 334, 335, 336, 399, 400, 461-2; Friedrichsruh visit, 208-9; interview with Crispi at Eger, 330-2; Italian order conferred on, 370; and Tunisian decrees *re* Italian schools, 361-2.
- Karamanli, Sid Hassuna, favourable to Italian acquisition of Tripoli, 474-5.
- Keudell, von, negotiations between Haymerle and, *re* Italo-Austrian alliance, 119-23; 157.
- Kiamil Pasha, 265, 287.
- Kisimayo, concession of, 336.
- Kölnische Zeitung*, article on Crispi's Turin speech, 239-40.
- LACAITA, G., 134.
- Lacava, 168.
- Launay, Count de, Berlin Congress, discussion of Tripoli Question, 118; Berlin Congress, suspicions of French demands, 100; Bismarck receives, at Friedrichsruh, *re* new Triple Alliance treaty, 160-1; on Bismarck's retirement, 427, 431-4; correspondence *re* King of Portugal's warning concerning proposed attempt on King Humbert's life, 321-3; letter to Crispi, 49; 26, 39, 55, 93, 132, 208, 222, 299, 417.
- Lavigerie, Cardinal, 259.
- League of the Lombard Communes, Milan celebrations, 3-4.
- Leo XIII., appointment of, 94; French pressure upon, to leave Rome, 393-4, 397, 400-7.
- Leonhardt, Dr., Crispi's interview with, 54.
- Levi, P., Crispi's letters to, *re* Egyptian Question, 141-55.
- Loewe, L., 39, 54.
- Logerot, General, 290, 291.
- Louis of Portugal, King, warning from, *re* contemplated assassination of King Humbert, 321-5.
- Luzzatti, 253.
- Lyons, Lord, 112.
- Lytton, Lord, 361.
- MACCÌD, statement *re* French imputations concerning Bey of Tunis and Sublime Porte, 109.
- Machiavelli, G. B., correspondence *re* French action in Tunis, 440, 443-5.

- MacMahon, Marshal, 5.
 Maffei, Count, and proposed Italo-German alliance, 118-19; 256.
 Malet, Sir E., interview with Bismarck, who urged Anglo-Italian alliance, 162-4.
 Mancini, and Triple Alliance, 123; policy in Egyptian Question (1882), 125-32; Crispi's letter to, *re* Egyptian Question, 148; first Triple Alliance treaty damaged by errors of, 156-7; disappointed by results of first Triple Alliance treaty, 159; 132.
 Maria Pia, Queen of Portugal, 325.
 Mariani, M., 369.
 Marie, 253.
 Marocchetti, 277, 381.
 Marschall, Baron von, 434.
 Martin, Henri, 20.
 Massicault, M., 355, 357, 358, 360, 362, 364, 365, 366, 444.
 Massowah, taxation in, dispute with France *re*, 307-18; 165.
 Mayor des Planches, Edmondo, report *re* visit to Lord Salisbury, 211, 455-7.
 Mazzoleni, 409.
 Melegari, letter to Crispi, entrusting him with German mission, 7-8.
 Menabrea, General, correspondence with Depretis, *re* Lord Derby's proposals (1878), 95-6; on alleged conversation between Corte and Salisbury *re* Tripoli, 114-18; correspondence between Mancini and, *re* Egyptian Question in 1882, 131-2; and Franco-Italian treaty of commerce, 253, 254; despatch *re* Massowah taxation incident, 316-17; and Tunisian decrees *re* Italian schools, 358-61, 363-7; *re* non-participation in Paris Exposition, 388; reports *re* French opinion towards Italy and Tunisian Question, 462-7; 112, 285.
 Mercinier, M., and Massowah taxation incident, 314-15.
 Meyendorf, M. de, 326.
 Minghetti, 2.
 Mohrenheim, Baron de, 292.
 Mombel, M. de, 397.
 Monaco, Cardinal, 406.
 Mór, Wahermann, 85.
 Moret, M., 261, 271, 272, 282, 287, 306.
 Morocco Conference, 265-6, 282, 283, 287, 296.
 — Question, diplomatic intercourse *re*, 256-278.
 Morocco, Sultan of, 368.
 Mouÿ, Count de, diplomatic intercourse with, 253, 263, 268-74; 285.
 Münster, Count, 326, 356, 357, 361.
 NABUKOFF, 282.
 Napoleon III., Italian policy of, reviewed by Crispi, 195-206.
 Negus, the, 313.
 Nelidoff, 5.
 Nicopuolo, 260.
 Nicotera, 168, 418, 419.
 Nigra, Count, correspondence with, *re* King of Portugal's warning concerning proposed assassination of King Humbert, 323-5: *re* Prince Ferdinand of Coburg, 177-8; *re* probable Austrian attitude in event of War with France, 398-400; 223, 281, 297, 318, 330, 370, 397.
 Norfolk, Duke of, 258.
 PAGET, SIR A., correspondence between, and Lord Granville, *re* Egyptian Question in 1882, 127-31; 95.
 Paris Exposition inaugurated, 386-9.
 Paul, Grand-Duke of Russia, 368.
 Pelloux, 394.
 Perpetuo, 364.
 Photiades-Pasha, 271, 300.
 Pietro, Monsignore di, 319-20.
 Pisani-Dossi, report to Crispi *re* Pope's reception of Hohenlohe's letter, 405-6.
 Pius IX., death of, 94.
 Portal Mission, 278.
 Pulszky, 86.
 Pyat, Félix, spurious letter from, 339-342.
 RACCHIA, ADMIRAL, 395.
 Radovitz, 101, 259, 274, 300.
 Raindre, M., conversation with Bismarck *re* Massowah incident, 325-6.
 Rampolla, Cardinal, *re* conciliations between Italy and Vatican, 319-20; letter to Cardinal Hohenlohe from, 402-3.
 Rantzaup, Countess, 327.
 Ras Alula, 313.
 Rascon, Count, diplomatic intercourse with, 257-8, 262, 286, 299, 306.
 Rati-Opizzoni, 38.
 Rattazzi, 394, 396.
 Regnauld, M., 443.
 Ressaun, *re* diplomatic non-participation in Paris Exposition, 388-9; *re* French Ministerial profession of friendliness to Italy, 419-22; *re*

- Italian labourers' expedition to France, 417-18; *re* Ribot and Tunisian Question, 467-71; 19, 285, 342, 351, 352, 353, 354, 356, 440.
- Reuss, Prince, 266, 267, 333.
- Ribot, M., *re* Biserta fortifications, 473; interviews with, *re* Tunisian Question, 464-7; 366, 367.
- Riva, 355, 360.
- Robilant, assumes office, and renews Triple Alliance treaty, 159-64; and Franco-Italian treaty of commerce, 241; 4, 77, 166.
- Roumania, diplomatic intercourse with, 279; independence proclaimed, 5; and Russian interference, 381-3.
- Roustan, M., 109.
- Rouvier, M., and Franco-Italian treaty of commerce, 242-55.
- Rudini, Marchese di, 168.
- Ruffo-Scilla, 259.
- Russell, Lord Odo, 100.
- Russia, Abyssinian ambitions, 337; Bulgarian Question, attitude towards, 183-92; diplomatic intercourse with—Oct.-Dec. (1887), 256-76; Jan.-June (1888), 277-306; 368-71; 326-7; and Germany, relations between, 345; influence in Roumania, 381-3.
- Russo-Turkish war, 4-5.
- SAINT-HILAIRE, M. BARTHÉLEMY DE, 108, 109.
- Saletta, General, 301.
- Salisbury, Lord, at Berlin Congress, 97; and French occupation of Tunis, 112; alleged conversation with, *re* acknowledgment of Italy's right to occupy Tripoli, 114-18; attitude towards Bulgarian Question, 187-9; correspondence with Italian representative *re* Massowah taxation incident, 317-18; on Massowah taxation incident, 326; concerning Kisimayo affair, 336; friendly intentions towards Italy, 349; and Tunisian decrees *re* Italian schools, 361, 362; alleged negotiations between France and, *re* concessions in Tunis, 438; correspondence with, *re* French action in Tunis, 448-61; 257, 395, 397.
- Sallua, Monsignor, 405.
- Saraccò, 166.
- Schouvalow, Count, 287.
- Schulze-Delitzsch, 57.
- Schweninger, Dr., 211.
- Serge, Grand-Duke of Russia, 368.
- Simon, Jules, 5.
- Simonyi, 85.
- Slivnitsa, battle of, 172.
- Smith, Captain, 259.
- Solms, Count, diplomatic intercourse with, 258-76, 277, 296, 299, 300, 301, 319, 320, 321, 368, 369, 370.
- Soumagne, M., and Massowah taxation incident, 313-14.
- Spain, Queen Regent of, 297.
- Spain, diplomatic intercourse with—Jan.-June (1888), 277-306; Oct.-Dec. (1857), 256-76.
- Spaventa, 168.
- Spuller, M., decorated by King of Italy, 425-6; profession of friendship towards Italy, 419-26.
- Stourdza, M., 279.
- Suez Canal, Convention, 265; diplomatic intercourse *re*, 256-7; Italian refusal to co-operate with England and France for protection of, 126-31.
- Switzerland, Italian commercial relations with, 270-1, 283.
- Szapáry, 85.
- Szlávy, 85.
- TAAFFE, 159, 347.
- Taib, 443.
- Tajani, 168.
- Teckenberg, Baron, 121.
- Teisserenc de Bort, 253, 254.
- Thiers, M., Crispi's interview with, 17; funeral, 20-1.
- Thomas of Savoy, Duke, 157, 158.
- Times*, leader on Crispi's Turin speech, 233-5.
- Tirard, M., *re* Italian tariff concession to France, 413-14, 285.
- Tisza, Crispi's interview with, 84-5, 159.
- Tornielli, diplomatic intercourse *re* French action in Tunis, 438-40; *re* Waddington securing France's right to Tunis at Berlin Congress, 98-100; 297, 319, 448.
- Trani, Countess of, 257.
- Triple Alliance, Italy's accession to, at first barren of results, 156; treaty (1887), 162; 123-4.
- Tripoli, Crispi's hopes *re* Italian acquisition of, 474-6; Italian occupation of, as to support from Powers in event of, in 1881, 114-18.
- Tunis, French action in, and alleged convention, Italian action, 437-76; French ambitions with regard to, encouraged by Bismarck, 103-4; French occupation of, 110-11; French right to occupy, sanctioned at Berlin Congress, 98-101; Italian schools at, documentary evidence

- concerning, 349-67; Italy's rights to be consulted in question of, recognised by France, 104-6.
- Tunis-Goletta railway, 106.
- Turco-Servian war, 4.
- Turin, Crispi's speech at, *re* Friedrichsruh visit, 225-30.
- Turkey, diplomatic intercourse with, 260, 282; French endeavours to rouse, *re* Massowah taxation incident, 308-17; intervention of, in Egypt, requested by Powers (1882), 126.
- UXKULL, BARON, diplomatic intercourse with, 269-70, 283-4.
- VALENSI, 444.
- Valeri, G., 39, 45.
- Vatican, Italian relations with, 319-20.
- Vega de Armajo, 306, 319, 370.
- Victor Emmanuel II., correspondence with Crispi, 21-6, 38-9, 40, 61-5, 73-4, 86, 89; death of, 93; visits to Berlin and Vienna, 2.
- Victoria, Crown Princess of Germany (Empress Frederick), 39, 45.
- Vidulich, 83.
- Vienna, Crispi in, 77-84.
- Villa, 263.
- Visconti-Venosta, 2, 418.
- WADDINGTON, M., at Berlin Congress, 98; alleged conversation with, *re* acknowledgment of Italy's right to occupy Tripoli, 114-18; and Lord Salisbury, *re* Tunis concessions, 438; statement by, acknowledging obligation to consult Italy in Tunisian Question, 104-6.
- Weber, Baron, 273.
- William I. of Germany, Crispi telegram to, 66; death of, 295-6.
- II. of Germany, announces death of Emperor Frederick, 302; and Bismarck's retirement, 428-34; telegrams exchanged with King Humbert, 344-5; visit to Peterhof, 321; visits Rome, 343-5.
- Wilson, 289.
- Wimpffen, Count, 3.
- Windthorst, 428.
- ZANZIBAR, SULTAN OF, 305, 368.
- Zsedénzi, 86.

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